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Currently, the MCE subsystem sysfs interface will be removed if the
thresholding sysfs interface fails to be created. A common failure is due to
new MCA bank types that are not recognized and don't have a short name set.
The MCA thresholding feature is optional and should not break the common MCE
sysfs interface. Also, new MCA bank types are occasionally introduced, and
updates will be needed to recognize them. But likewise, this should not break
the common sysfs interface.
Keep the MCE sysfs interface regardless of the status of the thresholding
sysfs interface.
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250624-wip-mca-updates-v4-1-236dd74f645f@amd.com
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The variable index is modified and reused as array index when modify
register EIOINTC_ENABLE. There will be array index overflow problem.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3956a52bc05b ("LoongArch: KVM: Add EIOINTC read and write functions")
Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
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When the KCOV is enabled all functions get instrumented, unless
the __no_sanitize_coverage attribute is used. To prepare for
__no_sanitize_coverage being applied to __init functions, we have to
handle differences in how GCC's inline optimizations get resolved.
For LoongArch this exposed several places where __init annotations
were missing but ended up being "accidentally correct". So fix these
cases.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
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The EFI memory map at 'boot_memmap' is crucial for kdump to understand
the primary kernel's memory layout. This memory region, typically part
of EFI Boot Services (BS) data, can be overwritten after ExitBootServices
if not explicitly preserved by the kernel.
This commit addresses this by:
1. Calling memblock_reserve() to reserve the entire physical region
occupied by the EFI memory map (header + descriptors). This prevents
the primary kernel from reallocating and corrupting this area.
2. Setting the EFI_PRESERVE_BS_REGIONS flag in efi.flags. This indicates
that efforts have been made to preserve critical BS code/data regions
which can be useful for other kernel subsystems or debugging.
These changes ensure the original EFI memory map data remains intact,
improving kdump reliability and potentially aiding other EFI-related
functionalities that might rely on preserved BS code/data.
Signed-off-by: Ming Wang <wangming01@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
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After commit a934a57a42f64a4 ("scripts/misc-check: check missing #include
<linux/export.h> when W=1") and 7d95680d64ac8e836c ("scripts/misc-check:
check unnecessary #include <linux/export.h> when W=1"), we get some build
warnings with W=1:
arch/loongarch/kernel/acpi.c: warning: EXPORT_SYMBOL() is used, but #include <linux/export.h> is missing
arch/loongarch/kernel/alternative.c: warning: EXPORT_SYMBOL() is used, but #include <linux/export.h> is missing
arch/loongarch/kernel/kfpu.c: warning: EXPORT_SYMBOL() is used, but #include <linux/export.h> is missing
arch/loongarch/kernel/traps.c: warning: EXPORT_SYMBOL() is used, but #include <linux/export.h> is missing
arch/loongarch/kernel/unwind_guess.c: warning: EXPORT_SYMBOL() is used, but #include <linux/export.h> is missing
arch/loongarch/kernel/unwind_orc.c: warning: EXPORT_SYMBOL() is used, but #include <linux/export.h> is missing
arch/loongarch/kernel/unwind_prologue.c: warning: EXPORT_SYMBOL() is used, but #include <linux/export.h> is missing
arch/loongarch/lib/crc32-loongarch.c: warning: EXPORT_SYMBOL() is used, but #include <linux/export.h> is missing
arch/loongarch/lib/csum.c: warning: EXPORT_SYMBOL() is used, but #include <linux/export.h> is missing
arch/loongarch/kernel/elf.c: warning: EXPORT_SYMBOL() is not used, but #include <linux/export.h> is present
arch/loongarch/kernel/paravirt.c: warning: EXPORT_SYMBOL() is not used, but #include <linux/export.h> is present
arch/loongarch/pci/pci.c: warning: EXPORT_SYMBOL() is not used, but #include <linux/export.h> is present
So fix these build warnings for LoongArch.
Reviewed-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
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While the GCC and Clang compilers already define __ASSEMBLER__
automatically when compiling assembler code, __ASSEMBLY__ is a macro
that only gets defined by the Makefiles in the kernel. This is bad
since macros starting with two underscores are names that are reserved
by the C language. It can also be very confusing for the developers
when switching between userspace and kernelspace coding, or when
dealing with uapi headers that rather should use __ASSEMBLER__ instead.
So let's now standardize on the __ASSEMBLER__ macro that is provided
by the compilers.
This is almost a completely mechanical patch (done with a simple
"sed -i" statement), with one comment tweaked manually in the
arch/loongarch/include/asm/cpu.h file (it was missing the trailing
underscores).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
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Marc reported that enabling protected mode on a device with GICv2
doesn't fail gracefully as one would expect, and leads to a host
kernel crash.
As it turns out, the first half of pKVM init happens before the vgic
probe, and so by the time we find out we have a GICv2 we're already
committed to keeping the pKVM vectors installed at EL2 -- pKVM rejects
stub HVCs for obvious security reasons. However, the error path on KVM
init leads to teardown_hyp_mode() which unconditionally frees hypervisor
allocations (including the EL2 stacks and per-cpu pages) under the
assumption that a previous cpu_hyp_uninit() execution has reset the
vectors back to the stubs, which is false with pKVM.
Interestingly, host stage-2 protection is not enabled yet at this point,
so this use-after-free may go unnoticed for a while. The issue becomes
more obvious after the finalize_pkvm() call.
Fix this by keeping track of the CPUs on which pKVM is initialized in
the kvm_hyp_initialized per-cpu variable, and use it from
teardown_hyp_mode() to skip freeing pages that are in fact used.
Fixes: a770ee80e662 ("KVM: arm64: pkvm: Disable GICv2 support")
Reported-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250626101014.1519345-1-qperret@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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In the unlikely case pKVM failed to allocate carveout, the error path
tries to access NULL ptr when it de-reference the SVE state from the
uninitialized nVHE per-cpu base.
