diff options
| author | Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com> | 2025-11-19 22:03:25 +0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> | 2025-11-19 09:19:42 -0500 |
| commit | c200892b46ba3df3dd210b7117a463ec283600c3 (patch) | |
| tree | f634b8754302ef54bd5e3f22bf5e313a41e95ad3 /kernel | |
| parent | 43369273518f57b7d56c1cf12d636a809b7bd81b (diff) | |
ima: Access decompressed kernel module to verify appended signature
Currently, when in-kernel module decompression (CONFIG_MODULE_DECOMPRESS)
is enabled, IMA has no way to verify the appended module signature as it
can't decompress the module.
Define a new kernel_read_file_id enumerate READING_MODULE_COMPRESSED so
IMA can calculate the compressed kernel module data hash on
READING_MODULE_COMPRESSED and defer appraising/measuring it until on
READING_MODULE when the module has been decompressed.
Before enabling in-kernel module decompression, a kernel module in
initramfs can still be loaded with ima_policy=secure_boot. So adjust the
kernel module rule in secure_boot policy to allow either an IMA
signature OR an appended signature i.e. to use
"appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig".
Reported-by: Karel Srot <ksrot@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/module/main.c | 17 |
1 files changed, 14 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/module/main.c b/kernel/module/main.c index c66b26184936..7b3ec2fa6e7c 100644 --- a/kernel/module/main.c +++ b/kernel/module/main.c @@ -3675,24 +3675,35 @@ static int idempotent_wait_for_completion(struct idempotent *u) static int init_module_from_file(struct file *f, const char __user * uargs, int flags) { + bool compressed = !!(flags & MODULE_INIT_COMPRESSED_FILE); struct load_info info = { }; void *buf = NULL; int len; + int err; - len = kernel_read_file(f, 0, &buf, INT_MAX, NULL, READING_MODULE); + len = kernel_read_file(f, 0, &buf, INT_MAX, NULL, + compressed ? READING_MODULE_COMPRESSED : + READING_MODULE); if (len < 0) { mod_stat_inc(&failed_kreads); return len; } - if (flags & MODULE_INIT_COMPRESSED_FILE) { - int err = module_decompress(&info, buf, len); + if (compressed) { + err = module_decompress(&info, buf, len); vfree(buf); /* compressed data is no longer needed */ if (err) { mod_stat_inc(&failed_decompress); mod_stat_add_long(len, &invalid_decompress_bytes); return err; } + err = security_kernel_post_read_file(f, (char *)info.hdr, info.len, + READING_MODULE); + if (err) { + mod_stat_inc(&failed_kreads); + free_copy(&info, flags); + return err; + } } else { info.hdr = buf; info.len = len; |
