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2024-11-02x86/vdso: Access vdso data without vvar.hThomas Weißschuh
The vdso_data is at the start of the vvar page. Make use of this invariant to remove the usage of vvar.h. This also matches the logic for the timens data. Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241010-vdso-generic-base-v1-18-b64f0842d512@linutronix.de
2024-11-02x86/vdso: Move the rng offset to vsyscall.hThomas Weißschuh
vvar.h will go away, so move the last useful bit into vsyscall.h. Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241010-vdso-generic-base-v1-17-b64f0842d512@linutronix.de
2024-11-02x86/vdso: Access rng vdso data without vvar.hThomas Weißschuh
The vdso_rng_data is at a well-known offset in the vvar page. Make use of this invariant to remove the usage of vvar.h. Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241010-vdso-generic-base-v1-16-b64f0842d512@linutronix.de
2024-11-02x86/vdso: Access timens vdso data without vvar.hThomas Weißschuh
The vdso_data is at the start of the timens page. Make use of this invariant to remove the usage of vvar.h. This also matches the logic for the pvclock and hvclock pages. Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241010-vdso-generic-base-v1-15-b64f0842d512@linutronix.de
2024-11-02x86/vdso: Allocate vvar page from C codeThomas Weißschuh
Allocate the vvar page through the standard union vdso_data_store and remove the custom linker script logic. Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241010-vdso-generic-base-v1-14-b64f0842d512@linutronix.de
2024-11-02x86/vdso: Access rng data from kernel without vvarThomas Weißschuh
Remove the usage of the vvar _vdso_rng_data from the kernel-space code, as the x86 vvar machinery is about to be removed. The definition of the structure is unnecessary, as the data lives in a page pre-allocated by the linker anyways. The vdso user-space access to the rng data will be switched soon. DEFINE_VVAR_SINGLE() is now unused. It will be removed later togehter with the rest of vvar.h. Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241010-vdso-generic-base-v1-13-b64f0842d512@linutronix.de
2024-11-02x86/vdso: Place vdso_data at beginning of vvar pageThomas Weißschuh
The offset of the vdso_data only has historic reasons, as back then other vvars also existed and offset 0 was already used. (See commit 8c49d9a74bac ("x86-64: Clean up vdso/kernel shared variables")) Over time most other vvars got removed and offset 0 is free again. Moving vdso_data to the beginning of the vvar page aligns x86 with other architectures and opens up the way for the removal of the custom x86 vvar machinery. Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241010-vdso-generic-base-v1-12-b64f0842d512@linutronix.de
2024-11-02x86/vdso: Use __arch_get_vdso_data() to access vdso dataThomas Weißschuh
The implementation details of the vdso_data access will change. Prepare for that by using the existing helper function. Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241010-vdso-generic-base-v1-11-b64f0842d512@linutronix.de
2024-11-01KVM: x86: Quirk initialization of feature MSRs to KVM's max configurationSean Christopherson
Add a quirk to control KVM's misguided initialization of select feature MSRs to KVM's max configuration, as enabling features by default violates KVM's approach of letting userspace own the vCPU model, and is actively problematic for MSRs that are conditionally supported, as the vCPU will end up with an MSR value that userspace can't restore. E.g. if the vCPU is configured with PDCM=0, userspace will save and attempt to restore a non-zero PERF_CAPABILITIES, thanks to KVM's meddling. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240802185511.305849-4-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-11-01KVM: x86: Bypass register cache when querying CPL from kvm_sched_out()Sean Christopherson
When querying guest CPL to determine if a vCPU was preempted while in kernel mode, bypass the register cache, i.e. always read SS.AR_BYTES from the VMCS on Intel CPUs. If the kernel is running with full preemption enabled, using the register cache in the preemption path can result in stale and/or uninitialized data being cached in the segment cache. In particular the following scenario is currently possible: - vCPU is just created, and the vCPU thread is preempted before SS.AR_BYTES is written in vmx_vcpu_reset(). - When scheduling out the vCPU task, kvm_arch_vcpu_in_kernel() => vmx_get_cpl() reads and caches '0' for SS.AR_BYTES. - vmx_vcpu_reset() => seg_setup() configures SS.AR_BYTES, but doesn't invoke vmx_segment_cache_clear() to invalidate the cache. As a result, KVM retains a stale value in the cache, which can be read, e.g. via KVM_GET_SREGS. Usually this is not a problem because the VMX segment cache is reset on each VM-Exit, but if the userspace VMM (e.g KVM selftests) reads and writes system registers just after the vCPU was created, _without_ modifying SS.AR_BYTES, userspace will write back the stale '0' value and ultimately will trigger a VM-Entry failure due to incorrect SS segment type. Note, the VM-Enter failure can also be avoided by moving the call to vmx_segment_cache_clear() until after the vmx_vcpu_reset() initializes all segments. However, while that change is correct and desirable (and will come along shortly), it does not address the underlying problem that accessing KVM's register caches from !task context is generally unsafe. In addition to fixing the immediate bug, bypassing the cache for this particular case will allow hardening KVM register caching log to assert that the caches are accessed only when KVM _knows_ it is safe to do so. Fixes: de63ad4cf497 ("KVM: X86: implement the logic for spinlock optimization") Reported-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240716022014.240960-3-mlevitsk@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241009175002.1118178-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-10-31x86/cpu: Fix FAM5_QUARK_X1000 to use X86_MATCH_VFM()Tony Luck
