diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'net/rxrpc')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/Kconfig | 23 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/Makefile | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c | 130 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h | 83 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/call_accept.c | 34 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/call_event.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/call_object.c | 28 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/conn_client.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/conn_event.c | 134 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/conn_object.c | 10 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/insecure.c | 13 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/io_thread.c | 12 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/key.c | 187 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/net_ns.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/oob.c | 379 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/output.c | 60 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/peer_object.c | 22 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/protocol.h | 20 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c | 132 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/rxgk.c | 1371 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/rxgk_app.c | 286 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h | 139 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/rxgk_kdf.c | 288 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/rxkad.c | 296 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/rxperf.c | 78 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/security.c | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c | 25 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/server_key.c | 42 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/txbuf.c | 8 |
29 files changed, 3545 insertions, 272 deletions
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/Kconfig b/net/rxrpc/Kconfig index a20986806fea..f60b81c66078 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/Kconfig +++ b/net/rxrpc/Kconfig @@ -67,6 +67,29 @@ config RXKAD See Documentation/networking/rxrpc.rst. +config RXGK + bool "RxRPC GSSAPI security" + select CRYPTO_KRB5 + select CRYPTO_MANAGER + select CRYPTO_KRB5ENC + select CRYPTO_AUTHENC + select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER + select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO + select CRYPTO_HMAC + select CRYPTO_CMAC + select CRYPTO_SHA1 + select CRYPTO_SHA256 + select CRYPTO_SHA512 + select CRYPTO_CBC + select CRYPTO_CTS + select CRYPTO_AES + select CRYPTO_CAMELLIA + help + Provide the GSSAPI-based RxGK security class for AFS. Keys are added + with add_key(). + + See Documentation/networking/rxrpc.rst. + config RXPERF tristate "RxRPC test service" help diff --git a/net/rxrpc/Makefile b/net/rxrpc/Makefile index 210b75e3179e..c0542bae719e 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/Makefile +++ b/net/rxrpc/Makefile @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ rxrpc-y := \ local_object.o \ misc.o \ net_ns.o \ + oob.o \ output.o \ peer_event.o \ peer_object.o \ @@ -39,6 +40,9 @@ rxrpc-y := \ rxrpc-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o rxrpc-$(CONFIG_RXKAD) += rxkad.o rxrpc-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o - +rxrpc-$(CONFIG_RXGK) += \ + rxgk.o \ + rxgk_app.o \ + rxgk_kdf.o obj-$(CONFIG_RXPERF) += rxperf.o diff --git a/net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c b/net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c index 86873399f7d5..36df0274d7b7 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c @@ -265,7 +265,10 @@ static int rxrpc_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) * @gfp: Allocation flags * * Lookup or create a remote transport endpoint record for the specified - * address and return it with a ref held. + * address. + * + * Return: The peer record found with a reference, %NULL if no record is found + * or a negative error code if the address is invalid or unsupported. */ struct rxrpc_peer *rxrpc_kernel_lookup_peer(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_rxrpc *srx, gfp_t gfp) @@ -283,9 +286,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_kernel_lookup_peer); /** * rxrpc_kernel_get_peer - Get a reference on a peer - * @peer: The peer to get a reference on. + * @peer: The peer to get a reference on (may be NULL). + * + * Get a reference for a remote peer record (if not NULL). * - * Get a record for the remote peer in a call. + * Return: The @peer argument. */ struct rxrpc_peer *rxrpc_kernel_get_peer(struct rxrpc_peer *peer) { @@ -296,6 +301,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_kernel_get_peer); /** * rxrpc_kernel_put_peer - Allow a kernel app to drop a peer reference * @peer: The peer to drop a ref on + * + * Drop a reference on a peer record. */ void rxrpc_kernel_put_peer(struct rxrpc_peer *peer) { @@ -320,10 +327,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_kernel_put_peer); * * Allow a kernel service to begin a call on the nominated socket. This just * sets up all the internal tracking structures and allocates connection and - * call IDs as appropriate. The call to be used is returned. + * call IDs as appropriate. * * The default socket destination address and security may be overridden by * supplying @srx and @key. + * + * Return: The new call or an error code. */ struct rxrpc_call *rxrpc_kernel_begin_call(struct socket *sock, struct rxrpc_peer *peer, @@ -437,6 +446,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_kernel_put_call); * * Allow a kernel service to find out whether a call is still alive - whether * it has completed successfully and all received data has been consumed. + * + * Return: %true if the call is still ongoing and %false if it has completed. */ bool rxrpc_kernel_check_life(const struct socket *sock, const struct rxrpc_call *call) @@ -450,63 +461,20 @@ bool rxrpc_kernel_check_life(const struct socket *sock, EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_kernel_check_life); /** - * rxrpc_kernel_get_epoch - Retrieve the epoch value from a call. - * @sock: The socket the call is on - * @call: The call to query - * - * Allow a kernel service to retrieve the epoch value from a service call to - * see if the client at the other end rebooted. - */ -u32 rxrpc_kernel_get_epoch(struct socket *sock, struct rxrpc_call *call) -{ - return call->conn->proto.epoch; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_kernel_get_epoch); - -/** - * rxrpc_kernel_new_call_notification - Get notifications of new calls - * @sock: The socket to intercept received messages on - * @notify_new_call: Function to be called when new calls appear - * @discard_new_call: Function to discard preallocated calls + * rxrpc_kernel_set_notifications - Set table of callback operations + * @sock: The socket to install table upon + * @app_ops: Callback operation table to set * - * Allow a kernel service to be given notifications about new calls. + * Allow a kernel service to set a table of event notifications on a socket. */ -void rxrpc_kernel_new_call_notification( - struct socket *sock, - rxrpc_notify_new_call_t notify_new_call, - rxrpc_discard_new_call_t discard_new_call) +void rxrpc_kernel_set_notifications(struct socket *sock, + const struct rxrpc_kernel_ops *app_ops) { struct rxrpc_sock *rx = rxrpc_sk(sock->sk); - rx->notify_new_call = notify_new_call; - rx->discard_new_call = discard_new_call; + rx->app_ops = app_ops; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_kernel_new_call_notification); - -/** - * rxrpc_kernel_set_max_life - Set maximum lifespan on a call - * @sock: The socket the call is on - * @call: The call to configure - * @hard_timeout: The maximum lifespan of the call in ms - * - * Set the maximum lifespan of a call. The call will end with ETIME or - * ETIMEDOUT if it takes longer than this. - */ -void rxrpc_kernel_set_max_life(struct socket *sock, struct rxrpc_call *call, - unsigned long hard_timeout) -{ - ktime_t delay = ms_to_ktime(hard_timeout), expect_term_by; - - mutex_lock(&call->user_mutex); - - expect_term_by = ktime_add(ktime_get_real(), delay); - WRITE_ONCE(call->expect_term_by, expect_term_by); - trace_rxrpc_timer_set(call, delay, rxrpc_timer_trace_hard); - rxrpc_poke_call(call, rxrpc_call_poke_set_timeout); - - mutex_unlock(&call->user_mutex); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_kernel_set_max_life); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_kernel_set_notifications); /* * connect an RxRPC socket @@ -624,7 +592,10 @@ static int rxrpc_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *m, size_t len) fallthrough; case RXRPC_SERVER_BOUND: case RXRPC_SERVER_LISTENING: - ret = rxrpc_do_sendmsg(rx, m, len); + if (m->msg_flags & MSG_OOB) + ret = rxrpc_sendmsg_oob(rx, m, len); + else + ret = rxrpc_do_sendmsg(rx, m, len); /* The socket has been unlocked */ goto out; default: @@ -659,7 +630,7 @@ static int rxrpc_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) { struct rxrpc_sock *rx = rxrpc_sk(sock->sk); - unsigned int min_sec_level; + unsigned int min_sec_level, val; u16 service_upgrade[2]; int ret; @@ -740,6 +711,26 @@ static int rxrpc_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, rx->service_upgrade.to = service_upgrade[1]; goto success; + case RXRPC_MANAGE_RESPONSE: + ret = -EINVAL; + if (optlen != sizeof(unsigned int)) + goto error; + ret = -EISCONN; + if (rx->sk.sk_state != RXRPC_UNBOUND) + goto error; + ret = copy_safe_from_sockptr(&val, sizeof(val), + optval, optlen); + if (ret) + goto error; + ret = -EINVAL; + if (val > 1) + goto error; + if (val) + set_bit(RXRPC_SOCK_MANAGE_RESPONSE, &rx->flags); + else + clear_bit(RXRPC_SOCK_MANAGE_RESPONSE, &rx->flags); + goto success; + default: break; } @@ -846,6 +837,8 @@ static int rxrpc_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, rx->calls = RB_ROOT; spin_lock_init(&rx->incoming_lock); + skb_queue_head_init(&rx->recvmsg_oobq); + rx->pending_oobq = RB_ROOT; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rx->sock_calls); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rx->to_be_accepted); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rx->recvmsg_q); @@ -879,8 +872,10 @@ static int rxrpc_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int flags) lock_sock(sk); if (sk->sk_state < RXRPC_CLOSE) { + spin_lock_irq(&rx->recvmsg_lock); sk->sk_state = RXRPC_CLOSE; sk->sk_shutdown = SHUTDOWN_MASK; + spin_unlock_irq(&rx->recvmsg_lock); } else { ret = -ESHUTDOWN; } @@ -892,12 +887,30 @@ static int rxrpc_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int flags) } /* + * Purge the out-of-band queue. + */ +static void rxrpc_purge_oob_queue(struct sock *sk) +{ + struct rxrpc_sock *rx = rxrpc_sk(sk); + struct sk_buff *skb; + + while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&rx->recvmsg_oobq))) + rxrpc_kernel_free_oob(skb); + while (!RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&rx->pending_oobq)) { + skb = rb_entry(rx->pending_oobq.rb_node, struct