Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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To pick up the changes in:
b8d1d163604bd1e6 ("x86/apic: Don't disable x2APIC if locked")
ca5b7c0d9621702e ("perf/x86/amd/lbr: Add LbrExtV2 branch record support")
Addressing these tools/perf build warnings:
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h'
That makes the beautification scripts to pick some new entries:
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > before
$ cp arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > after
$ diff -u before after
--- before 2022-10-14 18:06:34.294561729 -0300
+++ after 2022-10-14 18:06:41.285744044 -0300
@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@
[0xc0000102 - x86_64_specific_MSRs_offset] = "KERNEL_GS_BASE",
[0xc0000103 - x86_64_specific_MSRs_offset] = "TSC_AUX",
[0xc0000104 - x86_64_specific_MSRs_offset] = "AMD64_TSC_RATIO",
+ [0xc000010e - x86_64_specific_MSRs_offset] = "AMD64_LBR_SELECT",
[0xc000010f - x86_64_specific_MSRs_offset] = "AMD_DBG_EXTN_CFG",
[0xc0000300 - x86_64_specific_MSRs_offset] = "AMD64_PERF_CNTR_GLOBAL_STATUS",
[0xc0000301 - x86_64_specific_MSRs_offset] = "AMD64_PERF_CNTR_GLOBAL_CTL",
$
Now one can trace systemwide asking to see backtraces to where that MSR
is being read/written, see this example with a previous update:
# perf trace -e msr:*_msr/max-stack=32/ --filter="msr>=IA32_U_CET && msr<=IA32_INT_SSP_TAB"
^C#
If we use -v (verbose mode) we can see what it does behind the scenes:
# perf trace -v -e msr:*_msr/max-stack=32/ --filter="msr>=IA32_U_CET && msr<=IA32_INT_SSP_TAB"
Using CPUID AuthenticAMD-25-21-0
0x6a0
0x6a8
New filter for msr:read_msr: (msr>=0x6a0 && msr<=0x6a8) && (common_pid != 597499 && common_pid != 3313)
0x6a0
0x6a8
New filter for msr:write_msr: (msr>=0x6a0 && msr<=0x6a8) && (common_pid != 597499 && common_pid != 3313)
mmap size 528384B
^C#
Example with a frequent msr:
# perf trace -v -e msr:*_msr/max-stack=32/ --filter="msr==IA32_SPEC_CTRL" --max-events 2
Using CPUID AuthenticAMD-25-21-0
0x48
New filter for msr:read_msr: (msr==0x48) && (common_pid != 2612129 && common_pid != 3841)
0x48
New filter for msr:write_msr: (msr==0x48) && (common_pid != 2612129 && common_pid != 3841)
mmap size 528384B
Looking at the vmlinux_path (8 entries long)
symsrc__init: build id mismatch for vmlinux.
Using /proc/kcore for kernel data
Using /proc/kallsyms for symbols
0.000 Timer/2525383 msr:write_msr(msr: IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val: 6)
do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms])
__switch_to_xtra ([kernel.kallsyms])
__switch_to ([kernel.kallsyms])
__schedule ([kernel.kallsyms])
schedule ([kernel.kallsyms])
futex_wait_queue_me ([kernel.kallsyms])
futex_wait ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_futex ([kernel.kallsyms])
__x64_sys_futex ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_syscall_64 ([kernel.kallsyms])
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe ([kernel.kallsyms])
__futex_abstimed_wait_common64 (/usr/lib64/libpthread-2.33.so)
0.030 :0/0 msr:write_msr(msr: IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val: 2)
do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms])
__switch_to_xtra ([kernel.kallsyms])
__switch_to ([kernel.kallsyms])
__schedule ([kernel.kallsyms])
schedule_idle ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_idle ([kernel.kallsyms])
cpu_startup_entry ([kernel.kallsyms])
secondary_startup_64_no_verify ([kernel.kallsyms])
#
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Y0nQkz2TUJxwfXJd@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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Although new details added into this header is currently used by kernel
only, tools copy needs to be in sync with kernel file to avoid
tools/perf/check-headers.sh warnings.
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ali Saidi <alisaidi@amazon.com>
Cc: Ananth Narayan <ananth.narayan@amd.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Joe Mario <jmario@redhat.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com>
Cc: Santosh Shukla <santosh.shukla@amd.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221006153946.7816-3-ravi.bangoria@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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To pick the changes from:
7df548840c496b01 ("x86/bugs: Add "unknown" reporting for MMIO Stale Data")
This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YysTRji90sNn2p5f@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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GCC has supported asm goto since 4.5, and Clang has since version 9.0.0.
The minimum supported versions of these tools for the build according to
Documentation/process/changes.rst are 5.1 and 11.0.0 respectively.
Remove the feature detection script, Kconfig option, and clean up some
fallback code that is no longer supported.
The removed script was also testing for a GCC specific bug that was
fixed in the 4.7 release.
Also remove workarounds for bpftrace using clang older than 9.0.0, since
other BPF backend fixes are required at this point.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAK7LNATSr=BXKfkdW8f-H5VT_w=xBpT2ZQcZ7rm6JfkdE+QnmA@mail.gmail.com/
Link: http://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=48637
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Suggested-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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To pick the changes from:
2b1299322016731d ("x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections")
28a99e95f55c6185 ("x86/amd: Use IBPB for firmware calls")
4ad3278df6fe2b08 ("x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior")
26aae8ccbc197223 ("x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO")
9756bba28470722d ("x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS")
3ebc170068885b6f ("x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb")
2dbb887e875b1de3 ("x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation")
6b80b59b35557065 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")
a149180fbcf336e9 ("x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk")
15e67227c49a5783 ("x86: Undo return-thunk damage")
a883d624aed463c8 ("x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11")
aae99a7c9ab371b2 ("x86/cpufeatures: Introduce x2AVIC CPUID bit")
6f33a9daff9f0790 ("x86: Fix comment for X86_FEATURE_ZEN")
51802186158c74a0 ("x86/speculation/mmio: Enumerate Processor MMIO Stale Data bug")
This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Cc: Wyes Karny <wyes.karny@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Yvznmu5oHv0ZDN2w@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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To pick up the changes in:
2b1299322016731d ("x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections")
4af184ee8b2c0a69 ("tools/power turbostat: dump secondary Turbo-Ratio-Limit")
4ad3278df6fe2b08 ("x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior")
d7caac991feeef1b ("x86/cpu/amd: Add Spectral Chicken")
6ad0ad2bf8a67e27 ("x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability")
c59a1f106f5cd484 ("KVM: x86/pmu: Add IA32_PEBS_ENABLE MSR emulation for extended PEBS")
465932db25f36648 ("x86/cpu: Add new VMX feature, Tertiary VM-Execution control")
027bbb884be006b0 ("KVM: x86/speculation: Disable Fill buffer clear within guests")
51802186158c74a0 ("x86/speculation/mmio: Enumerate Processor MMIO Stale Data bug")
