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These mount option flags are obsolete since commit 12085b14a444 ("smack:
switch to private smack_mnt_opts"), remove them.
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Return the value smk_ptrace_rule_check() directly instead of storing it
in another redundant variable.
Reported-by: Zeal Robot <zealci@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Xu Panda <xu.panda@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Using smk_of_current() during sk_alloc_security hook leads in
rare cases to a faulty initialization of the security context
of the created socket.
By adding the LSM hook sk_clone_security to SMACK this initialization
fault is corrected by copying the security context of the old socket
pointer to the newly cloned one.
Co-authored-by: Martin Ostertag: <martin.ostertag@elektrobit.com>
Signed-off-by: Lontke Michael <michael.lontke@elektrobit.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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In preparation for the patch that introduces the bpf_lookup_user_key() eBPF
kfunc, move KEY_LOOKUP_ definitions to include/linux/key.h, to be able to
validate the kfunc parameters. Add them to enum key_lookup_flag, so that
all the current ones and the ones defined in the future are automatically
exported through BTF and available to eBPF programs.
Also, add KEY_LOOKUP_ALL to the enum, with the logical OR of currently
defined flags as value, to facilitate checking whether a variable contains
only those flags.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220920075951.929132-7-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Return the value avc_has_perm() directly instead of storing it in
another redundant variable.
Reported-by: Zeal Robot <zealci@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Xu Panda <xu.panda@zte.com.cn>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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User space can flood the log with lockdown denial messages:
[ 662.555584] Lockdown: bash: debugfs access is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7
[ 662.563237] Lockdown: bash: debugfs access is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7
[ 662.571134] Lockdown: bash: debugfs access is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7
[ 662.578668] Lockdown: bash: debugfs access is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7
[ 662.586021] Lockdown: bash: debugfs access is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7
[ 662.593398] Lockdown: bash: debugfs access is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7
Ratelimiting these shouldn't meaningfully degrade the quality of the
information logged.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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LoadPin expects the file with trusted verity root digests to be
an ASCII file with one digest (hex value) per line. A pinned
root could contain files that meet these format requirements,
even though the hex values don't represent trusted root
digests.
Add a new requirement to the file format which consists in
the first line containing a fixed string. This prevents
attackers from feeding files with an otherwise valid format
to LoadPin.
Suggested-by: Sarthak Kukreti <sarthakkukreti@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220906181725.1.I3f51d1bb0014e5a5951be4ad3c5ad7c7ca1dfc32@changeid
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The doc for CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_VERITY says that the file with verity
digests must contain a comma separated list of digests. That was the case
at some stage of the development, but was changed during the review
process to one digest per line. Update the Kconfig doc accordingly.
Reported-by: Jae Hoon Kim <kimjae@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Fixes: 3f805f8cc23b ("LoadPin: Enable loading from trusted dm-verity devices")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220829174557.1.I5d202d1344212a3800d9828f936df6511eb2d0d1@changeid
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux
Pull landlock fix from Mickaël Salaün:
"This fixes a mis-handling of the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER right when
multiple rulesets/domains are stacked.
The expected behaviour was that an additional ruleset can only
restrict the set of permitted operations, but in this particular case,
it was potentially possible to re-gain the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER
right"
* tag 'landlock-6.0-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux:
landlock: Fix file reparenting without explicit LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER
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This change fixes a mis-handling of the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER right
when multiple rulesets/domains are stacked. The expected behaviour was
that an additional ruleset can only restrict the set of permitted
operations, but in this particular case, it was potentially possible to
re-gain the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER right.
With the introduction of LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER, we added the first
globally denied-by-default access right. Indeed, this lifted an initial
Landlock limitation to rename and link files, which was initially always
denied when the source or the destination were different directories.
This led to an inconsistent backward compatibility behavior which was
only taken into account if no domain layer were using the new
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER right. However, when restricting a thread with
a new ruleset handling LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER, all inherited parent
rulesets/layers not explicitly handling LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER would
behave as if they were handling this access right and with all their
rules allowing it. This means that renaming and linking files could
became allowed by these parent layers, but all the other required
accesses must also be granted: all layers must allow file removal or
creation, and renaming and linking operations cannot lead to privilege
escalation according to the Landlock policy. See detailed explanation
in commit b91c3e4ea756 ("landlock: Add support for file reparenting with
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER").
To say it another way, this bug may lift the renaming and linking
limitations of the initial Landlock version, and a same ruleset can
enforce different restrictions depending on previous or next enforced
ruleset (i.e. inconsistent behavior). The LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER right
cannot give access to data not already allowed, but this doesn't follow
the contract of the first Landlock ABI. This fix puts back the
limitation for sandboxes that didn't opt-in for this additional right.
For instance, if a first ruleset allows LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG on
/dst and LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE on /src, renaming /src/file to
/dst/file is denied. However, without this fix, stacking a new ruleset
which allows LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER on / would now permit the
sandboxed thread to rename /src/file to /dst/file .
This change fixes the (absolute) rule access rights, which now always
forbid LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER except when it is explicitly allowed
when creating a rule.
Making all domain handle LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER was an initial
approach but there is two downsides:
* it makes the code more complex because we still want to check that a
rule allowing LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER is legitimate according to the
ruleset's handled access rights (i.e. ABI v1 != ABI v2);
* it would not allow to identify if the user created a ruleset
explicitly handling LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER or not, which will be an
issue to audit Landlock.
Instead, this change adds an ACCESS_INITIALLY_DENIED list of
denied-by-default rights, which (only) contains
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER. All domains are treated as if they are also
handling this list, but without modifying their fs_access_masks field.
A side effect is that the errno code returned by rename(2) or link(2)
*may* be changed from EXDEV to EACCES according to the enforced
restrictions. Indeed, we now have the mechanic to identify if an access
is denied because of a required right (e.g. LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG,
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE) or if it is denied because of missing
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER rights. This may result in different errno
codes than for the initial Landlock version, but this approach is more
consistent and better for rename/link compatibility reasons, and it
wasn't possible before (hence no backport to ABI v1). The
layout1.rename_file test reflects this change.
Add 4 layout1.refer_denied_by_default* test suites to check that the
behavior of a ruleset not handling LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER (ABI v1) is
unchanged even if another layer handles LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER (i.e.
ABI v1 precedence). Make sure rule's absolute access rights are correct
by testing with and without a matching path. Add test_rename() and
test_exchange() helpers.
Extend layout1.inval tests to check that a denied-by-default access
right is not necessarily part of a domain's handled access rights.
Test coverage for security/landlock is 95.3% of 599 lines according to
gcc/gcov-11.
Fixes: b91c3e4ea756 ("landlock: Add support for file reparenting with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER")
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220831203840.1370732-1-mic@digikod.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[mic: Constify and slightly simplify test helpers]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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cast of ->d_name.name to char * is completely wrong - nothing is
allowed to modify its contents.
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull LSM support for IORING_OP_URING_CMD from Paul Moore:
"Add SELinux and Smack controls to the io_uring IORING_OP_URING_CMD.
These are necessary as without them the IORING_OP_URING_CMD remains
outside the purview of the LSMs (Luis' LSM patch, Casey's Smack patch,
and my SELinux patch). They have been discussed at length with the
io_uring folks, and Jens has given his thumbs-up on the relevant
patches (see the commit descriptions).
There is one patch that is not strictly necessary, but it makes
testing much easier and is very trivial: the /dev/null
IORING_OP_URING_CMD patch."
* tag 'lsm-pr-20220829' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
Smack: Provide read control for io_uring_cmd
/dev/null: add IORING_OP_URING_CMD support
selinux: implement the security_uring_cmd() LSM hook
lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for the new uring_cmd file op
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The uapi POSIX ACL struct passed through the value argument during
setxattr() contains {g,u}id values encoded via ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries
that should actually be stored in the form of k{g,u}id_t (See [1] for a
long explanation of the issue.).
In 0c5fd887d2bb ("acl: move idmapped mount fixup into vfs_{g,s}etxattr()")
we took the mount's idmapping into account in order to let overlayfs
handle POSIX ACLs on idmapped layers correctly. The fixup is currently
performed directly in vfs_setxattr() which piles on top of the earlier
hackiness by handling the mount's idmapping and stuff the vfs{g,u}id_t
values into the uapi struct as well. While that is all correct and works
fine it's just ugly.
Now that we have introduced vfs_make_posix_acl() earlier move handling
idmapped mounts out of vfs_setxattr() and into the POSIX ACL handler
where it belongs.
Note that we also need to call vfs_make_posix_acl() for EVM which
interpretes POSIX ACLs during security_inode_setxattr(). Leave them a
longer comment for future reference.
All filesystems that support idmapped mounts via FS_ALLOW_IDMAP use the
standard POSIX ACL xattr handlers and are covered by this change. This
includes overlayfs which simply calls vfs_{g,s}etxattr().
The following filesystems use custom POSIX ACL xattr handlers: 9p, cifs,
ecryptfs, and ntfs3 (and overlayfs but we've covered that in the paragraph
above) and none of them support idmapped mounts yet.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org/ [1]
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) <sforshee@kernel.org>
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Declare ebitmap, mls_level and mls_context parameters const where they
are only read from. This allows callers to supply pointers to const
as arguments and increases readability.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Do not cast pointers of signed integers to pointers of unsigned integers
and vice versa.
It should currently not be an issue since they hold SELinux boolean
values which should only contain either 0's or 1's, which should have
the same representation.
Reported by sparse:
.../selinuxfs.c:1485:30: warning: incorrect type in assignment
(different signedness)
.../selinuxfs.c:1485:30: expected unsigned int *
.../selinuxfs.c:1485:30: got int *[addressable] values
.../selinuxfs.c:1402:48: warning: incorrect type in argument 3
(different signedness)
.../selinuxfs.c:1402:48: expected int *values
.../selinuxfs.c:1402:48: got unsigned int *bool_pending_values
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: minor whitespace fixes, sparse output cleanup]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Return the value sel_make_perm_files() directly instead of storing it
in another redundant variable.
Reported-by: Zeal Robot <zealci@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: ye xingchen <ye.xingchen@zte.com.cn>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Limit io_uring "cmd" options to files for which the caller has
Smack read access. There may be cases where the cmd option may
be closer to a write access than a read, but there is no way
to make that determination.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring: add infrastructure for uring-cmd")
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Add a SELinux access control for the iouring IORING_OP_URING_CMD
command. This includes the addition of a new permission in the
existing "io_uring" object class: "cmd". The subject of the new
permission check is the domain of the process requesting access, the
object is the open file which points to the device/file that is the
target of the IORING_OP_URING_CMD operation. A sample policy rule
is shown below:
allow <domain> <file>:io_uring { cmd };
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring: add infrastructure for uring-cmd")
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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io-uring cmd support was added through ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring:
add infrastructure for uring-cmd"), this extended the struct
file_operations to allow a new command which each subsystem can use
to enable command passthrough. Add an LSM specific for the command
passthrough which enables LSMs to inspect the command details.
This was discussed long ago without no clear pointer for something
conclusive, so this enables LSMs to at least reject this new file
operation.
[0] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/8adf55db-7bab-f59d-d612-ed906b948d19@schaufler-ca.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring: add infrastructure for uring-cmd")
Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Limit validating the hash algorithm to just security.ima xattr, not
the security.evm xattr or any of the protected EVM security xattrs,
nor posix acls.