This family 5 CPU escaped notice when cleaning up all the family 6 CPUs. Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241031185733.17327-1-tony.luck%40intel.com
2024-10-31EDAC/mce_amd: Add support for FRU text in MCAYazen Ghannam
A new "FRU Text in MCA" feature is defined where the Field Replaceable Unit (FRU) Text for a device is represented by a string in the new MCA_SYND1 and MCA_SYND2 registers. This feature is supported per MCA bank, and it is advertised by the McaFruTextInMca bit (MCA_CONFIG[9]). The FRU Text is populated dynamically for each individual error state (MCA_STATUS, MCA_ADDR, et al.). Handle the case where an MCA bank covers multiple devices, for example, a Unified Memory Controller (UMC) bank that manages two DIMMs. [ Yazen: Add Avadhut as co-developer for wrapper changes. ] [ bp: Do not expose MCA_CONFIG to userspace yet. ] Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com> Co-developed-by: Avadhut Naik <avadhut.naik@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Avadhut Naik <avadhut.naik@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241022194158.110073-6-avadhut.naik@amd.com
2024-10-31x86/MCE/AMD: Add support for new MCA_SYND{1,2} registersAvadhut Naik
Starting with Zen4, AMD's Scalable MCA systems incorporate two new registers: MCA_SYND1 and MCA_SYND2. These registers will include supplemental error information in addition to the existing MCA_SYND register. The data within these registers is considered valid if MCA_STATUS[SyndV] is set. Userspace error decoding tools like rasdaemon gather related hardware error information through the tracepoints. Therefore, export these two registers through the mce_record tracepoint so that tools like rasdaemon can parse them and output the supplemental error information like FRU text contained in them. [ bp: Massage. ] Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Avadhut Naik <avadhut.naik@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241022194158.110073-4-avadhut.naik@amd.com
2024-10-30x86/mce: Add wrapper for struct mce to export vendor specific infoAvadhut Naik
Currently, exporting new additional machine check error information involves adding new fields for the same at the end of the struct mce. This additional information can then be consumed through mcelog or tracepoint. However, as new MSRs are being added (and will be added in the future) by CPU vendors on their newer CPUs with additional machine check error information to be exported, the size of struct mce will balloon on some CPUs, unnecessarily, since those fields are vendor-specific. Moreover, different CPU vendors may export the additional information in varying sizes. The problem particularly intensifies since struct mce is exposed to userspace as part of UAPI. It's bloating through vendor-specific data should be avoided to limit the information being sent out to userspace. Add a new structure mce_hw_err to wrap the existing struct mce. The same will prevent its ballooning since vendor-specifc data, if any, can now be exported through a union within the wrapper structure and through __dynamic_array in mce_record tracepoint. Furthermore, new internal kernel fields can be added to the wrapper struct without impacting the user space API. [ bp: Restore reverse x-mas tree order of function vars declarations. ] Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Avadhut Naik <avadhut.naik@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241022194158.110073-2-avadhut.naik@amd.com
2024-10-29x86/amd_nb: Fix compile-testing without CONFIG_AMD_NBArnd Bergmann
node_to_amd_nb() is defined to NULL in non-AMD configs: drivers/platform/x86/amd/hsmp/plat.c: In function 'init_platform_device': drivers/platform/x86/amd/hsmp/plat.c:165:68: error: dereferencing 'void *' pointer [-Werror] 165 | sock->root = node_to_amd_nb(i)->root; | ^~ drivers/platform/x86/amd/hsmp/plat.c:165:68: error: request for member 'root' in something not a structure or union Users of the interface who also allow COMPILE_TEST will cause the above build error so provide an inline stub to fix that. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241029092329.3857004-1-arnd@kernel.org
2024-10-28asm-generic: provide generic page_to_phys and phys_to_page implementationsChristoph Hellwig
page_to_phys is duplicated by all architectures, and from some strange reason placed in <asm/io.h> where it doesn't fit at all. phys_to_page is only provided by a few architectures despite having a lot of open coded users. Provide generic versions in <asm-generic/memory_model.h> to make these helpers more easily usable. Note with this patch powerpc loses the CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL pfn_valid check. It will be added back in a generic version later. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2024-10-28x86/sev: Convert shared memory back to private on kexecAshish Kalra
