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Not all VMs allow access to RIP. Check guest_state_protected before
calling kvm_rip_read().
This avoids, for example, hitting WARN_ON_ONCE in vt_cache_reg() for
TDX VMs.
Fixes: 81bf912b2c15 ("KVM: TDX: Implement TDX vcpu enter/exit path")
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20250415104821.247234-2-adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Now that the AMD IOMMU doesn't signal success incorrectly, WARN if KVM
attempts to track an AMD IRTE entry without metadata.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20250404193923.1413163-8-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Take irqfds.lock when adding/deleting an IRQ bypass producer to ensure
irqfd->producer isn't modified while kvm_irq_routing_update() is running.
The only lock held when a producer is added/removed is irqbypass's mutex.
Fixes: 872768800652 ("KVM: x86: select IRQ_BYPASS_MANAGER")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20250404193923.1413163-5-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Explicitly treat type differences as GSI routing changes, as comparing MSI
data between two entries could get a false negative, e.g. if userspace
changed the type but left the type-specific data as-is.
Fixes: 515a0c79e796 ("kvm: irqfd: avoid update unmodified entries of the routing")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20250404193923.1413163-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Restore an IRTE back to host control (remapped or posted MSI mode) if the
*new* GSI route prevents posting the IRQ directly to a vCPU, regardless of
the GSI routing type. Updating the IRTE if and only if the new GSI is an
MSI results in KVM leaving an IRTE posting to a vCPU.
The dangling IRTE can result in interrupts being incorrectly delivered to
the guest, and in the worst case scenario can result in use-after-free,
e.g. if the VM is torn down, but the underlying host IRQ isn't freed.
Fixes: efc644048ecd ("KVM: x86: Update IRTE for posted-interrupts")
Fixes: 411b44ba80ab ("svm: Implements update_pi_irte hook to setup posted interrupt")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20250404193923.1413163-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Allocate SVM's interrupt remapping metadata using GFP_ATOMIC as
svm_ir_list_add() is called with IRQs are disabled and irqfs.lock held
when kvm_irq_routing_update() reacts to GSI routing changes.
Fixes: 411b44ba80ab ("svm: Implements update_pi_irte hook to setup posted interrupt")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20250404193923.1413163-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Skip IRTE updates if AVIC is disabled/unsupported, as forcing the IRTE
into remapped mode (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active() will never be true) is
unnecessary and wasteful. The IOMMU driver is responsible for putting
IRTEs into remapped mode when an IRQ is allocated by a device, long before
that device is assigned to a VM. I.e. the kernel as a whole has major
issues if the IRTE isn't already in remapped mode.
Opportunsitically kvm_arch_has_irq_bypass() to query for APICv/AVIC, so
so that all checks in KVM x86 incorporate the same information.
Cc: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed@linux.dev>
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20250401161804.842968-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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kvm_arch_has_irq_bypass() is a small function and even though it does
not appear in any *really* hot paths, it's also not entirely rare.
Make it inline---it also works out nicely in preparation for using it in
kvm-intel.ko and kvm-amd.ko, since the function is not currently exported.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The static key mmio_stale_data_clear controls the KVM-only mitigation for MMIO
Stale Data vulnerability. Rename it to reflect its purpose.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250416-mmio-rename-v2-1-ad1f5488767c@linux.intel.com
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Suggested-by: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Suggested-by: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Suggested-by: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Suggested-by: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Suggested-by: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
"ARM:
- Rework heuristics for resolving the fault IPA (HPFAR_EL2 v. re-walk
stage-1 page tables) to align with the architecture. This avoids
possibly taking an SEA at EL2 on the page table walk or using an
architecturally UNKNOWN fault IPA
- Use acquire/release semantics in the KVM FF-A proxy to avoid
reading a stale value for the FF-A version
- Fix KVM guest driver to match PV CPUID hypercall ABI
- Use Inner Shareable Normal Write-Back mappings at stage-1 in KVM
selftests, which is the only memory type for which atomic
instructions are architecturally guaranteed to work
s390:
- Don't use %pK for debug printing and tracepoints
x86:
- Use a separate subclass when acquiring KVM's per-CPU posted
interrupts wakeup lock in the scheduled out path, i.e. when adding
a vCPU on the list of vCPUs to wake, to workaround a false positive
deadlock. The schedule out code runs with a scheduler lock that the
wakeup handler takes in the opposite order; but it does so with
IRQs disabled and cannot run concurrently with a wakeup
- Explicitly zero-initialize on-stack CPUID unions
- Allow building irqbypass.ko as as module when kvm.ko is a module
- Wrap relatively expensive sanity check with KVM_PROVE_MMU
- Acquire SRCU in KVM_GET_MP_STATE to protect guest memory accesses
selftests:
- Add more scenarios to the MONITOR/MWAIT test
- Add option to rseq test to override /dev/cpu_dma_latency
- Bring list of exit reasons up to date
- Cleanup Makefile to list once tests that are valid on all
architectures
Other:
- Documentation fixes"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (26 commits)
KVM: arm64: Use acquire/release to communicate FF-A version negotiation
KVM: arm64: selftests: Explicitly set the page attrs to Inner-Shareable
KVM: arm64: selftests: Introduce and use hardware-definition macros
KVM: VMX: Use separate subclasses for PI wakeup lock to squash false positive
KVM: VMX: Assert that IRQs are disabled when putting vCPU on PI wakeup list
KVM: x86: Explicitly zero-initialize on-stack CPUID unions
KVM: Allow building irqbypass.ko as as module when kvm.ko is a module
KVM: x86/mmu: Wrap sanity check on number of TDP MMU pages with KVM_PROVE_MMU
KVM: selftests: Add option to rseq test to override /dev/cpu_dma_latency
KVM: x86: Acquire SRCU in KVM_GET_MP_STATE to protect guest memory accesses
Documentation: kvm: remove KVM_CAP_MIPS_TE
Documentation: kvm: organize capabilities in the right section
Documentation: kvm: fix some definition lists
Documentation: kvm: drop "Capability" heading from capabilities
Documentation: kvm: give correct name for KVM_CAP_SPAPR_MULTITCE
Documentation: KVM: KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID now exposes TSC_DEADLINE
selftests: kvm: list once tests that are valid on all architectures
selftests: kvm: bring list of exit reasons up to date
selftests: kvm: revamp MONITOR/MWAIT tests
KVM: arm64: Don't translate FAR if invalid/unsafe
...
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Move platform initialization of SEV/SNP from CCP driver probe time to
KVM module load time so that KVM can do SEV/SNP platform initialization
explicitly if it actually wants to use SEV/SNP functionality.
Add support for KVM to explicitly call into the CCP driver at load time
to initialize SEV/SNP. If required, this behavior can be altered with KVM
module parameters to not do SEV/SNP platform initialization at module load
time. Additionally, a corresponding SEV/SNP platform shutdown is invoked
during KVM module unload time.
Continue to support SEV deferred initialization as the user may have the
file containing SEV persistent data for SEV INIT_EX available only later
after module load/init.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This large commit contains the initial support for TDX in KVM. All x86
parts enable the host-side hypercalls that KVM uses to talk to the TDX
module, a software component that runs in a special CPU mode called SEAM
(Secure Arbitration Mode).
The series is in turn split into multiple sub-series, each with a separate
merge commit:
- Initialization: basic setup for using the TDX module from KVM, plus
ioctls to create TDX VMs and vCPUs.
- MMU: in TDX, private and shared halves of the address space are mapped by
different EPT roots, and the private half is managed by the TDX module.
Using the support that was added to the generic MMU code in 6.14,
add support for TDX's secure page tables to the Intel side of KVM.
Generic KVM code takes care of maintaining a mirror of the secure page
tables so that they can be queried efficiently, and ensuring that changes
are applied to both the mirror and the secure EPT.
- vCPU enter/exit: implement the callbacks that handle the entry of a TDX
vCPU (via the SEAMCALL TDH.VP.ENTER) and the corresponding save/restore
of host state.
- Userspace exits: introduce support for guest TDVMCALLs that KVM forwards to
userspace. These correspond to the usual KVM_EXIT_* "heavyweight vmexits"
but are triggered through a different mechanism, similar to VMGEXIT for
SEV-ES and SEV-SNP.
- Interrupt handling: support for virtual interrupt injection as well as
handling VM-Exits that are caused by vectored events. Exclusive to
TDX are machine-check SMIs, which the kernel already knows how to
handle through the kernel machine check handler (commit 7911f145de5f,
"x86/mce: Implement recovery for errors in TDX/SEAM non-root mode")
- Loose ends: handling of the remaining exits from the TDX module, including
EPT violation/misconfig and several TDVMCALL leaves that are handled in
the kernel (CPUID, HLT, RDMSR/WRMSR, GetTdVmCallInfo); plus returning
an error or ignoring operations that are not supported by TDX guests
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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timer_delete[_sync]() replaces del_timer[_sync](). Convert the whole tree
over and remove the historical wrapper inlines.
Conversion was done with coccinelle plus manual fixups where necessary.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Use a separate subclass when acquiring KVM's per-CPU posted interrupts
wakeup lock in the scheduled out path, i.e. when adding a vCPU on the list
of vCPUs to wake, to workaround a false positive deadlock.
