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Both Intel and AMD CPUs support 5-level paging, which is expected to
become more widely adopted in the future. All major x86 Linux
distributions have the feature enabled.
Remove CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL and related #ifdeffery for it to make it more readable.
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250516123306.3812286-4-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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Dynamic memory layout is used by KASLR and 5-level paging.
CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL is going to be removed, making 5-level paging support
unconditional which requires unconditional support of dynamic memory
layout.
Remove CONFIG_DYNAMIC_MEMORY_LAYOUT.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>
Cc: Kieran Bingham <kbingham@kernel.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250516123306.3812286-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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Virtual machines can exploit bus locks to degrade the performance of
the system. Bus locks can be caused by Non-WB(Write back) and
misaligned locked RMW (Read-modify-Write) instructions and require
systemwide synchronization among all processors which can result into
significant performance penalties.
To address this issue, the Bus Lock Threshold feature is introduced to
provide ability to hypervisor to restrict guests' capability of
initiating mulitple buslocks, thereby preventing system slowdowns.
Support for the buslock threshold is indicated via CPUID function
0x8000000A_EDX[29].
On the processors that support the Bus Lock Threshold feature, the
VMCB provides a Bus Lock Threshold enable bit and an unsigned 16-bit
Bus Lock threshold count.
VMCB intercept bit
VMCB Offset Bits Function
14h 5 Intercept bus lock operations
Bus lock threshold count
VMCB Offset Bits Function
120h 15:0 Bus lock counter
When a VMRUN instruction is executed, the bus lock threshold count is
loaded into an internal count register. Before the processor executes
a bus lock in the guest, it checks the value of this register:
- If the value is greater than '0', the processor successfully
executes the bus lock and decrements the count.
- If the value is '0', the bus lock is not executed, and a #VMEXIT to
the VMM is taken.
The bus lock threshold #VMEXIT is reported to the VMM with the VMEXIT
code A5h, SVM_EXIT_BUS_LOCK.
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Manali Shukla <manali.shukla@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Manali Shukla <manali.shukla@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250502050346.14274-4-manali.shukla@amd.com
[sean: rewrite shortlog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Misbehaving guests can cause bus locks to degrade the performance of
the system. The Bus Lock Threshold feature can be used to address this
issue by providing capability to the hypervisor to limit guest's
ability to generate bus lock, thereby preventing system slowdown due
to performance penalities.
When the Bus Lock Threshold feature is enabled, the processor checks
the bus lock threshold count before executing the buslock and decides
whether to trigger bus lock exit or not.
The value of the bus lock threshold count '0' generates bus lock
exits, and if the value is greater than '0', the bus lock is executed
successfully and the bus lock threshold count is decremented.
Presence of the Bus Lock threshold feature is indicated via CPUID
function 0x8000000A_EDX[29].
Signed-off-by: Manali Shukla <manali.shukla@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250502050346.14274-3-manali.shukla@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Move and rename kvm_pio_request.linear_rip to
kvm_vcpu_arch.cui_linear_rip so that the field can be used by other
userspace exit completion flows that need to take action if and only
if userspace has not modified RIP.
No functional changes intended.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Manali Shukla <manali.shukla@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250502050346.14274-2-manali.shukla@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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The resctrl pseudo-lock feature allows an architecture to allocate data
into particular cache portions, which are then treated as reserved to
avoid that data ever being evicted. Setting this up is deeply architecture
specific as it involves disabling prefetchers etc. It is not possible
to support this kind of feature on arm64. Risc-V is assumed to be the
same.
The prototypes for the architecture code were added to x86's asm/resctrl.h,
with other architectures able to provide stubs for their architecture. This
forces other architectures to provide identical stubs.
Move the prototypes and stubs to linux/resctrl.h, and switch between them
using the existing Kconfig symbol.
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghuay@nvidia.com>
Tested-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghuay@nvidia.com>
Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@jp.fujitsu.com>
Tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250515165855.31452-20-james.morse@arm.com
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resctrl_arch_mon_ctx_alloc() and resctrl_arch_mon_ctx_free() take an enum
resctrl_event_id that is already defined in resctrl_types.h to be
accessible to asm/resctrl.h.
The x86 stubs take an int. Fix that.
