diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 10 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/base.c | 65 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/fd.c | 16 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/generic.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/internal.h | 13 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/Kconfig | 32 |
6 files changed, 127 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 09126bb8cc9f..be010fec7654 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -4788,6 +4788,16 @@ printk.time= Show timing data prefixed to each printk message line Format: <bool> (1/Y/y=enable, 0/N/n=disable) + proc_mem.force_override= [KNL] + Format: {always | ptrace | never} + Traditionally /proc/pid/mem allows memory permissions to be + overridden without restrictions. This option may be set to + restrict that. Can be one of: + - 'always': traditional behavior always allows mem overrides. + - 'ptrace': only allow mem overrides for active ptracers. + - 'never': never allow mem overrides. + If not specified, default is the CONFIG_PROC_MEM_* choice. + processor.max_cstate= [HW,ACPI] Limit processor to maximum C-state max_cstate=9 overrides any DMI blacklist limit. diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 7f3abc3de49f..1ad51858528f 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ #include <linux/elf.h> #include <linux/pid_namespace.h> #include <linux/user_namespace.h> +#include <linux/fs_parser.h> #include <linux/fs_struct.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/sched/autogroup.h> @@ -117,6 +118,40 @@ static u8 nlink_tid __ro_after_init; static u8 nlink_tgid __ro_after_init; +enum proc_mem_force { + PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS, + PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE, + PROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER +}; + +static enum proc_mem_force proc_mem_force_override __ro_after_init = + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE) ? PROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER : + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE) ? PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE : + PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS; + +static const struct constant_table proc_mem_force_table[] __initconst = { + { "always", PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS }, + { "ptrace", PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE }, + { "never", PROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER }, + { } +}; + +static int __init early_proc_mem_force_override(char *buf) +{ + if (!buf) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * lookup_constant() defaults to proc_mem_force_override to preseve + * the initial Kconfig choice in case an invalid param gets passed. + */ + proc_mem_force_override = lookup_constant(proc_mem_force_table, + buf, proc_mem_force_override); + + return 0; +} +early_param("proc_mem.force_override", early_proc_mem_force_override); + struct pid_entry { const char *name; unsigned int len; @@ -832,6 +867,28 @@ static int mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) return __mem_open(inode, file, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH); } +static bool proc_mem_foll_force(struct file *file, struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + struct task_struct *task; + bool ptrace_active = false; + + switch (proc_mem_force_override) { + case PROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER: + return false; + case PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE: + task = get_proc_task(file_inode(file)); + if (task) { + ptrace_active = READ_ONCE(task->ptrace) && + READ_ONCE(task->mm) == mm && + READ_ONCE(task->parent) == current; + put_task_struct(task); + } + return ptrace_active; + default: + return true; + } +} + static ssize_t mem_rw(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos, int write) { @@ -852,7 +909,9 @@ static ssize_t mem_rw(struct file *file, char __user *buf, if (!mmget_not_zero(mm)) goto free; - flags = FOLL_FORCE | (write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0); + flags = write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0; + if (proc_mem_foll_force(file, mm)) + flags |= FOLL_FORCE; while (count > 0) { size_t this_len = min_t(size_t, count, PAGE_SIZE); @@ -2274,8 +2333,8 @@ proc_map_files_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, inode->i_op = &proc_map_files_link_inode_operations; inode->i_size = 64; - d_set_d_op(dentry, &tid_map_files_dentry_operations); - return d_splice_alias(inode, dentry); + return proc_splice_unmountable(inode, dentry, + &tid_map_files_dentry_operations); } static struct dentry *proc_map_files_lookup(struct inode *dir, diff --git a/fs/proc/fd.c