[ 1.575420] pstate: 61400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 1.576010] pc : teardown_hyp_mode+0xe4/0x180
[ 1.576920] lr : teardown_hyp_mode+0xd0/0x180
[ 1.577308] sp : ffff8000826fb9d0
[ 1.577600] x29: ffff8000826fb9d0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff80008209b000
[ 1.578383] x26: ffff800081dde000 x25: ffff8000820493c0 x24: ffff80008209eb00
[ 1.579180] x23: 0000000000000040 x22: 0000000000000001 x21: 0000000000000000
[ 1.579881] x20: 0000000000000002 x19: ffff800081d540b8 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 1.580544] x17: ffff800081205230 x16: 0000000000000152 x15: 00000000fffffff8
[ 1.581183] x14: 0000000000000008 x13: fff00000ff7f6880 x12: 000000000000003e
[ 1.581813] x11: 0000000000000002 x10: 00000000000000ff x9 : 0000000000000000
[ 1.582503] x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x6 : 43485e525851ff30
[ 1.583140] x5 : fff00000ff6e9030 x4 : fff00000ff6e8f80 x3 : 0000000000000000
[ 1.583780] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000002 x0 : 0000000000000000
[ 1.584526] Call trace:
[ 1.584945] teardown_hyp_mode+0xe4/0x180 (P)
[ 1.585578] init_hyp_mode+0x920/0x994
[ 1.586005] kvm_arm_init+0xb4/0x25c
[ 1.586387] do_one_initcall+0xe0/0x258
[ 1.586819] do_initcall_level+0xa0/0xd4
[ 1.587224] do_initcalls+0x54/0x94
[ 1.587606] do_basic_setup+0x1c/0x28
[ 1.587998] kernel_init_freeable+0xc8/0x130
[ 1.588409] kernel_init+0x20/0x1a4
[ 1.588768] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 1.589568] Code: f875db48 8b1c0109 f100011f 9a8903e8 (f9463100)
[ 1.590332] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
As Quentin pointed, the order of free is also wrong, we need to free
SVE state first before freeing the per CPU ptrs.
I initially observed this on 6.12, but I could also repro in master.
Signed-off-by: Mostafa Saleh <smostafa@google.com>
Fixes: 66d5b53e20a6 ("KVM: arm64: Allocate memory mapped at hyp for host sve state in pKVM")
Reviewed-by: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250625123058.875179-1-smostafa@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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host_stage2_adjust_range() tries to find the largest block mapping that
fits within a memory or mmio region (represented by a kvm_mem_range in
this function) during host stage-2 faults under pKVM. To do so, it walks
the host stage-2 page-table, finds the faulting PTE and its level, and
then progressively increments the level until it finds a granule of the
appropriate size. However, the condition in the loop implementing the
above is broken as it checks kvm_level_supports_block_mapping() for the
next level instead of the current, so pKVM may attempt to map a region
larger than can be covered with a single block.
This is not a security problem and is quite rare in practice (the
kvm_mem_range check usually forces host_stage2_adjust_range() to choose a
smaller granule), but this is clearly not the expected behaviour.
Refactor the loop to fix the bug and improve readability.
Fixes: c4f0935e4d95 ("KVM: arm64: Optimize host memory aborts")
Signed-off-by: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250625105548.984572-1-qperret@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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The state of the vcpu's MI line should be asserted when its
ICH_HCR_EL2.En is set and ICH_MISR_EL2 is non-zero. Using bitwise AND
(&=) directly for this calculation will not give us the correct result
when the LSB of the vcpu's ICH_MISR_EL2 isn't set. Correct this by
directly computing the line level with a logical AND operation.
Signed-off-by: Wei-Lin Chang <r09922117@csie.ntu.edu.tw>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250625084709.3968844-1-r09922117@csie.ntu.edu.tw
[maz: drop the level check from the original code]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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In KVM guests with Hyper-V hypercalls enabled, the hypercalls
HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST and HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST_EX
allow a guest to request invalidation of portions of a virtual TLB.
For this, the hypercall parameter includes a list of GVAs that are supposed
to be invalidated.
However, when non-canonical GVAs are passed, there is currently no
filtering in place and they are eventually passed to checked invocations of
INVVPID on Intel / INVLPGA on AMD. While AMD's INVLPGA silently ignores
non-canonical addresses (effectively a no-op), Intel's INVVPID explicitly
signals VM-Fail and ultimately triggers the WARN_ONCE in invvpid_error():
invvpid failed: ext=0x0 vpid=1 gva=0xaaaaaaaaaaaaa000
WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 326 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:482
invvpid_error+0x91/0xa0 [kvm_intel]
Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm 9pnet_virtio irqbypass fuse
CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 326 Comm: kvm-vm Not tainted 6.15.0 #14 PREEMPT(voluntary)
RIP: 0010:invvpid_error+0x91/0xa0 [kvm_intel]
Call Trace:
vmx_flush_tlb_gva+0x320/0x490 [kvm_intel]
kvm_hv_vcpu_flush_tlb+0x24f/0x4f0 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3013/0x5810 [kvm]
Hyper-V documents that invalid GVAs (those that are beyond a partition's
GVA space) are to be ignored. While not completely clear whether this
ruling also applies to non-canonical GVAs, it is likely fine to make that
assumption, and manual testing on Azure confirms "real" Hyper-V interprets
the specification in the same way.
Skip non-canonical GVAs when processing the list of address to avoid
tripping the INVVPID failure. Alternatively, KVM could filter out "bad"
GVAs before inserting into the FIFO, but practically speaking the only
downside of pushing validation to the final processing is that doing so
is suboptimal for the guest, and no well-behaved guest will request TLB
flushes for non-canonical addresses.
Fixes: 260970862c88 ("KVM: x86: hyper-v: Handle HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST{,EX} calls gently")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Manuel Andreas <manuel.andreas@tum.de>
Suggested-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c090efb3-ef82-499f-a5e0-360fc8420fb7@tum.de
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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When compiling with clang (19.1.7), initializing *vp using a compound
literal may result in excessive stack usage. Fix it by initializing the
required fields of *vp individually.
