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Call free_rdma_netdev instead of free_netdev each time we want to
release a netdevice. This call is also relevant for future freeing
of offloaded child interfaces.
This patch also adds a missing call for free netdevice when releasing
a parent interface that has child interfaces using ipoib_remove_one.
Fixes: cd565b4b51e5 ('IB/IPoIB: Support acceleration options callbacks')
Signed-off-by: Alex Vesker <valex@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
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A possible ABBA lock can happen with RTNL and vlan_rwsem.
For example:
Flow A: Device Flush
__ipoib_ib_dev_flush
down_read(vlan_rwsem) // Lock A
ipoib_flush_ah
flush_workqueue(priv->wq) // Wait for completion
A work on shared WQ (Mcast carrier)
ipoib_mcast_carrier_on_task
while (!rtnl_trylock()) // Wait for lock B
Flow B: Sysfs PKEY delete
ipoib_vlan_delete
lock(RTNL) // Lock B
down_write(vlan_rwsem) // Wait for lock A
This can happen with PKEY creates as well. The solution is to release
the RTNL lock in sysfs functions in case it is not possible to lock
VLAN RW semaphore and reset the SYS call.
Fixes: 69956d83267e ("IB/ipoib: Sync between remove_one to sysfs calls that use rtnl_lock")
Signed-off-by: Shalom Lagziel <shaloml@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Vesker <valex@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
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The ib_mr->length represents the length of the MR in bytes as per
the IBTA spec 1.3 section 11.2.10.3 (REGISTER PHYSICAL MEMORY REGION).
Currently ib_mr->length field is defined as only 32-bits field.
This might result into truncation and failed WRs of consumers who
registers more than 4GB bytes memory regions and whose WRs accessing
such MRs.
This patch makes the length 64-bit to avoid such truncation.
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: Faisal Latif <faisal.latif@intel.com>
Fixes: 4c67e2bfc8b7 ("IB/core: Introduce new fast registration API")
Signed-off-by: Ilya Lesokhin <ilyal@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
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When security_ib_alloc_security fails, qp->qp_sec memory is freed.
However ib_destroy_qp still tries to access this memory which result
in kernel crash. So its initialized to NULL to avoid such access.
Fixes: d291f1a65232 ("IB/core: Enforce PKey security on QPs")
Signed-off-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
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The tag matching functionality is implemented by mlx5 driver
by extending XRQ, however this internal kernel information was
exposed to user space applications with *xrq* name instead of *tm*.
This patch renames *xrq* to *tm* to handle that.
Fixes: 8d50505ada72 ("IB/uverbs: Expose XRQ capabilities")
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Yishai Hadas <yishaih@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
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part_stat_show takes a part device not a disk, so we should use
part_to_disk.
Fixes: d62e26b3ffd2("block: pass in queue to inflight accounting")
Cc: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Cc: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Currently when mixing buffered reads and asynchronous direct writes it
is possible to end up with the situation where we have stale data in the
page cache while the new data is already written to disk. This is
permanent until the affected pages are flushed away. Despite the fact
that mixing buffered and direct IO is ill-advised it does pose a thread
for a data integrity, is unexpected and should be fixed.
Fix this by deferring completion of asynchronous direct writes to a
process context in the case that there are mapped pages to be found in
the inode. Later before the completion in dio_complete() invalidate
the pages in question. This ensures that after the completion the pages
in the written area are either unmapped, or populated with up-to-date
data. Also do the same for the iomap case which uses
iomap_dio_complete() instead.
This has a side effect of deferring the completion to a process context
for every AIO DIO that happens on inode that has pages mapped. However
since the consensus is that this is ill-advised practice the performance
implication should not be a problem.
This was based on proposal from Jeff Moyer, thanks!
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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To support sqhd, for initiators that are following the spec and
paying attention to sqhd vs their sqtail values:
- add sqhd to struct nvmet_sq
- initialize sqhd to 0 in nvmet_sq_setup
- rather than propagate the 0's-based qsize value from the connect message
which requires a +1 in every sqhd update, and as nothing else references
it, convert to 1's-based value in nvmt_sq/cq_setup() calls.