Addressing these tools/perf build warnings:
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h'
That makes the beautification scripts to pick some new entries:
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > before
$ cp arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > after
$ diff -u before after
--- before 2022-08-17 09:05:13.938246475 -0300
+++ after 2022-08-17 09:05:22.221455851 -0300
@@ -161,6 +161,7 @@
[0x0000048f] = "IA32_VMX_TRUE_EXIT_CTLS",
[0x00000490] = "IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS",
[0x00000491] = "IA32_VMX_VMFUNC",
+ [0x00000492] = "IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS3",
[0x000004c1] = "IA32_PMC0",
[0x000004d0] = "IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL",
[0x00000560] = "IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE",
@@ -212,6 +213,7 @@
[0x0000064D] = "PLATFORM_ENERGY_STATUS",
[0x0000064e] = "PPERF",
[0x0000064f] = "PERF_LIMIT_REASONS",
+ [0x00000650] = "SECONDARY_TURBO_RATIO_LIMIT",
[0x00000658] = "PKG_WEIGHTED_CORE_C0_RES",
[0x00000659] = "PKG_ANY_CORE_C0_RES",
[0x0000065A] = "PKG_ANY_GFXE_C0_RES",
$
Now one can trace systemwide asking to see backtraces to where those
MSRs are being read/written, see this example with a previous update:
# perf trace -e msr:*_msr/max-stack=32/ --filter="msr>=IA32_U_CET && msr<=IA32_INT_SSP_TAB"
^C#
If we use -v (verbose mode) we can see what it does behind the scenes:
# perf trace -v -e msr:*_msr/max-stack=32/ --filter="msr>=IA32_U_CET && msr<=IA32_INT_SSP_TAB"
Using CPUID AuthenticAMD-25-21-0
0x6a0
0x6a8
New filter for msr:read_msr: (msr>=0x6a0 && msr<=0x6a8) && (common_pid != 597499 && common_pid != 3313)
0x6a0
0x6a8
New filter for msr:write_msr: (msr>=0x6a0 && msr<=0x6a8) && (common_pid != 597499 && common_pid != 3313)
mmap size 528384B
^C#
Example with a frequent msr:
# perf trace -v -e msr:*_msr/max-stack=32/ --filter="msr==IA32_SPEC_CTRL" --max-events 2
Using CPUID AuthenticAMD-25-21-0
0x48
New filter for msr:read_msr: (msr==0x48) && (common_pid != 2612129 && common_pid != 3841)
0x48
New filter for msr:write_msr: (msr==0x48) && (common_pid != 2612129 && common_pid != 3841)
mmap size 528384B
Looking at the vmlinux_path (8 entries long)
symsrc__init: build id mismatch for vmlinux.
Using /proc/kcore for kernel data
Using /proc/kallsyms for symbols
0.000 Timer/2525383 msr:write_msr(msr: IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val: 6)
do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms])
__switch_to_xtra ([kernel.kallsyms])
__switch_to ([kernel.kallsyms])
__schedule ([kernel.kallsyms])
schedule ([kernel.kallsyms])
futex_wait_queue_me ([kernel.kallsyms])
futex_wait ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_futex ([kernel.kallsyms])
__x64_sys_futex ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_syscall_64 ([kernel.kallsyms])
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe ([kernel.kallsyms])
__futex_abstimed_wait_common64 (/usr/lib64/libpthread-2.33.so)
0.030 :0/0 msr:write_msr(msr: IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val: 2)
do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms])
__switch_to_xtra ([kernel.kallsyms])
__switch_to ([kernel.kallsyms])
__schedule ([kernel.kallsyms])
schedule_idle ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_idle ([kernel.kallsyms])
cpu_startup_entry ([kernel.kallsyms])
secondary_startup_64_no_verify ([kernel.kallsyms])
#
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Cc: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Robert Hoo <robert.hu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YvzbT24m2o5U%2F7+q@kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 eIBRS fixes from Borislav Petkov:
"More from the CPU vulnerability nightmares front:
Intel eIBRS machines do not sufficiently mitigate against RET
mispredictions when doing a VM Exit therefore an additional RSB,
one-entry stuffing is needed"
* tag 'x86_bugs_pbrsb' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/speculation: Add LFENCE to RSB fill sequence
x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections
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tl;dr: The Enhanced IBRS mitigation for Spectre v2 does not work as
documented for RET instructions after VM exits. Mitigate it with a new
one-entry RSB stuffing mechanism and a new LFENCE.
== Background ==
Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) was designed to help
mitigate Branch Target Injection and Speculative Store Bypass, i.e.
Spectre, attacks. IBRS prevents software run in less privileged modes
from affecting branch prediction in more privileged modes. IBRS requires
the MSR to be written on every privilege level change.
To overcome some of the performance issues of IBRS, Enhanced IBRS was
introduced. eIBRS is an "always on" IBRS, in other words, just turn
it on once instead of writing the MSR on every privilege level change.
When eIBRS is enabled, more privileged modes should be protected from
less privileged modes, including protecting VMMs from guests.
== Problem ==
Here's a simplification of how guests are run on Linux' KVM:
void run_kvm_guest(void)
{
// Prepare to run guest
VMRESUME();
// Clean up after guest runs
}
The execution flow for that would look something like this to the
processor:
1. Host-side: call run_kvm_guest()
2. Host-side: VMRESUME
3. Guest runs, does "CALL guest_function"
4. VM exit, host runs again
5. Host might make some "cleanup" function calls
6. Host-side: RET from run_kvm_guest()
Now, when back on the host, there are a couple of possible scenarios of
post-guest activity the host needs to do before executing host code:
* on pre-eIBRS hardware (legacy IBRS, or nothing at all), the RSB is not
touched and Linux has to do a 32-entry stuffing.
* on eIBRS hardware, VM exit with IBRS enabled, or restoring the host
IBRS=1 shortly after VM exit, has a documented side effect of flushing
the RSB except in this PBRSB situation where the software needs to stuff
the last RSB entry "by hand".
IOW, with eIBRS supported, host RET instructions should no longer be
influenced by guest behavior after the host retires a single CALL
instruction.
However, if the RET instructions are "unbalanced" with CALLs after a VM
exit as is the RET in #6, it might speculatively use the address for the
instruction after the CALL in #3 as an RSB prediction. This is a problem
since the (untrusted) guest controls this address.
Balanced CALL/RET instruction pairs such as in step #5 are not affected.
== Solution ==
The PBRSB issue affects a wide variety of Intel processors which
support eIBRS. But not all of them need mitigation. Today,
X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT triggers an RSB filling sequence that mitigates
PBRSB. Systems setting RSB_VMEXIT need no further mitigation - i.e.,
eIBRS systems which enable legacy IBRS explicitly.
However, such systems (X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) do not set RSB_VMEXIT
and most of them need a new mitigation.
Therefore, introduce a new feature flag X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE
which triggers a lighter-weight PBRSB mitigation versus RSB_VMEXIT.
The lighter-weight mitigation performs a CALL instruction which is
immediately followed by a speculative execution barrier (INT3). This
steers speculative execution to the barrier -- just like a retpoline
-- which ensures that speculation can never reach an unbalanced RET.
Then, ensure this CALL is retired before continuing execution with an
LFENCE.