Without this patch:
$ objdump -d arch/um/drivers/vector_kern.o | ./scripts/checkstack.pl x86_64 0
...
0x0000000000000540 vector_eth_configure [vector_kern.o]:1472
...
With this patch:
$ objdump -d arch/um/drivers/vector_kern.o | ./scripts/checkstack.pl x86_64 0
...
0x0000000000000540 vector_eth_configure [vector_kern.o]:208
...
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202506221017.WtB7Usua-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Tiwei Bie <tiwei.btw@antgroup.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250623110829.314864-1-tiwei.btw@antgroup.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Read from the buffer pointed to by 'from' instead of '&buf', as
'buf' contains no valid data when 'ubuf' is NULL.
Fixes: b1e1bd2e6943 ("um: Add helper functions to get/set state for SECCOMP")
Signed-off-by: Tiwei Bie <tiwei.btw@antgroup.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250606124428.148164-5-tiwei.btw@antgroup.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Ensure devices are assigned only once. Reject subsequent requests
for duplicate assignments.
Fixes: a0e2cb6a9063 ("um: Add VFIO-based virtual PCI driver")
Signed-off-by: Tiwei Bie <tiwei.btw@antgroup.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250606124428.148164-4-tiwei.btw@antgroup.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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The subsequent call to os_set_fd_block() overwrites the previous
return value. OR the two return values together to fix it.
Fixes: f88f0bdfc32f ("um: UBD Improvements")
Signed-off-by: Tiwei Bie <tiwei.btw@antgroup.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250606124428.148164-2-tiwei.btw@antgroup.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Initialize DR7 by writing its architectural reset value to always set
bit 10, which is reserved to '1', when "clearing" DR7 so as not to
trigger unanticipated behavior if said bit is ever unreserved, e.g. as
a feature enabling flag with inverted polarity.
Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Reviewed-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Tested-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250620231504.2676902-3-xin%40zytor.com
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Initialize DR6 by writing its architectural reset value to avoid
incorrectly zeroing DR6 to clear DR6.BLD at boot time, which leads
to a false bus lock detected warning.
The Intel SDM says:
1) Certain debug exceptions may clear bits 0-3 of DR6.
2) BLD induced #DB clears DR6.BLD and any other debug exception
doesn't modify DR6.BLD.
3) RTM induced #DB clears DR6.RTM and any other debug exception
sets DR6.RTM.
To avoid confusion in identifying debug exceptions, debug handlers
should set DR6.BLD and DR6.RTM, and clear other DR6 bits before
returning.
The DR6 architectural reset value 0xFFFF0FF0, already defined as
macro DR6_RESERVED, satisfies these requirements, so just use it to
reinitialize DR6 whenever needed.
Since clear_all_debug_regs() no longer zeros all debug registers,
rename it to initialize_debug_regs() to better reflect its current
behavior.
Since debug_read_clear_dr6() no longer clears DR6, rename it to
debug_read_reset_dr6() to better reflect its current behavior.
Fixes: ebb1064e7c2e9 ("x86/traps: Handle #DB for bus lock")
Reported-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Reviewed-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/06e68373-a92b-472e-8fd9-ba548119770c@intel.com/
Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250620231504.2676902-2-xin%40zytor.com
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To avoid imposing an ordering constraint on userspace, allow 'invalid'
event channel targets to be configured in the IRQ routing table.
This is the same as accepting interrupts targeted at vCPUs which don't
exist yet, which is already the case for both Xen event channels *and*
for MSIs (which don't do any filtering of permitted APIC ID targets at
all).
If userspace actually *triggers* an IRQ with an invalid target, that
will fail cleanly, as kvm_xen_set_evtchn_fast() also does the same range
check.
If KVM enforced that the IRQ target must be valid at the time it is
*configured*, that would force userspace to create all vCPUs and do
various other parts of setup (in this case, setting the Xen long_mode)
before restoring the IRQ table.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/e489252745ac4b53f1f7f50570b03fb416aa2065.camel@infradead.org
[sean: massage comment]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Use a preallocated per-vCPU bitmap for tracking the unpacked set of vCPUs
being targeted for Hyper-V's paravirt TLB flushing. If KVM_MAX_NR_VCPUS
is set to 4096 (which is allowed even for MAXSMP=n builds), putting the
vCPU mask on-stack pushes kvm_hv_flush_tlb() past the default FRAME_WARN
limit.
arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c:2001:12: error: stack frame size (1288) exceeds limit (1024)
in 'kvm_hv_flush_tlb' [-Werror,-Wframe-larger-than]
2001 | static u64 kvm_hv_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_hv_hcall *hc)
| ^
1 error generated.
Note, sparse_banks was given the same treatment by commit 7d5e88d301f8
("KVM: x86: hyper-v: Use preallocated buffer in 'struct kvm_vcpu_hv'
instead of on-stack 'sparse_banks'"), for the exact same reason.
Reported-by: Abinash Lalotra <abinashsinghlalotra@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250613111023.786265-1-abinashsinghlalotra@gmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aEylI-O8kFnFHrOH@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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When creating an SEV-ES vCPU for intra-host migration, set its vmsa_pa to
INVALID_PAGE to harden against doing VMRUN with a bogus VMSA (KVM checks
for a valid VMSA page in pre_sev_run()).
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250602224459.41505-3-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Reject migration of SEV{-ES} state if either the source or destination VM
is actively creating a vCPU, i.e. if kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu() is in the
section between incrementing created_vcpus and online_vcpus. The bulk of
vCPU creation runs _outside_ of kvm->lock to allow creating multiple vCPUs
in parallel, and so sev_info.es_active can get toggled from false=>true in
the destination VM after (or during) svm_vcpu_create(), resulting in an
SEV{-ES} VM effectively having a non-SEV{-ES} vCPU.