SNP guests allocate shared buffers to perform I/O. It is done by allocating pages normally from the buddy allocator and converting them to shared with set_memory_decrypted(). The second, kexec-ed, kernel has no idea what memory is converted this way. It only sees E820_TYPE_RAM. Accessing shared memory via private mapping will cause unrecoverable RMP page-faults. On kexec, walk direct mapping and convert all shared memory back to private. It makes all RAM private again and second kernel may use it normally. Additionally, for SNP guests, convert all bss decrypted section pages back to private. The conversion occurs in two steps: stopping new conversions and unsharing all memory. In the case of normal kexec, the stopping of conversions takes place while scheduling is still functioning. This allows for waiting until any ongoing conversions are finished. The second step is carried out when all CPUs except one are inactive and interrupts are disabled. This prevents any conflicts with code that may access shared memory. Co-developed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/05a8c15fb665dbb062b04a8cb3d592a63f235937.1722520012.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com
2024-10-28x86/mm: Refactor __set_clr_pte_enc()Ashish Kalra
Refactor __set_clr_pte_enc() and add two new helper functions to set/clear PTE C-bit from early SEV/SNP initialization code and later during shutdown/kexec especially when all CPUs are stopped and interrupts are disabled and set_memory_xx() interfaces can't be used. Co-developed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5df4aa450447f28294d1c5a890e27b63ed4ded36.1722520012.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com
2024-10-28x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_AMD_WORKLOAD_CLASS feature bitPerry Yuan
Add a new feature bit that indicates support for workload-based heuristic feedback to OS for scheduling decisions. When the bit set, threads are classified during runtime into enumerated classes. The classes represent thread performance/power characteristics that may benefit from special scheduling behaviors. Signed-off-by: Perry Yuan <perry.yuan@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Gautham R. Shenoy <gautham.shenoy@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241028020251.8085-4-mario.limonciello@amd.com
2024-10-25x86/cpu: Add CPU type to struct cpuinfo_topologyPawan Gupta
Sometimes it is required to take actions based on if a CPU is a performance or efficiency core. As an example, intel_pstate driver uses the Intel core-type to determine CPU scaling. Also, some CPU vulnerabilities only affect a specific CPU type, like RFDS only affects Intel Atom. Hybrid systems that have variants P+E, P-only(Core) and E-only(Atom), it is not straightforward to identify which variant is affected by a type specific vulnerability. Such processors do have CPUID field that can uniquely identify them. Like, P+E, P-only and E-only enumerates CPUID.1A.CORE_TYPE identification, while P+E additionally enumerates CPUID.7.HYBRID. Based on this information, it is possible for boot CPU to identify if a system has mixed CPU types. Add a new field hw_cpu_type to struct cpuinfo_topology that stores the hardware specific CPU type. This saves the overhead of IPIs to get the CPU type of a different CPU. CPU type is populated early in the boot process, before vulnerabilities are enumerated. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Co-developed-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241025171459.1093-5-mario.limonciello@amd.com
2024-10-25x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_AMD_HETEROGENEOUS_CORESPerry Yuan
CPUID leaf 0x80000026 advertises core types with different efficiency rankings. Bit 30 indicates the heterogeneous core topology feature, if the bit set, it means not all instances at the current hierarchical level have the same core topology. This is described in the AMD64 Architecture Programmers Manual Volume 2 and 3, doc ID #25493 and #25494. Signed-off-by: Perry Yuan <perry.yuan@amd.com> Co-developed-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241025171459.1093-3-mario.limonciello@amd.com
2024-10-25x86/cpufeatures: Rename X86_FEATURE_FAST_CPPC to have AMD prefixMario Limonciello
This feature is an AMD unique feature of some processors, so put AMD into the name. Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241025171459.1093-2-mario.limonciello@amd.com
2024-10-25x86: fix whitespace in runtime-const assembler outputLinus Torvalds
The x86 user pointer validation changes made me look at compiler output a lot, and the wrong indentation for the ".popsection" in the generated assembler triggered me. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-25x86: fix user address masking non-canonical speculation issueLinus Torvalds