In other words, the window of exposure is opened at VM exit where RET
behavior is troublesome. While the window is open, force RSB predictions
sampling for RET targets to a dead end at the INT3. Close the window
with the LFENCE.
There is a subset of eIBRS systems which are not vulnerable to PBRSB.
Add these systems to the cpu_vuln_whitelist[] as NO_EIBRS_PBRSB.
Future systems that aren't vulnerable will set ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO.
[ bp: Massage, incorporate review comments from Andy Cooper. ]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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To pick up the fixes that went upstream via acme/perf/urgent and to get
to v5.19.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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To pick the changes from:
28a99e95f55c6185 ("x86/amd: Use IBPB for firmware calls")
This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Yt6oWce9UDAmBAtX@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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To update the perf/core codebase.
Fix conflict by moving arch__post_evsel_config(evsel, attr) to the end
of evsel__config(), after what was added in:
49c692b7dfc9b6c0 ("perf offcpu: Accept allowed sample types only")
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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To pick up the changes from these csets:
4ad3278df6fe2b08 ("x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior")
d7caac991feeef1b ("x86/cpu/amd: Add Spectral Chicken")
That cause no changes to tooling:
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > before
$ cp arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > after
$ diff -u before after
$
Just silences this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YtQTm9wsB3hxQWvy@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
To pick the changes from:
f43b9876e857c739 ("x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs")
a149180fbcf336e9 ("x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk")
15e67227c49a5783 ("x86: Undo return-thunk damage")
369ae6ffc41a3c11 ("x86/retpoline: Cleanup some #ifdefery")
4ad3278df6fe2b08 x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior
26aae8ccbc197223 x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO
9756bba28470722d x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS
3ebc170068885b6f x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb
2dbb887e875b1de3 x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation
6b80b59b35557065 x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability
a149180fbcf336e9 x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk
15e67227c49a5783 x86: Undo return-thunk damage
a883d624aed463c8 x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11
51802186158c74a0 x86/speculation/mmio: Enumerate Processor MMIO Stale Data bug
This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YtQM40VmiLTkPND2@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
Some Intel processors may use alternate predictors for RETs on
RSB-underflow. This condition may be vulnerable to Branch History
Injection (BHI) and intramode-BTI.
Kernel earlier added spectre_v2 mitigation modes (eIBRS+Retpolines,
eIBRS+LFENCE, Retpolines) which protect indirect CALLs and JMPs against
such attacks. However, on RSB-underflow, RET target prediction may
fallback to alternate predictors. As a result, RET's predicted target
may get influenced by branch history.
A new MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL bit (RRSBA_DIS_S) controls this fallback
behavior when in kernel mode. When set, RETs will not take predictions
from alternate predictors, hence mitigating RETs as well. Support for
this is enumerated by CPUID.7.2.EDX[RRSBA_CTRL] (bit2).
For spectre v2 mitigation, when a user selects a mitigation that
protects indirect CALLs and JMPs against BHI and intramode-BTI, set
RRSBA_DIS_S also to protect RETs for RSB-underflow case.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
|
|
To pick the changes from:
d6d0c7f681fda1d0 ("x86/cpufeatures: Add PerfMonV2 feature bit")
296d5a17e793956f ("KVM: SEV-ES: Use V_TSC_AUX if available instead of RDTSC/MSR_TSC_AUX intercepts")
f30903394eb62316 ("x86/cpufeatures: Add virtual TSC_AUX feature bit")
8ad7e8f696951f19 ("x86/fpu/xsave: Support XSAVEC in the kernel")
59bd54a84d15e933 ("x86/tdx: Detect running as a TDX guest in early boot")
a77d41ac3a0f41c8 ("x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD Fam19h Branch Sampling feature")
This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com>
Cc: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YrDkgmwhLv+nKeOo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
IBS support has been enhanced with two new features in upcoming uarch:
1. DataSrc extension
2. L3 miss filtering.
Additional set of bits has been introduced in IBS registers to exploit
these features.
New bits are already defining in arch/x86/ header. Sync it with tools
header file. Also rename existing ibs_op_data field 'data_src' to
'data_src_lo'.
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Ananth Narayan <ananth.narayan@amd.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Robert Richter <rrichter@amd.com>
Cc: Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com>
Cc: Santosh Shukla <santosh.shukla@amd.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: like.xu.linux@gmail.com
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220604044519.594-8-ravi.bangoria@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 MMIO stale data fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
"Yet another hw vulnerability with a software mitigation: Processor
MMIO Stale Data.
They are a class of MMIO-related weaknesses which can expose stale
data by propagating it into core fill buffers. Data which can then be
leaked using the usual speculative execution methods.
Mitigations include this set along with microcode updates and are
similar to MDS and TAA vulnerabilities: VERW now clears those buffers
too"
* tag 'x86-bugs-2022-06-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/speculation/mmio: Print SMT warning
KVM: x86/speculation: Disable Fill buffer clear within guests
x86/speculation/mmio: Reuse SRBDS mitigation for SBDS
x86/speculation/srbds: Update SRBDS mitigation selection
x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale Data
x86/speculation/mmio: Enable CPU Fill buffer clearing on idle
x86/bugs: Group MDS, TAA & Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigations
x86/speculation/mmio: Add mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data
x86/speculation: Add a common function for MD_CLEAR mitigation update
x86/speculation/mmio: Enumerate Processor MMIO Stale Data bug
Documentation: Add documentation for Processor MMIO Stale Data
|
|
To pick up the changes in:
db1af12929c99d15 ("x86/msr-index: Define INTEGRITY_CAPABILITIES MSR")
089be16d5992dd0b ("x86/msr: Add PerfCntrGlobal* registers")
f52ba93190457aa2 ("tools/power turbostat: Add Power Limit4 support")
Addressing these tools/perf build warnings:
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h'
That makes the beautification scripts to pick some new entries:
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > before
$ cp arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > after
$ diff -u before after
