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authorMickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>2021-04-22 17:41:22 +0200
committerJames Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>2021-04-22 12:22:11 -0700
commit5526b450834331d9196cae26acef0bfd5afd9fc4 (patch)
tree74f98af828ca72f8c2cda9fa4eb634e6b71d3071 /Documentation/security/landlock.rst
parentba84b0bf5a164f0f523656c1e37568c30f3f3303 (diff)
landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
Add a first document describing userspace API: how to define and enforce a Landlock security policy. This is explained with a simple example. The Landlock system calls are described with their expected behavior and current limitations. Another document is dedicated to kernel developers, describing guiding principles and some important kernel structures. This documentation can be built with the Sphinx framework. Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Vincent Dagonneau <vincent.dagonneau@ssi.gouv.fr> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-13-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
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+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+.. Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
+.. Copyright © 2019-2020 ANSSI
+
+==================================
+Landlock LSM: kernel documentation
+==================================
+
+:Author: Mickaël Salaün
+:Date: March 2021
+
+Landlock's goal is to create scoped access-control (i.e. sandboxing). To
+harden a whole system, this feature should be available to any process,
+including unprivileged ones. Because such process may be compromised or
+backdoored (i.e. untrusted), Landlock's features must be safe to use from the
+kernel and other processes point of view. Landlock's interface must therefore
+expose a minimal attack surface.
+
+Landlock is designed to be usable by unprivileged processes while following the
+system security policy enforced by other access control mechanisms (e.g. DAC,
+LSM). Indeed, a Landlock rule shall not interfere with other access-controls
+enforced on the system, only add more restrictions.
+
+Any user can enforce Landlock rulesets on their processes. They are merged and
+evaluated according to the inherited ones in a way that ensures that only more
+constraints can be added.
+
+User space documentation can be found here: :doc:`/userspace-api/landlock`.
+
+Guiding principles for safe access controls
+===========================================
+
+* A Landlock rule shall be focused on access control on kernel objects instead
+ of syscall filtering (i.e. syscall arguments), which is the purpose of
+ seccomp-bpf.
+* To avoid multiple kinds of side-channel attacks (e.g. leak of security
+ policies, CPU-based attacks), Landlock rules shall not be able to
+ programmatically communicate with user space.
+* Kernel access check shall not slow down access request from unsandboxed
+ processes.
+* Computation related to Landlock operations (e.g. enforcing a ruleset) shall
+ only impact the processes requesting them.
+
+Tests
+=====
+
+Userspace tests for backward compatibility, ptrace restrictions and filesystem
+support can be found here: `tools/testing/selftests/landlock/`_.
+
+Kernel structures
+=================
+
+Object
+------
+
+.. kernel-doc:: security/landlock/object.h
+ :identifiers:
+
+Filesystem
+----------
+
+.. kernel-doc:: security/landlock/fs.h
+ :identifiers:
+
+Ruleset and domain
+------------------
+
+A domain is a read-only ruleset tied to a set of subjects (i.e. tasks'
+credentials). Each time a ruleset is enforced on a task, the current domain is
+duplicated and the ruleset is imported as a new layer of rules in the new
+domain. Indeed, once in a domain, each rule is tied to a layer level. To
+grant access to an object, at least one rule of each layer must allow the
+requested action on the object. A task can then only transit to a new domain
+that is the intersection of the constraints from the current domain and those
+of a ruleset provided by the task.
+
+The definition of a subject is implicit for a task sandboxing itself, which
+makes the reasoning much easier and helps avoid pitfalls.
+
+.. kernel-doc:: security/landlock/ruleset.h
+ :identifiers:
+
+.. Links
+.. _tools/testing/selftests/landlock/:
+ https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/tree/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/