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghuay@nvidia.com>
Tested-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghuay@nvidia.com>
Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@jp.fujitsu.com>
Tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250515165855.31452-19-james.morse@arm.com
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hypervisor_cpuid_base()/for_each_possible_hypervisor_cpuid_base() to cpuid_base_hypervisor()/for_each_possible_cpuid_base_hypervisor()
In order to let all the APIs under <cpuid/api.h> have a shared "cpuid_"
namespace, rename hypervisor_cpuid_base() to cpuid_base_hypervisor().
To align with the new style, also rename:
for_each_possible_hypervisor_cpuid_base(function)
to:
for_each_possible_cpuid_base_hypervisor(function)
Adjust call-sites accordingly.
Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwi@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: x86-cpuid@lists.linux.dev
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/aCZOi0Oohc7DpgTo@lx-t490
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Rename the CPUID(0x2) register accessor function:
cpuid_get_leaf_0x2_regs(regs)
to:
cpuid_leaf_0x2(regs)
for consistency with other <cpuid/api.h> accessors that return full CPUID
registers outputs like:
cpuid_leaf(regs)
cpuid_subleaf(regs)
In the same vein, rename the CPUID(0x2) iteration macro:
for_each_leaf_0x2_entry()
to:
for_each_cpuid_0x2_desc()
to include "cpuid" in the macro name, and since what is iterated upon is
CPUID(0x2) cache and TLB "descriptos", not "entries". Prefix an
underscore to that iterator macro parameters, so that the newly renamed
'desc' parameter do not get mixed with "union leaf_0x2_regs :: desc[]" in
the macro's implementation.
Adjust all the affected call-sites accordingly.
While at it, use "CPUID(0x2)" instead of "CPUID leaf 0x2" as this is the
recommended style.
No change in functionality intended.
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwi@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-cpuid@lists.linux.dev
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250508150240.172915-6-darwi@linutronix.de
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Page fault tracepoints are interesting for other architectures as well.
Move them to be generic.
Signed-off-by: Nam Cao <namcao@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Gabriele Monaco <gmonaco@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/89c2f284adf9b4c933f0e65811c50cef900a5a95.1747046848.git.namcao@linutronix.de
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trace_pagefault_key is used to optimize the pagefault tracepoints when it
is disabled. However, tracepoints already have built-in static_key for this
exact purpose.
Remove this redundant key.
Signed-off-by: Nam Cao <namcao@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Gabriele Monaco <gmonaco@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/827c7666d2989f08742a4fb869b1ed5bfaaf1dbf.1747046848.git.namcao@linutronix.de
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resctrl_sched_in() loads the architecture specific CPU MSRs with the
CLOSID and RMID values. This function was named before resctrl was
split to have architecture specific code, and generic filesystem code.
This function is obviously architecture specific, but does not begin
with 'resctrl_arch_', making it the odd one out in the functions an
architecture needs to support to enable resctrl.
Rename it for consistency. This is purely cosmetic.
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghuay@nvidia.com>
Tested-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghuay@nvidia.com>
Tested-by: Carl Worth <carl@os.amperecomputing.com> # arm64
Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@jp.fujitsu.com>
Tested-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com>
Tested-by: Amit Singh Tomar <amitsinght@marvell.com> # arm64
Tested-by: Shanker Donthineni <sdonthineni@nvidia.com> # arm64
Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250515165855.31452-7-james.morse@arm.com
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In order to let all the APIs under <cpuid/api.h> have a shared "cpuid_"
namespace, rename have_cpuid_p() to cpuid_feature().
Adjust all call-sites accordingly.
Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwi@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-cpuid@lists.linux.dev
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250508150240.172915-4-darwi@linutronix.de
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The main CPUID header <asm/cpuid.h> was originally a storefront for the
headers:
<asm/cpuid/api.h>
<asm/cpuid/leaf_0x2_api.h>
Now that the latter CPUID(0x2) header has been merged into the former,
there is no practical difference between <asm/cpuid.h> and
<asm/cpuid/api.h>.
Migrate all users to the <asm/cpuid/api.h> header, in preparation of
the removal of <asm/cpuid.h>.
Don't remove <asm/cpuid.h> just yet, in case some new code in -next
started using it.
Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwi@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-cpuid@lists.linux.dev
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250508150240.172915-3-darwi@linutronix.de
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Move all of the CPUID(0x2) APIs at <cpuid/leaf_0x2_api.h> into
<cpuid/api.h>, in order centralize all CPUID APIs into the latter.
