|author||Tobin C. Harding <firstname.lastname@example.org>||2017-12-20 08:17:17 +1100|
|committer||Jonathan Corbet <email@example.com>||2017-12-21 13:39:27 -0700|
doc: add documentation on printing kernel addresses
Hashing addresses printed with printk specifier %p was implemented recently. During development a number of issues were raised regarding leaking kernel addresses to userspace. Other documentation was updated but security/self-protection missed out. Add self-protection documentation regarding printing kernel addresses. Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <firstname.lastname@example.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <email@example.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/security/self-protection.rst')
1 files changed, 15 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst b/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst
index 60c8bd8b77bf..0f53826c78b9 100644
@@ -270,6 +270,21 @@ attacks, it is important to defend against exposure of both kernel memory
addresses and kernel memory contents (since they may contain kernel
addresses or other sensitive things like canary values).
+Printing kernel addresses to userspace leaks sensitive information about
+the kernel memory layout. Care should be exercised when using any printk
+specifier that prints the raw address, currently %px, %p[ad], (and %p[sSb]
+in certain circumstances [*]). Any file written to using one of these
+specifiers should be readable only by privileged processes.
+Kernels 4.14 and older printed the raw address using %p. As of 4.15-rc1
+addresses printed with the specifier %p are hashed before printing.
+[*] If KALLSYMS is enabled and symbol lookup fails, the raw address is
+printed. If KALLSYMS is not enabled the raw address is printed.