From 95edcff497b126a3f3e079e94b20fe2ca7e5a63d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2011 20:22:41 -0500 Subject: cifs: attempt to freeze while looping on a receive attempt In the recent overhaul of the demultiplex thread receive path, I neglected to ensure that we attempt to freeze on each pass through the receive loop. Reported-and-Tested-by: Woody Suwalski Reported-and-Tested-by: Adam Williamson Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/connect.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'fs/cifs/connect.c') diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index d6a972df0338..8cd4b52d4217 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -441,6 +441,8 @@ cifs_readv_from_socket(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct kvec *iov_orig, smb_msg.msg_controllen = 0; for (total_read = 0; to_read; total_read += length, to_read -= length) { + try_to_freeze(); + if (server_unresponsive(server)) { total_read = -EAGAIN; break; -- cgit From 497728e11a9deeaea18be19fadcf7f1c85efbcf7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Sun, 1 Jan 2012 10:34:39 -0500 Subject: cifs: fix bad buffer length check in coalesce_t2 The current check looks to see if the RFC1002 length is larger than CIFSMaxBufSize, and fails if it is. The buffer is actually larger than that by MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE. This bug has been around for a long time, but the fact that we used to cap the clients MaxBufferSize at the same level as the server tended to paper over it. Commit c974befa changed that however and caused this bug to bite in more cases. Reported-and-Tested-by: Konstantinos Skarlatos Tested-by: Shirish Pargaonkar Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/connect.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs/cifs/connect.c') diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index 8cd4b52d4217..27c4f2551711 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ static int coalesce_t2(struct smb_hdr *psecond, struct smb_hdr *pTargetSMB) byte_count = be32_to_cpu(pTargetSMB->smb_buf_length); byte_count += total_in_buf2; /* don't allow buffer to overflow */ - if (byte_count > CIFSMaxBufSize) + if (byte_count > CIFSMaxBufSize + MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE - 4) return -ENOBUFS; pTargetSMB->smb_buf_length = cpu_to_be32(byte_count); -- cgit From 5206efd62ce49cf5c7940d81c22bc556fc843de2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2011 03:22:14 -0400 Subject: cifs: propagate umode_t Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- fs/cifs/connect.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs/cifs/connect.c') diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index 8cd4b52d4217..be1e8f91c0ad 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -2819,7 +2819,7 @@ void cifs_setup_cifs_sb(struct smb_vol *pvolume_info, cifs_sb->mnt_backupgid = pvolume_info->backupgid; cifs_sb->mnt_file_mode = pvolume_info->file_mode; cifs_sb->mnt_dir_mode = pvolume_info->dir_mode; - cFYI(1, "file mode: 0x%x dir mode: 0x%x", + cFYI(1, "file mode: 0x%hx dir mode: 0x%hx", cifs_sb->mnt_file_mode, cifs_sb->mnt_dir_mode); cifs_sb->actimeo = pvolume_info->actimeo; -- cgit From 225de11e31c1cecd04839b859a0b8f81d490a50b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steve French Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2012 23:08:24 -0600 Subject: [CIFS] default ntlmv2 for cifs mount delayed to 3.3 Turned out the ntlmv2 (default security authentication) upgrade was harder to test than expected, and we ran out of time to test against Apple and a few other servers that we wanted to. Delay upgrade of default security from ntlm to ntlmv2 (on mount) to 3.3. Still works fine to specify it explicitly via "sec=ntlmv2" so this should be fine. Acked-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/connect.