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Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/boot/startup/map_kernel.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/startup/map_kernel.c217
1 files changed, 217 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/startup/map_kernel.c b/arch/x86/boot/startup/map_kernel.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..332dbe6688c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/startup/map_kernel.c
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/pgtable.h>
+
+#include <asm/init.h>
+#include <asm/sections.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
+#include <asm/sev.h>
+
+extern pmd_t early_dynamic_pgts[EARLY_DYNAMIC_PAGE_TABLES][PTRS_PER_PMD];
+extern unsigned int next_early_pgt;
+
+static inline bool check_la57_support(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * 5-level paging is detected and enabled at kernel decompression
+ * stage. Only check if it has been enabled there.
+ */
+ if (!(native_read_cr4() & X86_CR4_LA57))
+ return false;
+
+ __pgtable_l5_enabled = 1;
+ pgdir_shift = 48;
+ ptrs_per_p4d = 512;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static unsigned long __head sme_postprocess_startup(struct boot_params *bp,
+ pmdval_t *pmd,
+ unsigned long p2v_offset)
+{
+ unsigned long paddr, paddr_end;
+ int i;
+
+ /* Encrypt the kernel and related (if SME is active) */
+ sme_encrypt_kernel(bp);
+
+ /*
+ * Clear the memory encryption mask from the .bss..decrypted section.
+ * The bss section will be memset to zero later in the initialization so
+ * there is no need to zero it after changing the memory encryption
+ * attribute.
+ */
+ if (sme_get_me_mask()) {
+ paddr = (unsigned long)rip_rel_ptr(__start_bss_decrypted);
+ paddr_end = (unsigned long)rip_rel_ptr(__end_bss_decrypted);
+
+ for (; paddr < paddr_end; paddr += PMD_SIZE) {
+ /*
+ * On SNP, transition the page to shared in the RMP table so that
+ * it is consistent with the page table attribute change.
+ *
+ * __start_bss_decrypted has a virtual address in the high range
+ * mapping (kernel .text). PVALIDATE, by way of
+ * early_snp_set_memory_shared(), requires a valid virtual
+ * address but the kernel is currently running off of the identity
+ * mapping so use the PA to get a *currently* valid virtual address.
+ */
+ early_snp_set_memory_shared(paddr, paddr, PTRS_PER_PMD);
+
+ i = pmd_index(paddr - p2v_offset);
+ pmd[i] -= sme_get_me_mask();
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Return the SME encryption mask (if SME is active) to be used as a
+ * modifier for the initial pgdir entry programmed into CR3.
+ */
+ return sme_get_me_mask();
+}
+
+/*
+ * This code is compiled using PIC codegen because it will execute from the
+ * early 1:1 mapping of memory, which deviates from the mapping expected by the
+ * linker. Due to this deviation, taking the address of a global variable will
+ * produce an ambiguous result when using the plain & operator. Instead,
+ * rip_rel_ptr() must be used, which will return the RIP-relative address in
+ * the 1:1 mapping of memory. Kernel virtual addresses can be determined by
+ * subtracting p2v_offset from the RIP-relative address.
+ */
+unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long p2v_offset,
+ struct boot_params *bp)
+{
+ pmd_t (*early_pgts)[PTRS_PER_PMD] = rip_rel_ptr(early_dynamic_pgts);
+ unsigned long physaddr = (unsigned long)rip_rel_ptr(_text);
+ unsigned long va_text, va_end;
+ unsigned long pgtable_flags;
+ unsigned long load_delta;
+ pgdval_t *pgd;
+ p4dval_t *p4d;
+ pudval_t *pud;
+ pmdval_t *pmd, pmd_entry;
+ bool la57;
+ int i;
+
+ la57 = check_la57_support();
+
+ /* Is the address too large? */
+ if (physaddr >> MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS)
+ for (;;);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the delta between the address I am compiled to run at
+ * and the address I am actually running at.
