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authorJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>2017-05-22 16:32:40 +1000
committerJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>2017-05-22 16:32:40 +1000
commitd68c51e0b377838dd31b37707813bb62089f399c (patch)
tree4557d5ced33ea6da60bc84ee288af9924192f046 /security
parent99c55fb18fc48508ae5bba57146a556aacc4558c (diff)
parent08332893e37af6ae779367e78e444f8f9571511d (diff)
Sync to mainline for security submaintainers to work against
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/Kconfig9
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c4
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/lib.h11
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lib.c30
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/match.c2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c2
-rw-r--r--security/inode.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/gc.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c42
-rw-r--r--security/keys/process_keys.c44
-rw-r--r--security/security.c12
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c1
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c4
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smackfs.c2
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/network.c2
15 files changed, 63 insertions, 106 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 823ca1aafd09..bdcbb92927ab 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -130,17 +130,8 @@ config HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
validating memory ranges against heap object sizes in
support of CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
-config HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
- bool
- help
- The architecture supports CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY by
- calling check_object_size() just before performing the
- userspace copies in the low level implementation of
- copy_to_user() and copy_from_user().
-
config HARDENED_USERCOPY
bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
- depends on HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
select BUG
help
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 41073f70eb41..4f6ac9dbc65d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static struct aa_loaddata *aa_simple_write_to_buffer(const char __user *userbuf,
return ERR_PTR(-ESPIPE);
/* freed by caller to simple_write_to_buffer */
- data = kvmalloc(sizeof(*data) + alloc_size);
+ data = kvmalloc(sizeof(*data) + alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (data == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
kref_init(&data->count);
@@ -1357,7 +1357,7 @@ static int aa_mk_null_file(struct dentry *parent)
inode->i_ino = get_next_ino();
inode->i_mode = S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO;
- inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
+ inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO,
MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3));
d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h
index 0291ff3902f9..550a700563b4 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h
@@ -64,17 +64,6 @@ char *aa_split_fqname(char *args, char **ns_name);
const char *aa_splitn_fqname(const char *fqname, size_t n, const char **ns_name,
size_t *ns_len);
void aa_info_message(const char *str);
-void *__aa_kvmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags);
-
-static inline void *kvmalloc(size_t size)
-{
- return __aa_kvmalloc(size, 0);
-}
-
-static inline void *kvzalloc(size_t size)
-{
- return __aa_kvmalloc(size, __GFP_ZERO);
-}
/**
* aa_strneq - compare null terminated @str to a non null terminated substring
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c
index 32cafc12593e..7cd788a9445b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lib.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c
@@ -129,36 +129,6 @@ void aa_info_message(const char *str)
}
/**
- * __aa_kvmalloc - do allocation preferring kmalloc but falling back to vmalloc
- * @size: how many bytes of memory are required
- * @flags: the type of memory to allocate (see kmalloc).
- *
- * Return: allocated buffer or NULL if failed
- *
- * It is possible that policy being loaded from the user is larger than
- * what can be allocated by kmalloc, in those cases fall back to vmalloc.
- */
-void *__aa_kvmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
-{
- void *buffer = NULL;
-
- if (size == 0)
- return NULL;
-
- /* do not attempt kmalloc if we need more than 16 pages at once */
- if (size <= (16*PAGE_SIZE))
- buffer = kmalloc(size, flags | GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NORETRY |
- __GFP_NOWARN);
- if (!buffer) {
- if (flags & __GFP_ZERO)
- buffer = vzalloc(size);
- else
- buffer = vmalloc(size);
- }
- return buffer;
-}
-
-/**
* aa_policy_init - initialize a policy structure
* @policy: policy to initialize (NOT NULL)
* @prefix: prefix name if any is required. (MAYBE NULL)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c
index eb0efef746f5..960c913381e2 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/match.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize)
if (bsize < tsize)
goto out;
- table = kvzalloc(tsize);
+ table = kvzalloc(tsize, GFP_KERNEL);
if (table) {
table->td_id = th.td_id;
table->td_flags = th.td_flags;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index 2e37c9c26bbd..f3422a91353c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -487,7 +487,7 @@ fail:
static void *kvmemdup(const void *src, size_t len)
{
- void *p = kvmalloc(len);
+ void *p = kvmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (p)
memcpy(p, src, len);
diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
index 2cb14162ff8d..eccd58ef2ae8 100644
--- a/security/inode.c
+++ b/security/inode.c
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ static int mount_count;
static int fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
{
- static struct tree_descr files[] = {{""}};
+ static const struct tree_descr files[] = {{""}};
return simple_fill_super(sb, SECURITYFS_MAGIC, files);
}
diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c
index 15b9ddf510e4..595becc6d0d2 100644
--- a/security/keys/gc.c
+++ b/security/keys/gc.c
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static unsigned long key_gc_flags;
* immediately unlinked.
