diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'net/core/scm.c')
-rw-r--r-- | net/core/scm.c | 132 |
1 files changed, 132 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c index 4f6a14babe5a..0225bd94170f 100644 --- a/net/core/scm.c +++ b/net/core/scm.c @@ -282,6 +282,16 @@ efault: } EXPORT_SYMBOL(put_cmsg); +int put_cmsg_notrunc(struct msghdr *msg, int level, int type, int len, + void *data) +{ + /* Don't produce truncated CMSGs */ + if (!msg->msg_control || msg->msg_controllen < CMSG_LEN(len)) + return -ETOOSMALL; + + return put_cmsg(msg, level, type, len, data); +} + void put_cmsg_scm_timestamping64(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_timestamping_internal *tss_internal) { struct scm_timestamping64 tss; @@ -394,3 +404,125 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl) return new_fpl; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(scm_fp_dup); + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK +static void scm_passec(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm) +{ + struct lsm_context ctx; + int err; + + if (sk->sk_scm_security) { + err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &ctx); + + if (err >= 0) { + put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, ctx.len, + ctx.context); + + security_release_secctx(&ctx); + } + } +} + +static bool scm_has_secdata(struct sock *sk) +{ + return sk->sk_scm_security; +} +#else +static void scm_passec(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm) +{ +} + +static bool scm_has_secdata(struct sock *sk) +{ + return false; +} +#endif + +static void scm_pidfd_recv(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm) +{ + struct file *pidfd_file = NULL; + int len, pidfd; + + /* put_cmsg() doesn't return an error if CMSG is truncated, + * that's why we need to opencode these checks here. + */ + if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT) + len = sizeof(struct compat_cmsghdr) + sizeof(int); + else + len = sizeof(struct cmsghdr) + sizeof(int); + + if (msg->msg_controllen < len) { + msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC; + return; + } + + if (!scm->pid) + return; + + pidfd = pidfd_prepare(scm->pid, 0, &pidfd_file); + + if (put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_PIDFD, sizeof(int), &pidfd)) { + if (pidfd_file) { + put_unused_fd(pidfd); + fput(pidfd_file); + } + + return; + } + + if (pidfd_file) + fd_install(pidfd, pidfd_file); +} + +static bool __scm_recv_common(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, + struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags) +{ + if (!msg->msg_control) { + if (sk->sk_scm_credentials || sk->sk_scm_pidfd || + scm->fp || scm_has_secdata(sk)) + msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC; + + scm_destroy(scm); + return false; + } + + if (sk->sk_scm_credentials) { + struct user_namespace *current_ns = current_user_ns(); + struct ucred ucreds = { + .pid = scm->creds.pid, + .uid = from_kuid_munged(current_ns, scm->creds.uid), + .gid = from_kgid_munged(current_ns, scm->creds.gid), + }; + + put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_CREDENTIALS, sizeof(ucreds), &ucreds); + } + + scm_passec(sk, msg, scm); + + if (scm->fp) + scm_detach_fds(msg, scm); + + return true; +} + +void scm_recv(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, + struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags) +{ + if (!__scm_recv_common(sock->sk, msg, scm, flags)) + return; + + scm_destroy_cred(scm); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(scm_recv); + +void scm_recv_unix(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, + struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags) +{ + if (!__scm_recv_common(sock->sk, msg, scm, flags)) + return; + + if (sock->sk->sk_scm_pidfd) + scm_pidfd_recv(msg, scm); + + scm_destroy_cred(scm); +} |