- validate connect message sqsize being non-zero per spec.
- updated assign sqhd for every completion that goes back.
Also remove handling the NULL sq case in __nvmet_req_complete, as it can't
happen with the current code.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
Reviewed-by: Max Gurtovoy <maxg@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Currently, driver code allows user to set 0 as KATO
(Keep Alive TimeOut), but this is not being respected.
This patch enforces the expected behavior.
Signed-off-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Currently the nvme_req_needs_retry() applies several checks to see if
a retry is allowed. On of those is whether the current time has exceeded
the start time of the io plus the timeout length. This check, if an io
times out, means there is never a retry allowed for the io. Which means
applications see the io failure.
Remove this check and allow the io to timeout, like it does on other
protocols, and retries to be made.
On the FC transport, a frame can be lost for an individual io, and there
may be no other errors that escalate for the connection/association.
The io will timeout, which causes the transport to escalate into creating
a new association, but the io that timed out, due to this retry logic, has
already failed back to the application and things are hosed.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Keith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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If an nvme async_event command completes, in most cases, a new
async event is posted. However, if the controller enters a
resetting or reconnecting state, there is nothing to block the
scheduled work element from posting the async event again. Nor are
there calls from the transport to stop async events when an
association dies.
In the case of FC, where the association is torn down, the aer must
be aborted on the FC link and completes through the normal job
completion path. Thus the terminated async event ends up being
rescheduled even though the controller isn't in a valid state for
the aer, and the reposting gets the transport into a partially torn
down data structure.
It's possible to hit the scenario on rdma, although much less likely
due to an aer completing right as the association is terminated and
as the association teardown reclaims the blk requests via
nvme_cancel_request() so its immediate, not a link-related action
like on FC.
Fix by putting controller state checks in both the async event
completion routine where it schedules the async event and in the
async event work routine before it calls into the transport. It's
effectively a "stop_async_events()" behavior. The transport, when
it creates a new association with the subsystem will transition
the state back to live and is already restarting the async event
posting.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
[hch: remove taking a lock over reading the controller state]
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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The WARN_ONCE macro returns true if the condition is true, not if the
warn was raised, so we're printing the scatter list every time it's
invalid. This is excessive and makes debugging harder, so this patch
prints it just once.
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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A spurious interrupt before the nvme driver has initialized the completion
queue may inadvertently cause the driver to believe it has a completion
to process. This may result in a NULL dereference since the nvmeq's tags
are not set at this point.
The patch initializes the host's CQ memory so that a spurious interrupt
isn't mistaken for a real completion.
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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fc transport is treating NVMET_NR_QUEUES as maximum queue count, e.g.
admin queue plus NVMET_NR_QUEUES-1 io queues. But NVMET_NR_QUEUES is
the number of io queues, so maximum queue count is really
NVMET_NR_QUEUES+1.
Fix the handling in the target fc transport
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Sync with NVM Express spec change and FC-NVME 1.18.
FC transport sets SGL type to Transport SGL Data Block Descriptor and
subtype to transport-specific value 0x0A.
Removed the warn-on's on the PRP fields. They are unneeded. They were
to check for values from the upper layer that weren't set right, and
for the most part were fine. But, with Async events, which reuse the
same structure and 2nd time issued the SGL overlay converted them to
the Transport SGL values - the warn-on's were errantly firing.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Add transport SGL defintions from NVMe TP 4008, required for
the final NVMe-FC standard.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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The NVM express group recinded the reserved range for the transport.
Remove the FC-centric values that had been defined.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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The qla2xxx driver uses the FC-specific error when it needed to return an
error to the FC-NVME transport. Convert to use a generic value instead.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Acked-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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The lpfc driver uses the FC-specific error when it needed to return an
error to the FC-NVME transport. Convert to use a generic value instead.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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The FC-NVME transport loopback test module used the FC-specific error
codes in cases where it emulated a transport abort case. Instead of
using the FC-specific values, now use a generic value (NVME_SC_INTERNAL).