The issue manifests most visibly as a crash when trying to free a vCPU's
NULL VMSA page in an SEV-ES VM, but any number of things can go wrong.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffebde00000000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 227 UID: 0 PID: 64063 Comm: syz.5.60023 Tainted: G U O 6.15.0-smp-DEV #2 NONE
Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 12.52.0-0 10/28/2024
RIP: 0010:constant_test_bit arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:206 [inline]
RIP: 0010:arch_test_bit arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:238 [inline]
RIP: 0010:_test_bit include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:142 [inline]
RIP: 0010:PageHead include/linux/page-flags.h:866 [inline]
RIP: 0010:___free_pages+0x3e/0x120 mm/page_alloc.c:5067
Code: <49> f7 06 40 00 00 00 75 05 45 31 ff eb 0c 66 90 4c 89 f0 4c 39 f0
RSP: 0018:ffff8984551978d0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000777f80000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff918aeb98
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffebde00000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffebde00000007 R09: 1ffffd7bc0000000
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff97bc0000001 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: ffff8983e19751a8 R14: ffffebde00000000 R15: 1ffffd7bc0000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff89ee661d3000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffebde00000000 CR3: 000000793ceaa000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000b5f DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
sev_free_vcpu+0x413/0x630 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c:3169
svm_vcpu_free+0x13a/0x2a0 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:1515
kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy+0x6a/0x1d0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12396
kvm_vcpu_destroy virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:470 [inline]
kvm_destroy_vcpus+0xd1/0x300 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:490
kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x636/0x820 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12895
kvm_put_kvm+0xb8e/0xfb0 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1310
kvm_vm_release+0x48/0x60 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1369
__fput+0x3e4/0x9e0 fs/file_table.c:465
task_work_run+0x1a9/0x220 kernel/task_work.c:227
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:40 [inline]
do_exit+0x7f0/0x25b0 kernel/exit.c:953
do_group_exit+0x203/0x2d0 kernel/exit.c:1102
get_signal+0x1357/0x1480 kernel/signal.c:3034
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x40/0x690 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:111 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline]
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x67/0xb0 kernel/entry/common.c:218
do_syscall_64+0x7c/0x150 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7f87a898e969
</TASK>
Modules linked in: gq(O)
gsmi: Log Shutdown Reason 0x03
CR2: ffffebde00000000
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Deliberately don't check for a NULL VMSA when freeing the vCPU, as crashing
the host is likely desirable due to the VMSA being consumed by hardware.
E.g. if KVM manages to allow VMRUN on the vCPU, hardware may read/write a
bogus VMSA page. Accessing PFN 0 is "fine"-ish now that it's sequestered
away thanks to L1TF, but panicking in this scenario is preferable to
potentially running with corrupted state.
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Fixes: 0b020f5af092 ("KVM: SEV: Add support for SEV-ES intra host migration")
Fixes: b56639318bb2 ("KVM: SEV: Add support for SEV intra host migration")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: James Houghton <jthoughton@google.com>
Cc: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: James Houghton <jthoughton@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250602224459.41505-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
|
|
The mailbox controller driver for the Microchip Inter-processor
Communication can be built as a module. It uses cpuid_to_hartid_map and
commit 4783ce32b080 ("riscv: export __cpuid_to_hartid_map") enables that
to work for SMP. However, cpuid_to_hartid_map uses boot_cpu_hartid on
non-SMP kernels and this driver can be useful in such configurations[1].
Export boot_cpu_hartid so the driver can be built as a module on non-SMP
kernels as well.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250617-confess-reimburse-876101e099cb@spud/ [1]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e4b1d67e7141 ("mailbox: add Microchip IPC support")
Signed-off-by: Klara Modin <klarasmodin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250617125847.23829-1-klarasmodin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
|
|
This reverts commit ad5643cf2f69 ("riscv: Define TASK_SIZE_MAX for
__access_ok()").
This commit changes TASK_SIZE_MAX to be LONG_MAX to optimize access_ok(),
because the previous TASK_SIZE_MAX (default to TASK_SIZE) requires some
computation.
The reasoning was that all user addresses are less than LONG_MAX, and all
kernel addresses are greater than LONG_MAX. Therefore access_ok() can
filter kernel addresses.
Addresses between TASK_SIZE and LONG_MAX are not valid user addresses, but
access_ok() let them pass. That was thought to be okay, because they are
not valid addresses at hardware level.
Unfortunately, one case is missed: get_user_pages_fast() happily accepts
addresses between TASK_SIZE and LONG_MAX. futex(), for instance, uses
get_user_pages_fast(). This causes the problem reported by Robert [1].
Therefore, revert this commit. TASK_SIZE_MAX is changed to the default:
TASK_SIZE.
This unfortunately reduces performance, because TASK_SIZE is more expensive
to compute compared to LONG_MAX. But correctness first, we can think about
optimization later, if required.
Reported-by: <rtm@csail.mit.edu>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/77605.1750245028@localhost/
Signed-off-by: Nam Cao <namcao@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Fixes: ad5643cf2f69 ("riscv: Define TASK_SIZE_MAX for __access_ok()")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250619155858.1249789-1-namcao@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
|
|
sparse reports the following warning:
arch/riscv/kernel/vendor_extensions/sifive.c:11:33: sparse: sparse: symbol 'riscv_isa_vendor_ext_sifive' was not declared. Should it be static?
So as this struct is only used in this file, make it static.
Fixes: 2d147d77ae6e ("riscv: Add SiFive xsfvqmaccdod and xsfvqmaccqoq vendor extensions")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202505072100.TZlEp8h1-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250620-dev-alex-fix_sparse_sifive_v1-v1-1-efa3a6f93846@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
|
|
access handling"
This reverts commit 61a74ad25462 ("riscv: misaligned: fix sleeping function
called during misaligned access handling"). The commit addresses a sleeping
in atomic context problem, but it is not the correct fix as explained by
Clément:
"Using nofault would lead to failure to read from user memory that is paged
out for instance. This is not really acceptable, we should handle user
misaligned access even at an address that would generate a page fault."