Fixes: 50f742dd9147 ("IMA: block writes of the security.ima xattr with unsupported algorithms")
Reported-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Idiomatic way to find how much space sprintf output would take is
len = snprintf(NULL, 0, ...) + 1;
Once upon a time there'd been libc implementations that blew chunks
on that and somebody had come up with the following "cute" trick:
len = snprintf((char *) &len, 1, ...) + 1;
for doing the same. However, that's unidiomatic, harder to follow
*and* any such libc implementation would violate both C99 and POSIX
(since 2001).
IOW, this kludge is best buried along with such libc implementations,
nevermind getting cargo-culted into newer code. Our vsnprintf() does not
suffer that braindamage, TYVM.
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull hardening fixes from Kees Cook:
- Also undef LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN for per-file disabling (Andrew
Donnellan)
- Return EFAULT on copy_from_user() failures in LoadPin (Kees Cook)
* tag 'hardening-v6.0-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
gcc-plugins: Undefine LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN when plugin disabled for a file
LoadPin: Return EFAULT on copy_from_user() failures
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Unprivileged user namespace creation is an intended feature to enable
sandboxing, however this feature is often used to as an initial step to
perform a privilege escalation attack.
This patch implements a new user_namespace { create } access control
permission to restrict which domains allow or deny user namespace
creation. This is necessary for system administrators to quickly protect
their systems while waiting for vulnerability patches to be applied.
This permission can be used in the following way:
allow domA_t domA_t : user_namespace { create };
Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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User namespaces are an effective tool to allow programs to run with
permission without requiring the need for a program to run as root. User
namespaces may also be used as a sandboxing technique. However, attackers
sometimes leverage user namespaces as an initial attack vector to perform
some exploit. [1,2,3]
While it is not the unprivileged user namespace functionality, which
causes the kernel to be exploitable, users/administrators might want to
more granularly limit or at least monitor how various processes use this
functionality, while vulnerable kernel subsystems are being patched.
Preventing user namespace already creation comes in a few of forms in
order of granularity:
1. /proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces sysctl
2. Distro specific patch(es)
3. CONFIG_USER_NS
To block a task based on its attributes, the LSM hook cred_prepare is a
decent candidate for use because it provides more granular control, and
it is called before create_user_ns():
cred = prepare_creds()
security_prepare_creds()
call_int_hook(cred_prepare, ...
if (cred)
create_user_ns(cred)
Since security_prepare_creds() is meant for LSMs to copy and prepare
credentials, access control is an unintended use of the hook. [4]
Further, security_prepare_creds() will always return a ENOMEM if the
hook returns any non-zero error code.
This hook also does not handle the clone3 case which requires us to
access a user space pointer to know if we're in the CLONE_NEW_USER
call path which may be subject to a TOCTTOU attack.
Lastly, cred_prepare is called in many call paths, and a targeted hook
further limits the frequency of calls which is a beneficial outcome.
Therefore introduce a new function security_create_user_ns() with an
accompanying userns_create LSM hook.
With the new userns_create hook, users will have more control over the
observability and access control over user namespace creation. Users
should expect that normal operation of user namespaces will behave as
usual, and only be impacted when controls are implemented by users or
administrators.
This hook takes the prepared creds for LSM authors to write policy
against. On success, the new namespace is applied to credentials,
otherwise an error is returned.
Links:
1. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0492
2. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25636
3. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-34918
4. https://lore.kernel.org/all/1c4b1c0d-12f6-6e9e-a6a3-cdce7418110c@schaufler-ca.com/
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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The copy_from_user() function returns the number of bytes remaining to
be copied on a failure. Such failures should return -EFAULT to high
levels.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Fixes: 3f805f8cc23b ("LoadPin: Enable loading from trusted dm-verity devices")
Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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The implements of {ip,tcp,udp,dccp,sctp,ipv6}_hdr(skb) guarantee that
they will never return NULL, and elsewhere users don't do the check
as well, so remove the check here.
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull AppArmor updates from John Johansen:
"This is mostly cleanups and bug fixes with the one bigger change being
Mathew Wilcox's patch to use XArrays instead of the IDR from the
thread around the locking weirdness.