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs/cifs/connect.c') diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index 27c4f2551711..f3670cf72587 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -2122,7 +2122,7 @@ cifs_get_smb_ses(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct smb_vol *volume_info) warned_on_ntlm = true; cERROR(1, "default security mechanism requested. The default " "security mechanism will be upgraded from ntlm to " - "ntlmv2 in kernel release 3.2"); + "ntlmv2 in kernel release 3.3"); } ses->overrideSecFlg = volume_info->secFlg; -- cgit From f5fffcee27c09143ba80e5257dbd1f381d86342f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2012 13:49:17 -0500 Subject: cifs: better instrumentation for coalesce_t2 When coalesce_t2 returns an error, have it throw a cFYI message that explains the reason. Also rename some variables to clarify what they represent. Reported-and-Tested-by: Konstantinos Skarlatos Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/connect.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs/cifs/connect.c') diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index 4666780f315d..5cc15856e4ad 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -225,74 +225,90 @@ static int check2ndT2(struct smb_hdr *pSMB) static int coalesce_t2(struct smb_hdr *psecond, struct smb_hdr *pTargetSMB) { - struct smb_t2_rsp *pSMB2 = (struct smb_t2_rsp *)psecond; + struct smb_t2_rsp *pSMBs = (struct smb_t2_rsp *)psecond; struct smb_t2_rsp *pSMBt = (struct smb_t2_rsp *)pTargetSMB; - char *data_area_of_target; - char *data_area_of_buf2; + char *data_area_of_tgt; + char *data_area_of_src; int remaining; - unsigned int byte_count, total_in_buf; - __u16 total_data_size, total_in_buf2; + unsigned int byte_count, total_in_tgt; + __u16 tgt_total_cnt, src_total_cnt, total_in_src; - total_data_size = get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBt->t2_rsp.TotalDataCount); + src_total_cnt = get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBs->t2_rsp.TotalDataCount); + tgt_total_cnt = get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBt->t2_rsp.TotalDataCount); - if (total_data_size != - get_unaligned_le16(&pSMB2->t2_rsp.TotalDataCount)) - cFYI(1, "total data size of primary and secondary t2 differ"); + if (tgt_total_cnt != src_total_cnt) + cFYI(1, "total data count of primary and secondary t2 differ " + "source=%hu target=%hu", src_total_cnt, tgt_total_cnt); - total_in_buf = get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBt->t2_rsp.DataCount); + total_in_tgt = get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBt->t2_rsp.DataCount); - remaining = total_data_size - total_in_buf; + remaining = tgt_total_cnt - total_in_tgt; - if (remaining < 0) + if (remaining < 0) { + cFYI(1, "Server sent too much data. tgt_total_cnt=%hu " + "total_in_tgt=%hu", tgt_total_cnt, total_in_tgt); return -EPROTO; + } - if (remaining == 0) /* nothing to do, ignore */ + if (remaining == 0) { + /* nothing to do, ignore */ + cFYI(1, "no more data remains"); return 0; + } - total_in_buf2 = get_unaligned_le16(&pSMB2->t2_rsp.DataCount); - if (remaining < total_in_buf2) { + total_in_src = get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBs->t2_rsp.DataCount); + if (remaining < total_in_src) cFYI(1, "transact2 2nd response contains too much data"); - } /* find end of first SMB data area */ - data_area_of_target = (char *)&pSMBt->hdr.Protocol + + data_area_of_tgt = (char *)&pSMBt->hdr.Protocol + get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBt->t2_rsp.DataOffset); - /* validate target area */ - data_area_of_buf2 = (char *)&pSMB2->hdr.Protocol + - get_unaligned_le16(&pSMB2->t2_rsp.DataOffset); + /* validate target area */ + data_area_of_src = (char *)&pSMBs->hdr.Protocol + + get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBs->t2_rsp.DataOffset); - data_area_of_target += total_in_buf; + data_area_of_tgt += total_in_tgt; - /* copy second buffer into end of first buffer */ - total_in_buf += total_in_buf2; + total_in_tgt += total_in_src; /* is the result too big for the field? */ - if (total_in_buf > USHRT_MAX) + if (total_in_tgt > USHRT_MAX) { + cFYI(1, "coalesced DataCount