diff options
| author | Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> | 2024-11-28 15:25:32 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> | 2024-12-11 17:45:18 +0100 |
| commit | 0357ef03c94ef835bd44a0658b8edb672a9dbf51 (patch) | |
| tree | 048ac20bb32843d457b0314075e6e2522f0f0a16 /kernel/fork.c | |
| parent | 5121711eb8dbcbed70b1db429a4665f413844164 (diff) | |
fs: don't block write during exec on pre-content watched files
Commit 2a010c412853 ("fs: don't block i_writecount during exec") removed
the legacy behavior of getting ETXTBSY on attempt to open and executable
file for write while it is being executed.
This commit was reverted because an application that depends on this
legacy behavior was broken by the change.
We need to allow HSM writing into executable files while executed to
fill their content on-the-fly.
To that end, disable the ETXTBSY legacy behavior for files that are
watched by pre-content events.
This change is not expected to cause regressions with existing systems
which do not have any pre-content event listeners.
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241128142532.465176-1-amir73il@gmail.com
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/fork.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/fork.c | 12 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 1450b461d196..015c397f47ca 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -625,8 +625,8 @@ static void dup_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct mm_struct *oldmm) * We depend on the oldmm having properly denied write access to the * exe_file already. */ - if (exe_file && deny_write_access(exe_file)) - pr_warn_once("deny_write_access() failed in %s\n", __func__); + if (exe_file && exe_file_deny_write_access(exe_file)) + pr_warn_once("exe_file_deny_write_access() failed in %s\n", __func__); } #ifdef CONFIG_MMU @@ -1424,13 +1424,13 @@ int set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct file *new_exe_file) * We expect the caller (i.e., sys_execve) to already denied * write access, so this is unlikely to fail. */ - if (unlikely(deny_write_access(new_exe_file))) + if (unlikely(exe_file_deny_write_access(new_exe_file))) return -EACCES; get_file(new_exe_file); } rcu_assign_pointer(mm->exe_file, new_exe_file); if (old_exe_file) { - allow_write_access(old_exe_file); + exe_file_allow_write_access(old_exe_file); fput(old_exe_file); } return 0; @@ -1471,7 +1471,7 @@ int replace_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct file *new_exe_file) return ret; } - ret = deny_write_access(new_exe_file); + ret = exe_file_deny_write_access(new_exe_file); if (ret) return -EACCES; get_file(new_exe_file); @@ -1483,7 +1483,7 @@ int replace_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct file *new_exe_file) mmap_write_unlock(mm); if (old_exe_file) { - allow_write_access(old_exe_file); + exe_file_allow_write_access(old_exe_file); fput(old_exe_file); } return 0; |