sk_buff, rbnode); + rb_erase(&skb->rbnode, &rx->pending_oobq); + rxrpc_kernel_free_oob(skb); + } +} + +/* * RxRPC socket destructor */ static void rxrpc_sock_destructor(struct sock *sk) { _enter("%p", sk); + rxrpc_purge_oob_queue(sk); rxrpc_purge_queue(&sk->sk_receive_queue); WARN_ON(refcount_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc)); @@ -936,7 +949,9 @@ static int rxrpc_release_sock(struct sock *sk) break; } + spin_lock_irq(&rx->recvmsg_lock); sk->sk_state = RXRPC_CLOSE; + spin_unlock_irq(&rx->recvmsg_lock); if (rx->local && rx->local->service == rx) { write_lock(&rx->local->services_lock); @@ -948,6 +963,7 @@ static int rxrpc_release_sock(struct sock *sk) rxrpc_discard_prealloc(rx); rxrpc_release_calls_on_socket(rx); flush_workqueue(rxrpc_workqueue); + rxrpc_purge_oob_queue(sk); rxrpc_purge_queue(&sk->sk_receive_queue); rxrpc_unuse_local(rx->local, rxrpc_local_unuse_release_sock); diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h index 3cc3af15086f..5bd3922c310d 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h +++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ struct key_preparsed_payload; struct rxrpc_connection; struct rxrpc_txbuf; struct rxrpc_txqueue; +struct rxgk_context; /* * Mark applied to socket buffers in skb->mark. skb->priority is used @@ -39,6 +40,7 @@ struct rxrpc_txqueue; enum rxrpc_skb_mark { RXRPC_SKB_MARK_PACKET, /* Received packet */ RXRPC_SKB_MARK_ERROR, /* Error notification */ + RXRPC_SKB_MARK_CHALLENGE, /* Challenge notification */ RXRPC_SKB_MARK_SERVICE_CONN_SECURED, /* Service connection response has been verified */ RXRPC_SKB_MARK_REJECT_BUSY, /* Reject with BUSY */ RXRPC_SKB_MARK_REJECT_ABORT, /* Reject with ABORT (code in skb->priority) */ @@ -146,10 +148,12 @@ struct rxrpc_backlog { struct rxrpc_sock { /* WARNING: sk has to be the first member */ struct sock sk; - rxrpc_notify_new_call_t notify_new_call; /* Func to notify of new call */ - rxrpc_discard_new_call_t discard_new_call; /* Func to discard a new call */ + const struct rxrpc_kernel_ops *app_ops; /* Table of kernel app notification funcs */ struct rxrpc_local *local; /* local endpoint */ struct rxrpc_backlog *backlog; /* Preallocation for services */ + struct sk_buff_head recvmsg_oobq; /* OOB messages for recvmsg to pick up */ + struct rb_root pending_oobq; /* OOB messages awaiting userspace to respond to */ + u64 oob_id_counter; /* OOB message ID counter */ spinlock_t incoming_lock; /* Incoming call vs service shutdown lock */ struct list_head sock_calls; /* List of calls owned by this socket */ struct list_head to_be_accepted; /* calls awaiting acceptance */ @@ -160,6 +164,7 @@ struct rxrpc_sock { struct rb_root calls; /* User ID -> call mapping */ unsigned long flags; #define RXRPC_SOCK_CONNECTED 0 /* connect_srx is set */ +#define RXRPC_SOCK_MANAGE_RESPONSE 1 /* User wants to manage RESPONSE packets */ rwlock_t call_lock; /* lock for calls */ u32 min_sec_level; /* minimum security level */ #define RXRPC_SECURITY_MAX RXRPC_SECURITY_ENCRYPT @@ -203,7 +208,7 @@ struct rxrpc_host_header { */ struct rxrpc_skb_priv { union { - struct rxrpc_connection *conn; /* Connection referred to (poke packet) */ + struct rxrpc_connection *poke_conn; /* Conn referred to (poke packet) */ struct { u16 offset; /* Offset of data */ u16 len; /* Length of data */ @@ -217,6 +222,19 @@ struct rxrpc_skb_priv { u16 nr_acks; /* Number of acks+nacks */ u8 reason; /* Reason for ack */ } ack; + struct { + struct rxrpc_connection *conn; /* Connection referred to */ + union { + u32 rxkad_nonce; + }; + } chall; + struct { + rxrpc_serial_t challenge_serial; + u32 kvno; + u32 version; + u16 len; + u16 ticket_len; + } resp; }; struct rxrpc_host_header hdr; /* RxRPC packet header from this packet */ }; @@ -270,9 +288,24 @@ struct rxrpc_security { /* issue a challenge */ int (*issue_challenge)(struct rxrpc_connection *); + /* Validate a challenge packet */ + bool (*validate_challenge)(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + struct sk_buff *skb); + + /* Fill out the cmsg for recvmsg() to pass on a challenge to userspace. + * The security class gets to add additional information. + */ + int (*challenge_to_recvmsg)(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + struct sk_buff *challenge, + struct msghdr *msg); + + /* Parse sendmsg() control message and respond to challenge. */ + int (*sendmsg_respond_to_challenge)(struct sk_buff *challenge, + struct msghdr *msg); + /* respond to a challenge */ - int (*respond_to_challenge)(struct rxrpc_connection *, - struct sk_buff *); + int (*respond_to_challenge)(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + struct sk_buff *challenge); /* verify a response */ int (*verify_response)(struct rxrpc_connection *, @@ -280,6 +313,11 @@ struct rxrpc_security { /* clear connection security */ void (*clear)(struct rxrpc_connection *); + + /* Default ticket -> key decoder */ + int (*default_decode_ticket)(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb, + unsigned int ticket_offset, unsigned int ticket_len, + struct key **_key); }; /* @@ -526,7 +564,17 @@ struct rxrpc_connection { struct rxrpc_crypt csum_iv; /* packet checksum base */ u32 nonce; /* response re-use preventer */ } rxkad; + struct { + struct rxgk_context *keys[4]; /* (Re-)keying buffer */ + u64 start_time; /* The start time for TK derivation */ + u8 nonce[20]; /* Response re-use preventer */ + u32 enctype; /* Kerberos 5 encoding type */ + u32 key_number; /* Current key number */ + } rxgk; }; + rwlock_t security_use_lock; /* Security use/modification lock */ + struct sk_buff *tx_response; /* Response packet to be transmitted */ + unsigned long flags; unsigned long events; unsigned long idle_timestamp; /* Time at which last became idle */ @@ -692,6 +740,7 @@ struct rxrpc_call { u32 call_id; /* call ID on connection */ u32 cid; /* connection ID plus channel index */ u32 security_level; /* Security level selected */ + u32 security_enctype; /* Security-specific encoding type (or 0) */ int debug_id; /* debug ID for printks */ unsigned short rx_pkt_offset; /* Current recvmsg packet offset */ unsigned short rx_pkt_len; /* Current recvmsg packet len */ @@ -867,6 +916,8 @@ struct rxrpc_txbuf { unsigned short len; /* Amount of data in buffer */ unsigned short space; /* Remaining data space */ unsigned short offset; /* Offset of fill point */ + unsigned short crypto_header; /* Size of crypto header */ + unsigned short sec_header; /* Size of security header */ unsigned short pkt_len; /* Size of packet content */ unsigned short alloc_size; /* Amount of bufferage allocated */ unsigned int flags; @@ -1001,7 +1052,9 @@ struct rxrpc_call *rxrpc_alloc_call(struct rxrpc_sock *, gfp_t, unsigned int); struct rxrpc_call *rxrpc_new_client_call(struct rxrpc_sock *, struct rxrpc_conn_parameters *, struct rxrpc_call_params *, gfp_t, - unsigned int); + unsigned int) + __releases(&rx->sk.sk_lock) + __acquires(&call->user_mutex); void rxrpc_start_call_timer(struct rxrpc_call *call); void rxrpc_incoming_call(struct rxrpc_sock *, struct rxrpc_call *, struct sk_buff *); @@ -1198,8 +1251,11 @@ void rxrpc_error_report(struct sock *); bool rxrpc_direct_abort(struct sk_buff *skb, enum rxrpc_abort_reason why, s32 abort_code, int err); int rxrpc_io_thread(void *data); +void rxrpc_post_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb); static inline void rxrpc_wake_up_io_thread(struct rxrpc_local *local) { + if (!local->io_thread) + return; wake_up_process(READ_ONCE(local->io_thread)); } @@ -1289,8 +1345,16 @@ static inline struct rxrpc_net *rxrpc_net(struct net *net) } /* + * out_of_band.c + */ +void rxrpc_notify_socket_oob(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb); +void rxrpc_add_pending_oob(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, struct sk_buff *skb); +int rxrpc_sendmsg_oob(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len); + +/* * output.c */ +ssize_t do_udp_sendmsg(struct socket *socket, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len); void rxrpc_send_ACK(struct rxrpc_call *call, u8 ack_reason, rxrpc_serial_t serial, enum rxrpc_propose_ack_trace why); void rxrpc_send_probe_for_pmtud(struct rxrpc_call *call); @@ -1299,6 +1363,7 @@ void rxrpc_send_data_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct rxrpc_send_data_req void rxrpc_send_conn_abort(struct rxrpc_connection *conn); void rxrpc_reject_packet(struct rxrpc_local *local, struct sk_buff *skb); void rxrpc_send_keepalive(struct rxrpc_peer *); +void rxrpc_send_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb); /* * peer_event.c @@ -1363,6 +1428,11 @@ ktime_t rxrpc_get_rto_backoff(struct rxrpc_call *call, bool retrans); void rxrpc_call_init_rtt(struct rxrpc_call *call); /* + * rxgk.c + */ +extern const struct rxrpc_security rxgk_yfs; + +/* * rxkad.c */ #ifdef CONFIG_RXKAD @@ -1433,7 +1503,6 @@ static inline void rxrpc_sysctl_exit(void) {} extern atomic_t rxrpc_nr_txbuf; struct rxrpc_txbuf *rxrpc_alloc_data_txbuf(struct rxrpc_call *call, size_t data_size, size_t data_align, gfp_t gfp); -void rxrpc_get_txbuf(struct rxrpc_txbuf *txb, enum rxrpc_txbuf_trace what); void rxrpc_see_txbuf(struct rxrpc_txbuf *txb, enum rxrpc_txbuf_trace what); void rxrpc_put_txbuf(struct rxrpc_txbuf *txb, enum rxrpc_txbuf_trace what); diff --git a/net/rxrpc/call_accept.c b/net/rxrpc/call_accept.c index e685034ce4f7..a4b363b47cca 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/call_accept.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/call_accept.c @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ static void rxrpc_dummy_notify(struct sock *sk, struct rxrpc_call *call, static int rxrpc_service_prealloc_one(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, struct rxrpc_backlog *b, rxrpc_notify_rx_t notify_rx, - rxrpc_user_attach_call_t user_attach_call, unsigned long user_call_ID, gfp_t gfp, unsigned int debug_id) { @@ -123,9 +122,10 @@ static int rxrpc_service_prealloc_one(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, call->user_call_ID = user_call_ID; call->notify_rx = notify_rx; - if (user_attach_call) { + if (rx->app_ops && + rx->app_ops->user_attach_call) { rxrpc_get_call(call, rxrpc_call_get_kernel_service); - user_attach_call(call, user_call_ID); + rx->app_ops->user_attach_call(call, user_call_ID); } rxrpc_get_call(call, rxrpc_call_get_userid); @@ -219,9 +219,10 @@ void rxrpc_discard_prealloc(struct rxrpc_sock *rx) while (CIRC_CNT(head, tail, size) > 0) { struct rxrpc_call *call = b->call_backlog[tail]; rcu_assign_pointer(call->socket, rx); - if (rx->discard_new_call) { + if (rx->app_ops && + rx->app_ops->discard_new_call) { _debug("discard %lx", call->user_call_ID); - rx->discard_new_call(call, call->user_call_ID); + rx->app_ops->discard_new_call(call, call->user_call_ID); if (call->notify_rx) call->notify_rx = rxrpc_dummy_notify; rxrpc_put_call(call, rxrpc_call_put_kernel); @@ -387,8 +388,9 @@ bool rxrpc_new_incoming_call(struct rxrpc_local *local, rxrpc_incoming_call(rx, call, skb); conn = call->conn; - if (rx->notify_new_call) - rx->notify_new_call(&rx->sk, call, call->user_call_ID); + if (rx->app_ops && + rx->app_ops->notify_new_call) + rx->app_ops->notify_new_call(&rx->sk, call, call->user_call_ID); spin_lock(&conn->state_lock); if (conn->state == RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_UNSECURED) { @@ -440,8 +442,7 @@ int rxrpc_user_charge_accept(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, unsigned long user_call_ID) if (rx->sk.sk_state == RXRPC_CLOSE) return -ESHUTDOWN; - return rxrpc_service_prealloc_one(rx, b, NULL, NULL, user_call_ID, - GFP_KERNEL, + return rxrpc_service_prealloc_one(rx, b, NULL, user_call_ID, GFP_KERNEL, atomic_inc_return(&rxrpc_debug_id)); } @@ -449,20 +450,18 @@ int rxrpc_user_charge_accept(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, unsigned long user_call_ID) * rxrpc_kernel_charge_accept - Charge up socket with preallocated calls * @sock: The socket on which to preallocate * @notify_rx: Event notification function for the call - * @user_attach_call: Func to attach call to user_call_ID * @user_call_ID: The tag to attach to the preallocated call * @gfp: The allocation conditions. * @debug_id: The tracing debug ID. * - * Charge up the socket with preallocated calls, each with a user ID. A - * function should be provided to effect the attachment from the user's side. - * The user is given a ref to hold on the call. + * Charge up the socket with preallocated calls, each with a user ID. The + * ->user_attach_call() callback function should be provided to effect the + * attachment from the user's side. The user is given a ref to hold on the + * call. * * Note that the call may be come connected before this function returns. */ -int rxrpc_kernel_charge_accept(struct socket *sock, - rxrpc_notify_rx_t notify_rx, - rxrpc_user_attach_call_t user_attach_call, +int rxrpc_kernel_charge_accept(struct socket *sock, rxrpc_notify_rx_t notify_rx, unsigned long user_call_ID, gfp_t gfp, unsigned int debug_id) { @@ -472,8 +471,7 @@ int rxrpc_kernel_charge_accept(struct socket *sock, if (sock->sk->sk_state == RXRPC_CLOSE) return -ESHUTDOWN; - return rxrpc_service_prealloc_one(rx, b, notify_rx, - user_attach_call, user_call_ID, + return rxrpc_service_prealloc_one(rx, b, notify_rx, user_call_ID, gfp, debug_id); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_kernel_charge_accept); diff --git a/net/rxrpc/call_event.c b/net/rxrpc/call_event.c index 8e477f7f8850..fec59d9338b9 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/call_event.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/call_event.c @@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ bool rxrpc_input_call_event(struct rxrpc_call *call) out: if (__rxrpc_call_is_complete(call)) { - del_timer_sync(&call->timer); + timer_delete_sync(&call->timer); if (!test_bit(RXRPC_CALL_DISCONNECTED, &call->flags)) rxrpc_disconnect_call(call); if (call->security) diff --git a/net/rxrpc/call_object.c b/net/rxrpc/call_object.c index c4c8b46a68c6..e9e8f0ef3fd5 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/call_object.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/call_object.c @@ -145,8 +145,8 @@ struct rxrpc_call *rxrpc_alloc_call(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, gfp_t gfp, INIT_LIST_HEAD(&call->recvmsg_link); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&call->sock_link); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&call->attend_link); - skb_queue_head_init(&call->rx_queue); skb_queue_head_init(&call->recvmsg_queue); + skb_queue_head_init(&call->rx_queue); skb_queue_head_init(&call->rx_oos_queue); init_waitqueue_head(&call->waitq); spin_lock_init(&call->notify_lock); @@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ struct rxrpc_call *rxrpc_new_client_call(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, struct rxrpc_call_params *p, gfp_t gfp, unsigned int debug_id) - __releases(&rx->sk.sk_lock.slock) + __releases(&rx->sk.sk_lock) __acquires(&call->user_mutex) { struct rxrpc_call *call, *xcall; @@ -688,7 +688,7 @@ static void rxrpc_destroy_call(struct work_struct *work) { struct rxrpc_call *call = container_of(work, struct rxrpc_call, destroyer); - del_timer_sync(&call->timer); + timer_delete_sync(&call->timer); rxrpc_cleanup_tx_buffers(call); rxrpc_cleanup_rx_buffers(call); @@ -711,7 +711,7 @@ void rxrpc_cleanup_call(struct rxrpc_call *call) ASSERTCMP(__rxrpc_call_state(call), ==, RXRPC_CALL_COMPLETE); ASSERT(test_bit(RXRPC_CALL_RELEASED, &call->flags)); - del_timer(&call->timer); + timer_delete(&call->timer); if (rcu_read_lock_held()) /* Can't use the rxrpc workqueue as we need to cancel/flush @@ -760,3 +760,23 @@ void rxrpc_destroy_all_calls(struct rxrpc_net *rxnet) atomic_dec(&rxnet->nr_calls); wait_var_event(&rxnet->nr_calls, !atomic_read(&rxnet->nr_calls)); } + +/** + * rxrpc_kernel_query_call_security - Query call's security parameters + * @call: The call to query + * @_service_id: Where to return the service ID + * @_enctype: Where to return the "encoding type" + * + * This queries the security parameters of a call, setting *@_service_id and + * *@_enctype and returning the security class. + * + * Return: The security class protocol number. + */ +u8 rxrpc_kernel_query_call_security(struct rxrpc_call *call, + u16 *_service_id, u32 *_enctype) +{ + *_service_id = call->dest_srx.srx_service; + *_enctype = call->security_enctype; + return call->security_ix; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_kernel_query_call_security); diff --git a/net/rxrpc/conn_client.c b/net/rxrpc/conn_client.c index db0099197890..63bbcc567f59 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/conn_client.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/conn_client.c @@ -818,7 +818,7 @@ void rxrpc_clean_up_local_conns(struct rxrpc_local *local) local->kill_all_client_conns = true; - del_timer_sync(&local->client_conn_reap_timer); + timer_delete_sync(&local->client_conn_reap_timer); while ((conn = list_first_entry_or_null(&local->idle_client_conns, struct rxrpc_connection, cache_link))) { diff --git a/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c b/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c index 4d9c5e21ba78..232b6986da83 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ /* * Set the completion state on an aborted connection. */ -static bool rxrpc_set_conn_aborted(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb, +static bool rxrpc_set_conn_aborted(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, s32 abort_code, int err, enum rxrpc_call_completion compl) { @@ -49,12 +49,20 @@ static bool rxrpc_set_conn_aborted(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff int rxrpc_abort_conn(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb, s32 abort_code, int err, enum rxrpc_abort_reason why) { - struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb); - if (rxrpc_set_conn_aborted(conn, skb, abort_code, err, + u32 cid = conn->proto.cid, call = 0, seq = 0; + + if (skb) { + struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb); + + cid = sp->hdr.cid; + call = sp->hdr.callNumber; + seq = sp->hdr.seq; + } + + if (rxrpc_set_conn_aborted(conn, abort_code, err, RXRPC_CALL_LOCALLY_ABORTED)) { - trace_rxrpc_abort(0, why, sp->hdr.cid, sp->hdr.callNumber, - sp->hdr.seq, abort_code, err); + trace_rxrpc_abort(0, why, cid, call, seq, abort_code, err); rxrpc_poke_conn(conn, rxrpc_conn_get_poke_abort); } return -EPROTO; @@ -67,7 +75,7 @@ static void rxrpc_input_conn_abort(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) { trace_rxrpc_rx_conn_abort(conn, skb); - rxrpc_set_conn_aborted(conn, skb, skb->priority, -ECONNABORTED, + rxrpc_set_conn_aborted(conn, skb->priority, -ECONNABORTED, RXRPC_CALL_REMOTELY_ABORTED); } @@ -248,7 +256,10 @@ static int rxrpc_process_event(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, switch (sp->hdr.type) { case RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_CHALLENGE: - return conn->security->respond_to_challenge(conn, skb); + ret = conn->security->respond_to_challenge(conn, skb); + sp->chall.conn = NULL; + rxrpc_put_connection(conn, rxrpc_conn_put_challenge_input); + return ret; case RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_RESPONSE: ret = conn->security->verify_response(conn, skb); @@ -270,7 +281,8 @@ static int rxrpc_process_event(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, * we've already received the packet, put it on the * front of the queue. */ - sp->conn = rxrpc_get_connection(conn, rxrpc_conn_get_poke_secured); + sp->poke_conn = rxrpc_get_connection( + conn, rxrpc_conn_get_poke_secured); skb->mark = RXRPC_SKB_MARK_SERVICE_CONN_SECURED; rxrpc_get_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_get_conn_secured); skb_queue_head(&conn->local->rx_queue, skb); @@ -392,6 +404,61 @@ static void rxrpc_post_packet_to_conn(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, } /* + * Post a CHALLENGE packet to the socket of one of a connection's calls so that + * it can get application data to include in the packet, possibly querying + * userspace. + */ +static bool rxrpc_post_challenge(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb); + struct rxrpc_call *call = NULL; + struct rxrpc_sock *rx; + bool respond = false; + + sp->chall.conn = + rxrpc_get_connection(conn, rxrpc_conn_get_challenge_input); + + if (!conn->security->challenge_to_recvmsg) { + rxrpc_post_packet_to_conn(conn, skb); + return true; + } + + rcu_read_lock(); + + for (int i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(conn->channels); i++) { + if (conn->channels[i].call) { + call = conn->channels[i].call; + rx = rcu_dereference(call->socket); + if (!rx) { + call = NULL; + continue; + } + + respond = true; + if (test_bit(RXRPC_SOCK_MANAGE_RESPONSE, &rx->flags)) + break; + call = NULL; + } + } + + if (!respond) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + rxrpc_put_connection(conn, rxrpc_conn_put_challenge_input); + sp->chall.conn = NULL; + return false; + } + + if (call) + rxrpc_notify_socket_oob(call, skb); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + if (!call) + rxrpc_post_packet_to_conn(conn, skb); + return true; +} + +/* * Input a connection-level packet. */ bool rxrpc_input_conn_packet(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) @@ -411,6 +478,16 @@ bool rxrpc_input_conn_packet(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) return true; case RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_CHALLENGE: + rxrpc_see_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_see_oob_challenge); + if (rxrpc_is_conn_aborted(conn)) { + if (conn->completion == RXRPC_CALL_LOCALLY_ABORTED) + rxrpc_send_conn_abort(conn); + return true; + } + if (!conn->security->validate_challenge(conn, skb)) + return false; + return rxrpc_post_challenge(conn, skb); + case RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_RESPONSE: if (rxrpc_is_conn_aborted(conn)) { if (conn->completion == RXRPC_CALL_LOCALLY_ABORTED) @@ -436,6 +513,19 @@ void rxrpc_input_conn_event(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) if (test_and_clear_bit(RXRPC_CONN_EV_ABORT_CALLS, &conn->events)) rxrpc_abort_calls(conn); + if (conn->tx_response) { + struct sk_buff *skb; + + spin_lock_irq(&conn->local->lock); + skb = conn->tx_response; + conn->tx_response = NULL; + spin_unlock_irq(&conn->local->lock); + + if (conn->state != RXRPC_CONN_ABORTED) + rxrpc_send_response(conn, skb); + rxrpc_free_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_put_response); + } + if (skb) { switch (skb->mark) { case RXRPC_SKB_MARK_SERVICE_CONN_SECURED: @@ -452,3 +542,31 @@ void rxrpc_input_conn_event(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) if (conn->flags & RXRPC_CONN_FINAL_ACK_MASK) rxrpc_process_delayed_final_acks(conn, false); } + +/* + * Post a RESPONSE message to the I/O thread for transmission. + */ +void rxrpc_post_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb); + struct rxrpc_local *local = conn->local; + struct sk_buff *old; + + _enter("%x", sp->resp.challenge_serial); + + spin_lock_irq(&local->lock); + old = conn->tx_response; + if (old) { + struct rxrpc_skb_priv *osp = rxrpc_skb(skb); + + /* Always go with the response to the most recent challenge. */ + if (after(sp->resp.challenge_serial, osp->resp.challenge_serial)) + conn->tx_response = old; + else + old = skb; + } else { + conn->tx_response = skb; + } + spin_unlock_irq(&local->lock); + rxrpc_poke_conn(conn, rxrpc_conn_get_poke_response); +} diff --git a/net/rxrpc/conn_object.c b/net/rxrpc/conn_object.c index 2f1fd1e2e7e4..37340becb224 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/conn_object.