too large (%u)", total_in_tgt); return -EPROTO; - put_unaligned_le16(total_in_buf, &pSMBt->t2_rsp.DataCount); + } + put_unaligned_le16(total_in_tgt, &pSMBt->t2_rsp.DataCount); /* fix up the BCC */ byte_count = get_bcc(pTargetSMB); - byte_count += total_in_buf2; + byte_count += total_in_src; /* is the result too big for the field? */ - if (byte_count > USHRT_MAX) + if (byte_count > USHRT_MAX) { + cFYI(1, "coalesced BCC too large (%u)", byte_count); return -EPROTO; + } put_bcc(byte_count, pTargetSMB); byte_count = be32_to_cpu(pTargetSMB->smb_buf_length); - byte_count += total_in_buf2; + byte_count += total_in_src; /* don't allow buffer to overflow */ - if (byte_count > CIFSMaxBufSize + MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE - 4) + if (byte_count > CIFSMaxBufSize + MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE - 4) { + cFYI(1, "coalesced BCC exceeds buffer size (%u)", byte_count); return -ENOBUFS; + } pTargetSMB->smb_buf_length = cpu_to_be32(byte_count); - memcpy(data_area_of_target, data_area_of_buf2, total_in_buf2); + /* copy second buffer into end of first buffer */ + memcpy(data_area_of_tgt, data_area_of_src, total_in_src); - if (remaining == total_in_buf2) { - cFYI(1, "found the last secondary response"); - return 0; /* we are done */ - } else /* more responses to go */ + if (remaining != total_in_src) { + /* more responses to go */ + cFYI(1, "waiting for more secondary responses"); return 1; + } + + /* we are done */ + cFYI(1, "found the last secondary response"); + return 0; } static void -- cgit From ce91acb3acae26f4163c5a6f1f695d1a1e8d9009 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2012 16:08:51 -0500 Subject: cifs: lower default wsize when unix extensions are not used We've had some reports of servers (namely, the Solaris in-kernel CIFS server) that don't deal properly with writes that are "too large" even though they set CAP_LARGE_WRITE_ANDX. Change the default to better mirror what windows clients do. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Pavel Shilovsky Reported-by: Nick Davis Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/connect.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs/cifs/connect.c') diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index 5cc15856e4ad..a66dcb52988c 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -2930,18 +2930,33 @@ void cifs_setup_cifs_sb(struct smb_vol *pvolume_info, #define CIFS_DEFAULT_IOSIZE (1024 * 1024) /* - * Windows only supports a max of 60k reads. Default to that when posix - * extensions aren't in force. + * Windows only supports a max of 60kb reads and 65535 byte writes. Default to + * those values when posix extensions aren't in force. In actuality here, we + * use 65536 to allow for a write that is a multiple of 4k. Most servers seem + * to be ok with the extra byte even though Windows doesn't send writes that + * are that large. + * + * Citation: + * + * http://blogs.msdn.com/b/openspecification/archive/2009/04/10/smb-maximum-transmit-buffer-size-and-performance-tuning.aspx */ #define CIFS_DEFAULT_NON_POSIX_RSIZE (60 * 1024) +#define CIFS_DEFAULT_NON_POSIX_WSIZE (65536) static unsigned int cifs_negotiate_wsize(struct cifs_tcon *tcon, struct smb_vol *pvolume_info) { __u64 unix_cap = le64_to_cpu(tcon->fsUnixInfo.Capability); struct TCP_Server_Info *server = tcon->ses->server; - unsigned int wsize = pvolume_info->wsize ? pvolume_info->wsize : - CIFS_DEFAULT_IOSIZE; + unsigned int wsize; + + /* start with specified wsize, or default */ + if (pvolume_info->wsize) + wsize = pvolume_info->wsize; + else if (tcon->unix_ext && (unix_cap & CIFS_UNIX_LARGE_WRITE_CAP)) + wsize = CIFS_DEFAULT_IOSIZE; + else + wsize = CIFS_DEFAULT_NON_POSIX_WSIZE; /* can server support 24-bit write sizes? (via UNIX extensions) */ if (!tcon->unix_ext || !