--- before 2022-05-26 12:50:01.228612839 -0300
+++ after 2022-05-26 12:50:07.699776166 -0300
@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@
[0x0000026f] = "MTRRfix4K_F8000",
[0x00000277] = "IA32_CR_PAT",
[0x00000280] = "IA32_MC0_CTL2",
+ [0x000002d9] = "INTEGRITY_CAPS",
[0x000002ff] = "MTRRdefType",
[0x00000309] = "CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR0",
[0x0000030a] = "CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR1",
@@ -176,6 +177,7 @@
[0x00000586] = "IA32_RTIT_ADDR3_A",
[0x00000587] = "IA32_RTIT_ADDR3_B",
[0x00000600] = "IA32_DS_AREA",
+ [0x00000601] = "VR_CURRENT_CONFIG",
[0x00000606] = "RAPL_POWER_UNIT",
[0x0000060a] = "PKGC3_IRTL",
[0x0000060b] = "PKGC6_IRTL",
@@ -260,6 +262,10 @@
[0xc0000102 - x86_64_specific_MSRs_offset] = "KERNEL_GS_BASE",
[0xc0000103 - x86_64_specific_MSRs_offset] = "TSC_AUX",
[0xc0000104 - x86_64_specific_MSRs_offset] = "AMD64_TSC_RATIO",
+ [0xc000010f - x86_64_specific_MSRs_offset] = "AMD_DBG_EXTN_CFG",
+ [0xc0000300 - x86_64_specific_MSRs_offset] = "AMD64_PERF_CNTR_GLOBAL_STATUS",
+ [0xc0000301 - x86_64_specific_MSRs_offset] = "AMD64_PERF_CNTR_GLOBAL_CTL",
+ [0xc0000302 - x86_64_specific_MSRs_offset] = "AMD64_PERF_CNTR_GLOBAL_STATUS_CLR",
};
#define x86_AMD_V_KVM_MSRs_offset 0xc0010000
@@ -318,4 +324,5 @@
[0xc00102b4 - x86_AMD_V_KVM_MSRs_offset] = "AMD_CPPC_STATUS",
[0xc00102f0 - x86_AMD_V_KVM_MSRs_offset] = "AMD_PPIN_CTL",
[0xc00102f1 - x86_AMD_V_KVM_MSRs_offset] = "AMD_PPIN",
+ [0xc0010300 - x86_AMD_V_KVM_MSRs_offset] = "AMD_SAMP_BR_FROM",
};
$
Now one can trace systemwide asking to see backtraces to where those
MSRs are being read/written, see this example with a previous update:
# perf trace -e msr:*_msr/max-stack=32/ --filter="msr>=IA32_U_CET && msr<=IA32_INT_SSP_TAB"
^C#
If we use -v (verbose mode) we can see what it does behind the scenes:
# perf trace -v -e msr:*_msr/max-stack=32/ --filter="msr>=IA32_U_CET && msr<=IA32_INT_SSP_TAB"
Using CPUID AuthenticAMD-25-21-0
0x6a0
0x6a8
New filter for msr:read_msr: (msr>=0x6a0 && msr<=0x6a8) && (common_pid != 597499 && common_pid != 3313)
0x6a0
0x6a8
New filter for msr:write_msr: (msr>=0x6a0 && msr<=0x6a8) && (common_pid != 597499 && common_pid != 3313)
mmap size 528384B
^C#
Example with a frequent msr:
# perf trace -v -e msr:*_msr/max-stack=32/ --filter="msr==IA32_SPEC_CTRL" --max-events 2
Using CPUID AuthenticAMD-25-21-0
0x48
New filter for msr:read_msr: (msr==0x48) && (common_pid != 2612129 && common_pid != 3841)
0x48
New filter for msr:write_msr: (msr==0x48) && (common_pid != 2612129 && common_pid != 3841)
mmap size 528384B
Looking at the vmlinux_path (8 entries long)
symsrc__init: build id mismatch for vmlinux.
Using /proc/kcore for kernel data
Using /proc/kallsyms for symbols
0.000 Timer/2525383 msr:write_msr(msr: IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val: 6)
do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms])
__switch_to_xtra ([kernel.kallsyms])
__switch_to ([kernel.kallsyms])
__schedule ([kernel.kallsyms])
schedule ([kernel.kallsyms])
futex_wait_queue_me ([kernel.kallsyms])
futex_wait ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_futex ([kernel.kallsyms])
__x64_sys_futex ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_syscall_64 ([kernel.kallsyms])
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe ([kernel.kallsyms])
__futex_abstimed_wait_common64 (/usr/lib64/libpthread-2.33.so)
0.030 :0/0 msr:write_msr(msr: IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val: 2)
do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms])
__switch_to_xtra ([kernel.kallsyms])
__switch_to ([kernel.kallsyms])
__schedule ([kernel.kallsyms])
schedule_idle ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_idle ([kernel.kallsyms])
cpu_startup_entry ([kernel.kallsyms])
secondary_startup_64_no_verify ([kernel.kallsyms])
#
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com>
Cc: Sumeet Pawnikar <sumeet.r.pawnikar@intel.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Yo+i%252Fj5+UtE9dcix@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull perf events updates from Ingo Molnar:
"Platform PMU changes:
- x86/intel:
- Add new Intel Alder Lake and Raptor Lake support
- x86/amd:
- AMD Zen4 IBS extensions support
- Add AMD PerfMonV2 support
- Add AMD Fam19h Branch Sampling support
Generic changes:
- signal: Deliver SIGTRAP on perf event asynchronously if blocked
Perf instrumentation can be driven via SIGTRAP, but this causes a
problem when SIGTRAP is blocked by a task & terminate the task.
Allow user-space to request these signals asynchronously (after
they get unblocked) & also give the information to the signal
handler when this happens:
"To give user space the ability to clearly distinguish
synchronous from asynchronous signals, introduce
siginfo_t::si_perf_flags and TRAP_PERF_FLAG_ASYNC (opted for
flags in case more binary information is required in future).
The resolution to the problem is then to (a) no longer force the
signal (avoiding the terminations), but (b) tell user space via
si_perf_flags if the signal was synchronous or not, so that such
signals can be handled differently (e.g. let user space decide
to ignore or consider the data imprecise). "
- Unify/standardize the /sys/devices/cpu/events/* output format.
- Misc fixes & cleanups"
* tag 'perf-core-2022-05-23' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (32 commits)
perf/x86/amd/core: Fix reloading events for SVM
perf/x86/amd: Run AMD BRS code only on supported hw
perf/x86/amd: Fix AMD BRS period adjustment
perf/x86/amd: Remove unused variable 'hwc'
perf/ibs: Fix comment
perf/amd/ibs: Advertise zen4_ibs_extensions as pmu capability attribute
perf/amd/ibs: Add support for L3 miss filtering
perf/amd/ibs: Use ->is_visible callback for dynamic attributes
perf/amd/ibs: Cascade pmu init functions' return value
perf/x86/uncore: Add new Alder Lake and Raptor Lake support
perf/x86/uncore: Clean up uncore_pci_ids[]
perf/x86/cstate: Add new Alder Lake and Raptor Lake support
perf/x86/msr: Add new Alder Lake and Raptor Lake support
perf/x86: Add new Alder Lake and Raptor Lake support
perf/amd/ibs: Use interrupt regs ip for stack unwinding
perf/x86/amd/core: Add PerfMonV2 overflow handling
perf/x86/amd/core: Add PerfMonV2 counter control
perf/x86/amd/core: Detect available counters
perf/x86/amd/core: Detect PerfMonV2 support
x86/msr: Add PerfCntrGlobal* registers
...
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 CPU feature updates from Borislav Petkov:
- Remove a bunch of chicken bit options to turn off CPU features which
are not really needed anymore
- Misc fixes and cleanups
* tag 'x86_cpu_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/speculation: Add missing prototype for unpriv_ebpf_notify()
x86/pm: Fix false positive kmemleak report in msr_build_context()
x86/speculation/srbds: Do not try to turn mitigation off when not supported
x86/cpu: Remove "noclflush"
x86/cpu: Remove "noexec"
x86/cpu: Remove "nosmep"
x86/cpu: Remove CONFIG_X86_SMAP and "nosmap"
x86/cpu: Remove "nosep"
x86/cpu: Allow feature bit names from /proc/cpuinfo in clearcpuid=
|
|
The enumeration of MD_CLEAR in CPUID(EAX=7,ECX=0).EDX{bit 10} is not an
accurate indicator on all CPUs of whether the VERW instruction will
overwrite fill buffers. FB_CLEAR enumeration in
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES{bit 17} covers the case of CPUs that are not
vulnerable to MDS/TAA, indicating that microcode does overwrite fill
buffers.