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/conn_object.c @@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ struct rxrpc_connection *rxrpc_alloc_connection(struct rxrpc_net *rxnet, skb_queue_head_init(&conn->rx_queue); conn->rxnet = rxnet; conn->security = &rxrpc_no_security; + rwlock_init(&conn->security_use_lock); spin_lock_init(&conn->state_lock); conn->debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&rxrpc_debug_id); conn->idle_timestamp = jiffies; @@ -314,9 +315,9 @@ static void rxrpc_clean_up_connection(struct work_struct *work) !conn->channels[3].call); ASSERT(list_empty(&conn->cache_link)); - del_timer_sync(&conn->timer); + timer_delete_sync(&conn->timer); cancel_work_sync(&conn->processor); /* Processing may restart the timer */ - del_timer_sync(&conn->timer); + timer_delete_sync(&conn->timer); write_lock(&rxnet->conn_lock); list_del_init(&conn->proc_link); @@ -329,6 +330,7 @@ static void rxrpc_clean_up_connection(struct work_struct *work) } rxrpc_purge_queue(&conn->rx_queue); + rxrpc_free_skb(conn->tx_response, rxrpc_skb_put_response); rxrpc_kill_client_conn(conn); @@ -365,7 +367,7 @@ void rxrpc_put_connection(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, dead = __refcount_dec_and_test(&conn->ref, &r); trace_rxrpc_conn(debug_id, r - 1, why); if (dead) { - del_timer(&conn->timer); + timer_delete(&conn->timer); cancel_work(&conn->processor); if (in_softirq() || work_busy(&conn->processor) || @@ -470,7 +472,7 @@ void rxrpc_destroy_all_connections(struct rxrpc_net *rxnet) atomic_dec(&rxnet->nr_conns); - del_timer_sync(&rxnet->service_conn_reap_timer); + timer_delete_sync(&rxnet->service_conn_reap_timer); rxrpc_queue_work(&rxnet->service_conn_reaper); flush_workqueue(rxrpc_workqueue); diff --git a/net/rxrpc/insecure.c b/net/rxrpc/insecure.c index e068f9b79d02..1f7c136d6d0e 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/insecure.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/insecure.c @@ -42,13 +42,19 @@ static void none_free_call_crypto(struct rxrpc_call *call) { } -static int none_respond_to_challenge(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, - struct sk_buff *skb) +static bool none_validate_challenge(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + struct sk_buff *skb) { return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RX_PROTOCOL_ERROR, -EPROTO, rxrpc_eproto_rxnull_challenge); } +static int none_sendmsg_respond_to_challenge(struct sk_buff *challenge, + struct msghdr *msg) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} + static int none_verify_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) { @@ -82,7 +88,8 @@ const struct rxrpc_security rxrpc_no_security = { .alloc_txbuf = none_alloc_txbuf, .secure_packet = none_secure_packet, .verify_packet = none_verify_packet, - .respond_to_challenge = none_respond_to_challenge, + .validate_challenge = none_validate_challenge, + .sendmsg_respond_to_challenge = none_sendmsg_respond_to_challenge, .verify_response = none_verify_response, .clear = none_clear, }; diff --git a/net/rxrpc/io_thread.c b/net/rxrpc/io_thread.c index 64f8d77b8731..27b650d30f4d 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/io_thread.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/io_thread.c @@ -489,8 +489,8 @@ int rxrpc_io_thread(void *data) rxrpc_free_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_put_error_report); break; case RXRPC_SKB_MARK_SERVICE_CONN_SECURED: - rxrpc_input_conn_event(sp->conn, skb); - rxrpc_put_connection(sp->conn, rxrpc_conn_put_poke); + rxrpc_input_conn_event(sp->poke_conn, skb); + rxrpc_put_connection(sp->poke_conn, rxrpc_conn_put_poke); rxrpc_free_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_put_conn_secured); break; default: @@ -501,9 +501,11 @@ int rxrpc_io_thread(void *data) } /* Deal with connections that want immediate attention. */ - spin_lock_irq(&local->lock); - list_splice_tail_init(&local->conn_attend_q, &conn_attend_q); - spin_unlock_irq(&local->lock); + if (!list_empty_careful(&local->conn_attend_q)) { + spin_lock_irq(&local->lock); + list_splice_tail_init(&local->conn_attend_q, &conn_attend_q); + spin_unlock_irq(&local->lock); + } while ((conn = list_first_entry_or_null(&conn_attend_q, struct rxrpc_connection, diff --git a/net/rxrpc/key.c b/net/rxrpc/key.c index 33e8302a79e3..9fdc1f031c9d 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/key.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/key.c @@ -129,6 +129,160 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse_xdr_rxkad(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep, return 0; } +static u64 xdr_dec64(const __be32 *xdr) +{ + return (u64)ntohl(xdr[0]) << 32 | (u64)ntohl(xdr[1]); +} + +static time64_t rxrpc_s64_to_time64(s64 time_in_100ns) +{ + bool neg = false; + u64 tmp = time_in_100ns; + + if (time_in_100ns < 0) { + tmp = -time_in_100ns; + neg = true; + } + do_div(tmp, 10000000); + return neg ? -tmp : tmp; +} + +/* + * Parse a YFS-RxGK type XDR format token + * - the caller guarantees we have at least 4 words + * + * struct token_rxgk { + * opr_time begintime; + * opr_time endtime; + * afs_int64 level; + * afs_int64 lifetime; + * afs_int64 bytelife; + * afs_int64 enctype; + * opaque key<>; + * opaque ticket<>; + * }; + */ +static int rxrpc_preparse_xdr_yfs_rxgk(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep, + size_t datalen, + const __be32 *xdr, unsigned int toklen) +{ + struct rxrpc_key_token *token, **pptoken; + time64_t expiry; + size_t plen; + const __be32 *ticket, *key; + s64 tmp; + u32 tktlen, keylen; + + _enter(",{%x,%x,%x,%x},%x", + ntohl(xdr[0]), ntohl(xdr[1]), ntohl(xdr[2]), ntohl(xdr[3]), + toklen); + + if (6 * 2 + 2 > toklen / 4) + goto reject; + + key = xdr + (6 * 2 + 1); + keylen = ntohl(key[-1]); + _debug("keylen: %x", keylen); + keylen = round_up(keylen, 4); + if ((6 * 2 + 2) * 4 + keylen > toklen) + goto reject; + + ticket = xdr + (6 * 2 + 1 + (keylen / 4) + 1); + tktlen = ntohl(ticket[-1]); + _debug("tktlen: %x", tktlen); + tktlen = round_up(tktlen, 4); + if ((6 * 2 + 2) * 4 + keylen + tktlen != toklen) { + kleave(" = -EKEYREJECTED [%x!=%x, %x,%x]", + (6 * 2 + 2) * 4 + keylen + tktlen, toklen, + keylen, tktlen); + goto reject; + } + + plen = sizeof(*token) + sizeof(*token->rxgk) + tktlen + keylen; + prep->quotalen = datalen + plen; + + plen -= sizeof(*token); + token = kzalloc(sizeof(*token), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!token) + goto nomem; + + token->rxgk = kzalloc(sizeof(*token->rxgk) + keylen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!token->rxgk) + goto nomem_token; + + token->security_index = RXRPC_SECURITY_YFS_RXGK; + token->rxgk->begintime = xdr_dec64(xdr + 0 * 2); + token->rxgk->endtime = xdr_dec64(xdr + 1 * 2); + token->rxgk->level = tmp = xdr_dec64(xdr + 2 * 2); + if (tmp < -1LL || tmp > RXRPC_SECURITY_ENCRYPT) + goto reject_token; + token->rxgk->lifetime = xdr_dec64(xdr + 3 * 2); + token->rxgk->bytelife = xdr_dec64(xdr + 4 * 2); + token->rxgk->enctype = tmp = xdr_dec64(xdr + 5 * 2); + if (tmp < 0 || tmp > UINT_MAX) + goto reject_token; + token->rxgk->key.len = ntohl(key[-1]); + token->rxgk->key.data = token->rxgk->_key; + token->rxgk->ticket.len = ntohl(ticket[-1]); + + if (token->rxgk->endtime != 0) { + expiry = rxrpc_s64_to_time64(token->rxgk->endtime); + if (expiry < 0) + goto expired; + if (expiry < prep->expiry) + prep->expiry = expiry; + } + + memcpy(token->rxgk->key.data, key, token->rxgk->key.len); + + /* Pad the ticket so that we can use it directly in XDR */ + token->rxgk->ticket.data = kzalloc(round_up(token->rxgk->ticket.len, 4), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!token->rxgk->ticket.data) + goto nomem_yrxgk; + memcpy(token->rxgk->ticket.data, ticket, token->rxgk->ticket.len); + + _debug("SCIX: %u", token->security_index); + _debug("EXPY: %llx", token->rxgk->endtime); + _debug("LIFE: %llx", token->rxgk->lifetime); + _debug("BYTE: %llx", token->rxgk->bytelife); + _debug("ENC : %u", token->rxgk->enctype); + _debug("LEVL: %u", token->rxgk->level); + _debug("KLEN: %u", token->rxgk->key.len); + _debug("TLEN: %u", token->rxgk->ticket.len); + _debug("KEY0: %*phN", token->rxgk->key.len, token->rxgk->key.data); + _debug("TICK: %*phN", + min_t(u32, token->rxgk->ticket.len, 32), token->rxgk->ticket.data); + + /* count the number of tokens attached */ + prep->payload.data[1] = (void *)((unsigned long)prep->payload.data[1] + 1); + + /* attach the data */ + for (pptoken = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&prep->payload.data[0]; + *pptoken; + pptoken = &(*pptoken)->next) + continue; + *pptoken = token; + + _leave(" = 0"); + return 0; + +nomem_yrxgk: + kfree(token->rxgk); +nomem_token: + kfree(token); +nomem: + return -ENOMEM; +reject_token: + kfree(token); +reject: + return -EKEYREJECTED; +expired: + kfree(token->rxgk); + kfree(token); + return -EKEYEXPIRED; +} + /* * attempt to parse the data as the XDR format * - the caller guarantees we have more than 7 words @@ -228,6 +382,9 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse_xdr(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) case RXRPC_SECURITY_RXKAD: ret2 = rxrpc_preparse_xdr_rxkad(prep, datalen, token, toklen); break; + case RXRPC_SECURITY_YFS_RXGK: + ret2 = rxrpc_preparse_xdr_yfs_rxgk(prep, datalen, token, toklen); + break; default: ret2 = -EPROTONOSUPPORT; break; @@ -390,6 +547,10 @@ static void rxrpc_free_token_list(struct rxrpc_key_token *token) case RXRPC_SECURITY_RXKAD: kfree(token->kad); break; + case RXRPC_SECURITY_YFS_RXGK: + kfree(token->rxgk->ticket.data); + kfree(token->rxgk); + break; default: pr_err("Unknown token type %x on rxrpc key\n", token->security_index); @@ -433,6 +594,9 @@ static void rxrpc_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) case RXRPC_SECURITY_RXKAD: seq_puts(m, "ka"); break; + case RXRPC_SECURITY_YFS_RXGK: + seq_puts(m, "ygk"); + break; default: /* we have a ticket we can't encode */ seq_printf(m, "%u", token->security_index); break; @@ -531,6 +695,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_get_server_data_key); * * Generate a null RxRPC key that can be used to indicate anonymous security is * required for a particular domain. + * + * Return: The new key or a negative error code. */ struct key *rxrpc_get_null_key(const char *keyname) { @@ -595,6 +761,13 @@ static long rxrpc_read(const struct key *key, toksize += RND(token->kad->ticket_len); break; + case RXRPC_SECURITY_YFS_RXGK: + toksize += 6 * 8 + 2 * 4; + if (!token->no_leak_key) + toksize += RND(token->rxgk->key.len); + toksize += RND(token->rxgk->ticket.len); + break; + default: /* we have a ticket we can't encode */ pr_err("Unsupported key token type (%u)\n", token->security_index); @@ -674,6 +847,20 @@ static long rxrpc_read(const struct key *key, ENCODE_DATA(token->kad->ticket_len, token->kad->ticket); break; + case RXRPC_SECURITY_YFS_RXGK: + ENCODE64(token->rxgk->begintime); + ENCODE64(token->rxgk->endtime); + ENCODE64(token->rxgk->level); + ENCODE64(token->rxgk->lifetime); + ENCODE64(token->rxgk->bytelife); + ENCODE64(token->rxgk->enctype); + if (token->no_leak_key) + ENCODE(0); + else + ENCODE_DATA(token->rxgk->key.len, token->rxgk->key.data); + ENCODE_DATA(token->rxgk->ticket.len, token->rxgk->ticket.data); + break; + default: pr_err("Unsupported key token type (%u)\n", token->security_index); diff --git a/net/rxrpc/net_ns.c b/net/rxrpc/net_ns.c index a4c135d0fbcc..9a9834145e81 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/net_ns.