This bug has been properly fixed by commit 453805f0a28f ("riscv:
misaligned: enable IRQs while handling misaligned accesses").
Revert this improper fix.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/b779beed-e44e-4a5e-9551-4647682b0d21@rivosinc.com/
Signed-off-by: Nam Cao <namcao@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Clément Léger <cleger@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Fixes: 61a74ad25462 ("riscv: misaligned: fix sleeping function called during misaligned access handling")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250620110939.1642735-1-namcao@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Make sure the array tracking which kernel text positions need to be
alternatives-patched doesn't get mishandled by out-of-order
modifications, leading to it overflowing and causing page faults when
patching
- Avoid an infinite loop when early code does a ranged TLB invalidation
before the broadcast TLB invalidation count of how many pages it can
flush, has been read from CPUID
- Fix a CONFIG_MODULES typo
- Disable broadcast TLB invalidation when PTI is enabled to avoid an
overflow of the bitmap tracking dynamic ASIDs which need to be
flushed when the kernel switches between the user and kernel address
space
- Handle the case of a CPU going offline and thus reporting zeroes when
reading top-level events in the resctrl code
* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.16_rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/alternatives: Fix int3 handling failure from broken text_poke array
x86/mm: Fix early boot use of INVPLGB
x86/its: Fix an ifdef typo in its_alloc()
x86/mm: Disable INVLPGB when PTI is enabled
x86,fs/resctrl: Remove inappropriate references to cacheinfo in the resctrl subsystem
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull perf fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Avoid a crash on a heterogeneous machine where not all cores support
the same hw events features
- Avoid a deadlock when throttling events
- Document the perf event states more
- Make sure a number of perf paths switching off or rescheduling events
call perf_cgroup_event_disable()
- Make sure perf does task sampling before its userspace mapping is
torn down, and not after
* tag 'perf_urgent_for_v6.16_rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
perf/x86/intel: Fix crash in icl_update_topdown_event()
perf: Fix the throttle error of some clock events
perf: Add comment to enum perf_event_state
perf/core: Fix WARN in perf_cgroup_switch()
perf: Fix dangling cgroup pointer in cpuctx
perf: Fix cgroup state vs ERROR
perf: Fix sample vs do_exit()
|
|
Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
"ARM:
- Fix another set of FP/SIMD/SVE bugs affecting NV, and plugging some
missing synchronisation
- A small fix for the irqbypass hook fixes, tightening the check and
ensuring that we only deal with MSI for both the old and the new
route entry
- Rework the way the shadow LRs are addressed in a nesting
configuration, plugging an embarrassing bug as well as simplifying
the whole process
- Add yet another fix for the dreaded arch_timer_edge_cases selftest
RISC-V:
- Fix the size parameter check in SBI SFENCE calls
- Don't treat SBI HFENCE calls as NOPs
x86 TDX:
- Complete API for handling complex TDVMCALLs in userspace.
This was delayed because the spec lacked a way for userspace to
deny supporting these calls; the new exit code is now approved"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
KVM: TDX: Exit to userspace for GetTdVmCallInfo
KVM: TDX: Handle TDG.VP.VMCALL<GetQuote>
KVM: TDX: Add new TDVMCALL status code for unsupported subfuncs
KVM: arm64: VHE: Centralize ISBs when returning to host
KVM: arm64: Remove cpacr_clear_set()
KVM: arm64: Remove ad-hoc CPTR manipulation from kvm_hyp_handle_fpsimd()
KVM: arm64: Remove ad-hoc CPTR manipulation from fpsimd_sve_sync()
KVM: arm64: Reorganise CPTR trap manipulation
KVM: arm64: VHE: Synchronize CPTR trap deactivation
KVM: arm64: VHE: Synchronize restore of host debug registers
KVM: arm64: selftests: Close the GIC FD in arch_timer_edge_cases
KVM: arm64: Explicitly treat routing entry type changes as changes
KVM: arm64: nv: Fix tracking of shadow list registers
RISC-V: KVM: Don't treat SBI HFENCE calls as NOPs
RISC-V: KVM: Fix the size parameter check in SBI SFENCE calls
|
|
Allow userspace to advertise TDG.VP.VMCALL subfunctions that the
kernel also supports. For each output register of GetTdVmCallInfo's
leaf 1, add two fields to KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES: one for kernel-supported
TDVMCALLs (userspace can set those blindly) and one for user-supported
TDVMCALLs (userspace can set those if it knows how to handle them).
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Exit to userspace for TDG.VP.VMCALL<GetTdVmCallInfo> via KVM_EXIT_TDX,
to allow userspace to provide information about the support of
TDVMCALLs when r12 is 1 for the TDVMCALLs beyond the GHCI base API.
GHCI spec defines the GHCI base TDVMCALLs: <GetTdVmCallInfo>, <MapGPA>,
<ReportFatalError>, <Instruction.CPUID>, <#VE.RequestMMIO>,
<Instruction.HLT>, <Instruction.IO>, <Instruction.RDMSR> and
<Instruction.WRMSR>. They must be supported by VMM to support TDX guests.
For GetTdVmCallInfo
- When leaf (r12) to enumerate TDVMCALL functionality is set to 0,
successful execution indicates all GHCI base TDVMCALLs listed above are
supported.
Update the KVM TDX document with the set of the GHCI base APIs.
- When leaf (r12) to enumerate TDVMCALL functionality is set to 1, it
indicates the TDX guest is querying the supported TDVMCALLs beyond
the GHCI base TDVMCALLs.
Exit to userspace to let userspace set the TDVMCALL sub-function bit(s)
accordingly to the leaf outputs. KVM could set the TDVMCALL bit(s)
supported by itself when the TDVMCALLs don't need support from userspace
after returning from userspace and before entering guest. Currently, no
such TDVMCALLs implemented, KVM just sets the values returned from
userspace.
