diff options
author | Benjamin Berg <benjamin.berg@intel.com> | 2025-06-02 15:00:52 +0200 |
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committer | Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> | 2025-06-02 16:20:10 +0200 |
commit | e92e2552858142b60238b9828d802f128e4acccd (patch) | |
tree | 57e6a51acfc7397215131df99d1a67fc58d18349 /scripts/generate_rust_analyzer.py | |
parent | beddc9fb1cb161e1bf779b180750b648ff9690c7 (diff) |
um: pass FD for memory operations when needed
Instead of always sharing the FDs with the userspace process, only hand
over the FDs needed for mmap when required. The idea is that userspace
might be able to force the stub into executing an mmap syscall, however,
it will not be able to manipulate the control flow sufficiently to have
access to an FD that would allow mapping arbitrary memory.
Security wise, we need to be sure that only the expected syscalls are
executed after the kernel sends FDs through the socket. This is
currently not the case, as userspace can trivially jump to the
rt_sigreturn syscall instruction to execute any syscall that the stub is
permitted to do. With this, it can trick the kernel to send the FD,
which in turn allows userspace to freely map any physical memory.
As such, this is currently *not* secure. However, in principle the
approach should be fine with a more strict SECCOMP filter and a careful
review of the stub control flow (as userspace can prepare a stack). With
some care, it is likely possible to extend the security model to SMP if
desired.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Berg <benjamin.berg@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250602130052.545733-8-benjamin@sipsolutions.net
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'scripts/generate_rust_analyzer.py')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions