path: root/security
diff options
authorRichard Guy Briggs <>2015-04-14 11:01:02 -0400
committerJames Morris <>2015-04-15 10:13:20 +1000
commit5deeb5cece3f9b30c8129786726b9d02c412c8ca (patch)
tree65ca929e44dc78b71be07d22091041f6dc80b936 /security
parent3add594bf60a901ba973cdcdafd47af2aac0ac1c (diff)
lsm: copy comm before calling audit_log to avoid race in string printing
When task->comm is passed directly to audit_log_untrustedstring() without getting a copy or using the task_lock, there is a race that could happen that would output a NULL (\0) in the middle of the output string that would effectively truncate the rest of the report text after the comm= field in the audit log message, losing fields. Using get_task_comm() to get a copy while acquiring the task_lock to prevent this and to prevent the result from being a mixture of old and new values of comm would incur potentially unacceptable overhead, considering that the value can be influenced by userspace and therefore untrusted anyways. Copy the value before passing it to audit_log_untrustedstring() ensures that a local copy is used to calculate the length *and* subsequently printed. Even if this value contains a mix of old and new values, it will only calculate and copy up to the first NULL, preventing the rest of the audit log message being truncated. Use a second local copy of comm to avoid a race between the first and second calls to audit_log_untrustedstring() with comm. Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <> Signed-off-by: James Morris <>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c
index 69fdf3bc765b..b526ddc3add5 100644
--- a/security/lsm_audit.c
+++ b/security/lsm_audit.c
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static inline void print_ipv4_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, __be32 addr,
static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
struct common_audit_data *a)
- struct task_struct *tsk = current;
+ char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
* To keep stack sizes in check force programers to notice if they
@@ -220,8 +220,8 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(a->u) > sizeof(void *)*2);
- audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_pid_nr(tsk));
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, tsk->comm);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_pid_nr(current));
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, memcpy(comm, current->comm, sizeof(comm)));
switch (a->type) {
@@ -276,16 +276,19 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino);
- tsk = a->u.tsk;
+ struct task_struct *tsk = a->u.tsk;
if (tsk) {
pid_t pid = task_pid_nr(tsk);
if (pid) {
+ char comm[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", pid);
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, tsk->comm);
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab,
+ memcpy(comm, tsk->comm, sizeof(comm)));
+ }
if (a->>sk) {
struct sock *sk = a->>sk;