While at it, separate the different CPUID leaf parsing APIs using
header comments like "CPUID(0xN) parsing: ".
Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwi@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-cpuid@lists.linux.dev
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250508150240.172915-2-darwi@linutronix.de
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Add a simple rdmsrl_on_cpu() compatibility wrapper for
rdmsrq_on_cpu(), to make life in -next easier, where
the PM tree recently grew more uses of the old API.
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250512145517.6e0666e3@canb.auug.org.au
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Add a synthetic feature flag for Zen6.
[ bp: Move the feature flag to a free slot and avoid future merge
conflicts from incoming stuff. ]
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250513204857.3376577-1-yazen.ghannam@amd.com
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Conflicts:
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
drivers/base/cpu.c
include/linux/cpu.h
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Prepare to resolve conflicts with an upstream series of fixes that conflict
with pending x86 changes:
6f5bf947bab0 Merge tag 'its-for-linus-20250509' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Prepare to resolve conflicts with an upstream series of fixes that conflict
with pending x86 changes:
6f5bf947bab0 Merge tag 'its-for-linus-20250509' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Conflicts:
arch/x86/boot/startup/sme.c
arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
Semantic conflict:
arch/x86/include/asm/sev-internal.h
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Conflicts:
arch/x86/mm/numa.c
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Prepare to resolve conflicts with an upstream series of fixes that conflict
with pending x86 changes:
6f5bf947bab0 Merge tag 'its-for-linus-20250509' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Prepare to resolve conflicts with an upstream series of fixes that conflict
with pending x86 changes:
6f5bf947bab0 Merge tag 'its-for-linus-20250509' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Conflicts:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Prepare to resolve conflicts with an upstream series of fixes that conflict
with pending x86 changes:
6f5bf947bab0 Merge tag 'its-for-linus-20250509' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Prepare to resolve conflicts with an upstream series of fixes that conflict
with pending x86 changes:
6f5bf947bab0 Merge tag 'its-for-linus-20250509' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Prepare to resolve conflicts with an upstream series of fixes that conflict
with pending x86 changes:
6f5bf947bab0 Merge tag 'its-for-linus-20250509' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Prepare to resolve conflicts with an upstream series of fixes that conflict
with pending x86 changes:
6f5bf947bab0 Merge tag 'its-for-linus-20250509' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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kexec handover (KHO) creates a metadata that the kernels pass between each
other during kexec. This metadata is stored in memory and kexec image
contains a (physical) pointer to that memory.
In addition, KHO keeps "scratch regions" available for kexec: physically
contiguous memory regions that are guaranteed to not have any memory that
KHO would preserve. The new kernel bootstraps itself using the scratch
regions and sets all handed over memory as in use. When subsystems that
support KHO initialize, they introspect the KHO metadata, restore
preserved memory regions, and retrieve their state stored in the preserved
memory.
Enlighten x86 kexec-file and boot path about the KHO metadata and make
sure it gets passed along to the next kernel.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250509074635.3187114-12-changyuanl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
Co-developed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
Co-developed-by: Changyuan Lyu <changyuanl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Changyuan Lyu <changyuanl@google.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Anthony Yznaga <anthony.yznaga@oracle.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Cc: Ben Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Borislav Betkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Gowans <jgowans@amazon.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Pratyush Yadav <ptyadav@amazon.de>
Cc: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Cc: Saravana Kannan <saravanak@google.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsburskii <skinsburskii@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleinxer <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Similar to syscall_set_arguments() that complements
syscall_get_arguments(), introduce syscall_set_nr() that complements
syscall_get_nr().
syscall_set_nr() is going to be needed along with syscall_set_arguments()
on all HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK architectures to implement
PTRACE_SET_SYSCALL_INFO API.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250303112020.GD24170@strace.io
Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@strace.io>
Tested-by: Charlie Jenkins <charlie@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Jenkins <charlie@rivosinc.com>
Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc
Reviewed-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk> # mips
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexey Gladkov (Intel) <legion@kernel.org>
Cc: Andreas Larsson <andreas@gaisler.com>
Cc: anton ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Betkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Cain <bcain@quicinc.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Davide Berardi <berardi.dav@gmail.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
Cc: Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>
Cc: Eugene Syromyatnikov <evgsyr@gmail.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se>
Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Cc: Naveen N Rao <naveen@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Renzo Davoi <renzo@cs.unibo.it>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Russel King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Cc: Stefan Kristiansson <stefan.kristiansson@saunalahti.fi>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleinxer <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@kernel.org>
Cc: WANG Xuerui <kernel@xen0n.name>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
This function is going to be needed on all HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
architectures to implement PTRACE_SET_SYSCALL_INFO API.
