path: root/security/loadpin
AgeCommit message (Collapse)Author
2020-10-05LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hookKees Cook
As with the kernel_load_data LSM hook, add a "contents" flag to the kernel_read_file LSM hook that indicates whether the LSM can expect a matching call to the kernel_post_read_file LSM hook with the full contents of the file. With the coming addition of partial file read support for kernel_read_file*() API, the LSM will no longer be able to always see the entire contents of a file during the read calls. For cases where the LSM must read examine the complete file contents, it will need to do so on its own every time the kernel_read_file hook is called with contents=false (or reject such cases). Adjust all existing LSMs to retain existing behavior. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <> Link: Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <>
2020-10-05LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hookKees Cook
There are a few places in the kernel where LSMs would like to have visibility into the contents of a kernel buffer that has been loaded or read. While security_kernel_post_read_file() (which includes the buffer) exists as a pairing for security_kernel_read_file(), no such hook exists to pair with security_kernel_load_data(). Earlier proposals for just using security_kernel_post_read_file() with a NULL file argument were rejected (i.e. "file" should always be valid for the security_..._file hooks, but it appears at least one case was left in the kernel during earlier refactoring. (This will be fixed in a subsequent patch.) Since not all cases of security_kernel_load_data() can have a single contiguous buffer made available to the LSM hook (e.g. kexec image segments are separately loaded), there needs to be a way for the LSM to reason about its expectations of the hook coverage. In order to handle this, add a "contents" argument to the "kernel_load_data" hook that indicates if the newly added "kernel_post_load_data" hook will be called with the full contents once loaded. That way, LSMs requiring full contents can choose to unilaterally reject "kernel_load_data" with contents=false (which is effectively the existing hook coverage), but when contents=true they can allow it and later evaluate the "kernel_post_load_data" hook once the buffer is loaded. With this change, LSMs can gain coverage over non-file-backed data loads (e.g. init_module(2) and firmware userspace helper), which will happen in subsequent patches. Additionally prepare IMA to start processing these cases. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <> Reviewed-by: KP Singh <> Link: Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <>
2020-10-05fs/kernel_read_file: Split into separate include fileScott Branden
Move kernel_read_file* out of linux/fs.h to its own linux/kernel_read_file.h include file. That header gets pulled in just about everywhere and doesn't really need functions not related to the general fs interface. Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <> Signed-off-by: Scott Branden <> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <> Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <> Acked-by: James Morris <> Link: Link: Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <>
2020-06-24block: move block-related definitions out of fs.hChristoph Hellwig
Move most of the block related definition out of fs.h into more suitable headers. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <>
2019-07-18proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range checkMatteo Croce
In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [ tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: [ fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [ proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: [ fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <> Acked-by: Kees Cook <> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <>
2019-07-11Merge tag 'loadpin-v5.3-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git:// Pull security/loadpin updates from Kees Cook: - Allow exclusion of specific file types (Ke Wu) * tag 'loadpin-v5.3-rc1' of git:// security/loadpin: Allow to exclude specific file types
2019-06-05treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 282Thomas Gleixner
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this software is licensed under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as published by the free software foundation and may be copied distributed and modified under those terms this program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license for more details extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-only has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 285 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <> Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <> Cc: Link: Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <>
2019-05-31security/loadpin: Allow to exclude specific file typesKe Wu
Linux kernel already provide MODULE_SIG and KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG to make sure loaded kernel module and kernel image are trusted. This patch adds a kernel command line option "loadpin.exclude" which allows to exclude specific file types from LoadPin. This is useful when people want to use different mechanisms to verify module and kernel image while still use LoadPin to protect the integrity of other files kernel loads. Signed-off-by: Ke Wu <> Reviewed-by: James Morris <> [kees: fix array size issue reported by Coverity via Colin Ian King] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <>
2019-05-21treewide: Add SPDX license identifier - Makefile/KconfigThomas Gleixner
Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which: - Have no license information of any form These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX license identifier is: GPL-2.0-only Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <>
2019-01-08LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSMKees Cook
This converts LoadPin from being a direct "minor" LSM into an ordered LSM. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <>
2018-10-18LoadPin: Rename boot param "enabled" to "enforce"Kees Cook
LoadPin's "enabled" setting is really about enforcement, not whether or not the LSM is using LSM hooks. Instead, split this out so that LSM enabling can be logically distinct from whether enforcement is happening (for example, the pinning happens when the LSM is enabled, but the pin is only checked when "enforce" is set). This allows LoadPin to continue to operate sanely in test environments once LSM enable/disable is centrally handled (i.e. we want LoadPin to be enabled separately from its enforcement). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <>
2018-10-18LoadPin: Report friendly block device nameKees Cook
Instead of only reporting major/minor, include the actual block device name, at least as seen by the kernel. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <>
2018-07-16module: replace the existing LSM hook in init_moduleMimi Zohar
Both the init_module and finit_module syscalls call either directly or indirectly the security_kernel_read_file LSM hook. This patch replaces the direct call in init_module with a call to the new security_kernel_load_data hook and makes the corresponding changes in SELinux, LoadPin, and IMA. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <> Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <> Cc: Casey Schaufler <> Cc: Kees Cook <> Acked-by: Jessica Yu <> Acked-by: Paul Moore <> Acked-by: Kees Cook <> Signed-off-by: James Morris <>
2018-02-22get rid of pointless includes of fs_struct.hAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <>
2017-03-06security: mark LSM hooks as __ro_after_initJames Morris
Mark all of the registration hooks as __ro_after_init (via the __lsm_ro_after_init macro). Signed-off-by: James Morris <> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <> Acked-by: Kees Cook <>
2017-01-19LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsmCasey Schaufler
I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine what security modules are active on a system. I have added /sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated list of the active security modules. No more groping around in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks. Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated to the latest security next branch. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <> Acked-by: John Johansen <> Acked-by: Paul Moore <> Acked-by: Kees Cook <> Signed-off-by: James Morris <>
2016-05-17LSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIGKees Cook
Instead of being enabled by default when SECURITY_LOADPIN is selected, provide an additional (default off) config to determine the boot time behavior. As before, the "loadpin.enabled=0/1" kernel parameter remains available. Suggested-by: James Morris <> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <> Signed-off-by: James Morris <>
2016-04-21LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictionsKees Cook
This LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc) must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation that such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified and/or unchangeable filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading restrictions without needing to sign the files individually. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <> Signed-off-by: James Morris <>