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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The FC-NVME target transport used the FC-specific error codes in
return codes when the transport or lldd failed. Instead of using the
FC-specific values, now use a generic value (NVME_SC_INTERNAL).
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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The FC-NVME transport used the FC-specific error codes in cases where
it had to fabricate an error to go back up stack. Instead of using the
FC-specific values, now use a generic value (NVME_SC_INTERNAL).
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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When the request is completed, lo_complete_rq() checks cmd->use_aio.
However, if this is in fact an aio request, cmd->use_aio will have
already been reused as cmd->ref by lo_rw_aio*. Fix it by not using a
union. On x86_64, there's a hole after the union anyways, so this
doesn't make struct loop_cmd any bigger.
Fixes: 92d773324b7e ("block/loop: fix use after free")
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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The lockdep code had reported the following unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(s_active#228);
lock(&bdev->bd_mutex/1);
lock(s_active#228);
lock(&bdev->bd_mutex);
*** DEADLOCK ***
The deadlock may happen when one task (CPU1) is trying to delete a
partition in a block device and another task (CPU0) is accessing
tracing sysfs file (e.g. /sys/block/dm-1/trace/act_mask) in that
partition.
The s_active isn't an actual lock. It is a reference count (kn->count)
on the sysfs (kernfs) file. Removal of a sysfs file, however, require
a wait until all the references are gone. The reference count is
treated like a rwsem using lockdep instrumentation code.
The fact that a thread is in the sysfs callback method or in the
ioctl call means there is a reference to the opended sysfs or device
file. That should prevent the underlying block structure from being
removed.
Instead of using bd_mutex in the block_device structure, a new
blk_trace_mutex is now added to the request_queue structure to protect
access to the blk_trace structure.
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Fix typo in patch subject line, and prune a comment detailing how
the code used to work.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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In testing we noticed that nbd would spew if you ran a fio job against
the raw device itself. This is because fio calls a block device
specific ioctl, however the block layer will first pass this back to the
driver ioctl handler in case the driver wants to do something special.
Since the device was setup using netlink this caused us to spew every
time fio called this ioctl. Since we don't have special handling, just
error out for any non-nbd specific ioctl's that come in. This fixes the
spew.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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The job structure is allocated as part of the request, so we should not
free it in the error path of bsg_prepare_job.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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The code in __brd_direct_access multiplies the pgoff variable by page size
and divides it by 512. It can cause overflow on 32-bit architectures. The
overflow happens if we create ramdisk larger than 4G and use it as a
sparse device.
This patch replaces multiplication and division with multiplication by the
number of sectors per page.
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Fixes: 1647b9b959c7 ("brd: add dax_operations support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.12+
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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kmemdup() is preferred to kmalloc() followed by memcpy().
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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When checking for permission to view keys whilst reading from
/proc/keys, we should use the credentials with which the /proc/keys file
was opened. This is because, in a classic type of exploit, it can be
possible to bypass checks for the *current* credentials by passing the
file descriptor to a suid program.
Following commit 34dbbcdbf633 ("Make file credentials available to the
seqfile interfaces") we can finally fix it. So let's do it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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In key_user_lookup(), if there is no key_user for the given uid, we drop
key_user_lock, allocate a new key_user, and search the tree again. But
we failed to set 'parent' to NULL at the beginning of the second search.
If the tree were to be empty for the second search, the insertion would
be done with an invalid 'parent', scribbling over freed memory.
Fortunately this can't actually happen currently because the tree always
contains at least the root_key_user. But it still should be fixed to
make the code more robust.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Because keyctl_read_key() looks up the key with no permissions
requested, it may find a negatively instantiated key. If the key is
also possessed, we went ahead and called ->read() on the key. But the
key payload will actually contain the ->reject_error rather than the
normal payload. Thus, the kernel oopses trying to read the
user_key_payload from memory address (int)-ENOKEY = 0x00000000ffffff82.