(unix_cap & CIFS_UNIX_LARGE_WRITE_CAP)) -- cgit From 04febabcf55beeffb8794a0d8c539e571bd2ae29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2012 16:09:15 -0500 Subject: cifs: sanitize username handling Currently, it's not very clear whether you're allowed to have a NULL vol->username or ses->user_name. Some places check for it and some don't. Make it clear that a NULL pointer is OK in these fields, and ensure that all the callers check for that. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/connect.c | 19 ++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs/cifs/connect.c') diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index a66dcb52988c..b952a21e917b 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -1997,10 +1997,16 @@ static int match_session(struct cifs_ses *ses, struct smb_vol *vol) return 0; break; default: + /* NULL username means anonymous session */ + if (ses->user_name == NULL) { + if (!vol->nullauth) + return 0; + break; + } + /* anything else takes username/password */ - if (ses->user_name == NULL) - return 0; - if (strncmp(ses->user_name, vol->username, + if (strncmp(ses->user_name, + vol->username ? vol->username : "", MAX_USERNAME_SIZE)) return 0; if (strlen(vol->username) != 0 && @@ -3167,10 +3173,9 @@ cifs_setup_volume_info(struct smb_vol *volume_info, char *mount_data, return -EINVAL; if (volume_info->nullauth) { - cFYI(1, "null user"); - volume_info->username = kzalloc(1, GFP_KERNEL); - if (volume_info->username == NULL) - return -ENOMEM; + cFYI(1, "Anonymous login"); + kfree(volume_info->username); + volume_info->username = NULL; } else if (volume_info->username) { /* BB fixme parse for domain name here */ cFYI(1, "Username: %s", volume_info->username); -- cgit From 8a8798a5ff90977d6459ce1d657cf8fe13a51e97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2012 16:09:15 -0500 Subject: cifs: fetch credentials out of keyring for non-krb5 auth multiuser mounts Fix up multiuser mounts to set the secType and set the username and password from the key payload in the vol info for non-krb5 auth types. Look for a key of type "secret" with a description of "cifs:a:" or "cifs:d:". If that's found, then scrape the username and password out of the key payload and use that to create a new user session. Finally, don't have the code enforce krb5 auth on multiuser mounts, but do require a kernel with keys support. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/connect.c | 175 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 165 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs/cifs/connect.c') diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index b952a21e917b..28f23c03da53 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include "cifspdu.h" #include "cifsglob.h" @@ -1594,11 +1595,14 @@ cifs_parse_mount_options(const char *mountdata, const char *devname, } } - if (vol->multiuser && !(vol->secFlg & CIFSSEC_MAY_KRB5)) { - cERROR(1, "Multiuser mounts currently require krb5 " - "authentication!"); +#ifndef CONFIG_KEYS + /* Muliuser mounts require CONFIG_KEYS support */ + if (vol->multiuser) { + cERROR(1, "Multiuser mounts require kernels with " + "CONFIG_KEYS enabled."); goto cifs_parse_mount_err; } +#endif if (vol->UNCip == NULL) vol->UNCip = &vol->UNC[2]; @@ -2061,6 +2065,132 @@ cifs_put_smb_ses(struct cifs_ses *ses) cifs_put_tcp_session(server); } +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + +/* strlen("cifs:a:") + INET6_ADDRSTRLEN + 1 */ +#define CIFSCREDS_DESC_SIZE (7 + INET6_ADDRSTRLEN + 1) + +/* Populate username and pw fields from keyring if possible */ +static int +cifs_set_cifscreds(struct smb_vol *vol, struct cifs_ses *ses) +{ + int rc = 0; + char *desc, *delim, *payload; + ssize_t len; + struct key *key; + struct TCP_Server_Info *server = ses->server; + struct sockaddr_in *sa; + struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6; + struct user_key_payload *upayload; + + desc = kmalloc(CIFSCREDS_DESC_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!desc) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* try to find an address key first */ + switch (server->dstaddr.ss_family) { + case AF_INET: + sa = (struct sockaddr_in *)&server->dstaddr; + sprintf(desc, "cifs:a:%pI4", &sa->sin_addr.s_addr); + break; + case