Guests running in VMM environments may not be aware of all the
capabilities/vulnerabilities of the host CPU. Specifically, a guest may
apply MDS/TAA mitigations when a virtual CPU is enumerated as vulnerable
to MDS/TAA even when the physical CPU is not. On CPUs that enumerate
FB_CLEAR_CTRL the VMM may set FB_CLEAR_DIS to skip overwriting of fill
buffers by the VERW instruction. This is done by setting FB_CLEAR_DIS
during VMENTER and resetting on VMEXIT. For guests that enumerate
FB_CLEAR (explicitly asking for fill buffer clear capability) the VMM
will not use FB_CLEAR_DIS.
Irrespective of guest state, host overwrites CPU buffers before VMENTER
to protect itself from an MMIO capable guest, as part of mitigation for
MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
|
|
Processor MMIO Stale Data is a class of vulnerabilities that may
expose data after an MMIO operation. For more details please refer to
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
Add the Processor MMIO Stale Data bug enumeration. A microcode update
adds new bits to the MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, define them.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
|
|
s/IBS Op Data 2/IBS Op Data 1/ for MSR 0xc0011035.
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220509044914.1473-9-ravi.bangoria@amd.com
|
|
A microcode update on some Intel processors causes all TSX transactions
to always abort by default[*]. Microcode also added functionality to
re-enable TSX for development purposes. With this microcode loaded, if
tsx=on was passed on the cmdline, and TSX development mode was already
enabled before the kernel boot, it may make the system vulnerable to TSX
Asynchronous Abort (TAA).
To be on safer side, unconditionally disable TSX development mode during
boot. If a viable use case appears, this can be revisited later.
[*]: Intel TSX Disable Update for Selected Processors, doc ID: 643557
[ bp: Drop unstable web link, massage heavily. ]
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/347bd844da3a333a9793c6687d4e4eb3b2419a3e.1646943780.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com
|
|
Those were added as part of the SMAP enablement but SMAP is currently
an integral part of kernel proper and there's no need to disable it
anymore.
Rip out that functionality. Leave --uaccess default on for objtool as
this is what objtool should do by default anyway.
If still needed - clearcpuid=smap.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220127115626.14179-4-bp@alien8.de
|
|
To pick the changes from:
991625f3dd2cbc4b ("x86/ibt: Add IBT feature, MSR and #CP handling")
This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YkSCx2kr4ambH+Qe@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
To pick up the changes in:
991625f3dd2cbc4b ("x86/ibt: Add IBT feature, MSR and #CP handling")
Addressing these tools/perf build warnings:
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h'
That makes the beautification scripts to pick some new entries:
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > before
$ cp arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > after
$ diff -u before after
--- before 2022-03-29 16:23:07.678740040 -0300
+++ after 2022-03-29 16:23:16.960978524 -0300
@@ -220,6 +220,13 @@
[0x00000669] = "MC6_DEMOTION_POLICY_CONFIG",
[0x00000680] = "LBR_NHM_FROM",
[0x00000690] = "CORE_PERF_LIMIT_REASONS",
+ [0x000006a0] = "IA32_U_CET",
+ [0x000006a2] = "IA32_S_CET",
+ [0x000006a4] = "IA32_PL0_SSP",
+ [0x000006a5] = "IA32_PL1_SSP",
+ [0x000006a6] = "IA32_PL2_SSP",
+ [0x000006a7] = "IA32_PL3_SSP",
+ [0x000006a8] = "IA32_INT_SSP_TAB",
[0x000006B0] = "GFX_PERF_LIMIT_REASONS",
[0x000006B1] = "RING_PERF_LIMIT_REASONS",
[0x000006c0] = "LBR_NHM_TO",
$
And this gets rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.o
LD /tmp/build/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/perf-in.o
LD /tmp/build/perf/trace/beauty/perf-in.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/util/amd-sample-raw.o
LD /tmp/build/perf/util/perf-in.o
LD /tmp/build/perf/perf-in.o
LINK /tmp/build/perf/perf
Now one can trace systemwide asking to see backtraces to where those
MSRs are being read/written with:
# perf trace -e msr:*_msr/max-stack=32/ --filter="msr>=IA32_U_CET && msr<=IA32_INT_SSP_TAB"
^C#
If we use -v (verbose mode) we can see what it does behind the scenes:
# perf trace -v -e msr:*_msr/max-stack=32/ --filter="msr>=IA32_U_CET && msr<=IA32_INT_SSP_TAB"
Using CPUID AuthenticAMD-25-21-0
0x6a0
0x6a8
New filter for msr:read_msr: (msr>=0x6a0 && msr<=0x6a8) && (common_pid != 597499 && common_pid != 3313)
0x6a0
0x6a8
New filter for msr:write_msr: (msr>=0x6a0 && msr<=0x6a8) && (common_pid != 597499 && common_pid != 3313)
mmap size 528384B
^C#
Example with a frequent msr:
# perf trace -v -e msr:*_msr/max-stack=32/ --filter="msr==IA32_SPEC_CTRL" --max-events 2
Using CPUID AuthenticAMD-25-21-0
0x48
New filter for msr:read_msr: (msr==0x48) && (common_pid != 2612129 && common_pid != 3841)
0x48
New filter for msr:write_msr: (msr==0x48) && (common_pid != 2612129 && common_pid != 3841)
mmap size 528384B
Looking at the vmlinux_path (8 entries long)
symsrc__init: build id mismatch for vmlinux.
Using /proc/kcore for kernel data
Using /proc/kallsyms for symbols
0.000 Timer/2525383 msr:write_msr(msr: IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val: 6)
do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms])
__switch_to_xtra ([kernel.kallsyms])
__switch_to ([kernel.kallsyms])
__schedule ([kernel.kallsyms])
schedule ([kernel.kallsyms])
futex_wait_queue_me ([kernel.kallsyms])
futex_wait ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_futex ([kernel.kallsyms])
__x64_sys_futex ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_syscall_64 ([kernel.kallsyms])
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe ([kernel.kallsyms])
__futex_abstimed_wait_common64 (/usr/lib64/libpthread-2.33.so)
0.030 :0/0 msr:write_msr(msr: IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val: 2)
do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms])
__switch_to_xtra ([kernel.kallsyms])
__switch_to ([kernel.kallsyms])
__schedule ([kernel.kallsyms])
schedule_idle ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_idle ([kernel.kallsyms])
cpu_startup_entry ([kernel.kallsyms])
secondary_startup_64_no_verify ([kernel.kallsyms])
#
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YkNd7Ky+vi7H2Zl2@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
To pick the changes from:
fa31a4d669bd471e ("x86/cpufeatures: Put the AMX macros in the word 18 block")
7b8f40b3de75c971 ("x86/cpu: Add definitions for the Intel Hardware Feedback Interface")
This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YjzZPxdyLjf76gM+@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
To pick the changes in:
7c1ef59145f1c8bf ("x86/cpufeatures: Re-enable ENQCMD")
That causes only these 'perf bench' objects to rebuild:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses these perf build warnings:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YjzX+PknzGoKaGMX@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
To pick up the changes from these csets:
7b8f40b3de75c971 ("x86/cpu: Add definitions for the Intel Hardware Feedback Interface")
That cause no changes to tooling:
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > before
$ cp arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > after
$ diff -u before after
$
Just silences this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YjzVt8CjAORAsTCo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull misc x86 updates from Borislav Petkov:
- Add support for a couple new insn sets to the insn decoder:
AVX512-FP16, AMX, other misc insns.