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/net_ns.c @@ -105,10 +105,10 @@ static __net_exit void rxrpc_exit_net(struct net *net) struct rxrpc_net *rxnet = rxrpc_net(net); rxnet->live = false; - del_timer_sync(&rxnet->peer_keepalive_timer); + timer_delete_sync(&rxnet->peer_keepalive_timer); cancel_work_sync(&rxnet->peer_keepalive_work); /* Remove the timer again as the worker may have restarted it. */ - del_timer_sync(&rxnet->peer_keepalive_timer); + timer_delete_sync(&rxnet->peer_keepalive_timer); rxrpc_destroy_all_calls(rxnet); rxrpc_destroy_all_connections(rxnet); rxrpc_destroy_all_peers(rxnet); diff --git a/net/rxrpc/oob.c b/net/rxrpc/oob.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..05ca9c1faa57 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/rxrpc/oob.c @@ -0,0 +1,379 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* Out of band message handling (e.g. challenge-response) + * + * Copyright (C) 2025 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + +#include <linux/net.h> +#include <linux/gfp.h> +#include <linux/skbuff.h> +#include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/sched/signal.h> +#include <net/sock.h> +#include <net/af_rxrpc.h> +#include "ar-internal.h" + +enum rxrpc_oob_command { + RXRPC_OOB_CMD_UNSET, + RXRPC_OOB_CMD_RESPOND, +} __mode(byte); + +struct rxrpc_oob_params { + u64 oob_id; /* ID number of message if reply */ + s32 abort_code; + enum rxrpc_oob_command command; + bool have_oob_id:1; +}; + +/* + * Post an out-of-band message for attention by the socket or kernel service + * associated with a reference call. + */ +void rxrpc_notify_socket_oob(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb); + struct rxrpc_sock *rx; + struct sock *sk; + + rcu_read_lock(); + + rx = rcu_dereference(call->socket); + if (rx) { + sk = &rx->sk; + spin_lock_irq(&rx->recvmsg_lock); + + if (sk->sk_state < RXRPC_CLOSE) { + skb->skb_mstamp_ns = rx->oob_id_counter++; + rxrpc_get_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_get_post_oob); + skb_queue_tail(&rx->recvmsg_oobq, skb); + + trace_rxrpc_notify_socket(call->debug_id, sp->hdr.serial); + if (rx->app_ops) + rx->app_ops->notify_oob(sk, skb); + } + + spin_unlock_irq(&rx->recvmsg_lock); + if (!rx->app_ops && !sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) + sk->sk_data_ready(sk); + } + + rcu_read_unlock(); +} + +/* + * Locate the OOB message to respond to by its ID. + */ +static struct sk_buff *rxrpc_find_pending_oob(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, u64 oob_id) +{ + struct rb_node *p; + struct sk_buff *skb; + + p = rx->pending_oobq.rb_node; + while (p) { + skb = rb_entry(p, struct sk_buff, rbnode); + + if (oob_id < skb->skb_mstamp_ns) + p = p->rb_left; + else if (oob_id > skb->skb_mstamp_ns) + p = p->rb_right; + else + return skb; + } + + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Add an OOB message into the pending-response set. We always assign the next + * value from a 64-bit counter to the oob_id, so just assume we're always going + * to be on the right-hand edge of the tree and that the counter won't wrap. + * The tree is also given a ref to the message. + */ +void rxrpc_add_pending_oob(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct rb_node **pp = &rx->pending_oobq.rb_node, *p = NULL; + + while (*pp) { + p = *pp; + pp = &(*pp)->rb_right; + } + + rb_link_node(&skb->rbnode, p, pp); + rb_insert_color(&skb->rbnode, &rx->pending_oobq); +} + +/* + * Extract control messages from the sendmsg() control buffer. + */ +static int rxrpc_sendmsg_oob_cmsg(struct msghdr *msg, struct rxrpc_oob_params *p) +{ + struct cmsghdr *cmsg; + int len; + + if (msg->msg_controllen == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + for_each_cmsghdr(cmsg, msg) { + if (!CMSG_OK(msg, cmsg)) + return -EINVAL; + + len = cmsg->cmsg_len - sizeof(struct cmsghdr); + _debug("CMSG %d, %d, %d", + cmsg->cmsg_level, cmsg->cmsg_type, len); + + if (cmsg->cmsg_level != SOL_RXRPC) + continue; + + switch (cmsg->cmsg_type) { + case RXRPC_OOB_ID: + if (len != sizeof(p->oob_id) || p->have_oob_id) + return -EINVAL; + memcpy(&p->oob_id, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), sizeof(p->oob_id)); + p->have_oob_id = true; + break; + case RXRPC_RESPOND: + if (p->command != RXRPC_OOB_CMD_UNSET) + return -EINVAL; + p->command = RXRPC_OOB_CMD_RESPOND; + break; + case RXRPC_ABORT: + if (len != sizeof(p->abort_code) || p->abort_code) + return -EINVAL; + memcpy(&p->abort_code, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), sizeof(p->abort_code)); + if (p->abort_code == 0) + return -EINVAL; + break; + case RXRPC_RESP_RXGK_APPDATA: + if (p->command != RXRPC_OOB_CMD_RESPOND) + return -EINVAL; + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + } + + switch (p->command) { + case RXRPC_OOB_CMD_RESPOND: + if (!p->have_oob_id) + return -EBADSLT; + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Allow userspace to respond to an OOB using sendmsg(). + */ +static int rxrpc_respond_to_oob(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, + struct rxrpc_oob_params *p, + struct msghdr *msg) +{ + struct rxrpc_connection *conn; + struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp; + struct sk_buff *skb; + int ret; + + skb = rxrpc_find_pending_oob(rx, p->oob_id); + if (skb) + rb_erase(&skb->rbnode, &rx->pending_oobq); + release_sock(&rx->sk); + if (!skb) + return -EBADSLT; + + sp = rxrpc_skb(skb); + + switch (p->command) { + case RXRPC_OOB_CMD_RESPOND: + ret = -EPROTO; + if (skb->mark != RXRPC_OOB_CHALLENGE) + break; + conn = sp->chall.conn; + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (!conn->security->sendmsg_respond_to_challenge) + break; + if (p->abort_code) { + rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, NULL, p->abort_code, -ECONNABORTED, + rxrpc_abort_response_sendmsg); + ret = 0; + } else { + ret = conn->security->sendmsg_respond_to_challenge(skb, msg); + } + break; + default: + ret = -EINVAL; + break; + } + + rxrpc_free_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_put_oob); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Send an out-of-band message or respond to a received out-of-band message. + * - caller gives us the socket lock + * - the socket may be either a client socket or a server socket + */ +int rxrpc_sendmsg_oob(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) +{ + struct rxrpc_oob_params p = {}; + int ret; + + _enter(""); + + ret = rxrpc_sendmsg_oob_cmsg(msg, &p); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_release_sock; + + if (p.have_oob_id) + return rxrpc_respond_to_oob(rx, &p, msg); + + release_sock(&rx->sk); + + switch (p.command) { + default: + ret = -EINVAL; + break; + } + + _leave(" = %d", ret); + return ret; + +error_release_sock: + release_sock(&rx->sk); + return ret; +} + +/** + * rxrpc_kernel_query_oob - Query the parameters of an out-of-band message + * @oob: The message to query + * @_peer: Where to return the peer record + * @_peer_appdata: The application data attached to a peer record + * + * Extract useful parameters from an out-of-band message. The source peer + * parameters are returned through the argument list and the message type is + * returned. + * + * Return: + * * %RXRPC_OOB_CHALLENGE - Challenge wanting a response. + */ +enum rxrpc_oob_type rxrpc_kernel_query_oob(struct sk_buff *oob, + struct rxrpc_peer **_peer, + unsigned long *_peer_appdata) +{ + struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(oob); + enum rxrpc_oob_type type = oob->mark; + + switch (type) { + case RXRPC_OOB_CHALLENGE: + *_peer = sp->chall.conn->peer; + *_peer_appdata = sp->chall.conn->peer->app_data; + break; + default: + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); + *_peer = NULL; + *_peer_appdata = 0; + break; + } + + return type; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_kernel_query_oob); + +/** + * rxrpc_kernel_dequeue_oob - Dequeue and return the front OOB message + * @sock: The socket to query + * @_type: Where to return the message type + * + * Dequeue the front OOB message, if there is one, and return it and + * its type. + * + * Return: The sk_buff representing the OOB message or %NULL if the queue was + * empty. + */ +struct sk_buff *rxrpc_kernel_dequeue_oob(struct socket *sock, + enum rxrpc_oob_type *_type) +{ + struct rxrpc_sock *rx = rxrpc_sk(sock->sk); + struct sk_buff *oob; + + oob = skb_dequeue(&rx->recvmsg_oobq); + if (oob) + *_type = oob->mark; + return oob; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_kernel_dequeue_oob); + +/** + * rxrpc_kernel_free_oob - Free an out-of-band message + * @oob: The OOB message to free + * + * Free an OOB message along with any resources it holds. + */ +void rxrpc_kernel_free_oob(struct sk_buff *oob) +{ + struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(oob); + + switch (oob->mark) { + case RXRPC_OOB_CHALLENGE: + rxrpc_put_connection(sp->chall.conn, rxrpc_conn_put_oob); + break; + } + + rxrpc_free_skb(oob, rxrpc_skb_put_purge_oob); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_kernel_free_oob); + +/** + * rxrpc_kernel_query_challenge - Query the parameters of a challenge + * @challenge: The challenge to query + * @_peer: Where to return the peer record + * @_peer_appdata: The application data attached to a peer record + * @_service_id: Where to return the connection service ID + * @_security_index: Where to return the connection security index + * + * Extract useful parameters from a CHALLENGE message. + */ +void rxrpc_kernel_query_challenge(struct sk_buff *challenge, + struct rxrpc_peer **_peer, + unsigned long *_peer_appdata, + u16 *_service_id, u8 *_security_index) +{ + struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(challenge); + + *_peer = sp->chall.conn->peer; + *_peer_appdata = sp->chall.conn->peer->app_data; + *_service_id = sp->hdr.serviceId; + *_security_index = sp->hdr.securityIndex; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_kernel_query_challenge); + +/** + * rxrpc_kernel_reject_challenge - Allow a kernel service to reject a challenge + * @challenge: The challenge to be rejected + * @abort_code: The abort code to stick into the ABORT packet + * @error: Local error value + * @why: Indication as to why. + * + * Allow a kernel service to reject a challenge by aborting the connection if + * it's still in an abortable state. The error is returned so this function + * can be used with a return statement. + * + * Return: The %error parameter. + */ +int rxrpc_kernel_reject_challenge(struct sk_buff *challenge, u32 abort_code, + int error, enum rxrpc_abort_reason why) +{ + struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(challenge); + + _enter("{%x},%d,%d,%u", sp->hdr.serial, abort_code, error, why); + + rxrpc_abort_conn(sp->chall.conn, NULL, abort_code, error, why); + return error; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_kernel_reject_challenge); diff --git a/net/rxrpc/output.c b/net/rxrpc/output.c index 95905b85a8d7..0af19bcdc80a 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/output.