*/
struct key_type key_type_dead = {
- .name = "dead",
+ .name = ".dead",
};
/*
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 10fcea154c0f..447a7d5cee0f 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -101,14 +101,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
if (_payload) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
- payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
- if (!payload) {
- if (plen <= PAGE_SIZE)
- goto error2;
- payload = vmalloc(plen);
- if (!payload)
- goto error2;
- }
+ payload = kvmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!payload)
+ goto error2;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(payload, _payload, plen) != 0)
@@ -273,7 +268,8 @@ error:
* Create and join an anonymous session keyring or join a named session
* keyring, creating it if necessary. A named session keyring must have Search
* permission for it to be joined. Session keyrings without this permit will
- * be skipped over.
+ * be skipped over. It is not permitted for userspace to create or join
+ * keyrings whose name begin with a dot.
*
* If successful, the ID of the joined session keyring will be returned.
*/
@@ -290,12 +286,16 @@ long keyctl_join_session_keyring(const char __user *_name)
ret = PTR_ERR(name);
goto error;
}
+
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if (name[0] == '.')
+ goto error_name;
}
/* join the session */
ret = join_session_keyring(name);
+error_name:
kfree(name);
-
error:
return ret;
}
@@ -1066,14 +1066,9 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id,
if (from) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
- payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!payload) {
- if (plen <= PAGE_SIZE)
- goto error;
- payload = vmalloc(plen);
- if (!payload)
- goto error;
- }
+ payload = kvmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!payload)
+ goto error;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (!copy_from_iter_full(payload, plen, from))
@@ -1253,8 +1248,8 @@ error:
* Read or set the default keyring in which request_key() will cache keys and
* return the old setting.
*
- * If a process keyring is specified then this will be created if it doesn't
- * yet exist. The old setting will be returned if successful.
+ * If a thread or process keyring is specified then it will be created if it
+ * doesn't yet exist. The old setting will be returned if successful.
*/
long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int reqkey_defl)
{
@@ -1279,11 +1274,8 @@ long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int reqkey_defl)
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING:
ret = install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);
- if (ret < 0) {
- if (ret != -EEXIST)
- goto error;
- ret = 0;
- }
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
goto set;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT:
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 44451af828c0..2217dfec7996 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -128,13 +128,18 @@ error:
}
/*
- * Install a fresh thread keyring directly to new credentials. This keyring is
- * allowed to overrun the quota.
+ * Install a thread keyring to the given credentials struct if it didn't have
+ * one already. This is allowed to overrun the quota.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if a thread keyring is now present; -errno on failure.
*/
int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
{
struct key *keyring;
+ if (new->thread_keyring)
+ return 0;
+
keyring = keyring_alloc("_tid", new->uid, new->gid, new,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,
KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN,
@@ -147,7 +152,9 @@ int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
}
/*
- * Install a fresh thread keyring, discarding the old one.
+ * Install a thread keyring to the current task if it didn't have one already.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if a thread keyring is now present; -errno on failure.
*/
static int install_thread_keyring(void)
{
@@ -158,8 +165,6 @@ static int install_thread_keyring(void)
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
- BUG_ON(new->thread_keyring);
-
ret = install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
@@ -170,17 +175,17 @@ static int install_thread_keyring(void)
}
/*
- * Install a process keyring directly to a credentials struct.
+ * Install a process keyring to the given credentials struct if it didn't have
+ * one already. This is allowed to overrun the quota.
*
- * Returns -EEXIST if there was already a process keyring, 0 if one installed,
- * and other value on any other error
+ * Return: 0 if a process keyring is now present; -errno on failure.
*/
int install_process_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
{
struct key *keyring;
if (new->process_keyring)
- return -EEXIST;
+ return 0;
keyring = keyring_alloc("_pid", new->uid, new->gid, new,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,
@@ -194,11 +199,9 @@ int install_process_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
}
/*
- * Make sure a process keyring is installed for the current process. The
- * existing process keyring is not replaced.
+ * Install a process keyring to the current task if it didn't have one already.
*
- * Returns 0 if there is a process keyring by the end of this function, some
- * error otherwise.
+ * Return: 0 if a process keyring is now present; -errno on failure.
*/
static int install_process_keyring(void)
{
@@ -212,14 +215,18 @@ static int install_process_keyring(void)
ret = install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
- return ret != -EEXIST ? ret : 0;
+ return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
}
/*
- * Install a session keyring directly to a credentials struct.
+ * Install the given keyring as the session keyring of the given credentials
+ * struct, replacing the existing one if any. If the given keyring is NULL,
+ * then install a new anonymous session keyring.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success; -errno on failure.
*/
int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring)
{
@@ -254,8 +261,11 @@ int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring)
}
/*
- * Install a session keyring, discarding the old one. If a keyring is not
- * supplied, an empty one is invented.
+ * Install the given keyring as the session keyring of the current task,
+ * replacing the existing one if any. If the given keyring is NULL, then
+ * install a new anonymous session keyring.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success; -errno on failure.
*/
static int install_session_keyring(struct key *keyring)
{
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 54b1e395978a..38316bb28b16 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -129,10 +129,14 @@ static int lsm_append(char *new, char **result)
* to avoid security registration races. This method may also be used
* to check if your LSM is currently loaded during kernel initialization.
*
- * Return true if:
- * -The passed LSM is the one chosen by user at boot time,
- * -or the passed LSM is configured as the default and the user did not
- * choose an alternate LSM at boot time.
+ * Returns:
+ *
+ * true if:
+ *
+ * - The passed LSM is the one chosen by user at boot time,
+ * - or the passed LSM is configured as the default and the user did not
+ * choose an alternate LSM at boot time.
+ *
* Otherwise, return false.
*/
int __init security_module_enable(const char *module)
diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
index 57e2596bdd8a..5aeaf30b7a13 100644
--- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_route_perms[] =
{ RTM_GETDCB, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
{ RTM_SETDCB, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
{ RTM_NEWNETCONF, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_DELNETCONF, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
{ RTM_GETNETCONF, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
{ RTM_NEWMDB, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
{ RTM_DELMDB, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index ce7171884223..50062e70140d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -1496,7 +1496,7 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_avc_cache_stats_ops = {
static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir)
{
int i;
- static struct tree_descr files[] = {
+ static const struct tree_descr files[] = {
{ "cache_threshold",
&sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR },
{ "hash_stats", &sel_avc_hash_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
@@ -1805,7 +1805,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
struct inode *inode;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
- static struct tree_descr selinux_files[] = {
+ static const struct tree_descr selinux_files[] = {
[SEL_LOAD] = {"load", &sel_load_ops, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR},
[SEL_ENFORCE] = {"enforce", &sel_enforce_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
[SEL_CONTEXT] = {"context", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 366b8356f75b..f6482e53d55a 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -2855,7 +2855,7 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
int rc;
struct inode *root_inode;
- static struct tree_descr smack_files[] = {
+ static const struct tree_descr smack_files[] = {
[SMK_LOAD] = {
"load", &smk_load_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
[SMK_CIPSO] = {
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/network.c b/security/tomoyo/network.c
index 97527710a72a..6c02ac478247 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/network.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/network.c
@@ -608,7 +608,7 @@ static int tomoyo_check_unix_address(struct sockaddr *addr,
static bool tomoyo_kernel_service(void)
{
/* Nothing to do if I am a kernel service. */
- return segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS);
+ return uaccess_kernel();
}
/**