- Update VMware-specific MAINTAINERS entries
* tag 'x86_misc_for_v5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
MAINTAINERS: Mark VMware mailing list entries as email aliases
MAINTAINERS: Add Zack as maintainer of vmmouse driver
MAINTAINERS: Update maintainers for paravirt ops and VMware hypervisor interface
x86/insn: Add AVX512-FP16 instructions to the x86 instruction decoder
perf/tests: Add AVX512-FP16 instructions to x86 instruction decoder test
x86/insn: Add misc instructions to x86 instruction decoder
perf/tests: Add misc instructions to the x86 instruction decoder test
x86/insn: Add AMX instructions to the x86 instruction decoder
perf/tests: Add AMX instructions to x86 instruction decoder test
|
|
To pick the changes from:
d45476d983240937 ("x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCE")
Its just a comment fixup.
This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YiyiHatGaJQM7l/Y@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 spectre fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Mitigate Spectre v2-type Branch History Buffer attacks on machines
which support eIBRS, i.e., the hardware-assisted speculation
restriction after it has been shown that such machines are vulnerable
even with the hardware mitigation.
- Do not use the default LFENCE-based Spectre v2 mitigation on AMD as
it is insufficient to mitigate such attacks. Instead, switch to
retpolines on all AMD by default.
- Update the docs and add some warnings for the obviously vulnerable
cmdline configurations.
* tag 'x86_bugs_for_v5.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT
x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation
x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper
x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMD
x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting
Documentation/hw-vuln: Update spectre doc
x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline options
x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCE
|
|
To pick up the changes in:
3915035282573c5e ("KVM: x86: SVM: move avic definitions from AMD's spec to svm.h")
Addressing these tools/perf build warnings:
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h'
That makes the beautification scripts to pick some new entries:
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > before
$ cp arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > after
$ diff -u before after
--- before 2022-02-22 17:35:36.996271430 -0300
+++ after 2022-02-22 17:35:46.258503347 -0300
@@ -287,6 +287,7 @@
[0xc0010114 - x86_AMD_V_KVM_MSRs_offset] = "VM_CR",
[0xc0010115 - x86_AMD_V_KVM_MSRs_offset] = "VM_IGNNE",
[0xc0010117 - x86_AMD_V_KVM_MSRs_offset] = "VM_HSAVE_PA",
+ [0xc001011b - x86_AMD_V_KVM_MSRs_offset] = "AMD64_SVM_AVIC_DOORBELL",
[0xc001011e - x86_AMD_V_KVM_MSRs_offset] = "AMD64_VM_PAGE_FLUSH",
[0xc001011f - x86_AMD_V_KVM_MSRs_offset] = "AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL",
[0xc0010130 - x86_AMD_V_KVM_MSRs_offset] = "AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB",
$
And this gets rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.o
LD /tmp/build/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/perf-in.o
LD /tmp/build/perf/trace/beauty/perf-in.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/util/amd-sample-raw.o
LD /tmp/build/perf/util/perf-in.o
LD /tmp/build/perf/perf-in.o
LINK /tmp/build/perf/perf
Now one can trace systemwide asking to see backtraces to where those
MSRs are being read/written with:
# perf trace -e msr:*_msr/max-stack=32/ --filter="msr>=AMD64_SVM_AVIC_DOORBELL && msr<=AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB"
^C#
If we use -v (verbose mode) we can see what it does behind the scenes:
# perf trace -v -e msr:*_msr/max-stack=32/ --filter="msr>=AMD64_SVM_AVIC_DOORBELL && msr<=AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB"
Using CPUID AuthenticAMD-25-21-0
0xc001011b
0xc0010130
New filter for msr:read_msr: (msr>=0xc001011b && msr<=0xc0010130) && (common_pid != 1019953 && common_pid != 3629)
0xc001011b
0xc0010130
New filter for msr:write_msr: (msr>=0xc001011b && msr<=0xc0010130) && (common_pid != 1019953 && common_pid != 3629)
mmap size 528384B
^C#
Example with a frequent msr:
# perf trace -v -e msr:*_msr/max-stack=32/ --filter="msr==IA32_SPEC_CTRL" --max-events 2
Using CPUID AuthenticAMD-25-21-0
0x48
New filter for msr:read_msr: (msr==0x48) && (common_pid != 2612129 && common_pid != 3841)
0x48
New filter for msr:write_msr: (msr==0x48) && (common_pid != 2612129 && common_pid != 3841)
mmap size 528384B
Looking at the vmlinux_path (8 entries long)
symsrc__init: build id mismatch for vmlinux.
Using /proc/kcore for kernel data
Using /proc/kallsyms for symbols
0.000 Timer/2525383 msr:write_msr(msr: IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val: 6)
do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms])
__switch_to_xtra ([kernel.kallsyms])
__switch_to ([kernel.kallsyms])
__schedule ([kernel.kallsyms])
schedule ([kernel.kallsyms])
futex_wait_queue_me ([kernel.kallsyms])
futex_wait ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_futex ([kernel.kallsyms])
__x64_sys_futex ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_syscall_64 ([kernel.kallsyms])
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe ([kernel.kallsyms])
__futex_abstimed_wait_common64 (/usr/lib64/libpthread-2.33.so)
0.030 :0/0 msr:write_msr(msr: IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val: 2)
do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms])
__switch_to_xtra ([kernel.kallsyms])
__switch_to ([kernel.kallsyms])
__schedule ([kernel.kallsyms])
schedule_idle ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_idle ([kernel.kallsyms])
cpu_startup_entry ([kernel.kallsyms])
secondary_startup_64_no_verify ([kernel.kallsyms])
#
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YhVKxaft+z8rpOfy@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
The RETPOLINE_AMD name is unfortunate since it isn't necessarily
AMD only, in fact Hygon also uses it. Furthermore it will likely be
sufficient for some Intel processors. Therefore rename the thing to
RETPOLINE_LFENCE to better describe what it is.
Add the spectre_v2=retpoline,lfence option as an alias to
spectre_v2=retpoline,amd to preserve existing setups. However, the output
of /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 will be changed.
[ bp: Fix typos, massage. ]
Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
|
|
To pick the changes from:
690a757d610e50c2 ("kvm: x86: Add CPUID support for Intel AMX")
This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Cc: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YflQCEO9FRLeTmlB@kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
The x86 instruction decoder is used for both kernel instructions and
user space instructions (e.g. uprobes, perf tools Intel PT), so it is
good to update it with new instructions.
Add AVX512-FP16 instructions to x86 instruction decoder.
