Merge tag 'landlock-6.15-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux

Pull landlock fixes from Mickaël Salaün:
 "Fix some Landlock audit issues, add related tests, and updates
  documentation"

* tag 'landlock-6.15-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux:
  landlock: Update log documentation
  landlock: Fix documentation for landlock_restrict_self(2)
  landlock: Fix documentation for landlock_create_ruleset(2)
  selftests/landlock: Add PID tests for audit records
  selftests/landlock: Factor out audit fixture in audit_test
  landlock: Log the TGID of the domain creator
  landlock: Remove incorrect warning

7 files changed, 226 insertions, 72 deletions

diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
index d9d0cb827117..f030adc462ee 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
@@ -53,43 +53,70 @@ struct landlock_ruleset_attr {
 	__u64 scoped;
 };
 
-/*
- * sys_landlock_create_ruleset() flags:
+/**
+ * DOC: landlock_create_ruleset_flags
+ *
+ * **Flags**
  *
- * - %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION: Get the highest supported Landlock ABI
- *   version.
- * - %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_ERRATA: Get a bitmask of fixed issues.
+ * %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION
+ *     Get the highest supported Landlock ABI version (starting at 1).
+ *
+ * %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_ERRATA
+ *     Get a bitmask of fixed issues for the current Landlock ABI version.
  */
 /* clang-format off */
 #define LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION			(1U << 0)
 #define LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_ERRATA			(1U << 1)
 /* clang-format on */
 
-/*
- * sys_landlock_restrict_self() flags:
- *
- * - %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF: Do not create any log related to the
- *   enforced restrictions.  This should only be set by tools launching unknown
- *   or untrusted programs (e.g. a sandbox tool, container runtime, system
- *   service manager).  Because programs sandboxing themselves should fix any
- *   denied access, they should not set this flag to be aware of potential
- *   issues reported by system's logs (i.e. audit).
- * - %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON: Explicitly ask to continue
- *   logging denied access requests even after an :manpage:`execve(2)` call.
- *   This flag should only be set if all the programs than can legitimately be
- *   executed will not try to request a denied access (which could spam audit
- *   logs).
- * - %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF: Do not create any log related
- *   to the enforced restrictions coming from future nested domains created by
- *   the caller or its descendants.  This should only be set according to a
- *   runtime configuration (i.e. not hardcoded) by programs launching other
- *   unknown or untrusted programs that may create their own Landlock domains
- *   and spam logs.  The main use case is for container runtimes to enable users
- *   to mute buggy sandboxed programs for a specific container image.  Other use
- *   cases include sandboxer tools and init systems.  Unlike
- *   %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF,
- *   %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF does not impact the requested
- *   restriction (if any) but only the future nested domains.
+/**
+ * DOC: landlock_restrict_self_flags
+ *
+ * **Flags**
+ *
+ * By default, denied accesses originating from programs that sandbox themselves
+ * are logged via the audit subsystem. Such events typically indicate unexpected
+ * behavior, such as bugs or exploitation attempts. However, to avoid excessive
+ * logging, access requests denied by a domain not created by the originating
+ * program are not logged by default. The rationale is that programs should know
+ * their own behavior, but not necessarily the behavior of other programs.  This
+ * default configuration is suitable for most programs that sandbox themselves.
+ * For specific use cases, the following flags allow programs to modify this
+ * default logging behavior.
+ *
+ * The %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF and
+ * %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON flags apply to the newly created
+ * Landlock domain.
+ *
+ * %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF
+ *     Disables logging of denied accesses originating from the thread creating
+ *     the Landlock domain, as well as its children, as long as they continue
+ *     running the same executable code (i.e., without an intervening
+ *     :manpage:`execve(2)` call). This is intended for programs that execute
+ *     unknown code without invoking :manpage:`execve(2)`, such as script
+ *     interpreters. Programs that only sandbox themselves should not set this
+ *     flag, so users can be notified of unauthorized access attempts via system
+ *     logs.
+ *
+ * %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON
+ *     Enables logging of denied accesses after an :manpage:`execve(2)` call,
+ *     providing visibility into unauthorized access attempts by newly executed
+ *     programs within the created Landlock domain. This flag is recommended
+ *     only when all potential executables in the domain are expected to comply
+ *     with the access restrictions, as excessive audit log entries could make
+ *     it more difficult to identify critical events.
+ *
+ * %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF
+ *     Disables logging of denied accesses originating from nested Landlock
+ *     domains created by the caller or its descendants. This flag should be set
+ *     according to runtime configuration, not hardcoded, to avoid suppressing
+ *     important security events. It is useful for container runtimes or
+ *     sandboxing tools that may launch programs which themselves create
+ *     Landlock domains and could otherwise generate excessive logs. Unlike
+ *     ``LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF``, this flag only affects
+ *     future nested domains, not the one being created. It can also be used
+ *     with a @ruleset_fd value of -1 to mute subdomain logs without creating a
+ *     domain.
  */
 /* clang-format off */
 #define LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF		(1U << 0)
diff --git a/security/landlock/domain.c b/security/landlock/domain.c
index bae2e9909013..a647b68e8d06 100644
--- a/security/landlock/domain.c
+++ b/security/landlock/domain.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/path.h>
 #include <linux/pid.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/signal.h>
 #include <linux/uidgid.h>
 