Chain exists of:
&p->pi_lock --> &rq->__lock --> &per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu_lock, cpu)
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu_lock, cpu));
lock(&rq->__lock);
lock(&per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu_lock, cpu));
lock(&p->pi_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
In the wakeup handler, the callchain is *always*:
sysvec_kvm_posted_intr_wakeup_ipi()
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--> pi_wakeup_handler()
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--> kvm_vcpu_wake_up()
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--> try_to_wake_up(),
and the lock order is:
&per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu_lock, cpu) --> &p->pi_lock.
For the schedule out path, the callchain is always (for all intents and
purposes; if the kernel is preemptible, kvm_sched_out() can be called from
something other than schedule(), but the beginning of the callchain will
be the same point in vcpu_block()):
vcpu_block()
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--> schedule()
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--> kvm_sched_out()
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--> vmx_vcpu_put()
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--> vmx_vcpu_pi_put()
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--> pi_enable_wakeup_handler()
and the lock order is:
&rq->__lock --> &per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu_lock, cpu)
I.e. lockdep sees AB+BC ordering for schedule out, and CA ordering for
wakeup, and complains about the A=>C versus C=>A inversion. In practice,
deadlock can't occur between schedule out and the wakeup handler as they
are mutually exclusive. The entirely of the schedule out code that runs
with the problematic scheduler locks held, does so with IRQs disabled,
i.e. can't run concurrently with the wakeup handler.
Use a subclass instead disabling lockdep entirely, and tell lockdep that
both subclasses are being acquired when loading a vCPU, as the sched_out
and sched_in paths are NOT mutually exclusive, e.g.
CPU 0 CPU 1
--------------- ---------------
vCPU0 sched_out
vCPU1 sched_in
vCPU1 sched_out vCPU 0 sched_in
where vCPU0's sched_in may race with vCPU1's sched_out, on CPU 0's wakeup
list+lock.
Signed-off-by: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20250401154727.835231-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Assert that IRQs are already disabled when putting a vCPU on a CPU's PI
wakeup list, as opposed to saving/disabling+restoring IRQs. KVM relies on
IRQs being disabled until the vCPU task is fully scheduled out, i.e. until
the scheduler has dropped all of its per-CPU locks (e.g. for the runqueue),
as attempting to wake the task while it's being scheduled out could lead
to deadlock.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20250401154727.835231-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Explicitly zero/empty-initialize the unions used for PMU related CPUID
entries, instead of manually zeroing all fields (hopefully), or in the
case of 0x80000022, relying on the compiler to clobber the uninitialized
bitfields.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-ID: <20250315024102.2361628-1-seanjc@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Wrap the TDP MMU page counter in CONFIG_KVM_PROVE_MMU so that the sanity
check is omitted from production builds, and more importantly to remove
the atomic accesses to account pages. A one-off memory leak in production
is relatively uninteresting, and a WARN_ON won't help mitigate a systemic
issue; it's as much about helping triage memory leaks as it is about
detecting them in the first place, and doesn't magically stop the leaks.
I.e. production environments will be quite sad if a severe KVM bug escapes,
regardless of whether or not KVM WARNs.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20250315023448.2358456-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Acquire a lock on kvm->srcu when userspace is getting MP state to handle a
rather extreme edge case where "accepting" APIC events, i.e. processing
pending INIT or SIPI, can trigger accesses to guest memory. If the vCPU
is in L2 with INIT *and* a TRIPLE_FAULT request pending, then getting MP
state will trigger a nested VM-Exit by way of ->check_nested_events(), and
emuating the nested VM-Exit can access guest memory.
The splat was originally hit by syzkaller on a Google-internal kernel, and
reproduced on an upstream kernel by hacking the triple_fault_event_test
selftest to stuff a pending INIT, store an MSR on VM-Exit (to generate a
memory access on VMX), and do vcpu_mp_state_get() to trigger the scenario.
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.14.0-rc3-b112d356288b-vmx/pi_lockdep_false_pos-lock #3 Not tainted
-----------------------------
include/linux/kvm_host.h:1058 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by triple_fault_ev/1256:
#0: ffff88810df5a330 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x8b/0x9a0 [kvm]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 11 UID: 1000 PID: 1256 Comm: triple_fault_ev Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3-b112d356288b-vmx #3
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x7f/0x90
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x144/0x190
kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot+0x156/0x180 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_read_guest+0x3e/0x90 [kvm]
read_and_check_msr_entry+0x2e/0x180 [kvm_intel]
__nested_vmx_vmexit+0x550/0xde0 [kvm_intel]
kvm_check_nested_events+0x1b/0x30 [kvm]
kvm_apic_accept_events+0x33/0x100 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_mpstate+0x30/0x1d0 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x33e/0x9a0 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x8b/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
</TASK>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20250401150504.829812-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"ARM:
- Nested virtualization support for VGICv3, giving the nested
hypervisor control of the VGIC hardware when running an L2 VM
- Removal of 'late' nested virtualization feature register masking,
making the supported feature set directly visible to userspace
- Support for emulating FEAT_PMUv3 on Apple silicon, taking advantage
of an IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED trap that covers all PMUv3 registers
- Paravirtual interface for discovering the set of CPU
implementations where a VM may run, addressing a longstanding issue
of guest CPU errata awareness in big-little systems and
cross-implementation VM migration
- Userspace control of the registers responsible for identifying a
particular CPU implementation (MIDR_EL1, REVIDR_EL1, AIDR_EL1),
allowing VMs to be migrated cross-implementation
- pKVM updates, including support for tracking stage-2 page table
allocations in the protected hypervisor in the 'SecPageTable' stat
- Fixes to vPMU, ensuring that userspace updates to the vPMU after
KVM_RUN are reflected into the backing perf events
LoongArch:
- Remove unnecessary header include path
- Assume constant PGD during VM context switch
- Add perf events support for guest VM
RISC-V:
- Disable the kernel perf counter during configure
- KVM selftests improvements for PMU
- Fix warning at the time of KVM module removal
x86:
- Add support for aging of SPTEs without holding mmu_lock.
Not taking mmu_lock allows multiple aging actions to run in
parallel, and more importantly avoids stalling vCPUs. This includes
an implementation of per-rmap-entry locking; aging the gfn is done
with only a per-rmap single-bin spinlock taken, whereas locking an
rmap for write requires taking both the per-rmap spinlock and the
mmu_lock.
Note that this decreases slightly the accuracy of accessed-page
information, because changes to the SPTE outside aging might not
use atomic operations even if they could race against a clear of
the Accessed bit.
This is deliberate because KVM and mm/ tolerate false
positives/negatives for accessed information, and testing has shown
that reducing the latency of aging is far more beneficial to
overall system performance than providing "perfect" young/old
information.
- Defer runtime CPUID updates until KVM emulates a CPUID instruction,
to coalesce updates when multiple pieces of vCPU state are
changing, e.g. as part of a nested transition
- Fix a variety of nested emulation bugs, and add VMX support for
synthesizing nested VM-Exit on interception (instead of injecting
#UD into L2)
- Drop "support" for async page faults for protected guests that do
not set SEND_ALWAYS (i.e. that only want async page faults at CPL3)
- Bring a bit of sanity to x86's VM teardown code, which has
accumulated a lot of cruft over the years. Particularly, destroy
vCPUs before the MMU, despite the latter being a VM-wide operation
- Add common secure TSC infrastructure for use within SNP and in the
future TDX
- Block KVM_CAP_SYNC_REGS if guest state is protected. It does not
make sense to use the capability if the relevant registers are not
available for reading or writing
- Don't take kvm->lock when iterating over vCPUs in the suspend
notifier to fix a largely theoretical deadlock
- Use the vCPU's actual Xen PV clock information when starting the
Xen timer, as the cached state in arch.hv_clock can be stale/bogus
- Fix a bug where KVM could bleed PVCLOCK_GUEST_STOPPED across
different PV clocks; restrict PVCLOCK_GUEST_STOPPED to kvmclock, as
KVM's suspend notifier only accounts for kvmclock, and there's no
evidence that the flag is actually supported by Xen guests
- Clean up the per-vCPU "cache" of its reference pvclock, and instead
only track the vCPU's TSC scaling (multipler+shift) metadata (which
is moderately expensive to compute, and rarely changes for modern
setups)
- Don't write to the Xen hypercall page on MSR writes that are
initiated by the host (userspace or KVM) to fix a class of bugs
where KVM can write to guest memory at unexpected times, e.g.
during vCPU creation if userspace has set the Xen hypercall MSR
index to collide with an MSR that KVM emulates
- Restrict the Xen hypercall MSR index to the unofficial synthetic
range to reduce the set of possible collisions with MSRs that are
emulated by KVM (collisions can still happen as KVM emulates
Hyper-V MSRs, which also reside in the synthetic range)
- Clean up and optimize KVM's handling of Xen MSR writes and
xen_hvm_config
- Update Xen TSC leaves during CPUID emulation instead of modifying
the CPUID entries when updating PV clocks; there is no guarantee PV
clocks will be updated between TSC frequency changes and CPUID
emulation, and guest reads of the TSC leaves should be rare, i.e.