AF_INET6: + sa6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&server->dstaddr; + sprintf(desc, "cifs:a:%pI6c", &sa6->sin6_addr.s6_addr); + break; + default: + cFYI(1, "Bad ss_family (%hu)", server->dstaddr.ss_family); + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out_err; + } + + cFYI(1, "%s: desc=%s", __func__, desc); + key = request_key(&key_type_logon, desc, ""); + if (IS_ERR(key)) { + if (!ses->domainName) { + cFYI(1, "domainName is NULL"); + rc = PTR_ERR(key); + goto out_err; + } + + /* didn't work, try to find a domain key */ + sprintf(desc, "cifs:d:%s", ses->domainName); + cFYI(1, "%s: desc=%s", __func__, desc); + key = request_key(&key_type_logon, desc, ""); + if (IS_ERR(key)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(key); + goto out_err; + } + } + + down_read(&key->sem); + upayload = key->payload.data; + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(upayload)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(key); + goto out_key_put; + } + + /* find first : in payload */ + payload = (char *)upayload->data; + delim = strnchr(payload, upayload->datalen, ':'); + cFYI(1, "payload=%s", payload); + if (!delim) { + cFYI(1, "Unable to find ':' in payload (datalen=%d)", + upayload->datalen); + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out_key_put; + } + + len = delim - payload; + if (len > MAX_USERNAME_SIZE || len <= 0) { + cFYI(1, "Bad value from username search (len=%ld)", len); + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out_key_put; + } + + vol->username = kstrndup(payload, len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!vol->username) { + cFYI(1, "Unable to allocate %ld bytes for username", len); + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out_key_put; + } + cFYI(1, "%s: username=%s", __func__, vol->username); + + len = key->datalen - (len + 1); + if (len > MAX_PASSWORD_SIZE || len <= 0) { + cFYI(1, "Bad len for password search (len=%ld)", len); + rc = -EINVAL; + kfree(vol->username); + vol->username = NULL; + goto out_key_put; + } + + ++delim; + vol->password = kstrndup(delim, len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!vol->password) { + cFYI(1, "Unable to allocate %ld bytes for password", len); + rc = -ENOMEM; + kfree(vol->username); + vol->username = NULL; + goto out_key_put; + } + +out_key_put: + up_read(&key->sem); + key_put(key); +out_err: + kfree(desc); + cFYI(1, "%s: returning %d", __func__, rc); + return rc; +} +#else /* ! CONFIG_KEYS */ +static inline int +cifs_set_cifscreds(struct smb_vol *vol __attribute__((unused)), + struct cifs_ses *ses __attribute__((unused))) +{ + return -ENOSYS; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ + static bool warned_on_ntlm; /* globals init to false automatically */ static struct cifs_ses * @@ -3693,16 +3823,38 @@ int cifs_setup_session(unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses, return rc; } +static int +cifs_set_vol_auth(struct smb_vol *vol, struct cifs_ses *ses) +{ + switch (ses->server->secType) { + case Kerberos: + vol->secFlg = CIFSSEC_MUST_KRB5; + return 0; + case NTLMv2: + vol->secFlg = CIFSSEC_MUST_NTLMV2; + break; + case NTLM: + vol->secFlg = CIFSSEC_MUST_NTLM; + break; + case RawNTLMSSP: + vol->secFlg = CIFSSEC_MUST_NTLMSSP; + break; + case LANMAN: + vol->secFlg = CIFSSEC_MUST_LANMAN; + break; + } + + return cifs_set_cifscreds(vol, ses); +} + static struct cifs_tcon * cifs_construct_tcon(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, uid_t fsuid) { + int rc; struct cifs_tcon *master_tcon = cifs_sb_master_tcon(cifs_sb); struct cifs_ses *ses; struct cifs_tcon *tcon = NULL; struct smb_vol *vol_info; - char username[28]; /* big enough for "krb50x" + hex of ULONG_MAX 6+16 */ - /* We used to have this as MAX_USERNAME which is */ - /* way too big now (256 instead of 32) */ vol_info = kzalloc(sizeof(*vol_info), GFP_KERNEL); if (vol_info == NULL) { @@ -3710,8 +3862,6 @@ cifs_construct_tcon(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, uid_t fsuid) goto