It turns out that AMD has a "Meltdown Lite(tm)" issue with non-canonical accesses in kernel space. And so using just the high bit to decide whether an access is in user space or kernel space ends up with the good old "leak speculative data" if you have the right gadget using the result: CVE-2020-12965 “Transient Execution of Non-Canonical Accesses“ Now, the kernel surrounds the access with a STAC/CLAC pair, and those instructions end up serializing execution on older Zen architectures, which closes the speculation window. But that was true only up until Zen 5, which renames the AC bit [1]. That improves performance of STAC/CLAC a lot, but also means that the speculation window is now open. Note that this affects not just the new address masking, but also the regular valid_user_address() check used by access_ok(), and the asm version of the sign bit check in the get_user() helpers. It does not affect put_user() or clear_user() variants, since there's no speculative result to be used in a gadget for those operations. Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/80d94591-1297-4afb-b510-c665efd37f10@citrix.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241023094448.GAZxjFkEOOF_DM83TQ@fat_crate.local/ [1] Link: https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-1010.html Link: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2108.10771 Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Tested-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman@intel.com> # LAM case Fixes: 2865baf54077 ("x86: support user address masking instead of non-speculative conditional") Fixes: 6014bc27561f ("x86-64: make access_ok() independent of LAM") Fixes: b19b74bc99b1 ("x86/mm: Rework address range check in get_user() and put_user()") Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-20Merge tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.12_rc4' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov: - Explicitly disable the TSC deadline timer when going idle to address some CPU errata in that area - Do not apply the Zenbleed fix on anything else except AMD Zen2 on the late microcode loading path - Clear CPU buffers later in the NMI exit path on 32-bit to avoid register clearing while they still contain sensitive data, for the RDFS mitigation - Do not clobber EFLAGS.ZF with VERW on the opportunistic SYSRET exit path on 32-bit - Fix parsing issues of memory bandwidth specification in sysfs for resctrl's memory bandwidth allocation feature - Other small cleanups and improvements * tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.12_rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/apic: Always explicitly disarm TSC-deadline timer x86/CPU/AMD: Only apply Zenbleed fix for Zen2 during late microcode load x86/bugs: Use code segment selector for VERW operand x86/entry_32: Clear CPU buffers after register restore in NMI return x86/entry_32: Do not clobber user EFLAGS.ZF x86/resctrl: Annotate get_mem_config() functions as __init x86/resctrl: Avoid overflow in MB settings in bw_validate() x86/amd_nb: Add new PCI ID for AMD family 1Ah model 20h
2024-10-16virt: sev-guest: Carve out SNP message context structureNikunj A Dadhania
Currently, the sev-guest driver is the only user of SNP guest messaging. The snp_guest_dev structure holds all the allocated buffers, secrets page and VMPCK details. In preparation for adding messaging allocation and initialization APIs, decouple snp_guest_dev from messaging-related information by carving out the guest message context structure(snp_msg_desc). Incorporate this newly added context into snp_send_guest_request() and all related functions, replacing the use of the snp_guest_dev. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241009092850.197575-7-nikunj@amd.com
2024-10-16virt: sev-guest: Consolidate SNP guest messaging parameters to a structNikunj A Dadhania
Add a snp_guest_req structure to eliminate the need to pass a long list of parameters. This structure will be used to call the SNP Guest message request API, simplifying the function arguments. Update the snp_issue_guest_request() prototype to include the new guest request structure. Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241009092850.197575-5-nikunj@amd.com
2024-10-16virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto libraryNikunj A Dadhania
The sev-guest driver encryption code uses the crypto API for SNP guest messaging with the AMD Security processor. In order to enable secure TSC, SEV-SNP guests need to send such a TSC_INFO message before the APs are booted. Details from the TSC_INFO response will then be used to program the VMSA before the APs are brought up. However, the crypto API is not available this early in the boot process. In preparation for moving the encryption code out of sev-guest to support secure TSC and to ease review, switch to using the AES GCM library implementation instead. Drop __enc_payload() and dec_payload() helpers as both are small and can be moved to the respective callers. Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Tested-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241009092850.197575-2-nikunj@amd.com
2024-10-16vdso: Introduce vdso/page.hVincenzo Frascino
The VDSO implementation includes headers from outside of the vdso/ namespace. Introduce vdso/page.h to make sure that the generic library uses only the allowed namespace. Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> # m68k Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241014151340.1639555-3-vincenzo.frascino@arm.com
2024-10-15x86/virt: Move SEV-specific parsing into arch/x86/virt/svmPavan Kumar Paluri
Move SEV-specific kernel command line option parsing support from arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c to arch/x86/virt/svm/cmdline.c so that both host and guest related SEV command line options can be supported. No functional changes intended. Signed-off-by: Pavan Kumar Paluri <papaluri@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241014130948.1476946-2-papaluri@amd.com
2024-10-15x86/vdso: Remove timekeeper includeThomas Weißschuh
Since the generic VDSO clock mode storage is used, this header file is unused and can be removed. This avoids including a non-VDSO header while building the VDSO, which can lead to compilation errors. Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241010-vdso-generic-arch_update_vsyscall-v1-7-7fe5a3ea4382@linutronix.de
2024-10-15ftrace: Consolidate ftrace_regs accessor functions for archs using pt_regsSteven Rostedt
Most architectures use pt_regs within ftrace_regs making a lot of the accessor functions just calls to the pt_regs internally. Instead of duplication this effort, use a HAVE_ARCH_FTRACE_REGS for architectures that have their own ftrace_regs that is not based on pt_regs and will define all the accessor functions, and for the architectures that just use pt_regs, it will leave it undefined, and the default accessor functions will be used. Note, this will also make it easier to add new accessor functions to ftrace_regs as it will mean having to touch less architectures. Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Cc: "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org> Cc: WANG Xuerui <kernel@xen0n.name> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Naveen N Rao <naveen@kernel.org> Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu> Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20241010202114.2289f6fd@gandalf.local.home Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> # s390 Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> # powerpc Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2024-10-10ftrace: Make ftrace_regs abstract from direct useSteven Rostedt
ftrace_regs was created to hold registers that store information to save function parameters, return value and stack. Since it is a subset of pt_regs, it should only be used by its accessor functions. But because pt_regs can easily be taken from ftrace_regs (on most archs), it is tempting to use it directly. But when running on other architectures, it may fail to build or worse, build but crash the kernel! Instead, make struct ftrace_regs an empty structure and have the architectures define __arch_ftrace_regs and all the accessor functions will typecast to it to get to the actual fields. This will help avoid usage of ftrace_regs directly. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241007171027.629bdafd@gandalf.local.home/ Cc: "linux-arch@vger.kernel.org" <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Cc: "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org> Cc: WANG Xuerui <kernel@xen0n.name> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Naveen N Rao <naveen@kernel.org> Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu> Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20241008230628.958778821@goodmis.org Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> # s390 Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2024-10-10x86/cpufeatures: Add a IBPB_NO_RET BUG flagJohannes Wikner
Set this flag if the CPU has an IBPB implementation that does not invalidate return target predictions. Zen generations < 4 do not flush the RSB when executing an IBPB and this bug flag denotes that. [ bp: Massage. ] Signed-off-by: Johannes Wikner <kwikner@ethz.ch> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
2024-10-10x86/cpufeatures: Define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RETJim Mattson
AMD's initial implementation of IBPB did not clear the return address predictor. Beginning with Zen4, AMD's IBPB *does* clear the return address predictor. This behavior is enumerated by CPUID.80000008H:EBX.IBPB_RET[30]. Define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET for use in KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID, when determining cross-vendor capabilities. Suggested-by: Venkatesh Srinivas <venkateshs@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
2024-10-09x86/bugs: Use code segment selector for VERW operandPawan Gupta
Robert Gill reported below #GP in 32-bit mode when dosemu software was executing vm86() system call: general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 4 PID: 4610 Comm: dosemu.bin Not tainted 6.6.21-gentoo-x86 #1 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge 1950/0H723K, BIOS 2.7.0 10/30/2010 EIP: restore_all_switch_stack+0xbe/0xcf EAX: 00000000 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00000000 ESI: 00000000 EDI: 00000000 EBP: 00000000 ESP: ff8affdc DS: 0000 ES: 0000 FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010046 CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00c2101c CR3: 04b6d000 CR4: 000406d0 Call Trace: show_regs+0x70/0x78 die_addr+0x29/0x70 exc_general_protection+0x13c/0x348 exc_bounds+0x98/0x98 handle_exception+0x14d/0x14d exc_bounds+0x98/0x98 restore_all_switch_stack+0xbe/0xcf exc_bounds+0x98/0x98 restore_all_switch_stack+0xbe/0xcf This only happens in 32-bit mode when VERW based mitigations like MDS/RFDS are enabled. This is because segment registers with an arbitrary user value can result in #GP when executing VERW. Intel SDM vol. 2C documents the following behavior for VERW instruction: #GP(0) - If a memory operand effective address is outside the CS, DS, ES, FS, or GS segment limit. CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS macro executes VERW instruction before returning to user space. Use %cs selector to reference VERW operand. This ensures VERW will not #GP for an arbitrary user %ds. [ mingo: Fixed the SOB chain. ] Fixes: a0e2dab44d22 ("x86/entry_32: Add VERW just before userspace transition") Reported-by: Robert Gill <rtgill82@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+ Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218707 Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/8c77ccfd-d561-45a1-8ed5-6b75212c7a58@leemhuis.info/ Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Suggested-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2024-10-07x86/cpu/intel: Define helper to get CPU core native IDDapeng Mi
