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In the unlikely case a new node could not be allocated, we need to
remove @newnode from @peer->allowedips_list before freeing it.
syzbot reported:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_del_entry_valid+0xdc/0xf5 lib/list_debug.c:54
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88809881a538 by task syz-executor.4/30133
CPU: 0 PID: 30133 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.5.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374
__kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x32 mm/kasan/report.c:506
kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:639
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:135
__list_del_entry_valid+0xdc/0xf5 lib/list_debug.c:54
__list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:132 [inline]
list_del include/linux/list.h:146 [inline]
root_remove_peer_lists+0x24f/0x4b0 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:65
wg_allowedips_free+0x232/0x390 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:300
wg_peer_remove_all+0xd5/0x620 drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c:187
wg_set_device+0xd01/0x1350 drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:542
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:672 [inline]
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:717 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x67d/0xea0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:734
netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
genl_rcv+0x29/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:745
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x59e/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328
netlink_sendmsg+0x91c/0xea0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:672
____sys_sendmsg+0x753/0x880 net/socket.c:2343
___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2397
__sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2430
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2437 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2437
do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x45b399
Code: ad b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f99a9bcdc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f99a9bce6d4 RCX: 000000000045b399
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020001340 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000000075bf20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: 00000000000009ba R14: 00000000004cb2b8 R15: 0000000000000009
Allocated by task 30103:
save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:513 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:486
kasan_kmalloc+0x9/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:527
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x158/0x790 mm/slab.c:3551
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:556 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:670 [inline]
add+0x70a/0x1970 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:236
wg_allowedips_insert_v4+0xf6/0x160 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:320
set_allowedip drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:343 [inline]
set_peer+0xfb9/0x1150 drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:468
wg_set_device+0xbd4/0x1350 drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:591
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:672 [inline]
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:717 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x67d/0xea0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:734
netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
genl_rcv+0x29/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:745
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x59e/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328
netlink_sendmsg+0x91c/0xea0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:672
____sys_sendmsg+0x753/0x880 net/socket.c:2343
___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2397
__sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2430
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2437 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2437
do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 30103:
save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline]
kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:335 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:474
kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:483
__cache_free mm/slab.c:3426 [inline]
kfree+0x10a/0x2c0 mm/slab.c:3757
add+0x12d2/0x1970 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:266
wg_allowedips_insert_v4+0xf6/0x160 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:320
set_allowedip drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:343 [inline]
set_peer+0xfb9/0x1150 drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:468
wg_set_device+0xbd4/0x1350 drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:591
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:672 [inline]
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:717 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x67d/0xea0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:734
netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
genl_rcv+0x29/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:745
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x59e/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328
netlink_sendmsg+0x91c/0xea0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:672
____sys_sendmsg+0x753/0x880 net/socket.c:2343
___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2397
__sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2430
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2437 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2437
do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88809881a500
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64
The buggy address is located 56 bytes inside of
64-byte region [ffff88809881a500, ffff88809881a540)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0002620680 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8880aa400380 index:0x0
raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea000250b748 ffffea000254bac8 ffff8880aa400380
raw: 0000000000000000 ffff88809881a000 0000000100000020 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88809881a400: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88809881a480: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88809881a500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffff88809881a580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88809881a600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: wireguard@lists.zx2c4.com
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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As part of the continual effort to remove direct usage of skb->next and
skb->prev, this patch adds a helper for iterating through the
singly-linked variant of skb lists, which are used for lists of GSO
packet. The name "skb_list_..." has been chosen to match the existing
function, "kfree_skb_list, which also operates on these singly-linked
lists, and the "..._walk_safe" part is the same idiom as elsewhere in
the kernel.
This patch removes the helper from wireguard and puts it into
linux/skbuff.h, while making it a bit more robust for general usage. In
particular, parenthesis are added around the macro argument usage, and it
now accounts for trying to iterate through an already-null skb pointer,
which will simply run the iteration zero times. This latter enhancement
means it can be used to replace both do { ... } while and while (...)
open-coded idioms.
This should take care of these three possible usages, which match all
current methods of iterations.
skb_list_walk_safe(segs, skb, next) { ... }
skb_list_walk_safe(skb, skb, next) { ... }
skb_list_walk_safe(segs, skb, segs) { ... }
Gcc appears to generate efficient code for each of these.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Certain drivers will pass gro skbs to udp, at which point the udp driver
simply iterates through them and passes them off to encap_rcv, which is
where we pick up. At the moment, we're not attempting to coalesce these
into bundles, but we also don't want to wind up having cascaded lists of
skbs treated separately. The right behavior here, then, is to just mark
each incoming one as not on a list. This can be seen in practice, for
example, with Qualcomm's rmnet_perf driver.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Tested-by: Yaroslav Furman <yaro330@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Before 8b7008620b84 ("net: Don't copy pfmemalloc flag in __copy_skb_
header()"), the pfmemalloc flag used to be between headers_start and
headers_end, which is a region we clear when preparing the packet for
encryption/decryption. This is a parameter we certainly want to
preserve, which is why 8b7008620b84 moved it out of there. The code here
was written in a world before 8b7008620b84, though, where we had to
manually account for it. This commit brings things up to speed.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The callback function of call_rcu() just calls a kfree(), so we
can use kfree_rcu() instead of call_rcu() + callback function.
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Remove <linux/version.h> from the includes for main.c, which is unused.
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
[Jason: reworded commit message]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This fixes two spelling errors in source code comments.
Signed-off-by: Josh Soref <jsoref@gmail.com>
[Jason: rewrote commit message]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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WireGuard is a layer 3 secure networking tunnel made specifically for
the kernel, that aims to be much simpler and easier to audit than IPsec.
Extensive documentation and description of the protocol and
considerations, along with formal proofs of the cryptography, are
available at:
* https://www.wireguard.com/
* https://www.wireguard.com/papers/wireguard.pdf
This commit implements WireGuard as a simple network device driver,
accessible in the usual RTNL way used by virtual network drivers. It
makes use of the udp_tunnel APIs, GRO, GSO, NAPI, and the usual set of
networking subsystem APIs. It has a somewhat novel multicore queueing
system designed for maximum throughput and minimal latency of encryption
operations, but it is implemented modestly using workqueues and NAPI.
Configuration is done via generic Netlink, and following a review from
the Netlink maintainer a year ago, several high profile userspace tools
have already implemented the API.
This commit also comes with several different tests, both in-kernel
tests and out-of-kernel tests based on network namespaces, taking profit
of the fact that sockets used by WireGuard intentionally stay in the
namespace the WireGuard interface was originally created, exactly like
the semantics of userspace tun devices. See wireguard.com/netns/ for
pictures and examples.
The source code is fairly short, but rather than combining everything
into a single file, WireGuard is developed as cleanly separable files,
making auditing and comprehension easier. Things are laid out as
follows:
* noise.[ch], cookie.[ch], messages.h: These implement the bulk of the
cryptographic aspects of the protocol, and are mostly data-only in
nature, taking in buffers of bytes and spitting out buffers of
bytes. They also handle reference counting for their various shared
pieces of data, like keys and key lists.
* ratelimiter.[ch]: Used as an integral part of cookie.[ch] for
ratelimiting certain types of cryptographic operations in accordance
with particular WireGuard semantics.
* allowedips.[ch], peerlookup.[ch]: The main lookup structures of
WireGuard, the former being trie-like with particular semantics, an
integral part of the design of the protocol, and the latter just
being nice helper functions around the various hashtables we use.
* device.[ch]: Implementation of functions for the netdevice and for
rtnl, responsible for maintaining the life of a given interface and
wiring it up to the rest of WireGuard.
* peer.[ch]: Each interface has a list of peers, with helper functions
available here for creation, destruction, and reference counting.
* socket.[ch]: Implementation of functions related to udp_socket and
the general set of kernel socket APIs, for sending and receiving
ciphertext UDP packets, and taking care of WireGuard-specific sticky
socket routing semantics for the automatic roaming.
* netlink.[ch]: Userspace API entry point for configuring WireGuard
peers and devices. The API has been implemented by several userspace
tools and network management utility, and the WireGuard project
distributes the basic wg(8) tool.
* queueing.[ch]: Shared function on the rx and tx path for handling
the various queues used in the multicore algorithms.
* send.c: Handles encrypting outgoing packets in parallel on
multiple cores, before sending them in order on a single core, via
workqueues and ring buffers. Also handles sending handshake and cookie
messages as part of the protocol, in parallel.
* receive.c: Handles decrypting incoming packets in parallel on
multiple cores, before passing them off in order to be ingested via
the rest of the networking subsystem with GRO via the typical NAPI
poll function. Also handles receiving handshake and cookie messages
as part of the protocol, in parallel.
* timers.[ch]: Uses the timer wheel to implement protocol particular
event timeouts, and gives a set of very simple event-driven entry
point functions for callers.
* main.c, version.h: Initialization and deinitialization of the module.
* selftest/*.h: Runtime unit tests for some of the most security
sensitive functions.
* tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh: Aforementioned testing
script using network namespaces.
This commit aims to be as self-contained as possible, implementing
WireGuard as a standalone module not needing much special handling or
coordination from the network subsystem. I expect for future
optimizations to the network stack to positively improve WireGuard, and
vice-versa, but for the time being, this exists as intentionally
standalone.
We introduce a menu option for CONFIG_WIREGUARD, as well as providing a
verbose debug log and self-tests via CONFIG_WIREGUARD_DEBUG.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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