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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2025-09-10 20:52:16 -0700 | 
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2025-09-10 20:52:16 -0700 | 
| commit | 223ba8ee0a3986718c874b66ed24e7f87f6b8124 (patch) | |
| tree | 7597b02a3a145b618b19a3e7e4f65875ee3cd68a /scripts/gdb/linux/mm.py | |
| parent | 7aac71907bdea16e2754a782b9d9155449a9d49d (diff) | |
| parent | 8a68d64bb10334426834e8c273319601878e961e (diff) | |
Merge tag 'vmscape-for-linus-20250904' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull vmescape mitigation fixes from Dave Hansen:
 "Mitigate vmscape issue with indirect branch predictor flushes.
  vmscape is a vulnerability that essentially takes Spectre-v2 and
  attacks host userspace from a guest. It particularly affects
  hypervisors like QEMU.
  Even if a hypervisor may not have any sensitive data like disk
  encryption keys, guest-userspace may be able to attack the
  guest-kernel using the hypervisor as a confused deputy.
  There are many ways to mitigate vmscape using the existing Spectre-v2
  defenses like IBRS variants or the IBPB flushes. This series focuses
  solely on IBPB because it works universally across vendors and all
  vulnerable processors. Further work doing vendor and model-specific
  optimizations can build on top of this if needed / wanted.
  Do the normal issue mitigation dance:
   - Add the CPU bug boilerplate
   - Add a list of vulnerable CPUs
   - Use IBPB to flush the branch predictors after running guests"
* tag 'vmscape-for-linus-20250904' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/vmscape: Add old Intel CPUs to affected list
  x86/vmscape: Warn when STIBP is disabled with SMT
  x86/bugs: Move cpu_bugs_smt_update() down
  x86/vmscape: Enable the mitigation
  x86/vmscape: Add conditional IBPB mitigation
  x86/vmscape: Enumerate VMSCAPE bug
  Documentation/hw-vuln: Add VMSCAPE documentation
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