are not a hot path
x86 (Intel):
- Fix a bug where KVM unnecessarily reads XFD_ERR from hardware and
thus modifies the vCPU's XFD_ERR on a #NM due to CR0.TS=1
- Pass XFD_ERR as the payload when injecting #NM, as a preparatory
step for upcoming FRED virtualization support
- Decouple the EPT entry RWX protection bit macros from the EPT
Violation bits, both as a general cleanup and in anticipation of
adding support for emulating Mode-Based Execution Control (MBEC)
- Reject KVM_RUN if userspace manages to gain control and stuff
invalid guest state while KVM is in the middle of emulating nested
VM-Enter
- Add a macro to handle KVM's sanity checks on entry/exit VMCS
control pairs in anticipation of adding sanity checks for secondary
exit controls (the primary field is out of bits)
x86 (AMD):
- Ensure the PSP driver is initialized when both the PSP and KVM
modules are built-in (the initcall framework doesn't handle
dependencies)
- Use long-term pins when registering encrypted memory regions, so
that the pages are migrated out of MIGRATE_CMA/ZONE_MOVABLE and
don't lead to excessive fragmentation
- Add macros and helpers for setting GHCB return/error codes
- Add support for Idle HLT interception, which elides interception if
the vCPU has a pending, unmasked virtual IRQ when HLT is executed
- Fix a bug in INVPCID emulation where KVM fails to check for a
non-canonical address
- Don't attempt VMRUN for SEV-ES+ guests if the vCPU's VMSA is
invalid, e.g. because the vCPU was "destroyed" via SNP's AP
Creation hypercall
- Reject SNP AP Creation if the requested SEV features for the vCPU
don't match the VM's configured set of features
Selftests:
- Fix again the Intel PMU counters test; add a data load and do
CLFLUSH{OPT} on the data instead of executing code. The theory is
that modern Intel CPUs have learned new code prefetching tricks
that bypass the PMU counters
- Fix a flaw in the Intel PMU counters test where it asserts that an
event is counting correctly without actually knowing what the event
counts on the underlying hardware
- Fix a variety of flaws, bugs, and false failures/passes
dirty_log_test, and improve its coverage by collecting all dirty
entries on each iteration
- Fix a few minor bugs related to handling of stats FDs
- Add infrastructure to make vCPU and VM stats FDs available to tests
by default (open the FDs during VM/vCPU creation)
- Relax an assertion on the number of HLT exits in the xAPIC IPI test
when running on a CPU that supports AMD's Idle HLT (which elides
interception of HLT if a virtual IRQ is pending and unmasked)"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (216 commits)
RISC-V: KVM: Optimize comments in kvm_riscv_vcpu_isa_disable_allowed
RISC-V: KVM: Teardown riscv specific bits after kvm_exit
LoongArch: KVM: Register perf callbacks for guest
LoongArch: KVM: Implement arch-specific functions for guest perf
LoongArch: KVM: Add stub for kvm_arch_vcpu_preempted_in_kernel()
LoongArch: KVM: Remove PGD saving during VM context switch
LoongArch: KVM: Remove unnecessary header include path
KVM: arm64: Tear down vGIC on failed vCPU creation
KVM: arm64: PMU: Reload when resetting
KVM: arm64: PMU: Reload when user modifies registers
KVM: arm64: PMU: Fix SET_ONE_REG for vPMC regs
KVM: arm64: PMU: Assume PMU presence in pmu-emul.c
KVM: arm64: PMU: Set raw values from user to PM{C,I}NTEN{SET,CLR}, PMOVS{SET,CLR}
KVM: arm64: Create each pKVM hyp vcpu after its corresponding host vcpu
KVM: arm64: Factor out pKVM hyp vcpu creation to separate function
KVM: arm64: Initialize HCRX_EL2 traps in pKVM
KVM: arm64: Factor out setting HCRX_EL2 traps into separate function
KVM: x86: block KVM_CAP_SYNC_REGS if guest state is protected
KVM: x86: Add infrastructure for secure TSC
KVM: x86: Push down setting vcpu.arch.user_set_tsc
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 speculation mitigation updates from Borislav Petkov:
- Some preparatory work to convert the mitigations machinery to
mitigating attack vectors instead of single vulnerabilities
- Untangle and remove a now unneeded X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB flag
- Add support for a Zen5-specific SRSO mitigation
- Cleanups and minor improvements
* tag 'x86_bugs_for_v6.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/bugs: Make spectre user default depend on MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2
x86/bugs: Use the cpu_smt_possible() helper instead of open-coded code
x86/bugs: Add AUTO mitigations for mds/taa/mmio/rfds
x86/bugs: Relocate mds/taa/mmio/rfds defines
x86/bugs: Add X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2_USER
x86/bugs: Remove X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB
KVM: nVMX: Always use IBPB to properly virtualize IBRS
x86/bugs: Use a static branch to guard IBPB on vCPU switch
x86/bugs: Remove the X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB check in ib_prctl_set()
x86/mm: Remove X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB checks in cond_mitigation()
x86/bugs: Move the X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB check into callers
x86/bugs: KVM: Add support for SRSO_MSR_FIX
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull timer cleanups from Thomas Gleixner:
"A treewide hrtimer timer cleanup
hrtimers are initialized with hrtimer_init() and a subsequent store to
the callback pointer. This turned out to be suboptimal for the
upcoming Rust integration and is obviously a silly implementation to
begin with.
