path: root/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c
diff options
authorLinus Torvalds <>2021-06-20 09:09:58 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <>2021-06-20 09:09:58 -0700
commit8363e795eb79a74c857ba89e3b04668a33fe3344 (patch)
treeedfdbfa3be22e945ce84260d2a48b7fb6cdac210 /arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c
parentb84a7c286cecf0604a5f8bd5dfcd5e1ca7233e15 (diff)
parent28e5e44aa3f4e0e0370864ed008fb5e2d85f4dc8 (diff)
Merge tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.13_rc6' of git://
Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov: "A first set of urgent fixes to the FPU/XSTATE handling mess^W code. (There's a lot more in the pipe): - Prevent corruption of the XSTATE buffer in signal handling by validating what is being copied from userspace first. - Invalidate other task's preserved FPU registers on XRSTOR failure (#PF) because latter can still modify some of them. - Restore the proper PKRU value in case userspace modified it - Reset FPU state when signal restoring fails Other: - Map EFI boot services data memory as encrypted in a SEV guest so that the guest can access it and actually boot properly - Two SGX correctness fixes: proper resources freeing and a NUMA fix" * tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.13_rc6' of git:// x86/mm: Avoid truncating memblocks for SGX memory x86/sgx: Add missing xa_destroy() when virtual EPC is destroyed x86/fpu: Reset state for all signal restore failures x86/pkru: Write hardware init value to PKRU when xstate is init x86/process: Check PF_KTHREAD and not current->mm for kernel threads x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a user buffer x86/fpu: Prevent state corruption in __fpu__restore_sig() x86/ioremap: Map EFI-reserved memory as encrypted for SEV
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c')
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c
index 6ad165a5c0cc..64511c4a5200 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c
@@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ static int sgx_vepc_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
list_splice_tail(&secs_pages, &zombie_secs_pages);
+ xa_destroy(&vepc->page_array);
return 0;