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/output.c @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ extern int udpv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len); -static ssize_t do_udp_sendmsg(struct socket *socket, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) +ssize_t do_udp_sendmsg(struct socket *socket, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) { struct sockaddr *sa = msg->msg_name; struct sock *sk = socket->sk; @@ -916,3 +916,61 @@ void rxrpc_send_keepalive(struct rxrpc_peer *peer) peer->last_tx_at = ktime_get_seconds(); _leave(""); } + +/* + * Send a RESPONSE message. + */ +void rxrpc_send_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *response) +{ + struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(response); + struct scatterlist sg[16]; + struct bio_vec bvec[16]; + struct msghdr msg; + size_t len = sp->resp.len; + __be32 wserial; + u32 serial = 0; + int ret, nr_sg; + + _enter("C=%x,%x", conn->debug_id, sp->resp.challenge_serial); + + sg_init_table(sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg)); + ret = skb_to_sgvec(response, sg, 0, len); + if (ret < 0) + goto fail; + nr_sg = ret; + + for (int i = 0; i < nr_sg; i++) + bvec_set_page(&bvec[i], sg_page(&sg[i]), sg[i].length, sg[i].offset); + + iov_iter_bvec(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, bvec, nr_sg, len); + + msg.msg_name = &conn->peer->srx.transport; + msg.msg_namelen = conn->peer->srx.transport_len; + msg.msg_control = NULL; + msg.msg_controllen = 0; + msg.msg_flags = MSG_SPLICE_PAGES; + + serial = rxrpc_get_next_serials(conn, 1); + wserial = htonl(serial); + + trace_rxrpc_tx_response(conn, serial, sp); + + ret = skb_store_bits(response, offsetof(struct rxrpc_wire_header, serial), + &wserial, sizeof(wserial)); + if (ret < 0) + goto fail; + + rxrpc_local_dont_fragment(conn->local, false); + + ret = do_udp_sendmsg(conn->local->socket, &msg, len); + if (ret < 0) + goto fail; + + conn->peer->last_tx_at = ktime_get_seconds(); + return; + +fail: + trace_rxrpc_tx_fail(conn->debug_id, serial, ret, + rxrpc_tx_point_response); + kleave(" = %d", ret); +} diff --git a/net/rxrpc/peer_object.c b/net/rxrpc/peer_object.c index 71b6e07bf161..e2f35e6c04d6 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/peer_object.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/peer_object.c @@ -475,6 +475,8 @@ void rxrpc_destroy_all_peers(struct rxrpc_net *rxnet) * @call: The call to query * * Get a record for the remote peer in a call. + * + * Return: The call's peer record. */ struct rxrpc_peer *rxrpc_kernel_get_call_peer(struct socket *sock, struct rxrpc_call *call) { @@ -486,7 +488,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_kernel_get_call_peer); * rxrpc_kernel_get_srtt - Get a call's peer smoothed RTT * @peer: The peer to query * - * Get the call's peer smoothed RTT in uS or UINT_MAX if we have no samples. + * Get the call's peer smoothed RTT. + * + * Return: The RTT in uS or %UINT_MAX if we have no samples. */ unsigned int rxrpc_kernel_get_srtt(const struct rxrpc_peer *peer) { @@ -499,7 +503,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_kernel_get_srtt); * @peer: The peer to query * * Get a pointer to the address from a peer record. The caller is responsible - * for making sure that the address is not deallocated. + * for making sure that the address is not deallocated. A fake address will be + * substituted if %peer in NULL. + * + * Return: The rxrpc address record or a fake record. */ const struct sockaddr_rxrpc *rxrpc_kernel_remote_srx(const struct rxrpc_peer *peer) { @@ -512,7 +519,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_kernel_remote_srx); * @peer: The peer to query * * Get a pointer to the transport address from a peer record. The caller is - * responsible for making sure that the address is not deallocated. + * responsible for making sure that the address is not deallocated. A fake + * address will be substituted if %peer in NULL. + * + * Return: The transport address record or a fake record. */ const struct sockaddr *rxrpc_kernel_remote_addr(const struct rxrpc_peer *peer) { @@ -527,7 +537,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_kernel_remote_addr); * @app_data: The data to set * * Set the app-specific data on a peer. AF_RXRPC makes no effort to retain - * anything the data might refer to. The previous app_data is returned. + * anything the data might refer to. + * + * Return: The previous app_data. */ unsigned long rxrpc_kernel_set_peer_data(struct rxrpc_peer *peer, unsigned long app_data) { @@ -540,6 +552,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_kernel_set_peer_data); * @peer: The peer to query * * Retrieve the app-specific data from a peer. + * + * Return: The peer's app data. */ unsigned long rxrpc_kernel_get_peer_data(const struct rxrpc_peer *peer) { diff --git a/net/rxrpc/protocol.h b/net/rxrpc/protocol.h index 42f70e4636f8..f8bfec12bc7e 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/protocol.h +++ b/net/rxrpc/protocol.h @@ -181,4 +181,24 @@ struct rxkad_response { __be32 ticket_len; /* Kerberos ticket length */ } __packed; +/* + * GSSAPI security type-4 and type-6 data header. + */ +struct rxgk_header { + __be32 epoch; + __be32 cid; + __be32 call_number; + __be32 seq; + __be32 sec_index; + __be32 data_len; +} __packed; + +/* + * GSSAPI security type-4 and type-6 response packet header. + */ +struct rxgk_response { + __be64 start_time; + __be32 token_len; +} __packed; + #endif /* _LINUX_RXRPC_PACKET_H */ diff --git a/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c b/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c index 32cd5f1d541d..86a27fb55a1c 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c @@ -155,6 +155,82 @@ static int rxrpc_verify_data(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb) } /* + * Transcribe a call's user ID to a control message. + */ +static int rxrpc_recvmsg_user_id(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct msghdr *msg, + int flags) +{ + if (!test_bit(RXRPC_CALL_HAS_USERID, &call->flags)) + return 0; + + if (flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT) { + unsigned int id32 = call->user_call_ID; + + return put_cmsg(msg, SOL_RXRPC, RXRPC_USER_CALL_ID, + sizeof(unsigned int), &id32); + } else { + unsigned long idl = call->user_call_ID; + + return put_cmsg(msg, SOL_RXRPC, RXRPC_USER_CALL_ID, + sizeof(unsigned long), &idl); + } +} + +/* + * Deal with a CHALLENGE packet. + */ +static int rxrpc_recvmsg_challenge(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, + struct sk_buff *challenge, unsigned int flags) +{ + struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(challenge); + struct rxrpc_connection *conn = sp->chall.conn; + + return conn->security->challenge_to_recvmsg(conn, challenge, msg); +} + +/* + * Process OOB packets. Called with the socket locked. + */ +static int rxrpc_recvmsg_oob(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, + unsigned int flags) +{ + struct rxrpc_sock *rx = rxrpc_sk(sock->sk); + struct sk_buff *skb; + bool need_response = false; + int ret; + + skb = skb_peek(&rx->recvmsg_oobq); + if (!skb) + return -EAGAIN; + rxrpc_see_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_see_recvmsg); + + ret = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_RXRPC, RXRPC_OOB_ID, sizeof(u64), + &skb->skb_mstamp_ns); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + switch ((enum rxrpc_oob_type)skb->mark) { + case RXRPC_OOB_CHALLENGE: + need_response = true; + ret = rxrpc_recvmsg_challenge(sock, msg, skb, flags); + break; + default: + WARN_ONCE(1, "recvmsg() can't process unknown OOB type %u\n", + skb->mark); + ret = -EIO; + break; + } + + if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) + skb_unlink(skb, &rx->recvmsg_oobq); + if (need_response) + rxrpc_add_pending_oob(rx, skb); + else + rxrpc_free_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_put_oob); + return ret; +} + +/* * Deliver messages to a call. This keeps processing packets until the buffer * is filled and we find either more DATA (returns 0) or the end of the DATA * (returns 1). If more packets are required, it returns -EAGAIN and if the @@ -165,6 +241,7 @@ static int rxrpc_recvmsg_data(struct socket *sock, struct rxrpc_call *call, size_t len, int flags, size_t *_offset) { struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp; + struct rxrpc_sock *rx = rxrpc_sk(sock->sk); struct sk_buff *skb; rxrpc_seq_t seq = 0; size_t remain; @@ -207,7 +284,6 @@ static int rxrpc_recvmsg_data(struct socket *sock, struct rxrpc_call *call, trace_rxrpc_recvdata(call, rxrpc_recvmsg_next, seq, sp->offset, sp->len, ret2); if (ret2 < 0) { - kdebug("verify = %d", ret2); ret = ret2; goto out; } @@ -255,6 +331,13 @@ static int rxrpc_recvmsg_data(struct socket *sock, struct rxrpc_call *call, if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) rxrpc_rotate_rx_window(call); + + if (!rx->app_ops && + !skb_queue_empty_lockless(&rx->recvmsg_oobq)) { + trace_rxrpc_recvdata(call, rxrpc_recvmsg_oobq, seq, + rx_pkt_offset, rx_pkt_len, ret); + break; + } } out: @@ -262,6 +345,7 @@ out: call->rx_pkt_offset = rx_pkt_offset; call->rx_pkt_len = rx_pkt_len; } + done: trace_rxrpc_recvdata(call, rxrpc_recvmsg_data_return, seq, rx_pkt_offset, rx_pkt_len, ret); @@ -301,6 +385,7 @@ try_again: /* Return immediately if a client socket has no outstanding calls */ if (RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&rx->calls) && list_empty(&rx->recvmsg_q) && + skb_queue_empty_lockless(&rx->recvmsg_oobq) && rx->sk.sk_state != RXRPC_SERVER_LISTENING) { release_sock(&rx->sk); return -EAGAIN; @@ -322,7 +407,8 @@ try_again: if (ret) goto wait_error; - if (list_empty(&rx->recvmsg_q)) { + if (list_empty(&rx->recvmsg_q) && + skb_queue_empty_lockless(&rx->recvmsg_oobq)) { if (signal_pending(current)) goto wait_interrupted; trace_rxrpc_recvmsg(0, rxrpc_recvmsg_wait, 0); @@ -332,6 +418,15 @@ try_again: goto try_again; } + /* Deal with OOB messages before we consider getting normal data. */ + if (!skb_queue_empty_lockless(&rx->recvmsg_oobq)) { + ret = rxrpc_recvmsg_oob(sock, msg, flags); + release_sock(&rx->sk); + if (ret == -EAGAIN) + goto try_again; + goto error_no_call; + } + /* Find the next call and dequeue it