This partially reverts commit 7962c2eddbfe ("arch: remove unused function
syscall_set_arguments()") by reusing some of old syscall_set_arguments()
implementations.
[nathan@kernel.org: fix compile time fortify checks]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250408213131.GA2872426@ax162
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250303112009.GC24170@strace.io
Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@strace.io>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Charlie Jenkins <charlie@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Jenkins <charlie@rivosinc.com>
Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc
Reviewed-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk> [mips]
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexey Gladkov (Intel) <legion@kernel.org>
Cc: Andreas Larsson <andreas@gaisler.com>
Cc: anton ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Betkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Cain <bcain@quicinc.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Davide Berardi <berardi.dav@gmail.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
Cc: Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>
Cc: Eugene Syromyatnikov <evgsyr@gmail.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se>
Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Cc: Naveen N Rao <naveen@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Renzo Davoi <renzo@cs.unibo.it>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Russel King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Cc: Stefan Kristiansson <stefan.kristiansson@saunalahti.fi>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleinxer <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@kernel.org>
Cc: WANG Xuerui <kernel@xen0n.name>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
There are now no callers of mk_huge_pmd() and mk_pmd(). Remove them.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250402181709.2386022-12-willy@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Andreas Larsson <andreas@gaisler.com>
Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: <x86@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
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Move the shadow stack check to pfn_pte() which lets us use the common
definition of mk_pte().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250402181709.2386022-5-willy@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Andreas Larsson <andreas@gaisler.com>
Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: <x86@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 ITS mitigation from Dave Hansen:
"Mitigate Indirect Target Selection (ITS) issue.
I'd describe this one as a good old CPU bug where the behavior is
_obviously_ wrong, but since it just results in bad predictions it
wasn't wrong enough to notice. Well, the researchers noticed and also
realized that thus bug undermined a bunch of existing indirect branch
mitigations.
Thus the unusually wide impact on this one. Details:
ITS is a bug in some Intel CPUs that affects indirect branches
including RETs in the first half of a cacheline. Due to ITS such
branches may get wrongly predicted to a target of (direct or indirect)
branch that is located in the second half of a cacheline. Researchers
at VUSec found this behavior and reported to Intel.
Affected processors:
- Cascade Lake, Cooper Lake, Whiskey Lake V, Coffee Lake R, Comet
Lake, Ice Lake, Tiger Lake and Rocket Lake.
Scope of impact:
- Guest/host isolation:
When eIBRS is used for guest/host isolation, the indirect branches
in the VMM may still be predicted with targets corresponding to
direct branches in the guest.
- Intra-mode using cBPF:
cBPF can be used to poison the branch history to exploit ITS.
Realigning the indirect branches and RETs mitigates this attack
vector.
- User/kernel:
With eIBRS enabled user/kernel isolation is *not* impacted by ITS.
- Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB):
Due to this bug indirect branches may be predicted with targets
corresponding to direct branches which were executed prior to IBPB.
This will be fixed in the microcode.
Mitigation:
As indirect branches in the first half of cacheline are affected, the
mitigation is to replace those indirect branches with a call to thunk that
is aligned to the second half of the cacheline.