Fortunately the payload data is stored inline, so it shouldn't be
possible to abuse this as an arbitrary memory read primitive...
Reproducer:
keyctl new_session
keyctl request2 user desc '' @s
keyctl read $(keyctl show | awk '/user: desc/ {print $1}')
It causes a crash like the following:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff92
IP: user_read+0x33/0xa0
PGD 36a54067 P4D 36a54067 PUD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 0 PID: 211 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.14.0-rc1 #337
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-20170228_101828-anatol 04/01/2014
task: ffff90aa3b74c3c0 task.stack: ffff9878c0478000
RIP: 0010:user_read+0x33/0xa0
RSP: 0018:ffff9878c047bee8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff90aa3d7da340 RCX: 0000000000000017
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000ffffff82 RDI: ffff90aa3d7da340
RBP: ffff9878c047bf00 R08: 00000024f95da94f R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f58ece69740(0000) GS:ffff90aa3e200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000ffffff92 CR3: 0000000036adc001 CR4: 00000000003606f0
Call Trace:
keyctl_read_key+0xac/0xe0
SyS_keyctl+0x99/0x120
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x7f58ec787bb9
RSP: 002b:00007ffc8d401678 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000fa
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc8d402800 RCX: 00007f58ec787bb9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000174a63ac RDI: 000000000000000b
RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 00007ffc8d402809 R09: 0000000000000020
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffc8d402800
R13: 00007ffc8d4016e0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Code: e5 41 55 49 89 f5 41 54 49 89 d4 53 48 89 fb e8 a4 b4 ad ff 85 c0 74 09 80 3d b9 4c 96 00 00 74 43 48 8b b3 20 01 00 00 4d 85 ed <0f> b7 5e 10 74 29 4d 85 e4 74 24 4c 39 e3 4c 89 e2 4c 89 ef 48
RIP: user_read+0x33/0xa0 RSP: ffff9878c047bee8
CR2: 00000000ffffff92
Fixes: 61ea0c0ba904 ("KEYS: Skip key state checks when checking for possession")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v3.13+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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It was possible for an unprivileged user to create the user and user
session keyrings for another user. For example:
sudo -u '#3000' sh -c 'keyctl add keyring _uid.4000 "" @u
keyctl add keyring _uid_ses.4000 "" @u
sleep 15' &
sleep 1
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @u
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @us
This is problematic because these "fake" keyrings won't have the right
permissions. In particular, the user who created them first will own
them and will have full access to them via the possessor permissions,
which can be used to compromise the security of a user's keys:
-4: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid.4000
-5: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid_ses.4000
Fix it by marking user and user session keyrings with a flag
KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING. Then, when searching for a user or user session
keyring by name, skip all keyrings that don't have the flag set.
Fixes: 69664cf16af4 ("keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v2.6.26+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Userspace can call keyctl_read() on a keyring to get the list of IDs of
keys in the keyring. But if the user-supplied buffer is too small, the
kernel would write the full list anyway --- which will corrupt whatever
userspace memory happened to be past the end of the buffer. Fix it by
only filling the space that is available.
Fixes: b2a4df200d57 ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v3.13+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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In keyctl_read_key(), if key_permission() were to return an error code
other than EACCES, we would leak a the reference to the key. This can't
actually happen currently because key_permission() can only return an
error code other than EACCES if security_key_permission() does, only
SELinux and Smack implement that hook, and neither can return an error
code other than EACCES. But it should still be fixed, as it is a bug
waiting to happen.
Fixes: 29db91906340 ("[PATCH] Keys: Add LSM hooks for key management [try #3]")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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In keyctl_assume_authority(), if keyctl_change_reqkey_auth() were to
fail, we would leak the reference to the 'authkey'. Currently this can
only happen if prepare_creds() fails to allocate memory. But it still
should be fixed, as it is a more severe bug waiting to happen.