if we're not just peeking. If we * do dequeue it, that comes with a ref that we will need to release. * We also want to weed out calls that got requeued whilst we were @@ -342,7 +437,8 @@ try_again: call = list_entry(l, struct rxrpc_call, recvmsg_link); if (!rxrpc_call_is_complete(call) && - skb_queue_empty(&call->recvmsg_queue)) { + skb_queue_empty(&call->recvmsg_queue) && + skb_queue_empty(&rx->recvmsg_oobq)) { list_del_init(&call->recvmsg_link); spin_unlock_irq(&rx->recvmsg_lock); release_sock(&rx->sk); @@ -377,21 +473,9 @@ try_again: if (test_bit(RXRPC_CALL_RELEASED, &call->flags)) BUG(); - if (test_bit(RXRPC_CALL_HAS_USERID, &call->flags)) { - if (flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT) { - unsigned int id32 = call->user_call_ID; - - ret = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_RXRPC, RXRPC_USER_CALL_ID, - sizeof(unsigned int), &id32); - } else { - unsigned long idl = call->user_call_ID; - - ret = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_RXRPC, RXRPC_USER_CALL_ID, - sizeof(unsigned long), &idl); - } - if (ret < 0) - goto error_unlock_call; - } + ret = rxrpc_recvmsg_user_id(call, msg, flags); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_unlock_call; if (msg->msg_name && call->peer) { size_t len = sizeof(call->dest_srx); @@ -477,14 +561,14 @@ wait_error: * @_service: Where to store the actual service ID (may be upgraded) * * Allow a kernel service to receive data and pick up information about the - * state of a call. Returns 0 if got what was asked for and there's more - * available, 1 if we got what was asked for and we're at the end of the data - * and -EAGAIN if we need more data. + * state of a call. Note that *@_abort should also be initialised to %0. * - * Note that we may return -EAGAIN to drain empty packets at the end of the - * data, even if we've already copied over the requested data. + * Note that we may return %-EAGAIN to drain empty packets at the end + * of the data, even if we've already copied over the requested data. * - * *_abort should also be initialised to 0. + * Return: %0 if got what was asked for and there's more available, %1 + * if we got what was asked for and we're at the end of the data and + * %-EAGAIN if we need more data. */ int rxrpc_kernel_recv_data(struct socket *sock, struct rxrpc_call *call, struct iov_iter *iter, size_t *_len, diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxgk.c b/net/rxrpc/rxgk.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1e19c605bcc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/rxrpc/rxgk.c @@ -0,0 +1,1371 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* GSSAPI-based RxRPC security + * + * Copyright (C) 2025 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + +#include <linux/net.h> +#include <linux/skbuff.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/key-type.h> +#include "ar-internal.h" +#include "rxgk_common.h" + +/* + * Parse the information from a server key + */ +static int rxgk_preparse_server_key(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{ + const struct krb5_enctype *krb5; + struct krb5_buffer *server_key = (void *)&prep->payload.data[2]; + unsigned int service, sec_class, kvno, enctype; + int n = 0; + + _enter("%zu", prep->datalen); + + if (sscanf(prep->orig_description, "%u:%u:%u:%u%n", + &service, &sec_class, &kvno, &enctype, &n) != 4) + return -EINVAL; + + if (prep->orig_description[n]) + return -EINVAL; + + krb5 = crypto_krb5_find_enctype(enctype); + if (!krb5) + return -ENOPKG; + + prep->payload.data[0] = (struct krb5_enctype *)krb5; + + if (prep->datalen != krb5->key_len) + return -EKEYREJECTED; + + server_key->len = prep->datalen; + server_key->data = kmemdup(prep->data, prep->datalen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!server_key->data) + return -ENOMEM; + + _leave(" = 0"); + return 0; +} + +static void rxgk_free_server_key(union key_payload *payload) +{ + struct krb5_buffer *server_key = (void *)&payload->data[2]; + + kfree_sensitive(server_key->data); +} + +static void rxgk_free_preparse_server_key(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{ + rxgk_free_server_key(&prep->payload); +} + +static void rxgk_destroy_server_key(struct key *key) +{ + rxgk_free_server_key(&key->payload); +} + +static void rxgk_describe_server_key(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) +{ + const struct krb5_enctype *krb5 = key->payload.data[0]; + + if (krb5) + seq_printf(m, ": %s", krb5->name); +} + +/* + * Handle rekeying the connection when we see our limits overrun or when the + * far side decided to rekey. + * + * Returns a ref on the context if successful or -ESTALE if the key is out of + * date. + */ +static struct rxgk_context *rxgk_rekey(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + const u16 *specific_key_number) +{ + struct rxgk_context *gk, *dead = NULL; + unsigned int key_number, current_key, mask = ARRAY_SIZE(conn->rxgk.keys) - 1; + bool crank = false; + + _enter("%d", specific_key_number ? *specific_key_number : -1); + + mutex_lock(&conn->security_lock); + + current_key = conn->rxgk.key_number; + if (!specific_key_number) { + key_number = current_key; + } else { + if (*specific_key_number == (u16)current_key) + key_number = current_key; + else if (*specific_key_number == (u16)(current_key - 1)) + key_number = current_key - 1; + else if (*specific_key_number == (u16)(current_key + 1)) + goto crank_window; + else + goto bad_key; + } + + gk = conn->rxgk.keys[key_number & mask]; + if (!gk) + goto generate_key; + if (!specific_key_number && + test_bit(RXGK_TK_NEEDS_REKEY, &gk->flags)) + goto crank_window; + +grab: + refcount_inc(&gk->usage); + mutex_unlock(&conn->security_lock); + rxgk_put(dead); + return gk; + +crank_window: + trace_rxrpc_rxgk_rekey(conn, current_key, + specific_key_number ? *specific_key_number : -1); + if (current_key == UINT_MAX) + goto bad_key; + if (current_key + 1 == UINT_MAX) + set_bit(RXRPC_CONN_DONT_REUSE, &conn->flags); + + key_number = current_key + 1; + if (WARN_ON(conn->rxgk.keys[key_number & mask])) + goto bad_key; + crank = true; + +generate_key: + gk = conn->rxgk.keys[current_key & mask]; + gk = rxgk_generate_transport_key(conn, gk->key, key_number, GFP_NOFS); + if (IS_ERR(gk)) { + mutex_unlock(&conn->security_lock); + return gk; + } + + write_lock(&conn->security_use_lock); + if (crank) { + current_key++; + conn->rxgk.key_number = current_key; + dead = conn->rxgk.keys[(current_key - 2) & mask]; + conn->rxgk.keys[(current_key - 2) & mask] = NULL; + } + conn->rxgk.keys[current_key & mask] = gk; + write_unlock(&conn->security_use_lock); + goto grab; + +bad_key: + mutex_unlock(&conn->security_lock); + return ERR_PTR(-ESTALE); +} + +/* + * Get the specified keying context. + * + * Returns a ref on the context if successful or -ESTALE if the key is out of + * date. + */ +static struct rxgk_context *rxgk_get_key(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + const u16 *specific_key_number) +{ + struct rxgk_context *gk; + unsigned int key_number, current_key, mask = ARRAY_SIZE(conn->rxgk.keys) - 1; + + _enter("{%u},%d", + conn->rxgk.key_number, specific_key_number ? *specific_key_number : -1); + + read_lock(&conn->security_use_lock); + + current_key = conn->rxgk.key_number; + if (!specific_key_number) { + key_number = current_key; + } else { + /* Only the bottom 16 bits of the key number are exposed in the + * header, so we try and keep the upper 16 bits in step. The + * whole 32 bits are used to generate the TK. + */ + if (*specific_key_number == (u16)current_key) + key_number = current_key; + else if (*specific_key_number == (u16)(current_key - 1)) + key_number = current_key - 1; + else if (*specific_key_number == (u16)(current_key + 1)) + goto rekey; + else + goto bad_key; + } + + gk = conn->rxgk.keys[key_number & mask]; + if (!gk) + goto slow_path; + if (!specific_key_number && + key_number < UINT_MAX) { + if (time_after(jiffies, gk->expiry) || + gk->bytes_remaining < 0) { + set_bit(RXGK_TK_NEEDS_REKEY, &gk->flags); + goto slow_path; + } + + if (test_bit(RXGK_TK_NEEDS_REKEY, &gk->flags)) + goto slow_path; + } + + refcount_inc(&gk->usage); + read_unlock(&conn->security_use_lock); + return gk; + +rekey: + _debug("rekey"); + if (current_key == UINT_MAX) + goto bad_key; + gk = conn->rxgk.keys[current_key & mask]; + if (gk) + set_bit(RXGK_TK_NEEDS_REKEY, &gk->flags); +slow_path: + read_unlock(&conn->security_use_lock); + return rxgk_rekey(conn, specific_key_number); +bad_key: + read_unlock(&conn->security_use_lock); + return ERR_PTR(-ESTALE); +} + +/* + * initialise connection security + */ +static int rxgk_init_connection_security(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + struct rxrpc_key_token *token) +{ + struct rxgk_context *gk; + int ret; + + _enter("{%d,%u},{%x}", + conn->debug_id, conn->rxgk.key_number, key_serial(conn->key)); + + conn->security_ix = token->security_index; + conn->security_level = token->rxgk->level; + + if (rxrpc_conn_is_client(conn)) { + conn->rxgk.start_time = ktime_get(); + do_div(conn->rxgk.start_time, 100); + } + + gk = rxgk_generate_transport_key(conn, token->rxgk, conn->rxgk.key_number, + GFP_NOFS); + if (IS_ERR(gk)) + return PTR_ERR(gk); + conn->rxgk.enctype = gk->krb5->etype; + conn->rxgk.keys[gk->key_number & 3] = gk; + + switch (conn->security_level) { + case RXRPC_SECURITY_PLAIN: + case RXRPC_SECURITY_AUTH: + case RXRPC_SECURITY_ENCRYPT: + break; + default: + ret = -EKEYREJECTED; + goto error; + } + + ret = 0; +error: + _leave(" = %d", ret); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Clean up the crypto on a call. + */ +static void rxgk_free_call_crypto(struct rxrpc_call *call) +{ +} + +/* + * Work out how much data we can put in a packet. + */ +static struct rxrpc_txbuf *rxgk_alloc_txbuf(struct rxrpc_call *call, size_t remain, gfp_t gfp) +{ + enum krb5_crypto_mode mode; + struct rxgk_context *gk; + struct rxrpc_txbuf *txb; + size_t shdr, alloc, limit, part, offset, gap; + + switch (call->conn->security_level) { + default: + alloc = umin(remain, RXRPC_JUMBO_DATALEN); + return rxrpc_alloc_data_txbuf(call, alloc, 1, gfp); + case RXRPC_SECURITY_AUTH: + shdr = 0; + mode = KRB5_CHECKSUM_MODE; + break; + case RXRPC_SECURITY_ENCRYPT: + shdr = sizeof(struct rxgk_header); + mode = KRB5_ENCRYPT_MODE; + break; + } + + gk = rxgk_get_key(call->conn, NULL); + if (IS_ERR(gk)) + return NULL; + + /* Work out the maximum amount of data that will fit. */ + alloc = RXRPC_JUMBO_DATALEN; + limit = crypto_krb5_how_much_data(gk->krb5, mode, &alloc, &offset); + + if (remain < limit - shdr) { + part = remain; + alloc = crypto_krb5_how_much_buffer(gk->krb5, mode, + shdr + part, &offset); + gap = 0; + } else { + part = limit - shdr; + gap = RXRPC_JUMBO_DATALEN - alloc; + alloc = RXRPC_JUMBO_DATALEN; + } + + rxgk_put(gk); + + txb = rxrpc_alloc_data_txbuf(call, alloc, 16, gfp); + if (!txb) + return NULL; + + txb->crypto_header = offset; + txb->sec_header = shdr; + txb->offset += offset + shdr; + txb->space = part; + + /* Clear excess space in the packet */ + if (gap) + memset(txb->data + alloc - gap, 0, gap); + return txb; +} + +/* + * Integrity mode (sign a packet - level 1 security) + */ +static int rxgk_secure_packet_integrity(const struct rxrpc_call *call, + struct rxgk_context *gk, + struct