Define helper get_this_hybrid_cpu_native_id() to return the CPU core native ID. This core native ID combining with core type can be used to figure out the CPU core uarch uniquely. Signed-off-by: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Yongwei Ma <yongwei.ma@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240820073853.1974746-3-dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com
2024-10-06Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvmLinus Torvalds
Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini: "ARM64: - Fix pKVM error path on init, making sure we do not change critical system registers as we're about to fail - Make sure that the host's vector length is at capped by a value common to all CPUs - Fix kvm_has_feat*() handling of "negative" features, as the current code is pretty broken - Promote Joey to the status of official reviewer, while James steps down -- hopefully only temporarly x86: - Fix compilation with KVM_INTEL=KVM_AMD=n - Fix disabling KVM_X86_QUIRK_SLOT_ZAP_ALL when shadow MMU is in use Selftests: - Fix compilation on non-x86 architectures" * tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: x86/reboot: emergency callbacks are now registered by common KVM code KVM: x86: leave kvm.ko out of the build if no vendor module is requested KVM: x86/mmu: fix KVM_X86_QUIRK_SLOT_ZAP_ALL for shadow MMU KVM: arm64: Fix kvm_has_feat*() handling of negative features KVM: selftests: Fix build on architectures other than x86_64 KVM: arm64: Another reviewer reshuffle KVM: arm64: Constrain the host to the maximum shared SVE VL with pKVM KVM: arm64: Fix __pkvm_init_vcpu cptr_el2 error path
2024-10-06Merge tag 'kvmarm-fixes-6.12-1' of ↵Paolo Bonzini
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.12, take #1 - Fix pKVM error path on init, making sure we do not change critical system registers as we're about to fail - Make sure that the host's vector length is at capped by a value common to all CPUs - Fix kvm_has_feat*() handling of "negative" features, as the current code is pretty broken - Promote Joey to the status of official reviewer, while James steps down -- hopefully only temporarly
2024-10-06x86/reboot: emergency callbacks are now registered by common KVM codePaolo Bonzini
Guard them with CONFIG_KVM_X86_COMMON rather than the two vendor modules. In practice this has no functional change, because CONFIG_KVM_X86_COMMON is set if and only if at least one vendor-specific module is being built. However, it is cleaner to specify CONFIG_KVM_X86_COMMON for functions that are used in kvm.ko. Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Fixes: 590b09b1d88e ("KVM: x86: Register "emergency disable" callbacks when virt is enabled") Fixes: 6d55a94222db ("x86/reboot: Unconditionally define cpu_emergency_virt_cb typedef") Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-10-04mman: Add map_shadow_stack() flagsMark Brown
In preparation for adding arm64 GCS support make the map_shadow_stack() SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN flag generic and add _SET_MARKER. The existing flag indicates that a token usable for stack switch should be added to the top of the newly mapped GCS region while the new flag indicates that a top of stack marker suitable for use by unwinders should be added above that. For arm64 the top of stack marker is all bits 0. Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <thiago.bauermann@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Acked-by: Yury Khrustalev <yury.khrustalev@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241001-arm64-gcs-v13-5-222b78d87eee@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2024-10-03x86/ftrace: Include <asm/ptrace.h>Sami Tolvanen
<asm/ftrace.h> uses struct pt_regs in several places. Include <asm/ptrace.h> to ensure it's visible. This is needed to make sure object files that only include <asm/asm-prototypes.h> compile. Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20240916221557.846853-2-samitolvanen@google.com Suggested-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2024-10-02ntp: Remove unused tick_nsecThomas Gleixner
tick_nsec is only updated in the NTP core, but there are no users. Remove it. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Anna-Maria Behnsen <anna-maria@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: John Stultz <jstultz@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240911-devel-anna-maria-b4-timers-ptp-ntp-v1-1-2d52f4e13476@linutronix.de
2024-09-29x86: kvm: fix build errorLinus Torvalds
