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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2025-04-03 11:10:00 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2025-04-03 11:10:00 -0700 |
commit | 8c7c1b5506e593ce00c42214b4fcafd640ceeb42 (patch) | |
tree | 456b3722fb1d05793d323b674cceb2d4d61de8b6 /Documentation | |
parent | 204e9a18f1b9685476d6480d4f26d5d7f7e2d505 (diff) | |
parent | e20706d5385b10a6f6a2fe5ad6b1333dad2d1416 (diff) |
Merge tag 'mm-stable-2025-04-02-22-07' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull more MM updates from Andrew Morton:
- The series "mm: fixes for fallouts from mem_init() cleanup" from Mike
Rapoport fixes a couple of issues with the just-merged "arch, mm:
reduce code duplication in mem_init()" series
- The series "MAINTAINERS: add my isub-entries to MM part." from Mike
Rapoport does some maintenance on MAINTAINERS
- The series "remove tlb_remove_page_ptdesc()" from Qi Zheng does some
cleanup work to the page mapping code
- The series "mseal system mappings" from Jeff Xu permits sealing of
"system mappings", such as vdso, vvar, vvar_vclock, vectors (arm
compat-mode), sigpage (arm compat-mode)
- Plus the usual shower of singleton patches
* tag 'mm-stable-2025-04-02-22-07' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (31 commits)
mseal sysmap: add arch-support txt
mseal sysmap: enable s390
selftest: test system mappings are sealed
mseal sysmap: update mseal.rst
mseal sysmap: uprobe mapping
mseal sysmap: enable arm64
mseal sysmap: enable x86-64
mseal sysmap: generic vdso vvar mapping
selftests: x86: test_mremap_vdso: skip if vdso is msealed
mseal sysmap: kernel config and header change
mm: pgtable: remove tlb_remove_page_ptdesc()
x86: pgtable: convert to use tlb_remove_ptdesc()
riscv: pgtable: unconditionally use tlb_remove_ptdesc()
mm: pgtable: convert some architectures to use tlb_remove_ptdesc()
mm: pgtable: change pt parameter of tlb_remove_ptdesc() to struct ptdesc*
mm: pgtable: make generic tlb_remove_table() use struct ptdesc
microblaze/mm: put mm_cmdline_setup() in .init.text section
mm/memory_hotplug: fix call folio_test_large with tail page in do_migrate_range
MAINTAINERS: mm: add entry for secretmem
MAINTAINERS: mm: add entry for numa memblocks and numa emulation
...
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation')
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/features/core/mseal_sys_mappings/arch-support.txt | 30 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst | 21 |
2 files changed, 51 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/features/core/mseal_sys_mappings/arch-support.txt b/Documentation/features/core/mseal_sys_mappings/arch-support.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c6cab9760d57 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/features/core/mseal_sys_mappings/arch-support.txt @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +# +# Feature name: mseal-system-mappings +# Kconfig: ARCH_SUPPORTS_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS +# description: arch supports mseal system mappings +# + ----------------------- + | arch |status| + ----------------------- + | alpha: | TODO | + | arc: | N/A | + | arm: | N/A | + | arm64: | ok | + | csky: | N/A | + | hexagon: | N/A | + | loongarch: | TODO | + | m68k: | N/A | + | microblaze: | N/A | + | mips: | TODO | + | nios2: | N/A | + | openrisc: | N/A | + | parisc: | TODO | + | powerpc: | TODO | + | riscv: | TODO | + | s390: | ok | + | sh: | N/A | + | sparc: | TODO | + | um: | TODO | + | x86: | ok | + | xtensa: | N/A | + ----------------------- diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst index 41102f74c5e2..1dabfc29be0d 100644 --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst @@ -130,6 +130,27 @@ Use cases - Chrome browser: protect some security sensitive data structures. +- System mappings: + The system mappings are created by the kernel and includes vdso, vvar, + vvar_vclock, vectors (arm compat-mode), sigpage (arm compat-mode), uprobes. + + Those system mappings are readonly only or execute only, memory sealing can + protect them from ever changing to writable or unmmap/remapped as different + attributes. This is useful to mitigate memory corruption issues where a + corrupted pointer is passed to a memory management system. + + If supported by an architecture (CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS), + the CONFIG_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS seals all system mappings of this + architecture. + + The following architectures currently support this feature: x86-64, arm64, + and s390. + + WARNING: This feature breaks programs which rely on relocating + or unmapping system mappings. Known broken software at the time + of writing includes CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, UML, gVisor, rr. Therefore + this config can't be enabled universally. + When not to use mseal ===================== Applications can apply sealing to any virtual memory region from userspace, |