RETs that take prediction from RSB are not affected, but they may be
affected by RSB-underflow condition. So, RETs in the first half of
cacheline are also patched to a return thunk that executes the RET aligned
to second half of cacheline"
* tag 'its-for-linus-20250509' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
selftest/x86/bugs: Add selftests for ITS
x86/its: FineIBT-paranoid vs ITS
x86/its: Use dynamic thunks for indirect branches
x86/ibt: Keep IBT disabled during alternative patching
mm/execmem: Unify early execmem_cache behaviour
x86/its: Align RETs in BHB clear sequence to avoid thunking
x86/its: Add support for RSB stuffing mitigation
x86/its: Add "vmexit" option to skip mitigation on some CPUs
x86/its: Enable Indirect Target Selection mitigation
x86/its: Add support for ITS-safe return thunk
x86/its: Add support for ITS-safe indirect thunk
x86/its: Enumerate Indirect Target Selection (ITS) bug
Documentation: x86/bugs/its: Add ITS documentation
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The GHCB_MSR_VMPL_REQ_LEVEL macro lacked parentheses around the bitmask
expression, causing the shift operation to bind too early. As a result,
when requesting VMPL1 (e.g., GHCB_MSR_VMPL_REQ_LEVEL(1)), incorrect
values such as 0x000000016 were generated instead of the intended
0x100000016 (the requested VMPL level is specified in GHCBData[39:32]).
Fix the precedence issue by grouping the masked value before applying
the shift.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Fixes: 34ff65901735 ("x86/sev: Use kernel provided SVSM Calling Areas")
Signed-off-by: Seongman Lee <augustus92@kaist.ac.kr>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250511092329.12680-1-cloudlee1719@gmail.com
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FineIBT-paranoid was using the retpoline bytes for the paranoid check,
disabling retpolines, because all parts that have IBT also have eIBRS
and thus don't need no stinking retpolines.
Except... ITS needs the retpolines for indirect calls must not be in
the first half of a cacheline :-/
So what was the paranoid call sequence:
<fineibt_paranoid_start>:
0: 41 ba 78 56 34 12 mov $0x12345678, %r10d
6: 45 3b 53 f7 cmp -0x9(%r11), %r10d
a: 4d 8d 5b <f0> lea -0x10(%r11), %r11
e: 75 fd jne d <fineibt_paranoid_start+0xd>
10: 41 ff d3 call *%r11
13: 90 nop
Now becomes:
<fineibt_paranoid_start>:
0: 41 ba 78 56 34 12 mov $0x12345678, %r10d
6: 45 3b 53 f7 cmp -0x9(%r11), %r10d
a: 4d 8d 5b f0 lea -0x10(%r11), %r11
e: 2e e8 XX XX XX XX cs call __x86_indirect_paranoid_thunk_r11
Where the paranoid_thunk looks like:
1d: <ea> (bad)
__x86_indirect_paranoid_thunk_r11:
1e: 75 fd jne 1d
__x86_indirect_its_thunk_r11:
20: 41 ff eb jmp *%r11
23: cc int3
[ dhansen: remove initialization to false ]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
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ITS mitigation moves the unsafe indirect branches to a safe thunk. This
could degrade the prediction accuracy as the source address of indirect
branches becomes same for different execution paths.
To improve the predictions, and hence the performance, assign a separate
thunk for each indirect callsite. This is also a defense-in-depth measure
to avoid indirect branches aliasing with each other.
As an example, 5000 dynamic thunks would utilize around 16 bits of the
address space, thereby gaining entropy. For a BTB that uses
32 bits for indexing, dynamic thunks could provide better prediction
accuracy over fixed thunks.
Have ITS thunks be variable sized and use EXECMEM_MODULE_TEXT such that
they are both more flexible (got to extend them later) and live in 2M TLBs,
just like kernel code, avoiding undue TLB pressure.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
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Ice Lake generation CPUs are not affected by guest/host isolation part of
ITS. If a user is only concerned about KVM guests, they can now choose a
new cmdline option "vmexit" that will not deploy the ITS mitigation when
CPU is not affected by guest/host isolation. This saves the performance
overhead of ITS mitigation on Ice Lake gen CPUs.
When "vmexit" option selected, if the CPU is affected by ITS guest/host
isolation, the default ITS mitigation is deployed.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
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RETs in the lower half of cacheline may be affected by ITS bug,
specifically when the RSB-underflows. Use ITS-safe return thunk for such
RETs.
RETs that are not patched:
- RET in retpoline sequence does not need to be patched, because the
sequence itself fills an RSB before RET.
- RET in Call Depth Tracking (CDT) thunks __x86_indirect_{call|jump}_thunk
and call_depth_return_thunk are not patched because CDT by design
prevents RSB-underflow.
- RETs in .init section are not reachable after init.
- RETs that are explicitly marked safe with ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
|
|
Due to ITS, indirect branches in the lower half of a cacheline may be
vulnerable to branch target injection attack.
