path: root/security/landlock/ptrace.c
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* landlock: Add ptrace restrictionsMickaël Salaün2021-04-221-0/+120
Using ptrace(2) and related debug features on a target process can lead to a privilege escalation. Indeed, ptrace(2) can be used by an attacker to impersonate another task and to remain undetected while performing malicious activities. Thanks to ptrace_may_access(), various part of the kernel can check if a tracer is more privileged than a tracee. A landlocked process has fewer privileges than a non-landlocked process and must then be subject to additional restrictions when manipulating processes. To be allowed to use ptrace(2) and related syscalls on a target process, a landlocked process must have a subset of the target process's rules (i.e. the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer). Cc: James Morris <> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <> Link: Signed-off-by: James Morris <>