This cleanup replaces the hrtimer_init(T); T->function = cb; sequence
with hrtimer_setup(T, cb);
The conversion was done with Coccinelle and a few manual fixups.
Once the conversion has completely landed in mainline, hrtimer_init()
will be removed and the hrtimer::function becomes a private member"
* tag 'timers-cleanups-2025-03-23' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (100 commits)
wifi: rt2x00: Switch to use hrtimer_update_function()
io_uring: Use helper function hrtimer_update_function()
serial: xilinx_uartps: Use helper function hrtimer_update_function()
ASoC: fsl: imx-pcm-fiq: Switch to use hrtimer_setup()
RDMA: Switch to use hrtimer_setup()
virtio: mem: Switch to use hrtimer_setup()
drm/vmwgfx: Switch to use hrtimer_setup()
drm/xe/oa: Switch to use hrtimer_setup()
drm/vkms: Switch to use hrtimer_setup()
drm/msm: Switch to use hrtimer_setup()
drm/i915/request: Switch to use hrtimer_setup()
drm/i915/uncore: Switch to use hrtimer_setup()
drm/i915/pmu: Switch to use hrtimer_setup()
drm/i915/perf: Switch to use hrtimer_setup()
drm/i915/gvt: Switch to use hrtimer_setup()
drm/i915/huc: Switch to use hrtimer_setup()
drm/amdgpu: Switch to use hrtimer_setup()
stm class: heartbeat: Switch to use hrtimer_setup()
i2c: Switch to use hrtimer_setup()
iio: Switch to use hrtimer_setup()
...
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- Add common secure TSC infrastructure for use within SNP and in the
future TDX
- Block KVM_CAP_SYNC_REGS if guest state is protected. It does not make
sense to use the capability if the relevant registers are not
available for reading or writing.
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The immediate issue being fixed here is a nVMX bug where KVM fails to
detect that, after nested VM-Exit, L1 has a pending IRQ (or NMI).
However, checking for a pending interrupt accesses the legacy PIC, and
x86's kvm_arch_destroy_vm() currently frees the PIC before destroying
vCPUs, i.e. checking for IRQs during the forced nested VM-Exit results
in a NULL pointer deref; that's a prerequisite for the nVMX fix.
The remaining patches attempt to bring a bit of sanity to x86's VM
teardown code, which has accumulated a lot of cruft over the years. E.g.
KVM currently unloads each vCPU's MMUs in a separate operation from
destroying vCPUs, all because when guest SMP support was added, KVM had a
kludgy MMU teardown flow that broke when a VM had more than one 1 vCPU.
And that oddity lived on, for 18 years...
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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KVM Xen changes for 6.15
- Don't write to the Xen hypercall page on MSR writes that are initiated by
the host (userspace or KVM) to fix a class of bugs where KVM can write to
guest memory at unexpected times, e.g. during vCPU creation if userspace has
set the Xen hypercall MSR index to collide with an MSR that KVM emulates.
- Restrict the Xen hypercall MSR indx to the unofficial synthetic range to
reduce the set of possible collisions with MSRs that are emulated by KVM
(collisions can still happen as KVM emulates Hyper-V MSRs, which also reside
in the synthetic range).
- Clean up and optimize KVM's handling of Xen MSR writes and xen_hvm_config.
- Update Xen TSC leaves during CPUID emulation instead of modifying the CPUID
entries when updating PV clocks, as there is no guarantee PV clocks will be
updated between TSC frequency changes and CPUID emulation, and guest reads
of Xen TSC should be rare, i.e. are not a hot path.
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KVM PV clock changes for 6.15:
- Don't take kvm->lock when iterating over vCPUs in the suspend notifier to
fix a largely theoretical deadlock.
- Use the vCPU's actual Xen PV clock information when starting the Xen timer,
as the cached state in arch.hv_clock can be stale/bogus.
- Fix a bug where KVM could bleed PVCLOCK_GUEST_STOPPED across different
PV clocks.
- Restrict PVCLOCK_GUEST_STOPPED to kvmclock, as KVM's suspend notifier only
accounts for kvmclock, and there's no evidence that the flag is actually
supported by Xen guests.