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
[Adjust userspace API. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Handle TDVMCALL for GetQuote to generate a TD-Quote.
GetQuote is a doorbell-like interface used by TDX guests to request VMM
to generate a TD-Quote signed by a service hosting TD-Quoting Enclave
operating on the host. A TDX guest passes a TD Report (TDREPORT_STRUCT) in
a shared-memory area as parameter. Host VMM can access it and queue the
operation for a service hosting TD-Quoting enclave. When completed, the
Quote is returned via the same shared-memory area.
KVM only checks the GPA from the TDX guest has the shared-bit set and drops
the shared-bit before exiting to userspace to avoid bleeding the shared-bit
into KVM's exit ABI. KVM forwards the request to userspace VMM (e.g. QEMU)
and userspace VMM queues the operation asynchronously. KVM sets the return
code according to the 'ret' field set by userspace to notify the TDX guest
whether the request has been queued successfully or not. When the request
has been queued successfully, the TDX guest can poll the status field in
the shared-memory area to check whether the Quote generation is completed
or not. When completed, the generated Quote is returned via the same
buffer.
Add KVM_EXIT_TDX as a new exit reason to userspace. Userspace is
required to handle the KVM exit reason as the initial support for TDX,
by reentering KVM to ensure that the TDVMCALL is complete. While at it,
add a note that KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL also requires reentry with KVM_RUN.
Signed-off-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Mikko Ylinen <mikko.ylinen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
[Adjust userspace API. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Add the new TDVMCALL status code TDVMCALL_STATUS_SUBFUNC_UNSUPPORTED and
return it for unimplemented TDVMCALL subfunctions.
Returning TDVMCALL_STATUS_INVALID_OPERAND when a subfunction is not
implemented is vague because TDX guests can't tell the error is due to
the subfunction is not supported or an invalid input of the subfunction.
New GHCI spec adds TDVMCALL_STATUS_SUBFUNC_UNSUPPORTED to avoid the
ambiguity. Use it instead of TDVMCALL_STATUS_INVALID_OPERAND.
Before the change, for common guest implementations, when a TDX guest
receives TDVMCALL_STATUS_INVALID_OPERAND, it has two cases:
1. Some operand is invalid. It could change the operand to another value
retry.
2. The subfunction is not supported.
For case 1, an invalid operand usually means the guest implementation bug.
Since the TDX guest can't tell which case is, the best practice for
handling TDVMCALL_STATUS_INVALID_OPERAND is stopping calling such leaf,
treating the failure as fatal if the TDVMCALL is essential or ignoring
it if the TDVMCALL is optional.
With this change, TDVMCALL_STATUS_SUBFUNC_UNSUPPORTED could be sent to
old TDX guest that do not know about it, but it is expected that the
guest will make the same action as TDVMCALL_STATUS_INVALID_OPERAND.
Currently, no known TDX guest checks TDVMCALL_STATUS_INVALID_OPERAND
specifically; for example Linux just checks for success.
Signed-off-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
[Return it for untrapped KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
into HEAD
KVM/riscv fixes for 6.16, take #1
- Fix the size parameter check in SBI SFENCE calls
- Don't treat SBI HFENCE calls as NOPs
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux
Pull arm64 fixes from Will Deacon:
"There's nothing major (even the vmalloc one is just suppressing a
potential warning) but all worth having, nonetheless.
- Suppress KASAN false positive in stack unwinding code
- Drop redundant reset of the GCS state on exec()
- Don't try to descend into a !present PMD when creating a huge
vmap() entry at the PUD level
- Fix a small typo in the arm64 booting Documentation"
* tag 'arm64-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux:
arm64/ptrace: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in regs_get_kernel_stack_nth()
arm64/gcs: Don't call gcs_free() during flush_gcs()
arm64: Restrict pagetable teardown to avoid false warning
docs: arm64: Fix ICC_SRE_EL2 register typo in booting.rst
|
|
The VHE hyp code has recently gained a few ISBs. Simplify this to one
unconditional ISB in __kvm_vcpu_run_vhe(), and remove the unnecessary
ISB from the kvm_call_hyp_ret() macro.
While kvm_call_hyp_ret() is also used to invoke
__vgic_v3_get_gic_config(), but no ISB is necessary in that case either.
For the moment, an ISB is left in kvm_call_hyp(), as there are many more
users, and removing the ISB would require a more thorough audit.
Suggested-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250617133718.4014181-8-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
|
|
We no longer use cpacr_clear_set().
Remove cpacr_clear_set() and its helper functions.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250617133718.4014181-7-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
|
|
The hyp code FPSIMD/SVE/SME trap handling logic has some rather messy
open-coded manipulation of CPTR/CPACR. This is benign for non-nested
guests, but broken for nested guests, as the guest hypervisor's CPTR
configuration is not taken into account.
Consider the case where L0 provides FPSIMD+SVE to an L1 guest
hypervisor, and the L1 guest hypervisor only provides FPSIMD to an L2
guest (with L1 configuring CPTR/CPACR to trap SVE usage from L2). If the
L2 guest triggers an FPSIMD trap to the L0 hypervisor,
kvm_hyp_handle_fpsimd() will see that the vCPU supports FPSIMD+SVE, and
will configure CPTR/CPACR to NOT trap FPSIMD+SVE before returning to the
L2 guest. Consequently the L2 guest would be able to manipulate SVE
state even though the L1 hypervisor had configured CPTR/CPACR to forbid
this.
Clean this up, and fix the nested virt issue by always using
__deactivate_cptr_traps() and __activate_cptr_traps() to manage the CPTR
traps. This removes the need for the ad-hoc fixup in
kvm_hyp_save_fpsimd_host(), and ensures that any guest hypervisor
configuration of CPTR/CPACR is taken into account.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250617133718.4014181-6-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
|
|
There's no need for fpsimd_sve_sync() to write to CPTR/CPACR. All
relevant traps are always disabled earlier within __kvm_vcpu_run(), when
__deactivate_cptr_traps() configures CPTR/CPACR.
With irrelevant details elided, the flow is:
handle___kvm_vcpu_run(...)