This patch also moves the read of 'authkey->serial' to before the
reference to the authkey is dropped. Doing the read after dropping the
reference is very fragile because it assumes we still hold another
reference to the key. (Which we do, in current->cred->request_key_auth,
but there's no reason not to write it in the "obviously correct" way.)
Fixes: d84f4f992cbd ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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If key_instantiate_and_link() were to fail (which fortunately isn't
possible currently), the call to key_revoke(authkey) would crash with a
NULL pointer dereference in request_key_auth_revoke() because the key
has not yet been instantiated.
Fix this by removing the call to key_revoke(). key_put() is sufficient,
as it's not possible for an uninstantiated authkey to have been used for
anything yet.
Fixes: b5f545c880a2 ("[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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In request_key_auth_new(), if key_alloc() or key_instantiate_and_link()
were to fail, we would leak a reference to the 'struct cred'. Currently
this can only happen if key_alloc() fails to allocate memory. But it
still should be fixed, as it is a more severe bug waiting to happen.
Fix it by cleaning things up to use a helper function which frees a
'struct request_key_auth' correctly.
Fixes: d84f4f992cbd ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Fix the default for microblaze. Michal Simek mentioned default for
microblaze should be CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN.
Fixes : commit 206d3642d8ee ("arch/microblaze: add choice for endianness
and update Makefile")
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@oracle.com>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
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Use vma_pages function on vma object instead of explicit computation.
Found by coccinelle spatch "api/vma_pages.cocci"
Signed-off-by: Thomas Meyer <thomas@m3y3r.de>
Signed-off-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
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Running make allmodconfig;make is throwing compilation error:
CC kernel/watchdog.o
In file included from ./include/linux/kvm_para.h:4:0,
from kernel/watchdog.c:29:
./include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h:32:26: fatal error: asm/kvm_para.h: No
such file or directory
#include <asm/kvm_para.h>
^
compilation terminated.
make[1]: *** [kernel/watchdog.o] Error 1
make: *** [kernel/watchdog.o] Error 2
Reported-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
Fixes: 83f0124ad81e87b ("microblaze: remove asm-generic wrapper headers")
Reviewed-by: Tobias Klauser <tklauser@distanz.ch>
Tested-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
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Userspace can change the FPU state of a task using the ptrace() or
rt_sigreturn() system calls. Because reserved bits in the FPU state can
cause the XRSTOR instruction to fail, the kernel has to carefully
validate that no reserved bits or other invalid values are being set.
Unfortunately, there have been bugs in this validation code. For
example, we were not checking that the 'xcomp_bv' field in the
xstate_header was 0. As-is, such bugs are exploitable to read the FPU
registers of other processes on the system. To do so, an attacker can
create a task, assign to it an invalid FPU state, then spin in a loop
and monitor the values of the FPU registers. Because the task's FPU
registers are not being restored, sometimes the FPU registers will have
the values from another process.
This is likely to continue to be a problem in the future because the
validation done by the CPU instructions like XRSTOR is not immediately
visible to kernel developers. Nor will invalid FPU states ever be
encountered during ordinary use --- they will only be seen during
fuzzing or exploits. There can even be reserved bits outside the
xstate_header which are easy to forget about. For example, the MXCSR
register contains reserved bits, which were not validated by the
KVM_SET_XSAVE ioctl until commit a575813bfe4b ("KVM: x86: Fix load
damaged SSEx MXCSR register").
Therefore, mitigate this class of vulnerability by restoring the FPU
registers from init_fpstate if restoring from the task's state fails.
