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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-03-07 17:29:47 -0800 | 
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-03-07 17:29:47 -0800 | 
| commit | 4a01e748a51cdc0527fdc913546dd46e822aa00d (patch) | |
| tree | 8dbdba3aa96fb2323ba8194e8838dddf917752e5 /net/lapb/lapb_out.c | |
| parent | ea4424be16887a37735d6550cfd0611528dbe5d9 (diff) | |
| parent | 0de05d056afdb00eca8c7bbb0c79a3438daf700c (diff) | |
Merge tag 'x86_bugs_for_v5.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 spectre fixes from Borislav Petkov:
 - Mitigate Spectre v2-type Branch History Buffer attacks on machines
   which support eIBRS, i.e., the hardware-assisted speculation
   restriction after it has been shown that such machines are vulnerable
   even with the hardware mitigation.
 - Do not use the default LFENCE-based Spectre v2 mitigation on AMD as
   it is insufficient to mitigate such attacks. Instead, switch to
   retpolines on all AMD by default.
 - Update the docs and add some warnings for the obviously vulnerable
   cmdline configurations.
* tag 'x86_bugs_for_v5.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT
  x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation
  x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper
  x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMD
  x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting
  Documentation/hw-vuln: Update spectre doc
  x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline options
  x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCE
Diffstat (limited to 'net/lapb/lapb_out.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions
