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-rw-r--r--fs/afs/cm_security.c340
1 files changed, 340 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/afs/cm_security.c b/fs/afs/cm_security.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..edcbd249d202
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/afs/cm_security.c
@@ -0,0 +1,340 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Cache manager security.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2025 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <crypto/krb5.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "afs_cm.h"
+#include "afs_fs.h"
+#include "protocol_yfs.h"
+#define RXRPC_TRACE_ONLY_DEFINE_ENUMS
+#include <trace/events/rxrpc.h>
+
+#define RXGK_SERVER_ENC_TOKEN 1036U // 0x40c
+#define xdr_round_up(x) (round_up((x), sizeof(__be32)))
+#define xdr_len_object(x) (4 + round_up((x), sizeof(__be32)))
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_RXGK
+static int afs_create_yfs_cm_token(struct sk_buff *challenge,
+ struct afs_server *server);
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Respond to an RxGK challenge, adding appdata.
+ */
+static int afs_respond_to_challenge(struct sk_buff *challenge)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_RXGK
+ struct krb5_buffer appdata = {};
+ struct afs_server *server;
+#endif
+ struct rxrpc_peer *peer;
+ unsigned long peer_data;
+ u16 service_id;
+ u8 security_index;
+
+ rxrpc_kernel_query_challenge(challenge, &peer, &peer_data,
+ &service_id, &security_index);
+
+ _enter("%u,%u", service_id, security_index);
+
+ switch (service_id) {
+ /* We don't send CM_SERVICE RPCs, so don't expect a challenge
+ * therefrom.
+ */
+ case FS_SERVICE:
+ case VL_SERVICE:
+ case YFS_FS_SERVICE:
+ case YFS_VL_SERVICE:
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("Can't respond to unknown challenge %u:%u",
+ service_id, security_index);
+ return rxrpc_kernel_reject_challenge(challenge, RX_USER_ABORT, -EPROTO,
+ afs_abort_unsupported_sec_class);
+ }
+
+ switch (security_index) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_RXKAD
+ case RXRPC_SECURITY_RXKAD:
+ return rxkad_kernel_respond_to_challenge(challenge);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_RXGK
+ case RXRPC_SECURITY_RXGK:
+ return rxgk_kernel_respond_to_challenge(challenge, &appdata);
+
+ case RXRPC_SECURITY_YFS_RXGK:
+ switch (service_id) {
+ case FS_SERVICE:
+ case YFS_FS_SERVICE:
+ server = (struct afs_server *)peer_data;
+ if (!server->cm_rxgk_appdata.data) {
+ mutex_lock(&server->cm_token_lock);
+ if (!server->cm_rxgk_appdata.data)
+ afs_create_yfs_cm_token(challenge, server);
+ mutex_unlock(&server->cm_token_lock);
+ }
+ if (server->cm_rxgk_appdata.data)
+ appdata = server->cm_rxgk_appdata;
+ break;
+ }
+ return rxgk_kernel_respond_to_challenge(challenge, &appdata);
+#endif
+
+ default:
+ return rxrpc_kernel_reject_challenge(challenge, RX_USER_ABORT, -EPROTO,
+ afs_abort_unsupported_sec_class);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process the OOB message queue, processing challenge packets.
+ */
+void afs_process_oob_queue(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ struct afs_net *net = container_of(work, struct afs_net, rx_oob_work);
+ struct sk_buff *oob;
+ enum rxrpc_oob_type type;
+
+ while ((oob = rxrpc_kernel_dequeue_oob(net->socket, &type))) {
+ switch (type) {
+ case RXRPC_OOB_CHALLENGE:
+ afs_respond_to_challenge(oob);
+ break;
+ }
+ rxrpc_kernel_free_oob(oob);
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_RXGK
+/*
+ * Create a securities keyring for the cache manager and attach a key to it for
+ * the RxGK tokens we want to use to secure the callback connection back from
+ * the fileserver.
+ */
+int afs_create_token_key(struct afs_net *net, struct socket *socket)
+{
+ const struct krb5_enctype *krb5;
+ struct key *ring;
+ key_ref_t key;
+ char K0[32], *desc;
+ int ret;
+
+ ring = keyring_alloc("kafs",
+ GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, current_cred(),
+ KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_WRITE |
+ KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH,
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
+ NULL, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(ring))
+ return PTR_ERR(ring);
+
+ ret = rxrpc_sock_set_security_keyring(socket->sk, ring);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = -ENOPKG;
+ krb5 = crypto_krb5_find_enctype(KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96);
+ if (!krb5)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(krb5->key_len > sizeof(K0)))
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ desc = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%u:%u:%u:%u",
+ YFS_CM_SERVICE, RXRPC_SECURITY_YFS_RXGK, 1, krb5->etype);
+ if (!desc)
+ goto out;
+
+ wait_for_random_bytes();
+ get_random_bytes(K0, krb5->key_len);
+
+ key = key_create(make_key_ref(ring, true),
+ "rxrpc_s", desc,
+ K0, krb5->key_len,
+ KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_USR_VIEW,
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
+ kfree(desc);
+ if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(key);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ net->fs_cm_token_key = key_ref_to_ptr(key);
+ ret = 0;
+out:
+ key_put(ring);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create an YFS RxGK GSS token to use as a ticket to the specified fileserver.
+ */
+static int afs_create_yfs_cm_token(struct sk_buff *challenge,
+ struct afs_server *server)
+{
+ const struct krb5_enctype *conn_krb5, *token_krb5;
+ const struct krb5_buffer *token_key;
+ struct crypto_aead *aead;
+ struct scatterlist sg;
+ struct afs_net *net = server->cell->net;
+ const struct key *key = net->fs_cm_token_key;
+ size_t keysize, uuidsize, authsize, toksize, encsize, contsize, adatasize, offset;
+ __be32 caps[1] = {
+ [0] = htonl(AFS_CAP_ERROR_TRANSLATION),
+ };
+ __be32 *xdr;
+ void *appdata, *K0, *encbase;
+ u32 enctype;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!key)
+ return -ENOKEY;
+
+ /* Assume that the fileserver is happy to use the same encoding type as
+ * we were told to use by the token obtained by the user.
+ */
+ enctype = rxgk_kernel_query_challenge(challenge);
+
+ conn_krb5 = crypto_krb5_find_enctype(enctype);
+ if (!conn_krb5)
+ return -ENOPKG;
+ token_krb5 = key->payload.data[0];
+ token_key = (const struct krb5_buffer *)&key->payload.data[2];
+
+ /* struct rxgk_key {
+ * afs_uint32 enctype;
+ * opaque key<>;
+ * };
+ */
+ keysize = 4 + xdr_len_object(conn_krb5->key_len);
+
+ /* struct RXGK_AuthName {
+ * afs_int32 kind;
+ * opaque data<AUTHDATAMAX>;
+ * opaque display<AUTHPRINTABLEMAX>;
+ * };
+ */
+ uuidsize = sizeof(server->uuid);
+ authsize = 4 + xdr_len_object(uuidsize) + xdr_len_object(0);
+
+ /* struct RXGK_Token {
+ * rxgk_key K0;
+ * RXGK_Level level;
+ * rxgkTime starttime;
+ * afs_int32 lifetime;
+ * afs_int32 bytelife;
+ * rxgkTime expirationtime;
+ * struct RXGK_AuthName identities<>;
+ * };
+ */
+ toksize = keysize + 8 + 4 + 4 + 8 + xdr_len_object(authsize);
+
+ offset = 0;
+ encsize = crypto_krb5_how_much_buffer(token_krb5, KRB5_ENCRYPT_MODE, toksize, &offset);
+
+ /* struct RXGK_TokenContainer {
+ * afs_int32 kvno;
+ * afs_int32 enctype;
+ * opaque encrypted_token<>;
+ * };
+ */
+ contsize = 4 + 4 + xdr_len_object(encsize);
+
+ /* struct YFSAppData {
+ * opr_uuid initiatorUuid;
+ * opr_uuid acceptorUuid;
+ * Capabilities caps;
+ * afs_int32 enctype;
+ * opaque callbackKey<>;
+ * opaque callbackToken<>;
+ * };
+ */
+ adatasize = 16 + 16 +
+ xdr_len_object(sizeof(caps)) +
+ 4 +
+ xdr_len_object(conn_krb5->key_len) +
+ xdr_len_object(contsize);
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ appdata = kzalloc(adatasize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!appdata)
+ goto out;
+ xdr = appdata;
+
+ memcpy(xdr, &net->uuid, 16); /* appdata.initiatorUuid */
+ xdr += 16 / 4;
+ memcpy(xdr, &server->uuid, 16); /* appdata.acceptorUuid */
+ xdr += 16 / 4;
+ *xdr++ = htonl(ARRAY_SIZE(caps)); /* appdata.caps.len */
+ memcpy(xdr, &caps, sizeof(caps)); /* appdata.caps */
+ xdr += ARRAY_SIZE(caps);
+ *xdr++ = htonl(conn_krb5->etype); /* appdata.enctype */
+
+ *xdr++ = htonl(conn_krb5->key_len); /* appdata.callbackKey.len */
+ K0 = xdr;
+ get_random_bytes(K0, conn_krb5->key_len); /* appdata.callbackKey.data */
+ xdr += xdr_round_up(conn_krb5->key_len) / 4;
+
+ *xdr++ = htonl(contsize); /* appdata.callbackToken.len */
+ *xdr++ = htonl(1); /* cont.kvno */
+ *xdr++ = htonl(token_krb5->etype); /* cont.enctype */
+ *xdr++ = htonl(encsize); /* cont.encrypted_token.len */
+
+ encbase = xdr;
+ xdr += offset / 4;
+ *xdr++ = htonl(conn_krb5->etype); /* token.K0.enctype */
+ *xdr++ = htonl(conn_krb5->key_len); /* token.K0.key.len */
+ memcpy(xdr, K0, conn_krb5->key_len); /* token.K0.key.data */
+ xdr += xdr_round_up(conn_krb5->key_len) / 4;
+
+ *xdr++ = htonl(RXRPC_SECURITY_ENCRYPT); /* token.level */
+ *xdr++ = htonl(0); /* token.starttime */
+ *xdr++ = htonl(0); /* " */
+ *xdr++ = htonl(0); /* token.lifetime */
+ *xdr++ = htonl(0); /* token.bytelife */
+ *xdr++ = htonl(0); /* token.expirationtime */
+ *xdr++ = htonl(0); /* " */
+ *xdr++ = htonl(1); /* token.identities.count */
+ *xdr++ = htonl(0); /* token.identities[0].kind */
+ *xdr++ = htonl(uuidsize); /* token.identities[0].data.len */
+ memcpy(xdr, &server->uuid, uuidsize);
+ xdr += xdr_round_up(uuidsize) / 4;
+ *xdr++ = htonl(0); /* token.identities[0].display.len */
+
+ xdr = encbase + xdr_round_up(encsize);
+
+ if ((unsigned long)xdr - (unsigned long)appdata != adatasize)
+ pr_err("Appdata size incorrect %lx != %zx\n",
+ (unsigned long)xdr - (unsigned long)appdata, adatasize);
+
+ aead = crypto_krb5_prepare_encryption(token_krb5, token_key, RXGK_SERVER_ENC_TOKEN,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (IS_ERR(aead)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(aead);
+ goto out_token;
+ }
+
+ sg_init_one(&sg, encbase, encsize);
+ ret = crypto_krb5_encrypt(token_krb5, aead, &sg, 1, encsize, offset, toksize, false);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out_aead;
+
+ server->cm_rxgk_appdata.len = adatasize;
+ server->cm_rxgk_appdata.data = appdata;
+ appdata = NULL;
+
+out_aead:
+ crypto_free_aead(aead);
+out_token:
+ kfree(appdata);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_RXGK */