Features:
- Convert secid mapping to XArrays instead of IDR
- Add a kernel label to use on kernel objects
- Extend policydb permission set by making use of the xbits
- Make export of raw binary profile to userspace optional
- Enable tuning of policy paranoid load for embedded systems
- Don't create raw_sha1 symlink if sha1 hashing is disabled
- Allow labels to carry debug flags
Cleanups:
- Update MAINTAINERS file
- Use struct_size() helper in kmalloc()
- Move ptrace mediation to more logical task.{h,c}
- Resolve uninitialized symbol warnings
- Remove redundant ret variable
- Mark alloc_unconfined() as static
- Update help description of policy hash for introspection
- Remove some casts which are no-longer required
Bug Fixes:
- Fix aa_label_asxprint return check
- Fix reference count leak in aa_pivotroot()
- Fix memleak in aa_simple_write_to_buffer()
- Fix kernel doc comments
- Fix absroot causing audited secids to begin with =
- Fix quiet_denied for file rules
- Fix failed mount permission check error message
- Disable showing the mode as part of a secid to secctx
- Fix setting unconfined mode on a loaded profile
- Fix overlapping attachment computation
- Fix undefined reference to `zlib_deflate_workspacesize'"
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2022-08-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor: (34 commits)
apparmor: Update MAINTAINERS file with new email address
apparmor: correct config reference to intended one
apparmor: move ptrace mediation to more logical task.{h,c}
apparmor: extend policydb permission set by making use of the xbits
apparmor: allow label to carry debug flags
apparmor: fix overlapping attachment computation
apparmor: fix setting unconfined mode on a loaded profile
apparmor: Fix some kernel-doc comments
apparmor: Mark alloc_unconfined() as static
apparmor: disable showing the mode as part of a secid to secctx
apparmor: Convert secid mapping to XArrays instead of IDR
apparmor: add a kernel label to use on kernel objects
apparmor: test: Remove some casts which are no-longer required
apparmor: Fix memleak in aa_simple_write_to_buffer()
apparmor: fix reference count leak in aa_pivotroot()
apparmor: Fix some kernel-doc comments
apparmor: Fix undefined reference to `zlib_deflate_workspacesize'
apparmor: fix aa_label_asxprint return check
apparmor: Fix some kernel-doc comments
apparmor: Fix some kernel-doc comments
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest
Pull KUnit updates from Shuah Khan:
"This consists of several fixes and an important feature to discourage
running KUnit tests on production systems. Running tests on a
production system could leave the system in a bad state.
Summary:
- Add a new taint type, TAINT_TEST to signal that a test has been
run.
This should discourage people from running these tests on
production systems, and to make it easier to tell if tests have
been run accidentally (by loading the wrong configuration, etc)
- Several documentation and tool enhancements and fixes"
* tag 'linux-kselftest-kunit-5.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest: (29 commits)
Documentation: KUnit: Fix example with compilation error
Documentation: kunit: Add CLI args for kunit_tool
kcsan: test: Add a .kunitconfig to run KCSAN tests
kunit: executor: Fix a memory leak on failure in kunit_filter_tests
clk: explicitly disable CONFIG_UML_PCI_OVER_VIRTIO in .kunitconfig
mmc: sdhci-of-aspeed: test: Use kunit_test_suite() macro
nitro_enclaves: test: Use kunit_test_suite() macro
thunderbolt: test: Use kunit_test_suite() macro
kunit: flatten kunit_suite*** to kunit_suite** in .kunit_test_suites
kunit: unify module and builtin suite definitions
selftest: Taint kernel when test module loaded
module: panic: Taint the kernel when selftest modules load
Documentation: kunit: fix example run_kunit func to allow spaces in args
Documentation: kunit: Cleanup run_wrapper, fix x-ref
kunit: test.h: fix a kernel-doc markup
kunit: tool: Enable virtio/PCI by default on UML
kunit: tool: make --kunitconfig repeatable, blindly concat
kunit: add coverage_uml.config to enable GCOV on UML
kunit: tool: refactor internal kconfig handling, allow overriding
kunit: tool: introduce --qemu_args
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Aside from the one EVM cleanup patch, all the other changes are kexec
related.
