diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 49 |
1 files changed, 39 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c index c7b66b2ea9f2..40daa38276f3 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c @@ -1411,7 +1411,8 @@ static void l2cap_request_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn) sizeof(req), &req); } -static bool l2cap_check_enc_key_size(struct hci_conn *hcon) +static bool l2cap_check_enc_key_size(struct hci_conn *hcon, + struct l2cap_chan *chan) { /* The minimum encryption key size needs to be enforced by the * host stack before establishing any L2CAP connections. The @@ -1425,7 +1426,7 @@ static bool l2cap_check_enc_key_size(struct hci_conn *hcon) int min_key_size = hcon->hdev->min_enc_key_size; /* On FIPS security level, key size must be 16 bytes */ - if (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS) + if (chan->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS) min_key_size = 16; return (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) || @@ -1453,7 +1454,7 @@ static void l2cap_do_start(struct l2cap_chan *chan) !__l2cap_no_conn_pending(chan)) return; - if (l2cap_check_enc_key_size(conn->hcon)) + if (l2cap_check_enc_key_size(conn->hcon, chan)) l2cap_start_connection(chan); else __set_chan_timer(chan, L2CAP_DISC_TIMEOUT); @@ -1528,7 +1529,7 @@ static void l2cap_conn_start(struct l2cap_conn *conn) continue; } - if (l2cap_check_enc_key_size(conn->hcon)) + if (l2cap_check_enc_key_size(conn->hcon, chan)) l2cap_start_connection(chan); else l2cap_chan_close(chan, ECONNREFUSED); @@ -3414,7 +3415,7 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_req(struct l2cap_chan *chan, void *data, size_t data struct l2cap_conf_rfc rfc = { .mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC }; struct l2cap_conf_efs efs; u8 remote_efs = 0; - u16 mtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU; + u16 mtu = 0; u16 result = L2CAP_CONF_SUCCESS; u16 size; @@ -3519,6 +3520,13 @@ done: /* Configure output options and let the other side know * which ones we don't like. */ + /* If MTU is not provided in configure request, use the most recently + * explicitly or implicitly accepted value for the other direction, + * or the default value. + */ + if (mtu == 0) + mtu = chan->imtu ? chan->imtu : L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU; + if (mtu < L2CAP_DEFAULT_MIN_MTU) result = L2CAP_CONF_UNACCEPT; else { @@ -3991,7 +3999,8 @@ static void l2cap_connect(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct l2cap_cmd_hdr *cmd, /* Check if the ACL is secure enough (if not SDP) */ if (psm != cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_PSM_SDP) && - !hci_conn_check_link_mode(conn->hcon)) { + (!hci_conn_check_link_mode(conn->hcon) || + !l2cap_check_enc_key_size(conn->hcon, pchan))) { conn->disc_reason = HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE; result = L2CAP_CR_SEC_BLOCK; goto response; @@ -4868,7 +4877,8 @@ static int l2cap_le_connect_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, if (!smp_sufficient_security(conn->hcon, pchan->sec_level, SMP_ALLOW_STK)) { - result = L2CAP_CR_LE_AUTHENTICATION; + result = pchan->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM ? + L2CAP_CR_LE_ENCRYPTION : L2CAP_CR_LE_AUTHENTICATION; chan = NULL; goto response_unlock; } @@ -7351,7 +7361,7 @@ static void l2cap_security_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status, u8 encrypt) } if (chan->state == BT_CONNECT) { - if (!status && l2cap_check_enc_key_size(hcon)) + if (!status && l2cap_check_enc_key_size(hcon, chan)) l2cap_start_connection(chan); else __set_chan_timer(chan, L2CAP_DISC_TIMEOUT); @@ -7361,7 +7371,7 @@ static void l2cap_security_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status, u8 encrypt) struct l2cap_conn_rsp rsp; __u16 res, stat; - if (!status && l2cap_check_enc_key_size(hcon)) { + if (!status && l2cap_check_enc_key_size(hcon, chan)) { if (test_bit(FLAG_DEFER_SETUP, &chan->flags)) { res = L2CAP_CR_PEND; stat = L2CAP_CS_AUTHOR_PEND; @@ -7414,6 +7424,9 @@ static int l2cap_recv_frag(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb, return -ENOMEM; /* Init rx_len */ conn->rx_len = len; + + skb_set_delivery_time(conn->rx_skb, skb->tstamp, + skb->tstamp_type); } /* Copy as much as the rx_skb can hold */ @@ -7538,8 +7551,24 @@ void l2cap_recv_acldata(struct hci_conn *hcon, struct sk_buff *skb, u16 flags) if (skb->len > len) { BT_ERR("Frame is too long (len %u, expected len %d)", skb->len, len); + /* PTS test cases L2CAP/COS/CED/BI-14-C and BI-15-C + * (Multiple Signaling Command in one PDU, Data + * Truncated, BR/EDR) send a C-frame to the IUT with + * PDU Length set to 8 and Channel ID set to the + * correct signaling channel for the logical link. + * The Information payload contains one L2CAP_ECHO_REQ + * packet with Data Length set to 0 with 0 octets of + * echo data and one invalid command packet due to + * data truncated in PDU but present in HCI packet. + * + * Shorter the socket buffer to the PDU length to + * allow to process valid commands from the PDU before + * setting the socket unreliable. + */ + skb->len = len; + l2cap_recv_frame(conn, skb); l2cap_conn_unreliable(conn, ECOMM); - goto drop; + goto unlock; } /* Append fragment into frame (with header) */ |