We actually used to do this, but it was (perhaps unwisely) removed by
commit 9ccc27a5d297 ("x86/fpu: Remove error return values from
copy_kernel_to_*regs() functions"). This new patch is also a bit
different. First, it only clears the registers, not also the bad
in-memory state; this is simpler and makes it easier to make the
mitigation cover all callers of __copy_kernel_to_fpregs(). Second, it
does the register clearing in an exception handler so that no extra
instructions are added to context switches. In fact, we *remove*
instructions, since previously we were always zeroing the register
containing 'err' even if CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU was disabled.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170922174156.16780-4-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170923130016.21448-27-mingo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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On x86, userspace can use the ptrace() or rt_sigreturn() system calls to
set a task's extended state (xstate) or "FPU" registers. ptrace() can
set them for another task using the PTRACE_SETREGSET request with
NT_X86_XSTATE, while rt_sigreturn() can set them for the current task.
In either case, registers can be set to any value, but the kernel
assumes that the XSAVE area itself remains valid in the sense that the
CPU can restore it.
However, in the case where the kernel is using the uncompacted xstate
format (which it does whenever the XSAVES instruction is unavailable),
it was possible for userspace to set the xcomp_bv field in the
xstate_header to an arbitrary value. However, all bits in that field
are reserved in the uncompacted case, so when switching to a task with
nonzero xcomp_bv, the XRSTOR instruction failed with a #GP fault. This
caused the WARN_ON_FPU(err) in copy_kernel_to_xregs() to be hit. In
addition, since the error is otherwise ignored, the FPU registers from
the task previously executing on the CPU were leaked.
Fix the bug by checking that the user-supplied value of xcomp_bv is 0 in
the uncompacted case, and returning an error otherwise.
The reason for validating xcomp_bv rather than simply overwriting it
with 0 is that we want userspace to see an error if it (incorrectly)
provides an XSAVE area in compacted format rather than in uncompacted
format.
Note that as before, in case of error we clear the task's FPU state.
This is perhaps non-ideal, especially for PTRACE_SETREGSET; it might be
better to return an error before changing anything. But it seems the
"clear on error" behavior is fine for now, and it's a little tricky to
do otherwise because it would mean we couldn't simply copy the full
userspace state into kernel memory in one __copy_from_user().
This bug was found by syzkaller, which hit the above-mentioned
WARN_ON_FPU():
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at ./arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h:373 __switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.13.0 #453
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0 task.stack: ffffa78cc036c000
RIP: 0010:__switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
RSP: 0000:ffffa78cc08bbb88 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff9ba2b8bf2180 RCX: 00000000c0000100
RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: 000000005cb10700 RDI: ffff9ba2b8bf36c0
RBP: ffffa78cc08bbbd0 R08: 00000000929fdf46 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9ba2b8bf3680 R15: ffff9ba2bf5d7b40
FS: 00007f7e5cb10700(0000) GS:ffff9ba2bf400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004005cc CR3: 0000000079fd5000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
Call Trace:
Code: 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 11 fd ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 e7 fa ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 c2 fa ff ff <0f> ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 d4 fc ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f
Here is a C reproducer. The expected behavior is that the program spin
forever with no output. However, on a buggy kernel running on a
processor with the "xsave" feature but without the "xsaves" feature
(e.g. Sandy Bridge through Broadwell for Intel), within a second or two
the program reports that the xmm registers were corrupted, i.e. were not
restored correctly. With CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU=y it also hits the above
kernel warning.
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <linux/elf.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(void)
{
int pid = fork();
uint64_t xstate[512];
struct iovec iov = { .iov_base = xstate, .iov_len = sizeof(xstate) };
if (pid == 0) {
bool tracee = true;
for (int i = 0; i < sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN) && tracee; i++)
tracee = (fork() != 0);
uint32_t xmm0[4] = { [0 ... 3] = tracee ? 0x00000000 : 0xDEADBEEF };
asm volatile(" movdqu %0, %%xmm0\n"
" mov %0, %%rbx\n"
"1: movdqu %%xmm0, %0\n"
" mov %0, %%rax\n"
" cmp %%rax, %%rbx\n"
" je 1b\n"
: "+m" (xmm0) : : "rax", "rbx", "xmm0");
printf("BUG: xmm registers corrupted! tracee=%d, xmm0=%08X%08X%08X%08X\n",
tracee, xmm0[0], xmm0[1], xmm0[2], xmm0[3]);
} else {
usleep(100000);
ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0, 0);
wait(NULL);
ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &iov);
xstate[65] = -1;
ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &iov);
ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0, 0);
wait(NULL);
}
return 1;
}
Note: the program only tests for the bug using the ptrace() system call.