The cpu_emergency_register_virt_callback() function is used unconditionally by the x86 kvm code, but it is declared (and defined) conditionally: #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD) void cpu_emergency_register_virt_callback(cpu_emergency_virt_cb *callback); ... leading to a build error when neither KVM_INTEL nor KVM_AMD support is enabled: arch/x86/kvm/x86.c: In function ‘kvm_arch_enable_virtualization’: arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12517:9: error: implicit declaration of function ‘cpu_emergency_register_virt_callback’ [-Wimplicit-function-declaration] 12517 | cpu_emergency_register_virt_callback(kvm_x86_ops.emergency_disable_virtualization_cpu); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c: In function ‘kvm_arch_disable_virtualization’: arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12522:9: error: implicit declaration of function ‘cpu_emergency_unregister_virt_callback’ [-Wimplicit-function-declaration] 12522 | cpu_emergency_unregister_virt_callback(kvm_x86_ops.emergency_disable_virtualization_cpu); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Fix the build by defining empty helper functions the same way the old cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization() function was dealt with for the same situation. Maybe we could instead have made the call sites conditional, since the callers (kvm_arch_{en,dis}able_virtualization()) have an empty weak fallback. I'll leave that to the kvm people to argue about, this at least gets the build going for that particular config. Fixes: 590b09b1d88e ("KVM: x86: Register "emergency disable" callbacks when virt is enabled") Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Cc: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com> Cc: Farrah Chen <farrah.chen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2024-09-29Merge tag 'x86-urgent-2024-09-29' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar: "Fix TDX MMIO #VE fault handling, and add two new Intel model numbers for 'Pantherlake' and 'Diamond Rapids'" * tag 'x86-urgent-2024-09-29' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/cpu: Add two Intel CPU model numbers x86/tdx: Fix "in-kernel MMIO" check
2024-09-29Merge tag 'locking-urgent-2024-09-29' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull locking updates from Ingo Molnar: "lockdep: - Fix potential deadlock between lockdep and RCU (Zhiguo Niu) - Use str_plural() to address Coccinelle warning (Thorsten Blum) - Add debuggability enhancement (Luis Claudio R. Goncalves) static keys & calls: - Fix static_key_slow_dec() yet again (Peter Zijlstra) - Handle module init failure correctly in static_call_del_module() (Thomas Gleixner) - Replace pointless WARN_ON() in static_call_module_notify() (Thomas Gleixner) <linux/cleanup.h>: - Add usage and style documentation (Dan Williams) rwsems: - Move is_rwsem_reader_owned() and rwsem_owner() under CONFIG_DEBUG_RWSEMS (Waiman Long) atomic ops, x86: - Redeclare x86_32 arch_atomic64_{add,sub}() as void (Uros Bizjak) - Introduce the read64_nonatomic macro to x86_32 with cx8 (Uros Bizjak)" Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> * tag 'locking-urgent-2024-09-29' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: locking/rwsem: Move is_rwsem_reader_owned() and rwsem_owner() under CONFIG_DEBUG_RWSEMS jump_label: Fix static_key_slow_dec() yet again static_call: Replace pointless WARN_ON() in static_call_module_notify() static_call: Handle module init failure correctly in static_call_del_module() locking/lockdep: Simplify character output in seq_line() lockdep: fix deadlock issue between lockdep and rcu lockdep: Use str_plural() to fix Coccinelle warning cleanup: Add usage and style documentation lockdep: suggest the fix for "lockdep bfs error:-1" on print_bfs_bug locking/atomic/x86: Redeclare x86_32 arch_atomic64_{add,sub}() as void locking/atomic/x86: Introduce the read64_nonatomic macro to x86_32 with cx8
2024-09-29Merge branch 'locking/core' into locking/urgent, to pick up pending commitsIngo Molnar
Merge all pending locking commits into a single branch. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2024-09-28Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvmLinus Torvalds
Pull x86 kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini: "x86: - KVM currently invalidates the entirety of the page tables, not just those for the memslot being touched, when a memslot is moved or deleted. This does not traditionally have particularly noticeable overhead, but Intel's TDX will require the guest to re-accept private pages if they are dropped from the secure EPT, which is a non starter. Actually, the only reason why this is not already being done is a bug which was never fully investigated and caused VM instability with assigned GeForce GPUs, so allow userspace to opt into the new behavior. - Advertise AVX10.1 to userspace (effectively prep work for the "real" AVX10 functionality that is on the horizon) - Rework common MSR handling code to suppress errors on userspace accesses to unsupported-but-advertised MSRs This will allow removing (almost?) all of KVM's exemptions for userspace access to MSRs that shouldn't exist based on the vCPU model (the actual cleanup is non-trivial future work) - Rework KVM's handling of x2APIC ICR, again, because AMD (x2AVIC) splits the 64-bit value into the legacy ICR and ICR2 storage, whereas Intel (APICv) stores the entire 64-bit value at the ICR offset - Fix a bug where KVM would fail to exit to userspace if one was triggered by a fastpath exit handler - Add fastpath handling of HLT VM-Exit to expedite re-entering the guest when there's already a pending wake event at the time of the exit - Fix a WARN caused by RSM entering a nested guest from SMM with invalid guest state, by forcing the vCPU out of guest mode prior to signalling SHUTDOWN (the SHUTDOWN hits the VM altogether, not the nested guest) - Overhaul the "unprotect and retry" logic to more precisely identify cases where retrying is actually helpful, and to harden all retry paths against putting the guest into an infinite retry loop - Add support for yielding, e.g. to honor NEED_RESCHED, when zapping rmaps in the shadow MMU - Refactor pieces of the shadow MMU related to aging SPTEs in prepartion for adding multi generation LRU support in KVM - Don't stuff the RSB after VM-Exit when RETPOLINE=y and AutoIBRS is enabled, i.e. when the CPU has already flushed the RSB - Trace the per-CPU host save area as a VMCB pointer to improve readability and cleanup the retrieval of the SEV-ES host save area - Remove unnecessary accounting of temporary nested VMCB related allocations - Set FINAL/PAGE in the page fault error code for EPT violations if and only if the GVA is valid. If the GVA is NOT valid, there is no guest-side page table walk and so stuffing paging related metadata is nonsensical - Fix a bug where KVM would incorrectly synthesize a nested VM-Exit instead of emulating posted interrupt delivery to L2 - Add a lockdep assertion to detect unsafe accesses of vmcs12 structures - Harden eVMCS loading against an impossible NULL pointer deref (really truly should be impossible) - Minor SGX fix and a cleanup - Misc cleanups Generic: - Register KVM's cpuhp and syscore callbacks when enabling virtualization in hardware, as the sole purpose of said callbacks is to disable and re-enable virtualization as needed - Enable virtualization when KVM is loaded, not right before the first VM is created Together with the previous change, this simplifies a lot the logic of the callbacks, because their very existence implies virtualization is enabled - Fix a bug that results in KVM prematurely exiting to userspace for coalesced MMIO/PIO in many cases, clean up the related code, and add a testcase - Fix a bug in kvm_clear_guest() where it would trigger a buffer overflow _if_ the gpa+len crosses a page boundary, which thankfully is guaranteed to not happen in the current code base. Add WARNs in more helpers that read/write guest memory to detect similar bugs Selftests: - Fix a goof that caused some Hyper-V tests to be skipped when run on bare metal, i.e. NOT in a VM - Add a regression test for KVM's handling of SHUTDOWN for an SEV-ES guest - Explicitly include one-off assets in .gitignore. Past Sean was completely wrong about not being able to detect missing .gitignore entries - Verify userspace single-stepping works when KVM happens to handle a VM-Exit in its fastpath - Misc cleanups" * tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (127 commits) Documentation: KVM: fix warning in "make htmldocs" s390: Enable KVM_S390_UCONTROL config in debug_defconfig selftests: kvm: s390: Add VM run test case KVM: SVM: let alternatives handle the cases when RSB filling is required KVM: VMX: Set PFERR_GUEST_{FINAL,PAGE}_MASK if and only if the GVA is valid KVM: x86/mmu: Use KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE() instead of an open coded equivalent KVM: x86/mmu: Add KVM_RMAP_MANY to replace open coded '1' and '1ul' literals KVM: x86/mmu: Fold mmu_spte_age() into kvm_rmap_age_gfn_range() KVM: x86/mmu: Morph kvm_handle_gfn_range() into an aging specific helper KVM: x86/mmu: Honor NEED_RESCHED when zapping rmaps and blocking is allowed KVM: x86/mmu: Add a helper to walk and zap rmaps for a memslot KVM: x86/mmu: Plumb a @can_yield parameter into __walk_slot_rmaps() KVM: x86/mmu: Move walk_slot_rmaps() up near for_each_slot_rmap_range() KVM: x86/mmu: WARN on MMIO cache hit when emulating write-protected gfn KVM: x86/mmu: Detect if unprotect will do anything based on invalid_list KVM: x86/mmu: Subsume kvm_mmu_unprotect_page() into the and_retry() version KVM: x86: Rename reexecute_instruction()=>kvm_unprotect_and_retry_on_failure() KVM: x86: Update retry protection fields when forcing retry on emulation failure KVM: x86: Apply retry protection to "unprotect on failure" path KVM: x86: Check EMULTYPE_WRITE_PF_TO_SP before unprotecting gfn ...
2024-09-27Merge tag 'for-linus-6.12-rc1a-tag' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip Pull more xen updates from Juergen Gross: "A second round of Xen related changes and features: - a small fix of the xen-pciback driver for a warning issued by sparse - support PCI passthrough when using a PVH dom0 - enable loading the kernel in PVH mode at arbitrary addresses, avoiding conflicts with the memory map when running as a Xen dom0 using the host memory layout" * tag 'for-linus-6.12-rc1a-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip: x86/pvh: Add 64bit relocation page tables x86/kernel: Move page table macros to header x86/pvh: Set phys_base when calling xen_prepare_pvh() x86/pvh: Make PVH entrypoint PIC for x86-64 xen: sync elfnote.h from xen tree xen/pciback: fix cast to restricted pci_ers_result_t and pci_power_t xen/privcmd: Add new syscall to get gsi from dev xen/pvh: Setup gsi for passthrough device xen/pci: Add a function to reset device for xen
2024-09-26x86/cpu: Add two Intel CPU model numbersTony Luck
Pantherlake is a mobile CPU. Diamond Rapids next generation Xeon. Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240923173750.16874-1-tony.luck%40intel.com