diff options
| author | David Wang <david.wang@arm.com> | 2015-07-29 11:42:10 +0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | David Wang <david.wang@arm.com> | 2015-08-04 12:20:46 +0800 |
| commit | 8abbe53fd032ff967608e4b746edd0b64b0be59f (patch) | |
| tree | 675d64a823bf315c628517bddec97d3a874d4de6 | |
| parent | c9af52e1b658ec71640f1e7a24da50bddc6e5e40 (diff) | |
Some minor fixes to interrupt-framework-design.md
This patch fixes a pair of typos. The security state had been described
as non-secure where it should have been secure.
Change-Id: Ib3f424708a6b8e2084e5447f8507ea4e9c99ee79
| -rw-r--r-- | docs/interrupt-framework-design.md | 14 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/docs/interrupt-framework-design.md b/docs/interrupt-framework-design.md index ff001b14..cee29a31 100644 --- a/docs/interrupt-framework-design.md +++ b/docs/interrupt-framework-design.md @@ -629,11 +629,13 @@ for the following: When an interrupt is received by the handler, it could check its id to ensure it has been configured as a secure interrupt at the interrupt controller. A non-secure interrupt should never be handed - to the secure interrupt handler. If the routing model chosen is such - that Secure-EL1 interrupts are not routed to EL3 when execution is - in non-secure state, then a Secure-EL1 interrupt generated in the - secure state would be invalid. The handler could use the security - state flag to check this. + to the secure interrupt handler. A routing model could be chosen + where Secure-EL1 interrupts are routed to S-EL1 instead of EL3 when + execution is in secure state. If the handler receives a Secure-EL1 + interrupt it should check which security state has the interrupt + originated from. A Secure-EL1 interrupt generated when execution is in + secure state would be invalid in this routing model. The handler could + use the security state flag to check this. The SPD service should use the platform API: `plat_ic_get_interrupt_type()` to determine the type of interrupt for the @@ -770,7 +772,7 @@ in `tspd_smc_handler()` function upon receiving this SMC: assertion is raised otherwise. 2. Checks whether the TSP needs a resume i.e check if it was preempted. It - then saves the system register context for the secure state by calling + then saves the system register context for the non-secure state by calling `cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE)`. 3. Restores the secure context by calling |