 #include "access.h"
@@ -99,8 +100,7 @@ static struct landlock_details *get_current_details(void)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 
 	memcpy(details->exe_path, path_str, path_size);
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(current_cred() != current_real_cred());
-	details->pid = get_pid(task_pid(current));
+	details->pid = get_pid(task_tgid(current));
 	details->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_uid());
 	get_task_comm(details->comm, current);
 	return details;
diff --git a/security/landlock/domain.h b/security/landlock/domain.h
index ed0d348e214c..7fb70b25f85a 100644
--- a/security/landlock/domain.h
+++ b/security/landlock/domain.h
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ int landlock_init_hierarchy_log(struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy);
 static inline void
 landlock_free_hierarchy_details(struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy)
 {
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!hierarchy || !hierarchy->details))
+	if (!hierarchy || !hierarchy->details)
 		return;
 
 	put_pid(hierarchy->details->pid);
diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
index 54a9f29e6ebb..b9561e3417ae 100644
--- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
+++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
@@ -169,20 +169,16 @@ const int landlock_abi_version = 7;
  *        the new ruleset.
  * @size: Size of the pointed &struct landlock_ruleset_attr (needed for
  *        backward and forward compatibility).
- * @flags: Supported value:
+ * @flags: Supported values:
+ *
  *         - %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION
  *         - %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_ERRATA
  *
  * This system call enables to create a new Landlock ruleset, and returns the
  * related file descriptor on success.
  *
- * If @flags is %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION and @attr is NULL and @size is
- * 0, then the returned value is the highest supported Landlock ABI version
- * (starting at 1).
- *
- * If @flags is %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_ERRATA and @attr is NULL and @size is
- * 0, then the returned value is a bitmask of fixed issues for the current
- * Landlock ABI version.
+ * If %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION or %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_ERRATA is
+ * set, then @attr must be NULL and @size must be 0.
  *
  * Possible returned errors are:
  *
@@ -191,6 +187,9 @@ const int landlock_abi_version = 7;
  * - %E2BIG: @attr or @size inconsistencies;
  * - %EFAULT: @attr or @size inconsistencies;
  * - %ENOMSG: empty &landlock_ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs.
+ *
+ * .. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
+ *     :identifiers: landlock_create_ruleset_flags
  */
 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(landlock_create_ruleset,
 		const struct landlock_ruleset_attr __user *const, attr,
@@ -452,18 +451,15 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, const int, ruleset_fd,
  * @ruleset_fd: File descriptor tied to the ruleset to merge with the target.
  * @flags: Supported values:
  *
- * - %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF
- * - %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON
- * - %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF
+ *         - %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF
+ *         - %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON
+ *         - %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF
  *
  * This system call enables to enforce a Landlock ruleset on the current
  * thread.  Enforcing a ruleset requires that the task has %CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its
  * namespace or is running with no_new_privs.  This avoids scenarios where
  * unprivileged tasks can affect the behavior of privileged children.
  *
- * It is allowed to only pass the %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF
- * flag with a @ruleset_fd value of -1.
- *
  * Possible returned errors are:
  *
  * - %EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time;
@@ -475,6 +471,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, const int, ruleset_fd,
  *   %CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its namespace.
  * - %E2BIG: The maximum number of stacked rulesets is reached for the current
  *   thread.
+ *
+ * .. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
+ *     :identifiers: landlock_restrict_self_flags
  */
 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(landlock_restrict_self, const int, ruleset_fd, const __u32,
 		flags)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit.h b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit.h
index b9054086a0c9..18a6014920b5 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit.h
@@ -300,15 +300,22 @@ out:
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int __maybe_unused matches_log_domain_allocated(int audit_fd,
+static int __maybe_unused matches_log_domain_allocated(int audit_fd, pid_t pid,
 						       __u64 *domain_id)
 {
-	return audit_match_record(
-		audit_fd, AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN,
-		REGEX_LANDLOCK_PREFIX
-		" status=allocated mode=enforcing pid=[0-9]\\+ uid=[0-9]\\+"
-		" exe=\"[^\"]\\+\" comm=\".*_test\"$",
-		domain_id);
+	static const char log_template[] = REGEX_LANDLOCK_PREFIX
+		" status=allocated mode=enforcing pid=%d uid=[0-9]\\+"
+		" exe=\"[^\"]\\+\" comm=\".*_test\"$";
+	char log_match[sizeof(log_template) + 10];
+	int log_match_len;
+
+	log_match_len =
+		snprintf(log_match, sizeof(log_match), log_template, pid);
+	if (log_match_len > sizeof(log_match))
+		return -E2BIG;
+
+	return audit_match_record(audit_fd, AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN, log_match,
+				  domain_id);
 }
 