out; } - snprintf(username, sizeof(username), "krb50x%x", fsuid); - vol_info->username = username; vol_info->local_nls = cifs_sb->local_nls; vol_info->linux_uid = fsuid; vol_info->cred_uid = fsuid; @@ -3721,8 +3871,11 @@ cifs_construct_tcon(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, uid_t fsuid) vol_info->local_lease = master_tcon->local_lease; vol_info->no_linux_ext = !master_tcon->unix_ext; - /* FIXME: allow for other secFlg settings */ - vol_info->secFlg = CIFSSEC_MUST_KRB5; + rc = cifs_set_vol_auth(vol_info, master_tcon->ses); + if (rc) { + tcon = ERR_PTR(rc); + goto out; + } /* get a reference for the same TCP session */ spin_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock); @@ -3745,6 +3898,8 @@ cifs_construct_tcon(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, uid_t fsuid) if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNIX) reset_cifs_unix_caps(0, tcon, NULL, vol_info); out: + kfree(vol_info->username); + kfree(vol_info->password); kfree(vol_info); return tcon; -- cgit From acbbb76a26648dfae6fed0989879e40d75692bfc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steve French Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2012 22:32:33 -0600 Subject: CIFS: Rename *UCS* functions to *UTF16* to reflect the unicode encoding used by CIFS protocol. Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky Acked-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar --- fs/cifs/connect.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs/cifs/connect.c') diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index 28f23c03da53..986709a8d903 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -3644,7 +3644,7 @@ CIFSTCon(unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses, if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) { smb_buffer->Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_UNICODE; length = - cifs_strtoUCS((__le16 *) bcc_ptr, tree, + cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *) bcc_ptr, tree, 6 /* max utf8 char length in bytes */ * (/* server len*/ + 256 /* share len */), nls_codepage); bcc_ptr += 2 * length; /* convert num 16 bit words to bytes */ @@ -3699,7 +3699,7 @@ CIFSTCon(unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses, /* mostly informational -- no need to fail on error here */ kfree(tcon->nativeFileSystem); - tcon->nativeFileSystem = cifs_strndup_from_ucs(bcc_ptr, + tcon->nativeFileSystem = cifs_strndup_from_utf16(bcc_ptr, bytes_left, is_unicode, nls_codepage); -- cgit From 803ab977618eae2b292cda0a97eed75f42250ddf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2012 11:39:22 +0300 Subject: cifs: NULL dereference on allocation failure We should just return directly here, the goto causes a NULL dereference. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/connect.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs/cifs/connect.c') diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index 986709a8d903..026d6464335b 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -3857,10 +3857,8 @@ cifs_construct_tcon(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, uid_t fsuid) struct smb_vol *vol_info; vol_info = kzalloc(sizeof(*vol_info), GFP_KERNEL); - if (vol_info == NULL) { - tcon = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - goto out; - } + if (vol_info == NULL) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); vol_info->local_nls = cifs_sb->local_nls; vol_info->linux_uid = fsuid; -- cgit From 000f9bb83968ebd6959ff76870f16fc8f766ebd3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Randy Dunlap Date: Mon, 30 Jan 2012 19:50:01 -0800 Subject: cifs: fix printk format warnings Fix printk format warnings for ssize_t variables: fs/cifs/connect.c:2145:3: warning: format '%ld' expects type 'long int', but argument 3 has type 'ssize_t' fs/cifs/connect.c:2152:3: warning: format '%ld' expects type 'long int', but argument 3 has type 'ssize_t' fs/cifs/connect.c:2160:3: warning: format '%ld' expects type 'long int', but argument 3 has type 'ssize_t' fs/cifs/connect.c:2170:3: warning: format '%ld' expects type 'long int', but argument 3 has type 'ssize_t' Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Acked-by: Jeff Layton Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org --- fs/cifs/connect.