b/fs/proc/fd.c index 7baafb1eba13..1f54a54bfb91 100644 --- a/fs/proc/fd.c +++ b/fs/proc/fd.c @@ -220,8 +220,8 @@ static struct dentry *proc_fd_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, ei->op.proc_get_link = proc_fd_link; tid_fd_update_inode(task, inode, data->mode); - d_set_d_op(dentry, &tid_fd_dentry_operations); - return d_splice_alias(inode, dentry); + return proc_splice_unmountable(inode, dentry, + &tid_fd_dentry_operations); } static struct dentry *proc_lookupfd_common(struct inode *dir, @@ -312,14 +312,14 @@ static int proc_readfd_count(struct inode *inode, loff_t *count) return 0; } -static int proc_readfd(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) +static int proc_fd_iterate(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) { return proc_readfd_common(file, ctx, proc_fd_instantiate); } const struct file_operations proc_fd_operations = { .read = generic_read_dir, - .iterate_shared = proc_readfd, + .iterate_shared = proc_fd_iterate, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; @@ -397,8 +397,8 @@ static struct dentry *proc_fdinfo_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, inode->i_fop = &proc_fdinfo_file_operations; tid_fd_update_inode(task, inode, 0); - d_set_d_op(dentry, &tid_fd_dentry_operations); - return d_splice_alias(inode, dentry); + return proc_splice_unmountable(inode, dentry, + &tid_fd_dentry_operations); } static struct dentry * @@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ proc_lookupfdinfo(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) return proc_lookupfd_common(dir, dentry, proc_fdinfo_instantiate); } -static int proc_readfdinfo(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) +static int proc_fdinfo_iterate(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) { return proc_readfd_common(file, ctx, proc_fdinfo_instantiate); @@ -421,6 +421,6 @@ const struct inode_operations proc_fdinfo_inode_operations = { const struct file_operations proc_fdinfo_operations = { .read = generic_read_dir, - .iterate_shared = proc_readfdinfo, + .iterate_shared = proc_fdinfo_iterate, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; diff --git a/fs/proc/generic.c b/fs/proc/generic.c index c02f1e63f82d..dbe82cf23ee4 100644 --- a/fs/proc/generic.c +++ b/fs/proc/generic.c @@ -464,9 +464,9 @@ struct proc_dir_entry *proc_symlink(const char *name, (S_IFLNK | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO | S_IXUGO),1); if (ent) { - ent->data = kmalloc((ent->size=strlen(dest))+1, GFP_KERNEL); + ent->size = strlen(dest); + ent->data = kmemdup(dest, ent->size + 1, GFP_KERNEL); if (ent->data) { - strcpy((char*)ent->data,dest); ent->proc_iops = &proc_link_inode_operations; ent = proc_register(parent, ent); } else { diff --git a/fs/proc/internal.h b/fs/proc/internal.h index a8a8576d8592..9e3f25e4c188 100644 --- a/fs/proc/internal.h +++ b/fs/proc/internal.h @@ -349,3 +349,16 @@ static inline void pde_force_lookup(struct proc_dir_entry *pde) /* /proc/net/ entries can be changed under us by setns(CLONE_NEWNET) */ pde->proc_dops = &proc_net_dentry_ops; } + +/* + * Add a new procfs dentry that can't serve as a mountpoint. That should + * encompass anything that is ephemeral and can just disappear while the + * process is still around. + */ +static inline struct dentry *proc_splice_unmountable(struct inode *inode, + struct dentry *dentry, const struct dentry_operations *d_ops) +{ + d_set_d_op(dentry, d_ops); + dont_mount(dentry); + return d_splice_alias(inode, dentry); +} diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 412e76f1575d..a93c1a9b7c28 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -19,6 +19,38 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. +choice + prompt "Allow /proc/pid/mem access override" + default PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE + help + Traditionally /proc/pid/mem allows users to override memory + permissions for users like ptrace, assuming they have ptrace + capability. + + This allows people to limit that - either never override, or + require actual active ptrace attachment. + + Defaults to the traditional behavior (for now) + +config PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE + bool "Traditional /proc/pid/mem behavior" + help + This allows /proc/pid/mem accesses to override memory mapping + permissions if you have ptrace access rights. + +config PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE + bool "Require active ptrace() use for access override" + help + This allows /proc/pid/mem accesses to override memory mapping + permissions for active ptracers like gdb. + +config PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE + bool "Never" + help + Never override memory mapping permissions + +endchoice + config SECURITY bool "Enable different security models" depends on SYSFS |