On different architectures different keyrings are used to verify the
kexec'ed kernel image signature. Here are a number of preparatory
cleanup patches and the patches themselves for making the keyrings -
builtin_trusted_keyring, .machine, .secondary_trusted_keyring, and
.platform - consistent across the different architectures"
* tag 'integrity-v6.0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
kexec, KEYS, s390: Make use of built-in and secondary keyring for signature verification
arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature
kexec, KEYS: make the code in bzImage64_verify_sig generic
kexec: clean up arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig
kexec: drop weak attribute from functions
kexec_file: drop weak attribute from functions
evm: Use IS_ENABLED to initialize .enabled
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Pull SafeSetID updates from Micah Morton:
"This contains one commit that touches common kernel code, one that
adds functionality internal to the SafeSetID LSM code, and a few other
commits that only modify the SafeSetID LSM selftest.
The commit that touches common kernel code simply adds an LSM hook in
the setgroups() syscall that mirrors what is done for the existing LSM
hooks in the setuid() and setgid() syscalls. This commit combined with
the SafeSetID-specific one allow the LSM to filter setgroups() calls
according to configured rule sets in the same way that is already done
for setuid() and setgid()"
* tag 'safesetid-6.0' of https://github.com/micah-morton/linux:
LSM: SafeSetID: add setgroups() testing to selftest
LSM: SafeSetID: Add setgroups() security policy handling
security: Add LSM hook to setgroups() syscall
LSM: SafeSetID: add GID testing to selftest
LSM: SafeSetID: selftest cleanup and prepare for GIDs
LSM: SafeSetID: fix userns bug in selftest
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Pull msack updates from Casey Schaufler:
"Two minor code clean-ups for Smack.
One removes a touch of dead code and the other replaces an instance of
kzalloc + strncpy with kstrndup"
* tag 'Smack-for-6.0' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
smack: Remove the redundant lsm_inode_alloc
smack: Replace kzalloc + strncpy with kstrndup
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"A relatively small set of patches for SELinux this time, eight patches
in total with really only one significant change.
The highlights are:
- Add support for proper labeling of memfd_secret anonymous inodes.
This will allow LSMs that implement the anonymous inode hooks to
apply security policy to memfd_secret() fds.
- Various small improvements to memory management: fixed leaks, freed
memory when needed, boundary checks.
- Hardened the selinux_audit_data struct with __randomize_layout.
- A minor documentation tweak to fix a formatting/style issue"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20220801' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: selinux_add_opt() callers free memory
selinux: Add boundary check in put_entry()
selinux: fix memleak in security_read_state_kernel()
docs: selinux: add '=' signs to kernel boot options
mm: create security context for memfd_secret inodes
selinux: fix typos in comments
selinux: drop unnecessary NULL check
selinux: add __randomize_layout to selinux_audit_data
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull hardening updates from Kees Cook:
- Fix Sparse warnings with randomizd kstack (GONG, Ruiqi)
- Replace uintptr_t with unsigned long in usercopy (Jason A. Donenfeld)
- Fix Clang -Wforward warning in LKDTM (Justin Stitt)
- Fix comment to correctly refer to STRICT_DEVMEM (Lukas Bulwahn)
- Introduce dm-verity binding logic to LoadPin LSM (Matthias Kaehlcke)
- Clean up warnings and overflow and KASAN tests (Kees Cook)
* tag 'hardening-v5.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
dm: verity-loadpin: Drop use of dm_table_get_num_targets()
kasan: test: Silence GCC 12 warnings
drivers: lkdtm: fix clang -Wformat warning
x86: mm: refer to the intended config STRICT_DEVMEM in a comment
dm: verity-loadpin: Use CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_VERITY for conditional compilation
LoadPin: Enable loading from trusted dm-verity devices
dm: Add verity helpers for LoadPin
stack: Declare {randomize_,}kstack_offset to fix Sparse warnings
lib: overflow: Do not define 64-bit tests on 32-bit
MAINTAINERS: Add a general "kernel hardening" section
usercopy: use unsigned long instead of uintptr_t
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It's not possible for inode->i_security to be NULL here because every
inode will call inode_init_always and then lsm_inode_alloc to alloc
memory for inode->security, this is what LSM infrastructure management
do, so remove this redundant code.
