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author | Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> | 2025-02-06 22:30:20 -0500 |
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committer | Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> | 2025-02-07 15:30:54 -0500 |
commit | 5fc80fb5b776fa22b01472baecec4d26d1af811b (patch) | |
tree | 764542a17c3ce5ab3911da89e4a51162448124e6 /scripts/bpf_doc.py | |
parent | 75eb39f2f50b8183fe7c14ca86acf6a1849d495a (diff) |
selinux: always check the file label in selinux_kernel_read_file()
Commit 2039bda1fa8d ("LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook")
added a new flag to the security_kernel_read_file() LSM hook, "contents",
which was set if a file was being read in its entirety or if it was the
first chunk read in a multi-step process. The SELinux LSM callback was
updated to only check against the file label if this "contents" flag was
set, meaning that in multi-step reads the file label was not considered
in the access control decision after the initial chunk.
Thankfully the only in-tree user that performs a multi-step read is the
"bcm-vk" driver and it is loading firmware, not a kernel module, so there
are no security regressions to worry about. However, we still want to
ensure that the SELinux code does the right thing, and *always* checks
the file label, especially as there is a chance the file could change
between chunk reads.
Fixes: 2039bda1fa8d ("LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook")
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'scripts/bpf_doc.py')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions