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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs
Pull fsnotify pre-content notification support from Jan Kara:
"This introduces a new fsnotify event (FS_PRE_ACCESS) that gets
generated before a file contents is accessed.
The event is synchronous so if there is listener for this event, the
kernel waits for reply. On success the execution continues as usual,
on failure we propagate the error to userspace. This allows userspace
to fill in file content on demand from slow storage. The context in
which the events are generated has been picked so that we don't hold
any locks and thus there's no risk of a deadlock for the userspace
handler.
The new pre-content event is available only for users with global
CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability (similarly to other parts of fanotify
functionality) and it is an administrator responsibility to make sure
the userspace event handler doesn't do stupid stuff that can DoS the
system.
Based on your feedback from the last submission, fsnotify code has
been improved and now file->f_mode encodes whether pre-content event
needs to be generated for the file so the fast path when nobody wants
pre-content event for the file just grows the additional file->f_mode
check. As a bonus this also removes the checks whether the old
FS_ACCESS event needs to be generated from the fast path. Also the
place where the event is generated during page fault has been moved so
now filemap_fault() generates the event if and only if there is no
uptodate folio in the page cache.
Also we have dropped FS_PRE_MODIFY event as current real-world users
of the pre-content functionality don't really use it so let's start
with the minimal useful feature set"
* tag 'fsnotify_hsm_for_v6.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs: (21 commits)
fanotify: Fix crash in fanotify_init(2)
fs: don't block write during exec on pre-content watched files
fs: enable pre-content events on supported file systems
ext4: add pre-content fsnotify hook for DAX faults
btrfs: disable defrag on pre-content watched files
xfs: add pre-content fsnotify hook for DAX faults
fsnotify: generate pre-content permission event on page fault
mm: don't allow huge faults for files with pre content watches
fanotify: disable readahead if we have pre-content watches
fanotify: allow to set errno in FAN_DENY permission response
fanotify: report file range info with pre-content events
fanotify: introduce FAN_PRE_ACCESS permission event
fsnotify: generate pre-content permission event on truncate
fsnotify: pass optional file access range in pre-content event
fsnotify: introduce pre-content permission events
fanotify: reserve event bit of deprecated FAN_DIR_MODIFY
fanotify: rename a misnamed constant
fanotify: don't skip extra event info if no info_mode is set
fsnotify: check if file is actually being watched for pre-content events on open
fsnotify: opt-in for permission events at file open time
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Extended permissions supported in conditional policy
The SELinux extended permissions, aka "xperms", allow security admins
to target individuals ioctls, and recently netlink messages, with
their SELinux policy. Adding support for conditional policies allows
admins to toggle the granular xperms using SELinux booleans, helping
pave the way for greater use of xperms in general purpose SELinux
policies. This change bumps the maximum SELinux policy version to 34.
- Fix a SCTP/SELinux error return code inconsistency
Depending on the loaded SELinux policy, specifically it's
EXTSOCKCLASS support, the bind(2) LSM/SELinux hook could return
different error codes due to the SELinux code checking the socket's
SELinux object class (which can vary depending on EXTSOCKCLASS) and
not the socket's sk_protocol field. We fix this by doing the obvious,
and looking at the sock->sk_protocol field instead of the object
class.
- Makefile fixes to properly cleanup av_permissions.h
Add av_permissions.h to "targets" so that it is properly cleaned up
using the kbuild infrastructure.
- A number of smaller improvements by Christian Göttsche
A variety of straightforward changes to reduce code duplication,
reduce pointer lookups, migrate void pointers to defined types,
simplify code, constify function parameters, and correct iterator
types.
* tag 'selinux-pr-20250121' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: make more use of str_read() when loading the policy
selinux: avoid unnecessary indirection in struct level_datum
selinux: use known type instead of void pointer
selinux: rename comparison functions for clarity
selinux: rework match_ipv6_addrmask()
selinux: constify and reconcile function parameter names
selinux: avoid using types indicating user space interaction
selinux: supply missing field initializers
selinux: add netlink nlmsg_type audit message
selinux: add support for xperms in conditional policies
selinux: Fix SCTP error inconsistency in selinux_socket_bind()
selinux: use native iterator types
selinux: add generated av_permissions.h to targets
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:
- Improved handling of LSM "secctx" strings through lsm_context struct
The LSM secctx string interface is from an older time when only one
LSM was supported, migrate over to the lsm_context struct to better
support the different LSMs we now have and make it easier to support
new LSMs in the future.
These changes explain the Rust, VFS, and networking changes in the
diffstat.
- Only build lsm_audit.c if CONFIG_SECURITY and CONFIG_AUDIT are
enabled
Small tweak to be a bit smarter about when we build the LSM's common
audit helpers.
- Check for absurdly large policies from userspace in SafeSetID
SafeSetID policies rules are fairly small, basically just "UID:UID",
it easy to impose a limit of KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE on policy writes which
helps quiet a number of syzbot related issues. While work is being
done to address the syzbot issues through other mechanisms, this is a
trivial and relatively safe fix that we can do now.
- Various minor improvements and cleanups
A collection of improvements to the kernel selftests, constification
of some function parameters, removing redundant assignments, and
local variable renames to improve readability.
* tag 'lsm-pr-20250121' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
lockdown: initialize local array before use to quiet static analysis
safesetid: check size of policy writes
net: corrections for security_secid_to_secctx returns
lsm: rename variable to avoid shadowing
lsm: constify function parameters
security: remove redundant assignment to return variable
lsm: Only build lsm_audit.c if CONFIG_SECURITY and CONFIG_AUDIT are set
selftests: refactor the lsm `flags_overset_lsm_set_self_attr` test
binder: initialize lsm_context structure
rust: replace lsm context+len with lsm_context
lsm: secctx provider check on release
lsm: lsm_context in security_dentry_init_security
lsm: use lsm_context in security_inode_getsecctx
lsm: replace context+len with lsm_context
lsm: ensure the correct LSM context releaser
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Simplify the call sites, and enable future string validation in a single
place.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Store the owned member of type struct mls_level directly in the parent
struct instead of an extra heap allocation.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Improve type safety and readability by using the known type.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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The functions context_cmp(), mls_context_cmp() and ebitmap_cmp() are not
traditional C style compare functions returning -1, 0, and 1 for less
than, equal, and greater than; they only return whether their arguments
are equal.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Constify parameters, add size hints, and simplify control flow.
According to godbolt the same assembly is generated.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Align the parameter names between declarations and definitions, and
constify read-only parameters.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: tweak the subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Integer types starting with a double underscore, like __u32, are
intended for usage of variables interacting with user-space.
Just use the plain variant.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Please clang by supplying the missing field initializers in the
secclass_map variable and sel_fill_super() function.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: tweak subj and commit description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fix from Paul Moore:
"A single SELinux patch to address a problem with a single domain using
multiple xperm classes"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20250107' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: match extended permissions to their base permissions
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In commit d1d991efaf34 ("selinux: Add netlink xperm support") a new
extended permission was added ("nlmsg"). This was the second extended
permission implemented in selinux ("ioctl" being the first one).
Extended permissions are associated with a base permission. It was found
that, in the access vector cache (avc), the extended permission did not
keep track of its base permission. This is an issue for a domain that is
using both extended permissions (i.e., a domain calling ioctl() on a
netlink socket). In this case, the extended permissions were
overlapping.
Keep track of the base permission in the cache. A new field "base_perm"
is added to struct extended_perms_decision to make sure that the
extended permission refers to the correct policy permission. A new field
"base_perms" is added to struct extended_perms to quickly decide if
extended permissions apply.
While it is in theory possible to retrieve the base permission from the
access vector, the same base permission may not be mapped to the same
bit for each class (e.g., "nlmsg" is mapped to a different bit for
"netlink_route_socket" and "netlink_audit_socket"). Instead, use a
constant (AVC_EXT_IOCTL or AVC_EXT_NLMSG) provided by the caller.
Fixes: d1d991efaf34 ("selinux: Add netlink xperm support")
Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fix from Paul Moore:
"One small SELinux patch to get rid improve our handling of unknown
extended permissions by safely ignoring them.
Not only does this make it easier to support newer SELinux policy
on older kernels in the future, it removes to BUG() calls from the
SELinux code."
* tag 'selinux-pr-20241217' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: ignore unknown extended permissions
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When evaluating extended permissions, ignore unknown permissions instead
of calling BUG(). This commit ensures that future permissions can be
added without interfering with older kernels.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Add a new audit message type to capture nlmsg-related information. This
is similar to LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP which was added for the other
SELinux extended permission (ioctl).
Adding a new type is preferred to adding to the existing
lsm_network_audit structure which contains irrelevant information for
the netlink sockets (i.e., dport, sport).
Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
[PM: change "nlnk-msgtype" to "nl-msgtype" as discussed]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Add support for extended permission rules in conditional policies.
Currently the kernel accepts such rules already, but evaluating a
security decision will hit a BUG() in
services_compute_xperms_decision(). Thus reject extended permission
rules in conditional policies for current policy versions.
Add a new policy version for this feature.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Check sk->sk_protocol instead of security class to recognize SCTP socket.
SCTP socket is initialized with SECCLASS_SOCKET class if policy does not
support EXTSOCKCLASS capability. In this case bind(2) hook wrongfully
return EAFNOSUPPORT instead of EINVAL.
The inconsistency was detected with help of Landlock tests:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/b58680ca-81b2-7222-7287-0ac7f4227c3c@huawei-partners.com/
Fixes: 0f8db8cc73df ("selinux: add AF_UNSPEC and INADDR_ANY checks to selinux_socket_bind()")
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Use types for iterators equal to the type of the to be compared values.
Reported by clang:
../ss/sidtab.c:126:2: warning: comparison of integers of different
signs: 'int' and 'unsigned long'
126 | hash_for_each_rcu(sidtab->context_to_sid, i, entry, list) {
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
../hashtable.h:139:51: note: expanded from macro 'hash_for_each_rcu'
139 | for (... ; obj == NULL && (bkt) < HASH_SIZE(name);\
| ~~~ ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
../selinuxfs.c:1520:23: warning: comparison of integers of different
signs: 'int' and 'unsigned int'
1520 | for (cpu = *idx; cpu < nr_cpu_ids; ++cpu) {
| ~~~ ^ ~~~~~~~~~~
../hooks.c:412:16: warning: comparison of integers of different signs:
'int' and 'unsigned long'
412 | for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
| ~ ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: munged the clang output due to line length concerns]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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av_permissions.h was not declared as a target and therefore not cleaned
up automatically by kbuild.
Suggested-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAK7LNATUnCPt03BRFSKh1EH=+Sy0Q48wE4ER0BZdJqOb_44L8w@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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The new FS_PRE_ACCESS permission event is similar to FS_ACCESS_PERM,
but it meant for a different use case of filling file content before
access to a file range, so it has slightly different semantics.
Generate FS_PRE_ACCESS/FS_ACCESS_PERM as two seperate events, so content
scanners could inspect the content filled by pre-content event handler.
Unlike FS_ACCESS_PERM, FS_PRE_ACCESS is also called before a file is
modified by syscalls as write() and fallocate().
FS_ACCESS_PERM is reported also on blockdev and pipes, but the new
pre-content events are only reported for regular files and dirs.
The pre-content events are meant to be used by hierarchical storage
managers that want to fill the content of files on first access.
There are some specific requirements from filesystems that could
be used with pre-content events, so add a flag for fs to opt-in
for pre-content events explicitly before they can be used.
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/b934c5e3af205abc4e0e4709f6486815937ddfdf.1731684329.git.josef@toxicpanda.com
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Verify that the LSM releasing the secctx is the LSM that
allocated it. This was not necessary when only one LSM could
create a secctx, but once there can be more than one it is.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single lsm_context
pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier along with the context
and context length. This allows security_release_secctx() to know how
to release the context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
returned data from the new structure.
Cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Change the security_inode_getsecctx() interface to fill a lsm_context
structure instead of data and length pointers. This provides
the information about which LSM created the context so that
security_release_secctx() can use the correct hook.
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single
lsm_context pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier
along with the context and context length. This allows
security_release_secctx() to know how to release the
context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
returned data from the new structure.
security_secid_to_secctx() and security_lsmproc_to_secctx()
will now return the length value on success instead of 0.
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject tweak, kdoc fix, signedness fix from Dan Carpenter]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Add a new lsm_context data structure to hold all the information about a
"security context", including the string, its size and which LSM allocated
the string. The allocation information is necessary because LSMs have
different policies regarding the lifecycle of these strings. SELinux
allocates and destroys them on each use, whereas Smack provides a pointer
to an entry in a list that never goes away.
Update security_release_secctx() to use the lsm_context instead of a
(char *, len) pair. Change its callers to do likewise. The LSMs
supporting this hook have had comments added to remind the developer
that there is more work to be done.
The BPF security module provides all LSM hooks. While there has yet to
be a known instance of a BPF configuration that uses security contexts,
the possibility is real. In the existing implementation there is
potential for multiple frees in that case.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
To: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In blamed commit, TCP started to attach timewait sockets to
some skbs.
syzbot reported that selinux_ip_output() was not expecting them yet.
Note that using sk_to_full_sk() is still allowing the
following sk_listener() check to work as before.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in selinux_sock security/selinux/include/objsec.h:207 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in selinux_ip_output+0x1e0/0x1f0 security/selinux/hooks.c:5761
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88804e86e758 by task syz-executor347/5894
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5894 Comm: syz-executor347 Not tainted 6.12.0-syzkaller-05480-gfcc79e1714e8 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/30/2024
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0xc3/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0xd9/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:601
selinux_sock security/selinux/include/objsec.h:207 [inline]
selinux_ip_output+0x1e0/0x1f0 security/selinux/hooks.c:5761
nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:154 [inline]
nf_hook_slow+0xbb/0x200 net/netfilter/core.c:626
nf_hook+0x386/0x6d0 include/linux/netfilter.h:269
__ip_local_out+0x339/0x640 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:119
ip_local_out net/ipv4/ip_output.c:128 [inline]
ip_send_skb net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1505 [inline]
ip_push_pending_frames+0xa0/0x5b0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1525
ip_send_unicast_reply+0xd0e/0x1650 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1672
tcp_v4_send_ack+0x976/0x13f0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1024
tcp_v4_timewait_ack net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1077 [inline]
tcp_v4_rcv+0x2f96/0x4390 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2428
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xba/0x4c0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x316/0x570 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline]
ip_local_deliver+0x18e/0x1f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254
dst_input include/net/dst.h:460 [inline]
ip_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:447 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline]
ip_rcv+0x2c3/0x5d0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:567
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x199/0x1e0 net/core/dev.c:5672
__netif_receive_skb+0x1d/0x160 net/core/dev.c:5785
process_backlog+0x443/0x15f0 net/core/dev.c:6117
__napi_poll.constprop.0+0xb7/0x550 net/core/dev.c:6877
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6946 [inline]
net_rx_action+0xa94/0x1010 net/core/dev.c:7068
handle_softirqs+0x213/0x8f0 kernel/softirq.c:554
do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:455 [inline]
do_softirq+0xb2/0xf0 kernel/softirq.c:442
</IRQ>
<TASK>
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x100/0x120 kernel/softirq.c:382
local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline]
rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:919 [inline]
__dev_queue_xmit+0x8af/0x43e0 net/core/dev.c:4461
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3168 [inline]
neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:523 [inline]
neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:537 [inline]
ip_finish_output2+0xc6c/0x2150 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:236
__ip_finish_output net/ipv4/ip_output.c:314 [inline]
__ip_finish_output+0x49e/0x950 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:296
ip_finish_output+0x35/0x380 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:324
NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline]
ip_output+0x13b/0x2a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:434
dst_output include/net/dst.h:450 [inline]
ip_local_out+0x33e/0x4a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:130
__ip_queue_xmit+0x777/0x1970 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:536
__tcp_transmit_skb+0x2b39/0x3df0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1466
tcp_transmit_skb net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1484 [inline]
tcp_write_xmit+0x12b1/0x8560 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2827
__tcp_push_pending_frames+0xaf/0x390 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3010
tcp_send_fin+0x154/0xc70 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3616
__tcp_close+0x96b/0xff0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3130
tcp_close+0x28/0x120 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3221
inet_release+0x13c/0x280 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:435
__sock_release net/socket.c:640 [inline]
sock_release+0x8e/0x1d0 net/socket.c:668
smc_clcsock_release+0xb7/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:34
__smc_release+0x5c2/0x880 net/smc/af_smc.c:301
smc_release+0x1fc/0x5f0 net/smc/af_smc.c:344
__sock_release+0xb0/0x270 net/socket.c:640
sock_close+0x1c/0x30 net/socket.c:1408
__fput+0x3f8/0xb60 fs/file_table.c:450
__fput_sync+0xa1/0xc0 fs/file_table.c:535
__do_sys_close fs/open.c:1550 [inline]
__se_sys_close fs/open.c:1535 [inline]
__x64_sys_close+0x86/0x100 fs/open.c:1535
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f6814c9ae10
Code: ff f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 80 3d b1 e2 07 00 00 74 17 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 48 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 83 ec 18 89 7c
RSP: 002b:00007fffb2389758 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007f6814c9ae10
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000000f4240 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fffb23897b0
R13: 00000000000141c3 R14: 00007fffb238977c R15: 00007fffb2389790
</TASK>
Fixes: 79636038d37e ("ipv4: tcp: give socket pointer to control skbs")
Reported-by: syzbot+2d9f5f948c31dcb7745e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/6745e1a2.050a0220.1286eb.001c.GAE@google.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241126145911.4187198-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull non-MM updates from Andrew Morton:
- The series "resource: A couple of cleanups" from Andy Shevchenko
performs some cleanups in the resource management code
- The series "Improve the copy of task comm" from Yafang Shao addresses
possible race-induced overflows in the management of
task_struct.comm[]
- The series "Remove unnecessary header includes from
{tools/}lib/list_sort.c" from Kuan-Wei Chiu adds some cleanups and a
small fix to the list_sort library code and to its selftest
- The series "Enhance min heap API with non-inline functions and
optimizations" also from Kuan-Wei Chiu optimizes and cleans up the
min_heap library code
- The series "nilfs2: Finish folio conversion" from Ryusuke Konishi
finishes off nilfs2's folioification
- The series "add detect count for hung tasks" from Lance Yang adds
more userspace visibility into the hung-task detector's activity
- Apart from that, singelton patches in many places - please see the
individual changelogs for details
* tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2024-11-24-02-05' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (71 commits)
gdb: lx-symbols: do not error out on monolithic build
kernel/reboot: replace sprintf() with sysfs_emit()
lib: util_macros_kunit: add kunit test for util_macros.h
util_macros.h: fix/rework find_closest() macros
Improve consistency of '#error' directive messages
ocfs2: fix uninitialized value in ocfs2_file_read_iter()
hung_task: add docs for hung_task_detect_count
hung_task: add detect count for hung tasks
dma-buf: use atomic64_inc_return() in dma_buf_getfile()
fs/proc/kcore.c: fix coccinelle reported ERROR instances
resource: avoid unnecessary resource tree walking in __region_intersects()
ocfs2: remove unused errmsg function and table
ocfs2: cluster: fix a typo
lib/scatterlist: use sg_phys() helper
checkpatch: always parse orig_commit in fixes tag
nilfs2: convert metadata aops from writepage to writepages
nilfs2: convert nilfs_recovery_copy_block() to take a folio
nilfs2: convert nilfs_page_count_clean_buffers() to take a folio
nilfs2: remove nilfs_writepage
nilfs2: convert checkpoint file to be folio-based
...
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:
"Thirteen patches, all focused on moving away from the current 'secid'
LSM identifier to a richer 'lsm_prop' structure.
This move will help reduce the translation that is necessary in many
LSMs, offering better performance, and make it easier to support
different LSMs in the future"
* tag 'lsm-pr-20241112' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
lsm: remove lsm_prop scaffolding
netlabel,smack: use lsm_prop for audit data
audit: change context data from secid to lsm_prop
lsm: create new security_cred_getlsmprop LSM hook
audit: use an lsm_prop in audit_names
lsm: use lsm_prop in security_inode_getsecid
lsm: use lsm_prop in security_current_getsecid
audit: update shutdown LSM data
lsm: use lsm_prop in security_ipc_getsecid
audit: maintain an lsm_prop in audit_context
lsm: add lsmprop_to_secctx hook
lsm: use lsm_prop in security_audit_rule_match
lsm: add the lsm_prop data structure
|
|
Quoted from Linus [0]:
selinux never wanted a lock, and never wanted any kind of *consistent*
result, it just wanted a *stable* result.
Using get_task_comm() to read the task comm ensures that the name is
always NUL-terminated, regardless of the source string. This approach also
facilitates future extensions to the task comm.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241007144911.27693-4-laoar.shao@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHk-=wivfrF0_zvf+oj6==Sh=-npJooP8chLPEfaFV0oNYTTBA@mail.gmail.com/ [0]
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Cc: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matus Jokay <matus.jokay@stuba.sk>
Cc: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>
Cc: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Remove the scaffold member from the lsm_prop. Remove the
remaining places it is being set.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subj line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Create a new LSM hook security_cred_getlsmprop() which, like
security_cred_getsecid(), fetches LSM specific attributes from the
cred structure. The associated data elements in the audit sub-system
are changed from a secid to a lsm_prop to accommodate multiple possible
LSM audit users.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subj line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Change the security_inode_getsecid() interface to fill in a
lsm_prop structure instead of a u32 secid. This allows for its
callers to gather data from all registered LSMs. Data is provided
for IMA and audit. Change the name to security_inode_getlsmprop().
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subj line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Change the security_current_getsecid_subj() and
security_task_getsecid_obj() interfaces to fill in a lsm_prop structure
instead of a u32 secid. Audit interfaces will need to collect all
possible security data for possible reporting.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
There may be more than one LSM that provides IPC data for auditing.
Change security_ipc_getsecid() to fill in a lsm_prop structure instead
of the u32 secid. Change the name to security_ipc_getlsmprop() to
reflect the change.
Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Add a new hook security_lsmprop_to_secctx() and its LSM specific
implementations. The LSM specific code will use the lsm_prop element
allocated for that module. This allows for the possibility that more
than one module may be called upon to translate a secid to a string,
as can occur in the audit code.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match
to a lsm_prop structure pointer. Pass the entry from the
lsm_prop structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.
Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the
lsm_prop instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmprop_init()
fills the structure with the value of the old secid, ensuring that
it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of
the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(),
will be converted to use the lsm_prop structure later in the series.
At that point the use of lsmprop_init() is dropped.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
The only known user of this interface was libselinux and its
internal usage of this interface for get_ordered_context_list(3)
was removed in Feb 2020, with a deprecation warning added to
security_compute_user(3) at the same time. Add a deprecation
warning to the kernel and schedule it for final removal in 2025.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Update nlmsgtab.c to better adhere to the kernel coding style guidelines.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Streamline the code in selinux_nlmsg_lookup() to improve the code flow,
readability, and remove the unnecessary local variables.
Tested-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Reuse the existing extended permissions infrastructure to support
policies based on the netlink message types.
A new policy capability "netlink_xperm" is introduced. When disabled,
the previous behaviour is preserved. That is, netlink_send will rely on
the permission mappings defined in nlmsgtab.c (e.g, nlmsg_read for
RTM_GETADDR on NETLINK_ROUTE). When enabled, the mappings are ignored
and the generic "nlmsg" permission is used instead.
The new "nlmsg" permission is an extended permission. The 16 bits of the
extended permission are mapped to the nlmsg_type field.
Example policy on Android, preventing regular apps from accessing the
device's MAC address and ARP table, but allowing this access to
privileged apps, looks as follows:
allow netdomain self:netlink_route_socket {
create read getattr write setattr lock append connect getopt
setopt shutdown nlmsg
};
allowxperm netdomain self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg ~{
RTM_GETLINK RTM_GETNEIGH RTM_GETNEIGHTBL
};
allowxperm priv_app self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg {
RTM_GETLINK RTM_GETNEIGH RTM_GETNEIGHTBL
};
The constants in the example above (e.g., RTM_GETLINK) are explicitly
defined in the policy.
It is possible to generate policies to support kernels that may or
may not have the capability enabled by generating a rule for each
scenario. For instance:
allow domain self:netlink_audit_socket nlmsg_read;
allow domain self:netlink_audit_socket nlmsg;
allowxperm domain self:netlink_audit_socket nlmsg { AUDIT_GET };
The approach of defining a new permission ("nlmsg") instead of relying
on the existing permissions (e.g., "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_readpriv" or
"nlmsg_tty_audit") has been preferred because:
1. This is similar to the other extended permission ("ioctl");
2. With the new extended permission, the coarse-grained mapping is not
necessary anymore. It could eventually be removed, which would be
impossible if the extended permission was defined below these.
3. Having a single extra extended permission considerably simplifies
the implementation here and in libselinux.
Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Bram Bonné <brambonne@google.com>
[PM: manual merge fixes for sock_skip_has_perm()]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
This tool is only used in security/selinux/Makefile.
Move it to security/selinux/ so that 'make clean' can clean it up.
Please note 'make clean' does not clean scripts/ because tools under
scripts/ are often used for external module builds. Obviously, genheaders
is not the case here.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
The header, security/selinux/include/classmap.h, is included not only
from kernel space but also from host programs.
It includes <linux/capability.h> and <linux/socket.h>, which pull in
more <linux/*.h> headers. This makes the host programs less portable,
specifically causing build errors on macOS.
Those headers are included for the following purposes:
- <linux/capability.h> for checking CAP_LAST_CAP
- <linux/socket.h> for checking PF_MAX
These checks can be guarded by __KERNEL__ so they are skipped when
building host programs. Testing them when building the kernel should
be sufficient.
The header, security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h, includes
<linux/stddef.h> for the NULL definition, but this is not portable
either. Instead, <stddef.h> should be included for host programs.
Reported-by: Daniel Gomez <da.gomez@samsung.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240807-macos-build-support-v1-6-4cd1ded85694@samsung.com/
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240807-macos-build-support-v1-7-4cd1ded85694@samsung.com/
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Pull bpf 'struct fd' updates from Alexei Starovoitov:
"This includes struct_fd BPF changes from Al and Andrii"
* tag 'bpf-next-6.12-struct-fd' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next:
bpf: convert bpf_token_create() to CLASS(fd, ...)
security,bpf: constify struct path in bpf_token_create() LSM hook
bpf: more trivial fdget() conversions
bpf: trivial conversions for fdget()
bpf: switch maps to CLASS(fd, ...)
bpf: factor out fetching bpf_map from FD and adding it to used_maps list
bpf: switch fdget_raw() uses to CLASS(fd_raw, ...)
bpf: convert __bpf_prog_get() to CLASS(fd, ...)
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull LSM fixes from Paul Moore:
- Add a missing security_mmap_file() check to the remap_file_pages()
syscall
- Properly reference the SELinux and Smack LSM blobs in the
security_watch_key() LSM hook
- Fix a random IPE selftest crash caused by a missing list terminator
in the test
* tag 'lsm-pr-20240923' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
ipe: Add missing terminator to list of unit tests
selinux,smack: properly reference the LSM blob in security_watch_key()
mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()
|
|
Unfortunately when we migrated the lifecycle management of the key LSM
blob to the LSM framework we forgot to convert the security_watch_key()
callbacks for SELinux and Smack. This patch corrects this by making use
of the selinux_key() and smack_key() helper functions respectively.
This patch also removes some input checking in the Smack callback as it
is no longer needed.
Fixes: 5f8d28f6d7d5 ("lsm: infrastructure management of the key security blob")
Reported-by: syzbot+044fdf24e96093584232@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+044fdf24e96093584232@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:
- Move the LSM framework to static calls
This transitions the vast majority of the LSM callbacks into static
calls. Those callbacks which haven't been converted were left as-is
due to the general ugliness of the changes required to support the
static call conversion; we can revisit those callbacks at a future
date.
- Add the Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) LSM
This adds a new LSM, Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE). There is
plenty of documentation about IPE in this patches, so I'll refrain
from going into too much detail here, but the basic motivation behind
IPE is to provide a mechanism such that administrators can restrict
execution to only those binaries which come from integrity protected
storage, e.g. a dm-verity protected filesystem. You will notice that
IPE requires additional LSM hooks in the initramfs, dm-verity, and
fs-verity code, with the associated patches carrying ACK/review tags
from the associated maintainers. We couldn't find an obvious
maintainer for the initramfs code, but the IPE patchset has been
widely posted over several years.
Both Deven Bowers and Fan Wu have contributed to IPE's development
over the past several years, with Fan Wu agreeing to serve as the IPE
maintainer moving forward. Once IPE is accepted into your tree, I'll
start working with Fan to ensure he has the necessary accounts, keys,
etc. so that he can start submitting IPE pull requests to you
directly during the next merge window.
- Move the lifecycle management of the LSM blobs to the LSM framework
Management of the LSM blobs (the LSM state buffers attached to
various kernel structs, typically via a void pointer named "security"
or similar) has been mixed, some blobs were allocated/managed by
individual LSMs, others were managed by the LSM framework itself.
Starting with this pull we move management of all the LSM blobs,
minus the XFRM blob, into the framework itself, improving consistency
across LSMs, and reducing the amount of duplicated code across LSMs.
Due to some additional work required to migrate the XFRM blob, it has
been left as a todo item for a later date; from a practical
standpoint this omission should have little impact as only SELinux
provides a XFRM LSM implementation.
- Fix problems with the LSM's handling of F_SETOWN
The LSM hook for the fcntl(F_SETOWN) operation had a couple of
problems: it was racy with itself, and it was disconnected from the
associated DAC related logic in such a way that the LSM state could
be updated in cases where the DAC state would not. We fix both of
these problems by moving the security_file_set_fowner() hook into the
same section of code where the DAC attributes are updated. Not only
does this resolve the DAC/LSM synchronization issue, but as that code
block is protected by a lock, it also resolve the race condition.
- Fix potential problems with the security_inode_free() LSM hook
Due to use of RCU to protect inodes and the placement of the LSM hook
associated with freeing the inode, there is a bit of a challenge when
it comes to managing any LSM state associated with an inode. The VFS
folks are not open to relocating the LSM hook so we have to get
creative when it comes to releasing an inode's LSM state.
Traditionally we have used a single LSM callback within the hook that
is triggered when the inode is "marked for death", but not actually
released due to RCU.
Unfortunately, this causes problems for LSMs which want to take an
action when the inode's associated LSM state is actually released; so
we add an additional LSM callback, inode_free_security_rcu(), that is
called when the inode's LSM state is released in the RCU free
callback.
- Refactor two LSM hooks to better fit the LSM return value patterns
The vast majority of the LSM hooks follow the "return 0 on success,
negative values on failure" pattern, however, there are a small
handful that have unique return value behaviors which has caused
confusion in the past and makes it difficult for the BPF verifier to
properly vet BPF LSM programs. This includes patches to
convert two of these"special" LSM hooks to the common 0/-ERRNO pattern.
- Various cleanups and improvements
A handful of patches to remove redundant code, better leverage the
IS_ERR_OR_NULL() helper, add missing "static" markings, and do some
minor style fixups.
* tag 'lsm-pr-20240911' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (40 commits)
security: Update file_set_fowner documentation
fs: Fix file_set_fowner LSM hook inconsistencies
lsm: Use IS_ERR_OR_NULL() helper function
lsm: remove LSM_COUNT and LSM_CONFIG_COUNT
ipe: Remove duplicated include in ipe.c
lsm: replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls
lsm: count the LSMs enabled at compile time
kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling
init/main.c: Initialize early LSMs after arch code, static keys and calls.
MAINTAINERS: add IPE entry with Fan Wu as maintainer
documentation: add IPE documentation
ipe: kunit test for parser
scripts: add boot policy generation program
ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider
fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs
lsm: add security_inode_setintegrity() hook
ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider
dm-verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs
block,lsm: add LSM blob and new LSM hooks for block devices
ipe: add permissive toggle
...
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Ensure that both IPv4 and IPv6 connections are properly initialized
While we always properly initialized IPv4 connections early in their
life, we missed the necessary IPv6 change when we were adding IPv6
support.
- Annotate the SELinux inode revalidation function to quiet KCSAN
KCSAN correctly identifies a race in __inode_security_revalidate()
when we check to see if an inode's SELinux has been properly
initialized. While KCSAN is correct, it is an intentional choice made
for performance reasons; if necessary, we check the state a second
time, this time with a lock held, before initializing the inode's
state.
- Code cleanups, simplification, etc.
A handful of individual patches to simplify some SELinux kernel
logic, improve return code granularity via ERR_PTR(), follow the
guidance on using KMEM_CACHE(), and correct some minor style
problems.
* tag 'selinux-pr-20240911' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix style problems in security/selinux/include/audit.h
selinux: simplify avc_xperms_audit_required()
selinux: mark both IPv4 and IPv6 accepted connection sockets as labeled
selinux: replace kmem_cache_create() with KMEM_CACHE()
selinux: annotate false positive data race to avoid KCSAN warnings
selinux: refactor code to return ERR_PTR in selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr
selinux: Streamline type determination in security_compute_sid
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull vfs file updates from Christian Brauner:
"This is the work to cleanup and shrink struct file significantly.
Right now, (focusing on x86) struct file is 232 bytes. After this
series struct file will be 184 bytes aka 3 cacheline and a spare 8
bytes for future extensions at the end of the struct.
With struct file being as ubiquitous as it is this should make a
difference for file heavy workloads and allow further optimizations in
the future.
- struct fown_struct was embedded into struct file letting it take up
32 bytes in total when really it shouldn't even be embedded in
struct file in the first place. Instead, actual users of struct
fown_struct now allocate the struct on demand. This frees up 24
bytes.
- Move struct file_ra_state into the union containg the cleanup hooks
and move f_iocb_flags out of the union. This closes a 4 byte hole
we created earlier and brings struct file to 192 bytes. Which means
struct file is 3 cachelines and we managed to shrink it by 40
bytes.
- Reorder struct file so that nothing crosses a cacheline.
I suspect that in the future we will end up reordering some members
to mitigate false sharing issues or just because someone does
actually provide really good perf data.
- Shrinking struct file to 192 bytes is only part of the work.
Files use a slab that is SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU and when a kmem cache
is created with SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU the free pointer must be
located outside of the object because the cache doesn't know what
part of the memory can safely be overwritten as it may be needed to
prevent object recycling.
That has the consequence that SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU may end up
adding a new cacheline.
So this also contains work to add a new kmem_cache_create_rcu()
function that allows the caller to specify an offset where the
freelist pointer is supposed to be placed. Thus avoiding the
implicit addition of a fourth cacheline.
- And finally this removes the f_version member in struct file.
The f_version member isn't particularly well-defined. It is mainly
used as a cookie to detect concurrent seeks when iterating
directories. But it is also abused by some subsystems for
completely unrelated things.
It is mostly a directory and filesystem specific thing that doesn't
really need to live in struct file and with its wonky semantics it
really lacks a specific function.
For pipes, f_version is (ab)used to defer poll notifications until
a write has happened. And struct pipe_inode_info is used by
multiple struct files in their ->private_data so there's no chance
of pushing that down into file->private_data without introducing
another pointer indirection.
But pipes don't rely on f_pos_lock so this adds a union into struct
file encompassing f_pos_lock and a pipe specific f_pipe member that
pipes can use. This union of course can be extended to other file
types and is similar to what we do in struct inode already"
* tag 'vfs-6.12.file' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: (26 commits)
fs: remove f_version
pipe: use f_pipe
fs: add f_pipe
ubifs: store cookie in private data
ufs: store cookie in private data
udf: store cookie in private data
proc: store cookie in private data
ocfs2: store cookie in private data
input: remove f_version abuse
ext4: store cookie in private data
ext2: store cookie in private data
affs: store cookie in private data
fs: add generic_llseek_cookie()
fs: use must_set_pos()
fs: add must_set_pos()
fs: add vfs_setpos_cookie()
s390: remove unused f_version
ceph: remove unused f_version
adi: remove unused f_version
mm: Removed @freeptr_offset to prevent doc warning
...
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There is no reason why struct path pointer shouldn't be const-qualified
when being passed into bpf_token_create() LSM hook. Add that const.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (LSM/SELinux)
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
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