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Simplify the code by using kstrndup instead of kzalloc and strncpy in
smk_parse_smack(), which meanwhile remove strncpy as [1] suggests.
[1]: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/90
Signed-off-by: GONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 kdump updates from Borislav Petkov:
- Add the ability to pass early an RNG seed to the kernel from the boot
loader
- Add the ability to pass the IMA measurement of kernel and bootloader
to the kexec-ed kernel
* tag 'x86_kdump_for_v6.0_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/setup: Use rng seeds from setup_data
x86/kexec: Carry forward IMA measurement log on kexec
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull fs idmapping updates from Christian Brauner:
"This introduces the new vfs{g,u}id_t types we agreed on. Similar to
k{g,u}id_t the new types are just simple wrapper structs around
regular {g,u}id_t types.
They allow to establish a type safety boundary in the VFS for idmapped
mounts preventing confusion betwen {g,u}ids mapped into an idmapped
mount and {g,u}ids mapped into the caller's or the filesystem's
idmapping.
An initial set of helpers is introduced that allows to operate on
vfs{g,u}id_t types. We will remove all references to non-type safe
idmapped mounts helpers in the very near future. The patches do
already exist.
This converts the core attribute changing codepaths which become
significantly easier to reason about because of this change.
Just a few highlights here as the patches give detailed overviews of
what is happening in the commit messages:
- The kernel internal struct iattr contains type safe vfs{g,u}id_t
values clearly communicating that these values have to take a given
mount's idmapping into account.
- The ownership values placed in struct iattr to change ownership are
identical for idmapped and non-idmapped mounts going forward. This
also allows to simplify stacking filesystems such as overlayfs that
change attributes In other words, they always represent the values.
- Instead of open coding checks for whether ownership changes have
been requested and an actual update of the inode is required we now
have small static inline wrappers that abstract this logic away
removing a lot of code duplication from individual filesystems that
all open-coded the same checks"
* tag 'fs.idmapped.vfsuid.v5.20' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
mnt_idmapping: align kernel doc and parameter order
mnt_idmapping: use new helpers in mapped_fs{g,u}id()
fs: port HAS_UNMAPPED_ID() to vfs{g,u}id_t
mnt_idmapping: return false when comparing two invalid ids
attr: fix kernel doc
attr: port attribute changes to new types
security: pass down mount idmapping to setattr hook
quota: port quota helpers mount ids
fs: port to iattr ownership update helpers
fs: introduce tiny iattr ownership update helpers
fs: use mount types in iattr
fs: add two type safe mapping helpers
mnt_idmapping: add vfs{g,u}id_t
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Commit 5bfcbd22ee4e ("apparmor: Enable tuning of policy paranoid load for
embedded systems") introduces the config SECURITY_APPARMOR_PARANOID_LOAD,
but then refers in the code to SECURITY_PARANOID_LOAD; note the missing
APPARMOR in the middle.
Correct this to the introduced and intended config option.
Fixes: 5bfcbd22ee4e ("apparmor: Enable tuning of policy paranoid load for embedded systems")
Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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The lockdown LSM is primarily used in conjunction with UEFI Secure Boot.
This LSM may also be used on machines without UEFI. It can also be
enabled when UEFI Secure Boot is disabled. One of lockdown's features
is to prevent kexec from loading untrusted kernels. Lockdown can be
enabled through a bootparam or after the kernel has booted through
securityfs.