Introduce ITS-safe thunks to patch indirect branches in the lower half of
cacheline with the thunk. Also thunk any eBPF generated indirect branches
in emit_indirect_jump().
Below category of indirect branches are not mitigated:
- Indirect branches in the .init section are not mitigated because they are
discarded after boot.
- Indirect branches that are explicitly marked retpoline-safe.
Note that retpoline also mitigates the indirect branches against ITS. This
is because the retpoline sequence fills an RSB entry before RET, and it
does not suffer from RSB-underflow part of the ITS.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
|
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ITS bug in some pre-Alderlake Intel CPUs may allow indirect branches in the
first half of a cache line get predicted to a target of a branch located in
the second half of the cache line.
Set X86_BUG_ITS on affected CPUs. Mitigation to follow in later commits.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
|
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The TDX guest exposes one MRTD (Build-time Measurement Register) and four
RTMR (Run-time Measurement Register) registers to record the build and boot
measurements of a virtual machine (VM). These registers are similar to PCR
(Platform Configuration Register) registers in the TPM (Trusted Platform
Module) space. This measurement data is used to implement security features
like attestation and trusted boot.
To facilitate updating the RTMR registers, the TDX module provides support
for the `TDG.MR.RTMR.EXTEND` TDCALL which can be used to securely extend
the RTMR registers.
Add helper function to update RTMR registers. It will be used by the TDX
guest driver in enabling RTMR extension support.
Co-developed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>
Acked-by: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250506-tdx-rtmr-v6-3-ac6ff5e9d58a@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
|
|
In commit 2e044911be75 ("x86/traps: Decode 0xEA instructions as #UD")
FineIBT starts using 0xEA as an invalid instruction like UD2. But
insn decoder always returns the length of "0xea" instruction as 7
because it does not check the (i64) superscript.
The x86 instruction decoder should also decode 0xEA on x86-64 as
a one-byte invalid instruction by decoding the "(i64)" superscript tag.
This stops decoding instruction which has (i64) but does not have (o64)
superscript in 64-bit mode at opcode and skips other fields.
With this change, insn_decoder_test says 0xea is 1 byte length if
x86-64 (-y option means 64-bit):
$ printf "0:\tea\t\n" | insn_decoder_test -y -v
insn_decoder_test: success: Decoded and checked 1 instructions
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/174580490000.388420.5225447607417115496.stgit@devnote2
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Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
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Remove @perm from the guest pseudo FPU container. The field is
initialized during allocation and never used later.
Rename fpu_init_guest_permissions() to show that its sole purpose is to
lock down guest permissions.
Suggested-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mitchell Levy <levymitchell0@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/af972fe5981b9e7101b64de43c7be0a8cc165323.camel@redhat.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250506093740.2864458-3-chao.gao@intel.com
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When granting userspace or a KVM guest access to an xfeature, preserve the
entity's existing supervisor and software-defined permissions as tracked
by __state_perm, i.e. use __state_perm to track *all* permissions even
though all supported supervisor xfeatures are granted to all FPUs and
FPU_GUEST_PERM_LOCKED disallows changing permissions.
Effectively clobbering supervisor permissions results in inconsistent
behavior, as xstate_get_group_perm() will report supervisor features for
process that do NOT request access to dynamic user xfeatures, whereas any
and all supervisor features will be absent from the set of permissions for
any process that is granted access to one or more dynamic xfeatures (which
right now means AMX).
The inconsistency isn't problematic because fpu_xstate_prctl() already
strips out everything except user xfeatures:
case ARCH_GET_XCOMP_PERM:
/*
* Lockless snapshot as it can also change right after the
* dropping the lock.
*/
permitted = xstate_get_host_group_perm();
permitted &= XFEATURE_MASK_USER_SUPPORTED;
return put_user(permitted, uptr);
case ARCH_GET_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM:
permitted = xstate_get_guest_group_perm();
permitted &= XFEATURE_MASK_USER_SUPPORTED;
return put_user(permitted, uptr);
and similarly KVM doesn't apply the __state_perm to supervisor states
(kvm_get_filtered_xcr0() incorporates xstate_get_guest_group_perm()):
case 0xd: {
u64 permitted_xcr0 = kvm_get_filtered_xcr0();
u64 permitted_xss = kvm_caps.supported_xss;
But if KVM in particular were to ever change, dropping supervisor
permissions would result in subtle bugs in KVM's reporting of supported
CPUID settings. And the above behavior also means that having supervisor
xfeatures in __state_perm is correctly handled by all users.