 static int __maybe_unused matches_log_domain_deallocated(
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c
index a0643070c403..cfc571afd0eb 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <limits.h>
 #include <linux/landlock.h>
+#include <pthread.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <sys/mount.h>
 #include <sys/prctl.h>
@@ -40,7 +41,6 @@ FIXTURE(audit)
 {
 	struct audit_filter audit_filter;
 	int audit_fd;
-	__u64(*domain_stack)[16];
 };
 
 FIXTURE_SETUP(audit)
@@ -60,18 +60,10 @@ FIXTURE_SETUP(audit)
 		TH_LOG("Failed to initialize audit: %s", error_msg);
 	}
 	clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL);
-
-	self->domain_stack = mmap(NULL, sizeof(*self->domain_stack),
-				  PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
-				  MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
-	ASSERT_NE(MAP_FAILED, self->domain_stack);
-	memset(self->domain_stack, 0, sizeof(*self->domain_stack));
 }
 
 FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(audit)
 {
-	EXPECT_EQ(0, munmap(self->domain_stack, sizeof(*self->domain_stack)));
-
 	set_cap(_metadata, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL);
 	EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_cleanup(self->audit_fd, &self->audit_filter));
 	clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL);
@@ -83,9 +75,15 @@ TEST_F(audit, layers)
 		.scoped = LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL,
 	};
 	int status, ruleset_fd, i;
+	__u64(*domain_stack)[16];
 	__u64 prev_dom = 3;
 	pid_t child;
 
+	domain_stack = mmap(NULL, sizeof(*domain_stack), PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+			    MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
+	ASSERT_NE(MAP_FAILED, domain_stack);
+	memset(domain_stack, 0, sizeof(*domain_stack));
+
 	ruleset_fd =
 		landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
 	ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
@@ -94,7 +92,7 @@ TEST_F(audit, layers)
 	child = fork();
 	ASSERT_LE(0, child);
 	if (child == 0) {
-		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(*self->domain_stack); i++) {
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(*domain_stack); i++) {
 			__u64 denial_dom = 1;
 			__u64 allocated_dom = 2;
 
@@ -107,7 +105,8 @@ TEST_F(audit, layers)
 				  matches_log_signal(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
 						     getppid(), &denial_dom));
 			EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_domain_allocated(
-					     self->audit_fd, &allocated_dom));
+					     self->audit_fd, getpid(),
+					     &allocated_dom));
 			EXPECT_NE(denial_dom, 1);
 			EXPECT_NE(denial_dom, 0);
 			EXPECT_EQ(denial_dom, allocated_dom);
@@ -115,7 +114,7 @@ TEST_F(audit, layers)
 			/* Checks that the new domain is younger than the previous one. */
 			EXPECT_GT(allocated_dom, prev_dom);
 			prev_dom = allocated_dom;
-			(*self->domain_stack)[i] = allocated_dom;
+			(*domain_stack)[i] = allocated_dom;
 		}
 
 		/* Checks that we reached the maximum number of layers. */
@@ -142,23 +141,143 @@ TEST_F(audit, layers)
 	/* Purges log from deallocated domains. */
 	EXPECT_EQ(0, setsockopt(self->audit_fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO,
 				&audit_tv_dom_drop, sizeof(audit_tv_dom_drop)));
-	for (i = ARRAY_SIZE(*self->domain_stack) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+	for (i = ARRAY_SIZE(*domain_stack) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
 		__u64 deallocated_dom = 2;
 
 		EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_domain_deallocated(self->audit_fd, 1,
 							    &deallocated_dom));
-		EXPECT_EQ((*self->domain_stack)[i], deallocated_dom)
+		EXPECT_EQ((*domain_stack)[i], deallocated_dom)
 		{
 			TH_LOG("Failed to match domain %llx (#%d)",
-			       (*self->domain_stack)[i], i);
+			       (*domain_stack)[i], i);
 		}
 	}
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, munmap(domain_stack, sizeof(*domain_stack)));
 	EXPECT_EQ(0, setsockopt(self->audit_fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO,
 				&audit_tv_default, sizeof(audit_tv_default)));
-
 	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
 }
 