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs/cifs/connect.c') diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index 026d6464335b..9c288653e6d6 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -2142,14 +2142,14 @@ cifs_set_cifscreds(struct smb_vol *vol, struct cifs_ses *ses) len = delim - payload; if (len > MAX_USERNAME_SIZE || len <= 0) { - cFYI(1, "Bad value from username search (len=%ld)", len); + cFYI(1, "Bad value from username search (len=%zd)", len); rc = -EINVAL; goto out_key_put; } vol->username = kstrndup(payload, len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!vol->username) { - cFYI(1, "Unable to allocate %ld bytes for username", len); + cFYI(1, "Unable to allocate %zd bytes for username", len); rc = -ENOMEM; goto out_key_put; } @@ -2157,7 +2157,7 @@ cifs_set_cifscreds(struct smb_vol *vol, struct cifs_ses *ses) len = key->datalen - (len + 1); if (len > MAX_PASSWORD_SIZE || len <= 0) { - cFYI(1, "Bad len for password search (len=%ld)", len); + cFYI(1, "Bad len for password search (len=%zd)", len); rc = -EINVAL; kfree(vol->username); vol->username = NULL; @@ -2167,7 +2167,7 @@ cifs_set_cifscreds(struct smb_vol *vol, struct cifs_ses *ses) ++delim; vol->password = kstrndup(delim, len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!vol->password) { - cFYI(1, "Unable to allocate %ld bytes for password", len); + cFYI(1, "Unable to allocate %zd bytes for password", len); rc = -ENOMEM; kfree(vol->username); vol->username = NULL; -- cgit From 4edc53c1f8cdd99d349165d6c61c45aa4e8e2564 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2012 06:30:51 -0500 Subject: cifs: fix error handling when cifscreds key payload is an error Reported-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/connect.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs/cifs/connect.c') diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index 9c288653e6d6..940189bd6490 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -2125,7 +2125,7 @@ cifs_set_cifscreds(struct smb_vol *vol, struct cifs_ses *ses) down_read(&key->sem); upayload = key->payload.data; if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(upayload)) { - rc = PTR_ERR(key); + rc = upayload ? PTR_ERR(upayload) : -EINVAL; goto out_key_put; } -- cgit From ff4fa4a25a33f92b5653bb43add0c63bea98d464 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2012 06:31:05 -0500 Subject: cifs: don't return error from standard_receive3 after marking response malformed standard_receive3 will check the validity of the response from the server (via checkSMB). It'll pass the result of that check to handle_mid which will dequeue it and mark it with a status of MID_RESPONSE_MALFORMED if checkSMB returned an error. At that point, standard_receive3 will also return an error, which will make the demultiplex thread skip doing the callback for the mid. This is wrong -- if we were able to identify the request and the response is marked malformed, then we want the demultiplex thread to do the callback. Fix this by making standard_receive3 return 0 in this situation. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-and-Tested-by: Mark Moseley Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/connect.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs/cifs/connect.c') diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index 940189bd6490..602f77c304c9 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -773,10 +773,11 @@ standard_receive3(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct mid_q_entry *mid) cifs_dump_mem("Bad SMB: ", buf, min_t(unsigned int, server->total_read, 48)); - if (mid) - handle_mid(mid, server, smb_buffer, length); + if (!mid) + return length; - return length; + handle_mid(mid, server, smb_buffer, length); + return 0; } static int -- cgit