- Clean up the per-vCPU "cache" of its reference pvclock, and instead only
track the vCPU's TSC scaling (multipler+shift) metadata (which is moderately
expensive to compute, and rarely changes for modern setups).
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KVM SVM changes for 6.15
- Ensure the PSP driver is initialized when both the PSP and KVM modules are
built-in (the initcall framework doesn't handle dependencies).
- Use long-term pins when registering encrypted memory regions, so that the
pages are migrated out of MIGRATE_CMA/ZONE_MOVABLE and don't lead to
excessive fragmentation.
- Add macros and helpers for setting GHCB return/error codes.
- Add support for Idle HLT interception, which elides interception if the vCPU
has a pending, unmasked virtual IRQ when HLT is executed.
- Fix a bug in INVPCID emulation where KVM fails to check for a non-canonical
address.
- Don't attempt VMRUN for SEV-ES+ guests if the vCPU's VMSA is invalid, e.g.
because the vCPU was "destroyed" via SNP's AP Creation hypercall.
- Reject SNP AP Creation if the requested SEV features for the vCPU don't
match the VM's configured set of features.
- Misc cleanups
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KVM VMX changes for 6.15
- Fix a bug where KVM unnecessarily reads XFD_ERR from hardware and thus
modifies the vCPU's XFD_ERR on a #NM due to CR0.TS=1.
- Pass XFD_ERR as a psueo-payload when injecting #NM as a preparatory step
for upcoming FRED virtualization support.
- Decouple the EPT entry RWX protection bit macros from the EPT Violation bits
as a general cleanup, and in anticipation of adding support for emulating
Mode-Based Execution (MBEC).
- Reject KVM_RUN if userspace manages to gain control and stuff invalid guest
state while KVM is in the middle of emulating nested VM-Enter.
- Add a macro to handle KVM's sanity checks on entry/exit VMCS control pairs
in anticipation of adding sanity checks for secondary exit controls (the
primary field is out of bits).
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KVM x86 misc changes for 6.15:
- Fix a bug in PIC emulation that caused KVM to emit a spurious KVM_REQ_EVENT.
- Add a helper to consolidate handling of mp_state transitions, and use it to
clear pv_unhalted whenever a vCPU is made RUNNABLE.
- Defer runtime CPUID updates until KVM emulates a CPUID instruction, to
coalesce updates when multiple pieces of vCPU state are changing, e.g. as
part of a nested transition.
- Fix a variety of nested emulation bugs, and add VMX support for synthesizing
nested VM-Exit on interception (instead of injecting #UD into L2).
- Drop "support" for PV Async #PF with proctected guests without SEND_ALWAYS,
as KVM can't get the current CPL.
- Misc cleanups
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KVM x86/mmu changes for 6.15
Add support for "fast" aging of SPTEs in both the TDP MMU and Shadow MMU, where
"fast" means "without holding mmu_lock". Not taking mmu_lock allows multiple
aging actions to run in parallel, and more importantly avoids stalling vCPUs,
e.g. due to holding mmu_lock for an extended duration while a vCPU is faulting
in memory.
For the TDP MMU, protect aging via RCU; the page tables are RCU-protected and
KVM doesn't need to access any metadata to age SPTEs.
For the Shadow MMU, use bit 1 of rmap pointers (bit 0 is used to terminate a
list of rmaps) to implement a per-rmap single-bit spinlock. When aging a gfn,
acquire the rmap's spinlock with read-only permissions, which allows hardening
and optimizing the locking and aging, e.g. locking an rmap for write requires
mmu_lock to also be held. The lock is NOT a true R/W spinlock, i.e. multiple
concurrent readers aren't supported.
To avoid forcing all SPTE updates to use atomic operations (clearing the
Accessed bit out of mmu_lock makes it inherently volatile), rework and rename
spte_has_volatile_bits() to spte_needs_atomic_update() and deliberately exclude
the Accessed bit. KVM (and mm/) already tolerates false positives/negatives
for Accessed information, and all testing has shown that reducing the latency
of aging is far more beneficial to overall system performance than providing
"perfect" young/old information.
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Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Now all the necessary code for TDX is in place, it's ready to run TDX
guest. Advertise the VM type of KVM_X86_TDX_VM so that the user space
VMM like QEMU can start to use it.
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
---
TDX "the rest" v2:
- No change.
TDX "the rest" v1:
- Move down to the end of patch series.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Always honor guest PAT in KVM-managed EPTs on TDX enabled guests by
making self-snoop feature a hard dependency for TDX and making quirk
KVM_X86_QUIRK_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT not a valid quirk once TDX is enabled.
The quirk KVM_X86_QUIRK_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT only affects memory type of
KVM-managed EPTs. For the TDX-module-managed private EPT, memory type is
always forced to WB now.
Honoring guest PAT in KVM-managed EPTs ensures KVM does not invoke
kvm_zap_gfn_range() when attaching/detaching non-coherent DMA devices,
which would cause mirrored EPTs for TDs to be zapped, leading to the
TDX-module-managed private EPT being incorrectly zapped.
As a new feature, TDX always comes with support for self-snoop, and does
not have to worry about unmodifiable but buggy guests. So, simply ignore
KVM_X86_QUIRK_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT on TDX guests just like kvm-amd.ko already
does.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20250224071039.31511-1-yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
[Only apply to TDX guests. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The IGNORE_GUEST_PAT quirk is inapplicable, and thus always-disabled,
if shadow_memtype_mask is zero. As long as vmx_get_mt_mask is not
called for the shadow paging case, there is no need to consult
shadow_memtype_mask and it can be removed altogether.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Introduce an Intel specific quirk KVM_X86_QUIRK_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT to have
KVM ignore guest PAT when this quirk is enabled.
On AMD platforms, KVM always honors guest PAT. On Intel however there are
two issues. First, KVM *cannot* honor guest PAT if CPU feature self-snoop
is not supported. Second, UC access on certain Intel platforms can be very
slow[1] and honoring guest PAT on those platforms may break some old
guests that accidentally specify video RAM as UC. Those old guests may
never expect the slowness since KVM always forces WB previously. See [2].
So, introduce a quirk that KVM can enable by default on all Intel platforms
to avoid breaking old unmodifiable guests. Newer userspace can disable this
quirk if it wishes KVM to honor guest PAT; disabling the quirk will fail
if self-snoop is not supported, i.e. if KVM cannot obey the wish.
The quirk is a no-op on AMD and also if any assigned devices have
non-coherent DMA. This is not an issue, as KVM_X86_QUIRK_CD_NW_CLEARED is
another example of a quirk that is sometimes automatically disabled.
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/Ztl9NWCOupNfVaCA@yzhao56-desk.sh.intel.com # [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/87jzfutmfc.fsf@redhat.com # [2]
Message-ID: <20250224070946.31482-1-yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
[Use supported_quirks/inapplicable_quirks to support both AMD and
no-self-snoop cases, as well as to remove the shadow_memtype_mask check
from kvm_mmu_may_ignore_guest_pat(). - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Introduce supported_quirks in kvm_caps to store platform-specific force-enabled
quirks.
No functional changes intended.
Signed-off-by: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20250224070832.31394-1-yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
[Remove unsupported quirks at KVM_ENABLE_CAP time. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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In some cases, the handling of quirks is split between platform-specific
code and generic code, or it is done entirely in generic code, but the
relevant bug does not trigger on some platforms; for example,
this will be the case for "ignore guest PAT". Allow unaffected vendor
modules to disable handling of a quirk for all VMs via a new entry in
kvm_caps.
Such quirks remain available in KVM_CAP_DISABLE_QUIRKS2, because that API
tells userspace that KVM *knows* that some of its past behavior was bogus
or just undesirable. In other words, it's plausible for userspace to
refuse to run if a quirk is not listed by KVM_CAP_DISABLE_QUIRKS2, so
preserve that and make it part of the API.
As an example, mark KVM_X86_QUIRK_CD_NW_CLEARED as auto-disabled on
Intel systems.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Allowing arbitrary re-enabling of quirks puts a limit on what the
quirks themselves can do, since you cannot assume that the quirk
prevents a particular state. More important, it also prevents
KVM from disabling a quirk at VM creation time, because userspace
can always go back and re-enable that.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Allow TDX guests to access MTRR MSRs as what KVM does for normal VMs, i.e.,
KVM emulates accesses to MTRR MSRs, but doesn't virtualize guest MTRR
memory types.
TDX module exposes MTRR feature to TDX guests unconditionally. KVM needs
to support MTRR MSRs accesses for TDX guests to match the architectural
behavior.
Signed-off-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Message-ID: <20250227012021.1778144-19-binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Because guest TD memory is protected, VMM patching guest binary for
hypercall instruction isn't possible. Add a method to ignore hypercall
patching. Note: guest TD kernel needs to be modified to use
TDG.VP.VMCALL for hypercall.
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Message-ID: <20250227012021.1778144-18-binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Because vmx_set_mce function is VMX specific and it cannot be used for TDX.
Add vt stub to ignore setting up mce for TDX.
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Message-ID: <20250227012021.1778144-17-binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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TDX protects TDX guest TSC state from VMM. Implement access methods to
ignore guest TSC.
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Message-ID: <20250227012021.1778144-16-binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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TDX doesn't support VMX preemption timer. Implement access methods for VMM
to ignore VMX preemption timer.
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Message-ID: <20250227012021.1778144-15-binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|