Note the EVEX map field is extended by 1 bit, and most instructions are in
map 5 and map 6.
Reference:
Intel AVX512-FP16 Architecture Specification
June 2021
Revision 1.0
Document Number: 347407-001US
Example using perf tools' x86 instruction decoder test:
$ perf test -v "x86 instruction decoder" |& grep vfcmaddcph | head -2
Decoded ok: 62 f6 6f 48 56 cb vfcmaddcph %zmm3,%zmm2,%zmm1
Decoded ok: 62 f6 6f 48 56 8c c8 78 56 34 12 vfcmaddcph 0x12345678(%eax,%ecx,8),%zmm2,%zmm1
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211202095029.2165714-7-adrian.hunter@intel.com
|
|
To pick up the changes in:
89aa94b4a218339b ("x86/msr: Add AMD CPPC MSR definitions")
Addressing these tools/perf build warnings:
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h'
That makes the beautification scripts to pick some new entries:
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > before
$ cp arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > after
$ diff -u before after
--- before 2022-01-13 10:59:51.743416890 -0300
+++ after 2022-01-13 11:00:00.776644178 -0300
@@ -303,6 +303,11 @@
[0xc0010299 - x86_AMD_V_KVM_MSRs_offset] = "AMD_RAPL_POWER_UNIT",
[0xc001029a - x86_AMD_V_KVM_MSRs_offset] = "AMD_CORE_ENERGY_STATUS",
[0xc001029b - x86_AMD_V_KVM_MSRs_offset] = "AMD_PKG_ENERGY_STATUS",
+ [0xc00102b0 - x86_AMD_V_KVM_MSRs_offset] = "AMD_CPPC_CAP1",
+ [0xc00102b1 - x86_AMD_V_KVM_MSRs_offset] = "AMD_CPPC_ENABLE",
+ [0xc00102b2 - x86_AMD_V_KVM_MSRs_offset] = "AMD_CPPC_CAP2",
+ [0xc00102b3 - x86_AMD_V_KVM_MSRs_offset] = "AMD_CPPC_REQ",
+ [0xc00102b4 - x86_AMD_V_KVM_MSRs_offset] = "AMD_CPPC_STATUS",
[0xc00102f0 - x86_AMD_V_KVM_MSRs_offset] = "AMD_PPIN_CTL",
[0xc00102f1 - x86_AMD_V_KVM_MSRs_offset] = "AMD_PPIN",
};
$
And this gets rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.o
INSTALL trace_plugins
LD /tmp/build/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/perf-in.o
LD /tmp/build/perf/trace/beauty/perf-in.o
LD /tmp/build/perf/perf-in.o
LINK /tmp/build/perf/perf
Now one can trace systemwide asking to see backtraces to where those
MSRs are being read/written with:
# perf trace -e msr:*_msr/max-stack=32/ --filter="msr>=AMD_CPPC_CAP1 && msr<=AMD_CPPC_STATUS"
^C#
If we use -v (verbose mode) we can see what it does behind the scenes:
# perf trace -v -e msr:*_msr/max-stack=32/ --filter="msr>=AMD_CPPC_CAP1 && msr<=AMD_CPPC_STATUS"
<SNIP>
New filter for msr:read_msr: (msr>=0xc00102b0 && msr<=0xc00102b4) && (common_pid != 2612102 && common_pid != 3841)
New filter for msr:write_msr: (msr>=0xc00102b0 && msr<=0xc00102b4) && (common_pid != 2612102 && common_pid != 3841)
<SNIP>
^C#
Example with a frequent msr:
# perf trace -v -e msr:*_msr/max-stack=32/ --filter="msr==IA32_SPEC_CTRL" --max-events 2
Using CPUID AuthenticAMD-25-21-0
0x48
New filter for msr:read_msr: (msr==0x48) && (common_pid != 2612129 && common_pid != 3841)
0x48
New filter for msr:write_msr: (msr==0x48) && (common_pid != 2612129 && common_pid != 3841)
mmap size 528384B
Looking at the vmlinux_path (8 entries long)
symsrc__init: build id mismatch for vmlinux.
Using /proc/kcore for kernel data
Using /proc/kallsyms for symbols
0.000 Timer/2525383 msr:write_msr(msr: IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val: 6)
do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms])
__switch_to_xtra ([kernel.kallsyms])
__switch_to ([kernel.kallsyms])
__schedule ([kernel.kallsyms])
schedule ([kernel.kallsyms])
futex_wait_queue_me ([kernel.kallsyms])
futex_wait ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_futex ([kernel.kallsyms])
__x64_sys_futex ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_syscall_64 ([kernel.kallsyms])
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe ([kernel.kallsyms])
__futex_abstimed_wait_common64 (/usr/lib64/libpthread-2.33.so)
0.030 :0/0 msr:write_msr(msr: IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val: 2)
do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms])
__switch_to_xtra ([kernel.kallsyms])
__switch_to ([kernel.kallsyms])
__schedule ([kernel.kallsyms])
schedule_idle ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_idle ([kernel.kallsyms])
cpu_startup_entry ([kernel.kallsyms])
secondary_startup_64_no_verify ([kernel.kallsyms])
#
Acked-by: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/YeA2PAvHV+uHRhLj@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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To pick the changes from:
d341db8f48ea4331 ("x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD Collaborative Processor Performance Control feature flag")
This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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This code puts an exception table entry on the PREFETCH instruction to
overwrite it with a JMP.d8 when it triggers an exception. Except of
course, our code is no longer writable, also SMP.
Instead of fixing this broken mess, simply take it out.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YZKQzUmeNuwyvZpk@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
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To pick the changes from:
eec2113eabd92b7b ("x86/fpu/amx: Define AMX state components and have it used for boot-time checks")
This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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To pick up the changes in:
dae1bd58389615d4 ("x86/msr-index: Add MSRs for XFD")
Addressing these tools/perf build warnings:
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h'
That makes the beautification scripts to pick some new entries:
$ diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
--- tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h 2021-07-15 16:17:01.819817827 -0300
+++ arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h 2021-11-06 15:49:33.738517311 -0300
@@ -625,6 +625,8 @@
#define MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS_RSVD 0x00000ffc
+#define MSR_IA32_XFD 0x000001c4
+#define MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR 0x000001c5
#define MSR_IA32_XSS 0x00000da0
#define MSR_IA32_APICBASE 0x0000001b
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > /tmp/before
$ cp arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > /tmp/after
$ diff -u /tmp/before /tmp/after
--- /tmp/before 2021-11-13 11:10:39.964201505 -0300
+++ /tmp/after 2021-11-13 11:10:47.902410873 -0300
@@ -93,6 +93,8 @@
[0x000001b0] = "IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS",
[0x000001b1] = "IA32_PACKAGE_THERM_STATUS",
[0x000001b2] = "IA32_PACKAGE_THERM_INTERRUPT",
+ [0x000001c4] = "IA32_XFD",
+ [0x000001c5] = "IA32_XFD_ERR",
[0x000001c8] = "LBR_SELECT",
[0x000001c9] = "LBR_TOS",
[0x000001d9] = "IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR",
$
And this gets rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.o
INSTALL trace_plugins
LD /tmp/build/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/perf-in.o
LD /tmp/build/perf/trace/beauty/perf-in.o
LD /tmp/build/perf/perf-in.o
LINK /tmp/build/perf/perf
Now one can trace systemwide asking to see backtraces to where those
MSRs are being read/written with:
# perf trace -e msr:*_msr/max-stack=32/ --filter="msr==IA32_XFD || msr==IA32_XFD_ERR"
^C#
#
If we use -v (verbose mode) we can see what it does behind the scenes:
# perf trace -v -e msr:*_msr/max-stack=32/ --filter="msr==IA32_XFD || msr==IA32_XFD_ERR"
<SNIP>
New filter for msr:read_msr: (msr==0x1c4 || msr==0x1c5) && (common_pid != 4448951 && common_pid != 8781)
New filter for msr:write_msr: (msr==0x1c4 || msr==0x1c5) && (common_pid != 4448951 && common_pid != 8781)
<SNIP>
^C#
Example with a frequent msr:
# perf trace -v -e msr:*_msr/max-stack=32/ --filter="msr==IA32_SPEC_CTRL" --max-events 2
Using CPUID AuthenticAMD-25-21-0
0x48
New filter for msr:read_msr: (msr==0x48) && (common_pid != 3738351 && common_pid != 3564)
0x48
New filter for msr:write_msr: (msr==0x48) && (common_pid != 3738351 && common_pid != 3564)
mmap size 528384B
Looking at the vmlinux_path (8 entries long)
symsrc__init: build id mismatch for vmlinux.