If IMA appraisal is used with the "ima_appraise=log" boot param,
lockdown can be defeated with kexec on any machine when Secure Boot is
disabled or unavailable. IMA prevents setting "ima_appraise=log" from
the boot param when Secure Boot is enabled, but this does not cover
cases where lockdown is used without Secure Boot.
To defeat lockdown, boot without Secure Boot and add ima_appraise=log to
the kernel command line; then:
$ echo "integrity" > /sys/kernel/security/lockdown
$ echo "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig" > \
/sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
$ kexec -ls unsigned-kernel
Add a call to verify ima appraisal is set to "enforce" whenever lockdown
is enabled. This fixes CVE-2022-21505.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 29d3c1c8dfe7 ("kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down")
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: John Haxby <john.haxby@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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AppArmor split out task oriented controls to their own logical file
a while ago. Ptrace mediation is better grouped with task than
ipc, so move it.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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The policydb permission set has left the xbits unused. Make them available
for mediation.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Allow labels to have debug flags that can be used to trigger debug output
only from profiles/labels that are marked. This can help reduce debug
output by allowing debug to be target to a specific confinement condition.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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When finding the profile via patterned attachments, the longest left
match is being set to the static compile time value and not using the
runtime computed value.
Fix this by setting the candidate value to the greater of the
precomputed value or runtime computed value.
Fixes: 21f606610502 ("apparmor: improve overlapping domain attachment resolution")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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When loading a profile that is set to unconfined mode, that label
flag is not set when it should be. Ensure it is set so that when
used in a label the unconfined check will be applied correctly.
Fixes: 038165070aa5 ("apparmor: allow setting any profile into the unconfined state")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Remove warnings found by running scripts/kernel-doc, which is caused by
using 'make W=1'.
security/apparmor/policy_ns.c:65: warning: Function parameter or member 'curr' not described in 'aa_ns_name'
security/apparmor/policy_ns.c:65: warning: Function parameter or member 'view' not described in 'aa_ns_name'
security/apparmor/policy_ns.c:65: warning: Function parameter or member 'subns' not described in 'aa_ns_name'
security/apparmor/policy_ns.c:65: warning: expecting prototype for aa_na_name(). Prototype was for aa_ns_name() instead
security/apparmor/policy_ns.c:214: warning: Function parameter or member 'view' not described in '__aa_lookupn_ns'
security/apparmor/policy_ns.c:214: warning: Excess function parameter 'base' description in '__aa_lookupn_ns'
security/apparmor/policy_ns.c:297: warning: expecting prototype for aa_create_ns(). Prototype was for __aa_find_or_create_ns() instead
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Kernel test robot throws below warning ->
security/apparmor/policy_ns.c:83:20: warning: no previous prototype
for function 'alloc_unconfined' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
Mark it as static.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Souptick Joarder (HPE) <jrdr.linux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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The SafeSetID LSM has functionality for restricting setuid()/setgid()
syscalls based on its configured security policies. This patch adds the
analogous functionality for the setgroups() syscall. Security policy
for the setgroups() syscall follows the same policies that are
installed on the system for setgid() syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
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Give the LSM framework the ability to filter setgroups() syscalls. There
are already analagous hooks for the set*uid() and set*gid() syscalls.
The SafeSetID LSM will use this new hook to ensure setgroups() calls are
allowed by the installed security policy. Tested by putting print
statement in security_task_fix_setgroups() hook and confirming that it
gets hit when userspace does a setgroups() syscall.
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity fixes from Mimi Zohar:
"Here are a number of fixes for recently found bugs.
Only 'ima: fix violation measurement list record' was introduced in
the current release. The rest address existing bugs"
* tag 'integrity-v5.19-fix' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: Fix potential memory leak in ima_init_crypto()
ima: force signature verification when CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG is configured
ima: Fix a potential integer overflow in ima_appraise_measurement
ima: fix violation measurement list record
Revert "evm: Fix memleak in init_desc"
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