{
flush_hyp_vcpu(...) {
fpsimd_sve_flush(...);
}
__kvm_vcpu_run(...) {
__activate_traps(...) {
__activate_cptr_traps(...);
}
do {
__guest_enter(...);
} while (...);
__deactivate_traps(....) {
__deactivate_cptr_traps(...);
}
}
sync_hyp_vcpu(...) {
fpsimd_sve_sync(...);
}
}
Remove the unnecessary write to CPTR/CPACR. An ISB is still necessary,
so a comment is added to describe this requirement.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250617133718.4014181-5-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
|
|
The NVHE/HVHE and VHE modes have separate implementations of
__activate_cptr_traps() and __deactivate_cptr_traps() in their
respective switch.c files. There's some duplication of logic, and it's
not currently possible to reuse this logic elsewhere.
Move the logic into the common switch.h header so that it can be reused,
and de-duplicate the common logic.
This rework changes the way SVE traps are deactivated in VHE mode,
aligning it with NVHE/HVHE modes:
* Before this patch, VHE's __deactivate_cptr_traps() would
unconditionally enable SVE for host EL2 (but not EL0), regardless of
whether the ARM64_SVE cpucap was set.
* After this patch, VHE's __deactivate_cptr_traps() will take the
ARM64_SVE cpucap into account. When ARM64_SVE is not set, SVE will be
trapped from EL2 and below.
The old and new behaviour are both benign:
* When ARM64_SVE is not set, the host will not touch SVE state, and will
not reconfigure SVE traps. Host EL0 access to SVE will be trapped as
expected.
* When ARM64_SVE is set, the host will configure EL0 SVE traps before
returning to EL0 as part of reloading the EL0 FPSIMD/SVE/SME state.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250617133718.4014181-4-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
|
|
Currently there is no ISB between __deactivate_cptr_traps() disabling
traps that affect EL2 and fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_host() manipulating
registers potentially affected by CPTR traps.
When NV is not in use, this is safe because the relevant registers are
only accessed when guest_owns_fp_regs() && vcpu_has_sve(vcpu), and this
also implies that SVE traps affecting EL2 have been deactivated prior to
__guest_entry().
When NV is in use, a guest hypervisor may have configured SVE traps for
a nested context, and so it is necessary to have an ISB between
__deactivate_cptr_traps() and fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_host().
Due to the current lack of an ISB, when a guest hypervisor enables SVE
traps in CPTR, the host can take an unexpected SVE trap from within
fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_host(), e.g.
| Unhandled 64-bit el1h sync exception on CPU1, ESR 0x0000000066000000 -- SVE
| CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 164 Comm: kvm-vcpu-0 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc4-00138-ga05e0f012c05 #3 PREEMPT
| Hardware name: FVP Base RevC (DT)
| pstate: 604023c9 (nZCv DAIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
| pc : __kvm_vcpu_run+0x6f4/0x844
| lr : __kvm_vcpu_run+0x150/0x844
| sp : ffff800083903a60
| x29: ffff800083903a90 x28: ffff000801f4a300 x27: 0000000000000000
| x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff000801f90000 x24: ffff000801f900f0
| x23: ffff800081ff7720 x22: 0002433c807d623f x21: ffff000801f90000
| x20: ffff00087f730730 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
| x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000
| x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
| x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000
| x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff000801f90d70
| x5 : 0000000000001000 x4 : ffff8007fd739000 x3 : ffff000801f90000
| x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 00000000000003cc x0 : ffff800082f9d000
| Kernel panic - not syncing: Unhandled exception
| CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 164 Comm: kvm-vcpu-0 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc4-00138-ga05e0f012c05 #3 PREEMPT
| Hardware name: FVP Base RevC (DT)
| Call trace:
| show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C)
| dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x80
| dump_stack+0x18/0x24
| panic+0x168/0x360
| __panic_unhandled+0x68/0x74
| el1h_64_irq_handler+0x0/0x24
| el1h_64_sync+0x6c/0x70
| __kvm_vcpu_run+0x6f4/0x844 (P)
| kvm_arm_vcpu_enter_exit+0x64/0xa0
| kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x21c/0x870
| kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x1a8/0x9d0
| __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xb4/0xf4
| invoke_syscall+0x48/0x104
| el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0
| do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
| el0_svc+0x30/0xcc
| el0t_64_sync_handler+0x10c/0x138
| el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
| SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
| Kernel Offset: disabled
| CPU features: 0x0000,000002c0,02df4fb9,97ee773f
| Memory Limit: none
| ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Unhandled exception ]---
Fix this by adding an ISB between __deactivate_traps() and
fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_host().
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250617133718.4014181-3-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
|
|
When KVM runs in non-protected VHE mode, there's no context
synchronization event between __debug_switch_to_host() restoring the
host debug registers and __kvm_vcpu_run() unmasking debug exceptions.
Due to this, it's theoretically possible for the host to take an
unexpected debug exception due to the stale guest configuration.
This cannot happen in NVHE/HVHE mode as debug exceptions are masked in
the hyp code, and the exception return to the host will provide the
necessary context synchronization before debug exceptions can be taken.
For now, avoid the problem by adding an ISB after VHE hyp code restores
the host debug registers.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250617133718.4014181-2-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
|
|
Explicitly treat type differences as GSI routing changes, as comparing MSI
data between two entries could get a false negative, e.g. if userspace
changed the type but left the type-specific data as-
Note, the same bug was fixed in x86 by commit bcda70c56f3e ("KVM: x86:
Explicitly treat routing entry type changes as changes").