Using /proc/kcore for kernel data
Using /proc/kallsyms for symbols
0.000 pipewire/2479 msr:write_msr(msr: IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val: 6)
do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms])
__switch_to_xtra ([kernel.kallsyms])
__switch_to ([kernel.kallsyms])
__schedule ([kernel.kallsyms])
schedule ([kernel.kallsyms])
schedule_hrtimeout_range_clock ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_epoll_wait ([kernel.kallsyms])
__x64_sys_epoll_wait ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_syscall_64 ([kernel.kallsyms])
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe ([kernel.kallsyms])
epoll_wait (/usr/lib64/libc-2.33.so)
[0x76c4] (/usr/lib64/spa-0.2/support/libspa-support.so)
[0x4cf0] (/usr/lib64/spa-0.2/support/libspa-support.so)
0.027 :0/0 msr:write_msr(msr: IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val: 2)
do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_trace_write_msr ([kernel.kallsyms])
__switch_to_xtra ([kernel.kallsyms])
__switch_to ([kernel.kallsyms])
__schedule ([kernel.kallsyms])
schedule_idle ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_idle ([kernel.kallsyms])
cpu_startup_entry ([kernel.kallsyms])
start_kernel ([kernel.kallsyms])
secondary_startup_64_no_verify ([kernel.kallsyms])
#
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YY%2FJdb6on7swsn+C@kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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Copy over approximately clean versions of the pvclock headers into
tools. Reconcile headers/symbols missing in tools that are unneeded.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210916181555.973085-2-oupton@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Move unistd_{32,64}.h from x86/include/asm to x86/include/uapi/asm so
that tools/selftests that install kernel headers, e.g. KVM selftests, can
include non-uapi tools headers, e.g. to get 'struct list_head', without
effectively overriding the installed non-tool uapi headers.
Swapping KVM's search order, e.g. to search the kernel headers before
tool headers, is not a viable option as doing results in linux/type.h and
other core headers getting pulled from the kernel headers, which do not
have the kernel-internal typedefs that are used through tools, including
many files outside of selftests/kvm's control.
Prior to commit cec07f53c398 ("perf tools: Move syscall number fallbacks
from perf-sys.h to tools/arch/x86/include/asm/"), the handcoded numbers
were actual fallbacks, i.e. overriding unistd_{32,64}.h from the kernel
headers was unintentional.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210901203030.1292304-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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This is a tools/-side patch for the patch that adds the original copy
of the IBS header file, in arch/x86/include/asm/.
We also add an entry to check-headers.sh, so future changes continue
to be copied.
Committer notes:
Had to add this
-#include <asm/msr-index.h>
+#include "msr-index.h"
And change the check-headers.sh entry to ignore this line when diffing
with the original kernel header.
This is needed so that we can use 'perf report' on a perf.data with IBS
data on a !x86 system, i.e. building on ARM fails without this as there
is no asm/msr-index.h there.
This was done on the next patch in this series and is done for things
like Intel PT and ARM CoreSight.
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Robert Richter <robert.richter@amd.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: https //lore.kernel.org/r/20210817221509.88391-3-kim.phillips@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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To pick the changes from:
1348924ba8169f35 ("x86/msr: Define new bits in TSX_FORCE_ABORT MSR")
cbcddaa33d7e11a0 ("perf/x86/rapl: Use CPUID bit on AMD and Hygon parts")
This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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To pick up the changes from these csets:
1348924ba8169f35 ("x86/msr: Define new bits in TSX_FORCE_ABORT MSR")
That cause no changes to tooling:
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > before
$ cp arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > after
$ diff -u before after
$
Just silences this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 interrupt related updates from Thomas Gleixner:
- Consolidate the VECTOR defines and the usage sites.
- Cleanup GDT/IDT related code and replace open coded ASM with proper
native helper functions.
* tag 'x86-irq-2021-06-29' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/kexec: Set_[gi]dt() -> native_[gi]dt_invalidate() in machine_kexec_*.c
x86: Add native_[ig]dt_invalidate()
x86/idt: Remove address argument from idt_invalidate()
x86/irq: Add and use NR_EXTERNAL_VECTORS and NR_SYSTEM_VECTORS
x86/irq: Remove unused vectors defines
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 asm updates from Ingo Molnar:
- Micro-optimize and standardize the do_syscall_64() calling convention
- Make syscall entry flags clearing more conservative
- Clean up syscall table handling
- Clean up & standardize assembly macros, in preparation of FRED
- Misc cleanups and fixes
* tag 'x86-asm-2021-06-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/asm: Make <asm/asm.h> valid on cross-builds as well
x86/regs: Syscall_get_nr() returns -1 for a non-system call
x86/entry: Split PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS into two submacros
x86/syscall: Maximize MSR_SYSCALL_MASK
x86/syscall: Unconditionally prototype {ia32,x32}_sys_call_table[]
x86/entry: Reverse arguments to do_syscall_64()
x86/entry: Unify definitions from <asm/calling.h> and <asm/ptrace-abi.h>
x86/asm: Use _ASM_BYTES() in <asm/nops.h>
x86/asm: Add _ASM_BYTES() macro for a .byte ... opcode sequence
x86/asm: Have the __ASM_FORM macros handle commas in arguments
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To pick the changes in:
fb35d30fe5b06cc2 ("x86/cpufeatures: Assign dedicated feature word for CPUID_0x8000001F[EAX]")
e7b6385b01d8e9fb ("x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel SGX hardware bits")
1478b99a76534b6c ("x86/cpufeatures: Mark ENQCMD as disabled when configured out")
That don't cause any change in the tools, just silences this perf build
warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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