Dropping supervisor permissions also creates another landmine for KVM. If
more dynamic user xfeatures are ever added, requesting access to multiple
xfeatures in separate ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM calls will result in the
second invocation of __xstate_request_perm() computing the wrong ksize, as
as the mask passed to xstate_calculate_size() would not contain *any*
supervisor features.
Commit 781c64bfcb73 ("x86/fpu/xstate: Handle supervisor states in XSTATE
permissions") fudged around the size issue for userspace FPUs, but for
reasons unknown skipped guest FPUs. Lack of a fix for KVM "works" only
because KVM doesn't yet support virtualizing features that have supervisor
xfeatures, i.e. as of today, KVM guest FPUs will never need the relevant
xfeatures.
Simply extending the hack-a-fix for guests would temporarily solve the
ksize issue, but wouldn't address the inconsistency issue and would leave
another lurking pitfall for KVM. KVM support for virtualizing CET will
likely add CET_KERNEL as a guest-only xfeature, i.e. CET_KERNEL will not
be set in xfeatures_mask_supervisor() and would again be dropped when
granting access to dynamic xfeatures.
Note, the existing clobbering behavior is rather subtle. The @permitted
parameter to __xstate_request_perm() comes from:
permitted = xstate_get_group_perm(guest);
which is either fpu->guest_perm.__state_perm or fpu->perm.__state_perm,
where __state_perm is initialized to:
fpu->perm.__state_perm = fpu_kernel_cfg.default_features;
and copied to the guest side of things:
/* Same defaults for guests */
fpu->guest_perm = fpu->perm;
fpu_kernel_cfg.default_features contains everything except the dynamic
xfeatures, i.e. everything except XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE_DATA:
fpu_kernel_cfg.default_features = fpu_kernel_cfg.max_features;
fpu_kernel_cfg.default_features &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_USER_DYNAMIC;
When __xstate_request_perm() restricts the local "mask" variable to
compute the user state size:
mask &= XFEATURE_MASK_USER_SUPPORTED;
usize = xstate_calculate_size(mask, false);
it subtly overwrites the target __state_perm with "mask" containing only
user xfeatures:
perm = guest ? &fpu->guest_perm : &fpu->perm;
/* Pairs with the READ_ONCE() in xstate_get_group_perm() */
WRITE_ONCE(perm->__state_perm, mask);
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mitchell Levy <levymitchell0@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
Cc: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Cc: Vignesh Balasubramanian <vigbalas@amd.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZTqgzZl-reO1m01I@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250506093740.2864458-2-chao.gao@intel.com
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Multiple testers reported the following new warning:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at arch/x86/mm/tlb.c:795
Which corresponds to:
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_VM) && WARN_ON_ONCE(prev != &init_mm &&
!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(next))))
cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(next));
So the problem is that unuse_temporary_mm() explicitly clears
that bit; and it has to, because otherwise the flush_tlb_mm_range() in
__text_poke() will try sending IPIs, which are not at all needed.
See also:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241113095550.GBZzR3pg-RhJKPDazS@fat_crate.local/
Notably, the whole {,un}use_temporary_mm() thing requires preemption to
be disabled across it with the express purpose of keeping all TLB
nonsense CPU local, such that invalidations can also stay local etc.
However, as a side-effect, we violate this above WARN(), which sorta
makes sense for the normal case, but very much doesn't make sense here.
Change unuse_temporary_mm() to mark the mm_struct such that a further
exception (beyond init_mm) can be grafted, to keep the warning for all
the other cases.
Reported-by: Chaitanya Kumar Borah <chaitanya.kumar.borah@intel.com>
Reported-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250430081154.GH4439@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
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Conflicts:
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Remove some unfortunately-named unused macros which could potentially
result in weird build failures. Fortunately, they are under an #ifdef
__ASSEMBLER__ which has kept them from causing problems so far.
[ dhansen: subject and changelog tweaks ]
Fixes: 1a6ade825079 ("x86/alternative: Convert the asm ALTERNATIVE_3() macro")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250505131646.29288-1-jgross%40suse.com
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