+struct thread_data {
+	pid_t parent_pid;
+	int ruleset_fd, pipe_child, pipe_parent;
+};
+
+static void *thread_audit_test(void *arg)
+{
+	const struct thread_data *data = (struct thread_data *)arg;
+	uintptr_t err = 0;
+	char buffer;
+
+	/* TGID and TID are different for a second thread. */
+	if (getpid() == gettid()) {
+		err = 1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (landlock_restrict_self(data->ruleset_fd, 0)) {
+		err = 2;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (close(data->ruleset_fd)) {
+		err = 3;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Creates a denial to get the domain ID. */
+	if (kill(data->parent_pid, 0) != -1) {
+		err = 4;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (EPERM != errno) {
+		err = 5;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Signals the parent to read denial logs. */
+	if (write(data->pipe_child, ".", 1) != 1) {
+		err = 6;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Waits for the parent to update audit filters. */
+	if (read(data->pipe_parent, &buffer, 1) != 1) {
+		err = 7;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+out:
+	close(data->pipe_child);
+	close(data->pipe_parent);
+	return (void *)err;
+}
+
+/* Checks that the PID tied to a domain is not a TID but the TGID. */
+TEST_F(audit, thread)
+{
+	const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+		.scoped = LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL,
+	};
+	__u64 denial_dom = 1;
+	__u64 allocated_dom = 2;
+	__u64 deallocated_dom = 3;
+	pthread_t thread;
+	int pipe_child[2], pipe_parent[2];
+	char buffer;
+	struct thread_data child_data;
+
+	child_data.parent_pid = getppid();
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe2(pipe_child, O_CLOEXEC));
+	child_data.pipe_child = pipe_child[1];
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe2(pipe_parent, O_CLOEXEC));
+	child_data.pipe_parent = pipe_parent[0];
+	child_data.ruleset_fd =
+		landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, child_data.ruleset_fd);
+
+	/* TGID and TID are the same for the initial thread . */
+	EXPECT_EQ(getpid(), gettid());
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_create(&thread, NULL, thread_audit_test,
+				    &child_data));
+
+	/* Waits for the child to generate a denial. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(1, read(pipe_child[0], &buffer, 1));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipe_child[0]));
+
+	/* Matches the signal log to get the domain ID. */
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_signal(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+					child_data.parent_pid, &denial_dom));
+	EXPECT_NE(denial_dom, 1);
+	EXPECT_NE(denial_dom, 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_domain_allocated(self->audit_fd, getpid(),
+						  &allocated_dom));
+	EXPECT_EQ(denial_dom, allocated_dom);
+
+	/* Updates filter rules to match the drop record. */
+	set_cap(_metadata, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL);
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_filter_drop(self->audit_fd, AUDIT_ADD_RULE));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_filter_exe(self->audit_fd, &self->audit_filter,
+				      AUDIT_DEL_RULE));
+	clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL);
+
+	/* Signals the thread to exit, which will generate a domain deallocation. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(1, write(pipe_parent[1], ".", 1));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipe_parent[1]));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_join(thread, NULL));
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, setsockopt(self->audit_fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO,
+				&audit_tv_dom_drop, sizeof(audit_tv_dom_drop)));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_domain_deallocated(self->audit_fd, 1,
+						    &deallocated_dom));
+	EXPECT_EQ(denial_dom, deallocated_dom);
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, setsockopt(self->audit_fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO,
+				&audit_tv_default, sizeof(audit_tv_default)));
+}
+
 FIXTURE(audit_flags)
 {
 	struct audit_filter audit_filter;
@@ -273,7 +392,8 @@ TEST_F(audit_flags, signal)
 
 			/* Checks domain information records. */
 			EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_domain_allocated(
-					     self->audit_fd, &allocated_dom));
+					     self->audit_fd, getpid(),
+					     &allocated_dom));
 			EXPECT_NE(*self->domain_id, 1);
 			EXPECT_NE(*self->domain_id, 0);
 			EXPECT_EQ(*self->domain_id, allocated_dom);
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
index f819011a8798..73729382d40f 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
@@ -5964,7 +5964,8 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, refer_handled)
 	EXPECT_EQ(EXDEV, errno);
 	EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.refer",
 				    dir_s1d1));
-	EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_domain_allocated(self->audit_fd, NULL));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0,
+		  matches_log_domain_allocated(self->audit_fd, getpid(), NULL));
 	EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.refer",
 				    dir_s1d3));