+ */
+ phys_base = load_delta = __START_KERNEL_map + p2v_offset;
+
+ /* Is the address not 2M aligned? */
+ if (load_delta & ~PMD_MASK)
+ for (;;);
+
+ va_text = physaddr - p2v_offset;
+ va_end = (unsigned long)rip_rel_ptr(_end) - p2v_offset;
+
+ /* Include the SME encryption mask in the fixup value */
+ load_delta += sme_get_me_mask();
+
+ /* Fixup the physical addresses in the page table */
+
+ pgd = rip_rel_ptr(early_top_pgt);
+ pgd[pgd_index(__START_KERNEL_map)] += load_delta;
+
+ if (la57) {
+ p4d = (p4dval_t *)rip_rel_ptr(level4_kernel_pgt);
+ p4d[MAX_PTRS_PER_P4D - 1] += load_delta;
+
+ pgd[pgd_index(__START_KERNEL_map)] = (pgdval_t)p4d | _PAGE_TABLE;
+ }
+
+ level3_kernel_pgt[PTRS_PER_PUD - 2].pud += load_delta;
+ level3_kernel_pgt[PTRS_PER_PUD - 1].pud += load_delta;
+
+ for (i = FIXMAP_PMD_TOP; i > FIXMAP_PMD_TOP - FIXMAP_PMD_NUM; i--)
+ level2_fixmap_pgt[i].pmd += load_delta;
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the identity mapping for the switchover. These
+ * entries should *NOT* have the global bit set! This also
+ * creates a bunch of nonsense entries but that is fine --
+ * it avoids problems around wraparound.
+ */
+
+ pud = &early_pgts[0]->pmd;
+ pmd = &early_pgts[1]->pmd;
+ next_early_pgt = 2;
+
+ pgtable_flags = _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC + sme_get_me_mask();
+
+ if (la57) {
+ p4d = &early_pgts[next_early_pgt++]->pmd;
+
+ i = (physaddr >> PGDIR_SHIFT) % PTRS_PER_PGD;
+ pgd[i + 0] = (pgdval_t)p4d + pgtable_flags;
+ pgd[i + 1] = (pgdval_t)p4d + pgtable_flags;
+
+ i = physaddr >> P4D_SHIFT;
+ p4d[(i + 0) % PTRS_PER_P4D] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags;
+ p4d[(i + 1) % PTRS_PER_P4D] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags;
+ } else {
+ i = (physaddr >> PGDIR_SHIFT) % PTRS_PER_PGD;
+ pgd[i + 0] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags;
+ pgd[i + 1] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags;
+ }
+
+ i = physaddr >> PUD_SHIFT;
+ pud[(i + 0) % PTRS_PER_PUD] = (pudval_t)pmd + pgtable_flags;
+ pud[(i + 1) % PTRS_PER_PUD] = (pudval_t)pmd + pgtable_flags;
+
+ pmd_entry = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL;
+ pmd_entry += sme_get_me_mask();
+ pmd_entry += physaddr;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < DIV_ROUND_UP(va_end - va_text, PMD_SIZE); i++) {
+ int idx = i + (physaddr >> PMD_SHIFT);
+
+ pmd[idx % PTRS_PER_PMD] = pmd_entry + i * PMD_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Fixup the kernel text+data virtual addresses. Note that
+ * we might write invalid pmds, when the kernel is relocated
+ * cleanup_highmap() fixes this up along with the mappings
+ * beyond _end.
+ *
+ * Only the region occupied by the kernel image has so far
+ * been checked against the table of usable memory regions
+ * provided by the firmware, so invalidate pages outside that
+ * region. A page table entry that maps to a reserved area of
+ * memory would allow processor speculation into that area,
+ * and on some hardware (particularly the UV platform) even
+ * speculative access to some reserved areas is caught as an
+ * error, causing the BIOS to halt the system.
+ */
+
+ pmd = rip_rel_ptr(level2_kernel_pgt);
+
+ /* invalidate pages before the kernel image */
+ for (i = 0; i < pmd_index(va_text); i++)
+ pmd[i] &= ~_PAGE_PRESENT;
+
+ /* fixup pages that are part of the kernel image */
+ for (; i <= pmd_index(va_end); i++)
+ if (pmd[i] & _PAGE_PRESENT)
+ pmd[i] += load_delta;
+
+ /* invalidate pages after the kernel image */
+ for (; i < PTRS_PER_PMD; i++)
+ pmd[i] &= ~_PAGE_PRESENT;
+
+ return sme_postprocess_startup(bp, pmd, p2v_offset);
+}