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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2025-01-22 20:34:42 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2025-01-22 20:34:42 -0800
commit21266b8df5224c4f677acf9f353eecc9094731f0 (patch)
tree53bccb221736248181993c6c1c70819b9613f3d1 /security/security.c
parent5ab889facc6893e4a973d6ab5432550ef4f6ff09 (diff)
parent95b3cdafd7cb74414070893445a9b731793f7b55 (diff)
Merge tag 'AT_EXECVE_CHECK-v6.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull AT_EXECVE_CHECK from Kees Cook: - Implement AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag to execveat(2) (Mickaël Salaün) - Implement EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits (Mickaël Salaün) - Add selftests and samples for AT_EXECVE_CHECK (Mickaël Salaün) * tag 'AT_EXECVE_CHECK-v6.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: ima: instantiate the bprm_creds_for_exec() hook samples/check-exec: Add an enlighten "inc" interpreter and 28 tests selftests: ktap_helpers: Fix uninitialized variable samples/check-exec: Add set-exec selftests/landlock: Add tests for execveat + AT_EXECVE_CHECK selftests/exec: Add 32 tests for AT_EXECVE_CHECK and exec securebits security: Add EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits exec: Add a new AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
Diffstat (limited to 'security/security.c')
-rw-r--r--security/security.c10
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 39df4451455b..143561ebc3e8 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1248,6 +1248,12 @@ int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
* to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to request libc enable secure mode. @bprm
* contains the linux_binprm structure.
*
+ * If execveat(2) is called with the AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag, bprm->is_check is
+ * set. The result must be the same as without this flag even if the execution
+ * will never really happen and @bprm will always be dropped.
+ *
+ * This hook must not change current->cred, only @bprm->cred.
+ *
* Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
*/
int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -3097,6 +3103,10 @@ int security_file_receive(struct file *file)
* Save open-time permission checking state for later use upon file_permission,
* and recheck access if anything has changed since inode_permission.
*
+ * We can check if a file is opened for execution (e.g. execve(2) call), either
+ * directly or indirectly (e.g. ELF's ld.so) by checking file->f_flags &
+ * __FMODE_EXEC .
+ *
* Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/
int security_file_open(struct file *file)