The bug can also be reproduced using the rt_sigreturn() system call, but
only when called from a 32-bit program, since for 64-bit programs the
kernel restores the FPU state from the signal frame by doing XRSTOR
directly from userspace memory (with proper error checking).
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v3.17+]
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Fixes: 0b29643a5843 ("x86/xsaves: Change compacted format xsave area header")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170922174156.16780-2-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170923130016.21448-25-mingo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/robh/linux
Pull DeviceTree fixes from Rob Herring:
- fix build for !OF providing empty of_find_device_by_node
- fix Abracon vendor prefix
- sync dtx_diff include paths (again)
- a stm32h7 clock binding doc fix
* tag 'devicetree-fixes-for-4.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/robh/linux:
dt-bindings: clk: stm32h7: fix clock-cell size
scripts/dtc: dtx_diff - 2nd update of include dts paths to match build
dt-bindings: fix vendor prefix for Abracon
of: provide inline helper for of_find_device_by_node
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Another round of CR3/PCID related fixes (I think this addresses all
but one of the known problems with PCID support), an objtool fix plus
a Clang fix that (finally) solves all Clang quirks to build a bootable
x86 kernel as-is"
* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang
objtool: Handle another GCC stack pointer adjustment bug
x86/mm/32: Load a sane CR3 before cpu_init() on secondary CPUs
x86/mm/32: Move setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PCID) earlier
x86/mm/64: Stop using CR3.PCID == 0 in ASID-aware code
x86/mm: Factor out CR3-building code
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull timer fix from Ingo Molnar:
"A clocksource driver section mismatch fix"
* 'timers-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
clocksource/integrator: Fix section mismatch warning
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull irq fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Three irqchip driver fixes, and an affinity mask helper function bug
fix affecting x86"
* 'irq-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
Revert "genirq: Restrict effective affinity to interrupts actually using it"
irqchip.mips-gic: Fix shared interrupt mask writes
irqchip/gic-v4: Fix building with ancient gcc
irqchip/gic-v3: Iterate over possible CPUs by for_each_possible_cpu()
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull address-limit checking fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"This fixes a number of bugs in the address-limit (USER_DS) checks that
got introduced in the merge window, (mostly) affecting the ARM and
ARM64 platforms"
* 'core-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
arm64/syscalls: Move address limit check in loop
arm/syscalls: Optimize address limit check
Revert "arm/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return"
syscalls: Use CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION for addr_limit_user_check
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull misc security layer update from James Morris:
"This is the remaining 'general' change in the security tree for v4.14,
following the direct merging of SELinux (+ TOMOYO), AppArmor, and
seccomp.
That's everything now for the security tree except IMA, which will
follow shortly (I've been traveling for the past week with patchy
internet)"
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
security: fix description of values returned by cap_inode_need_killpriv
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull TPM updates from James Morris:
"Here are the TPM updates from Jarkko for v4.14, which I've placed in
their own branch (next-tpm). I ended up cherry-picking them as other
changes had been made in Jarkko's branch after he sent me his original
pull request.
I plan on maintaining a separate branch for TPM (and other security
subsystems) from now on.
From Jarkko: 'Not much this time except a few fixes'"
* 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
tpm: ibmvtpm: simplify crq initialization and document crq format
tpm: replace msleep() with usleep_range() in TPM 1.2/2.0 generic drivers
Documentation: tpm: add powered-while-suspended binding documentation
tpm: tpm_crb: constify acpi_device_id.
tpm: vtpm: constify vio_device_id
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