Fixes: 4bf3693d36af ("KVM: arm64: Unmap vLPIs affected by changes to GSI routing information")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611224604.313496-3-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
|
|
Wei-Lin reports that the tracking of shadow list registers is
majorly broken when resync'ing the L2 state after a run, as
we confuse the guest's LR index with the host's, potentially
losing the interrupt state.
While this could be fixed by adding yet another side index to
track it (Wei-Lin's fix), it may be better to refactor this
code to avoid having a side index altogether, limiting the
risk to introduce this class of bugs.
A key observation is that the shadow index is always the number
of bits in the lr_map bitmap. With that, the parallel indexing
scheme can be completely dropped.
While doing this, introduce a couple of helpers that abstract
the index conversion and some of the LR repainting, making the
whole exercise much simpler.
Reported-by: Wei-Lin Chang <r09922117@csie.ntu.edu.tw>
Reviewed-by: Wei-Lin Chang <r09922117@csie.ntu.edu.tw>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250614145721.2504524-1-r09922117@csie.ntu.edu.tw
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/86qzzkc5xa.wl-maz@kernel.org
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/linux
Pull crypto library fixes from Eric Biggers:
- Fix a regression in the arm64 Poly1305 code
- Fix a couple compiler warnings
* tag 'libcrypto-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/linux:
lib/crypto/poly1305: Fix arm64's poly1305_blocks_arch()
lib/crypto/curve25519-hacl64: Disable KASAN with clang-17 and older
lib/crypto: Annotate crypto strings with nonstring
|
|
Since smp_text_poke_single() does not expect there is another
text_poke request is queued, it can make text_poke_array not
sorted or cause a buffer overflow on the text_poke_array.vec[].
This will cause an Oops in int3 because of bsearch failing;
CPU 0 CPU 1 CPU 2
----- ----- -----
smp_text_poke_batch_add()
smp_text_poke_single() <<-- Adds out of order
<int3>
[Fails o find address
in text_poke_array ]
OOPS!
Or unhandled page fault because of a buffer overflow;
CPU 0 CPU 1
----- -----
smp_text_poke_batch_add() <<+
... |
smp_text_poke_batch_add() <<-- Adds TEXT_POKE_ARRAY_MAX times.
smp_text_poke_single() {
__smp_text_poke_batch_add() <<-- Adds entry at
TEXT_POKE_ARRAY_MAX + 1
smp_text_poke_batch_finish()
[Unhandled page fault because
text_poke_array.nr_entries is
overwritten]
BUG!
}
Use smp_text_poke_batch_add() instead of __smp_text_poke_batch_add()
so that it correctly flush the queue if needed.
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CA+G9fYsLu0roY3DV=tKyqP7FEKbOEETRvTDhnpPxJGbA=Cg+4w@mail.gmail.com/
Fixes: c8976ade0c1b ("x86/alternatives: Simplify smp_text_poke_single() by using tp_vec and existing APIs")
Reported-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/\ 175020512308.3582717.13631440385506146631.stgit@mhiramat.tok.corp.google.com
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The INVLPGB instruction has limits on how many pages it can invalidate
at once. That limit is enumerated in CPUID, read by the kernel, and
stored in 'invpgb_count_max'. Ranged invalidation, like
invlpgb_kernel_range_flush() break up their invalidations so
that they do not exceed the limit.
However, early boot code currently attempts to do ranged
invalidation before populating 'invlpgb_count_max'. There is a
for loop which is basically:
for (...; addr < end; addr += invlpgb_count_max*PAGE_SIZE)
If invlpgb_kernel_range_flush is called before the kernel has read
the value of invlpgb_count_max from the hardware, the normally
bounded loop can become an infinite loop if invlpgb_count_max is
initialized to zero.
Fix that issue by initializing invlpgb_count_max to 1.
This way INVPLGB at early boot time will be a little bit slower
than normal (with initialized invplgb_count_max), and not an
instant hang at bootup time.
Fixes: b7aa05cbdc52 ("x86/mm: Add INVLPGB support code")
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250606171112.4013261-3-riel%40surriel.com
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Commit a82b26451de1 ("x86/its: explicitly manage permissions for ITS
pages") reworks its_alloc() and introduces a typo in an ifdef
conditional, referring to CONFIG_MODULE instead of CONFIG_MODULES.
Fix this typo in its_alloc().
Fixes: a82b26451de1 ("x86/its: explicitly manage permissions for ITS pages")
Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250616100432.22941-1-lukas.bulwahn%40redhat.com
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PTI uses separate ASIDs (aka. PCIDs) for kernel and user address
spaces. When the kernel needs to flush the user address space, it
just sets a bit in a bitmap and then flushes the entire PCID on
the next switch to userspace.
This bitmap is a single 'unsigned long' which is plenty for all 6
dynamic ASIDs. But, unfortunately, the INVLPGB support brings along a
bunch more user ASIDs, as many as ~2k more. The bitmap can't address
that many.
Fortunately, the bitmap is only needed for PTI and all the CPUs
with INVLPGB are AMD CPUs that aren't vulnerable to Meltdown and
don't need PTI. The only way someone can run into an issue in
practice is by booting with pti=on on a newer AMD CPU.
Disable INVLPGB if PTI is enabled. Avoid overrunning the small
bitmap.
Note: this will be fixed up properly by making the bitmap bigger.
For now, just avoid the mostly theoretical bug.
Fixes: 4afeb0ed1753 ("x86/mm: Enable broadcast TLB invalidation for multi-threaded processes")
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250610222420.E8CBF472%40davehans-spike.ostc.intel.com
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The recent change which added READ_ONCE_NOCHECK() to read the nth entry
from the kernel stack incorrectly dropped dereferencing of the stack
pointer in order to read the requested entry.
In result the address of the entry is returned instead of its content.
Dereference the pointer again to fix this.
Reported-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250612163331.GA13384@willie-the-truck
Fixes: d93a855c31b7 ("s390/ptrace: Avoid KASAN false positives in regs_get_kernel_stack_nth()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
|