rxrpc_txbuf *txb) +{ + struct rxgk_header *hdr; + struct scatterlist sg[1]; + struct krb5_buffer metadata; + int ret = -ENOMEM; + + _enter(""); + + hdr = kzalloc(sizeof(*hdr), GFP_NOFS); + if (!hdr) + goto error_gk; + + hdr->epoch = htonl(call->conn->proto.epoch); + hdr->cid = htonl(call->cid); + hdr->call_number = htonl(call->call_id); + hdr->seq = htonl(txb->seq); + hdr->sec_index = htonl(call->security_ix); + hdr->data_len = htonl(txb->len); + metadata.len = sizeof(*hdr); + metadata.data = hdr; + + sg_init_table(sg, 1); + sg_set_buf(&sg[0], txb->data, txb->alloc_size); + + ret = crypto_krb5_get_mic(gk->krb5, gk->tx_Kc, &metadata, + sg, 1, txb->alloc_size, + txb->crypto_header, txb->sec_header + txb->len); + if (ret >= 0) { + txb->pkt_len = ret; + if (txb->alloc_size == RXRPC_JUMBO_DATALEN) + txb->jumboable = true; + gk->bytes_remaining -= ret; + } + kfree(hdr); +error_gk: + rxgk_put(gk); + _leave(" = %d", ret); + return ret; +} + +/* + * wholly encrypt a packet (level 2 security) + */ +static int rxgk_secure_packet_encrypted(const struct rxrpc_call *call, + struct rxgk_context *gk, + struct rxrpc_txbuf *txb) +{ + struct rxgk_header *hdr; + struct scatterlist sg[1]; + int ret; + + _enter("%x", txb->len); + + /* Insert the header into the buffer. */ + hdr = txb->data + txb->crypto_header; + hdr->epoch = htonl(call->conn->proto.epoch); + hdr->cid = htonl(call->cid); + hdr->call_number = htonl(call->call_id); + hdr->seq = htonl(txb->seq); + hdr->sec_index = htonl(call->security_ix); + hdr->data_len = htonl(txb->len); + + sg_init_table(sg, 1); + sg_set_buf(&sg[0], txb->data, txb->alloc_size); + + ret = crypto_krb5_encrypt(gk->krb5, gk->tx_enc, + sg, 1, txb->alloc_size, + txb->crypto_header, txb->sec_header + txb->len, + false); + if (ret >= 0) { + txb->pkt_len = ret; + if (txb->alloc_size == RXRPC_JUMBO_DATALEN) + txb->jumboable = true; + gk->bytes_remaining -= ret; + } + + rxgk_put(gk); + _leave(" = %d", ret); + return ret; +} + +/* + * checksum an RxRPC packet header + */ +static int rxgk_secure_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct rxrpc_txbuf *txb) +{ + struct rxgk_context *gk; + int ret; + + _enter("{%d{%x}},{#%u},%u,", + call->debug_id, key_serial(call->conn->key), txb->seq, txb->len); + + gk = rxgk_get_key(call->conn, NULL); + if (IS_ERR(gk)) + return PTR_ERR(gk) == -ESTALE ? -EKEYREJECTED : PTR_ERR(gk); + + ret = key_validate(call->conn->key); + if (ret < 0) { + rxgk_put(gk); + return ret; + } + + call->security_enctype = gk->krb5->etype; + txb->cksum = htons(gk->key_number); + + switch (call->conn->security_level) { + case RXRPC_SECURITY_PLAIN: + rxgk_put(gk); + txb->pkt_len = txb->len; + return 0; + case RXRPC_SECURITY_AUTH: + return rxgk_secure_packet_integrity(call, gk, txb); + case RXRPC_SECURITY_ENCRYPT: + return rxgk_secure_packet_encrypted(call, gk, txb); + default: + rxgk_put(gk); + return -EPERM; + } +} + +/* + * Integrity mode (check the signature on a packet - level 1 security) + */ +static int rxgk_verify_packet_integrity(struct rxrpc_call *call, + struct rxgk_context *gk, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb); + struct rxgk_header *hdr; + struct krb5_buffer metadata; + unsigned int offset = sp->offset, len = sp->len; + size_t data_offset = 0, data_len = len; + u32 ac; + int ret = -ENOMEM; + + _enter(""); + + crypto_krb5_where_is_the_data(gk->krb5, KRB5_CHECKSUM_MODE, + &data_offset, &data_len); + + hdr = kzalloc(sizeof(*hdr), GFP_NOFS); + if (!hdr) + goto put_gk; + + hdr->epoch = htonl(call->conn->proto.epoch); + hdr->cid = htonl(call->cid); + hdr->call_number = htonl(call->call_id); + hdr->seq = htonl(sp->hdr.seq); + hdr->sec_index = htonl(call->security_ix); + hdr->data_len = htonl(data_len); + + metadata.len = sizeof(*hdr); + metadata.data = hdr; + ret = rxgk_verify_mic_skb(gk->krb5, gk->rx_Kc, &metadata, + skb, &offset, &len, &ac); + kfree(hdr); + if (ret == -EPROTO) { + rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, ac, + rxgk_abort_1_verify_mic_eproto); + } else { + sp->offset = offset; + sp->len = len; + } + +put_gk: + rxgk_put(gk); + _leave(" = %d", ret); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Decrypt an encrypted packet (level 2 security). + */ +static int rxgk_verify_packet_encrypted(struct rxrpc_call *call, + struct rxgk_context *gk, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb); + struct rxgk_header hdr; + unsigned int offset = sp->offset, len = sp->len; + int ret; + u32 ac; + + _enter(""); + + ret = rxgk_decrypt_skb(gk->krb5, gk->rx_enc, skb, &offset, &len, &ac); + if (ret == -EPROTO) + rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, ac, rxgk_abort_2_decrypt_eproto); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + + if (len < sizeof(hdr)) { + ret = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXGK_PACKETSHORT, + rxgk_abort_2_short_header); + goto error; + } + + /* Extract the header from the skb */ + ret = skb_copy_bits(skb, offset, &hdr, sizeof(hdr)); + if (ret < 0) { + ret = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXGK_PACKETSHORT, + rxgk_abort_2_short_encdata); + goto error; + } + offset += sizeof(hdr); + len -= sizeof(hdr); + + if (ntohl(hdr.epoch) != call->conn->proto.epoch || + ntohl(hdr.cid) != call->cid || + ntohl(hdr.call_number) != call->call_id || + ntohl(hdr.seq) != sp->hdr.seq || + ntohl(hdr.sec_index) != call->security_ix || + ntohl(hdr.data_len) > len) { + ret = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXGK_SEALEDINCON, + rxgk_abort_2_short_data); + goto error; + } + + sp->offset = offset; + sp->len = ntohl(hdr.data_len); + ret = 0; +error: + rxgk_put(gk); + _leave(" = %d", ret); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Verify the security on a received packet or subpacket (if part of a + * jumbo packet). + */ +static int rxgk_verify_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb); + struct rxgk_context *gk; + u16 key_number = sp->hdr.cksum; + + _enter("{%d{%x}},{#%u}", + call->debug_id, key_serial(call->conn->key), sp->hdr.seq); + + gk = rxgk_get_key(call->conn, &key_number); + if (IS_ERR(gk)) { + switch (PTR_ERR(gk)) { + case -ESTALE: + return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXGK_BADKEYNO, + rxgk_abort_bad_key_number); + default: + return PTR_ERR(gk); + } + } + + call->security_enctype = gk->krb5->etype; + switch (call->conn->security_level) { + case RXRPC_SECURITY_PLAIN: + rxgk_put(gk); + return 0; + case RXRPC_SECURITY_AUTH: + return rxgk_verify_packet_integrity(call, gk, skb); + case RXRPC_SECURITY_ENCRYPT: + return rxgk_verify_packet_encrypted(call, gk, skb); + default: + rxgk_put(gk); + return -ENOANO; + } +} + +/* + * Allocate memory to hold a challenge or a response packet. We're not running + * in the io_thread, so we can't use ->tx_alloc. + */ +static struct page *rxgk_alloc_packet(size_t total_len) +{ + gfp_t gfp = GFP_NOFS; + int order; + + order = get_order(total_len); + if (order > 0) + gfp |= __GFP_COMP; + return alloc_pages(gfp, order); +} + +/* + * Issue a challenge. + */ +static int rxgk_issue_challenge(struct rxrpc_connection *conn) +{ + struct rxrpc_wire_header *whdr; + struct bio_vec bvec[1]; + struct msghdr msg; + struct page *page; + size_t len = sizeof(*whdr) + sizeof(conn->rxgk.nonce); + u32 serial; + int ret; + + _enter("{%d}", conn->debug_id); + + get_random_bytes(&conn->rxgk.nonce, sizeof(conn->rxgk.nonce)); + + /* We can't use conn->tx_alloc without a lock */ + page = rxgk_alloc_packet(sizeof(*whdr) + sizeof(conn->rxgk.nonce)); + if (!page) + return -ENOMEM; + + bvec_set_page(&bvec[0], page, len, 0); + iov_iter_bvec(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, bvec, 1, len); + + msg.msg_name = &conn->peer->srx.transport; + msg.msg_namelen = conn->peer->srx.transport_len; + msg.msg_control = NULL; + msg.msg_controllen = 0; + msg.msg_flags = MSG_SPLICE_PAGES; + + whdr = page_address(page); + whdr->epoch = htonl(conn->proto.epoch); + whdr->cid = htonl(conn->proto.cid); + whdr->callNumber = 0; + whdr->seq = 0; + whdr->type = RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_CHALLENGE; + whdr->flags = conn->out_clientflag; + whdr->userStatus = 0; + whdr->securityIndex = conn->security_ix; + whdr->_rsvd = 0; + whdr->serviceId = htons(conn->service_id); + + memcpy(whdr + 1, conn->rxgk.nonce, sizeof(conn->rxgk.nonce)); + + serial = rxrpc_get_next_serials(conn, 1); + whdr->serial = htonl(serial); + + trace_rxrpc_tx_challenge(conn, serial, 0, *(u32 *)&conn->rxgk.nonce); + + ret = do_udp_sendmsg(conn->local->socket, &msg, len); + if (ret > 0) + conn->peer->last_tx_at = ktime_get_seconds(); + __free_page(page); + + if (ret < 0) { + trace_rxrpc_tx_fail(conn->debug_id, serial, ret, + rxrpc_tx_point_rxgk_challenge); + return -EAGAIN; + } + + trace_rxrpc_tx_packet(conn->debug_id, whdr, + rxrpc_tx_point_rxgk_challenge); + _leave(" = 0"); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Validate a challenge packet. + */ +static bool rxgk_validate_challenge(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb); + u8 nonce[20]; + + if (!conn->key) { + rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RX_PROTOCOL_ERROR, -EPROTO, + rxgk_abort_chall_no_key); + return false; + } + + if (key_validate(conn->key) < 0) { + rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_EXPIRED, -EPROTO, + rxgk_abort_chall_key_expired); + return false; + } + + if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header), + nonce, sizeof(nonce)) < 0) { + rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_PACKETSHORT, -EPROTO, + rxgk_abort_chall_short); + return false; + } + + trace_rxrpc_rx_challenge(conn, sp->hdr.serial, 0, *(u32 *)nonce, 0); + return true; +} + +/** + * rxgk_kernel_query_challenge - Query RxGK-specific challenge parameters + * @challenge: The challenge packet to query + * + * Return: The Kerberos 5 encoding type for the challenged connection. + */ +u32 rxgk_kernel_query_challenge(struct sk_buff *challenge) +{ + struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(challenge); + + return sp->chall.conn->rxgk.enctype; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxgk_kernel_query_challenge); + +/* + * Fill out the control message to pass to userspace to inform about the + * challenge. + */ +static int rxgk_challenge_to_recvmsg(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + struct sk_buff *challenge, + struct msghdr *msg) +{ + struct rxgk_challenge chall; + + chall.base.service_id = conn->service_id; + chall.base.security_index = conn->security_ix; + chall.enctype = conn->rxgk.enctype; + + return put_cmsg(msg, SOL_RXRPC, RXRPC_CHALLENGED, sizeof(chall), &chall); +} + +/* + * Insert the requisite amount of XDR padding for the length given. + */ +static int rxgk_pad_out(struct sk_buff *response, size_t len, size_t offset) +{ + __be32 zero = 0; + size_t pad = xdr_round_up(len) - len; + int ret; + + if (!pad) + return 0; + + ret = skb_store_bits(response, offset, &zero, pad); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + return pad; +} + +/* + * Insert the header into the response. + */ +static noinline ssize_t rxgk_insert_response_header(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + struct rxgk_context *gk, + struct sk_buff *response, + size_t offset) +{ + struct rxrpc_skb_priv *rsp = rxrpc_skb(response); + + struct { + struct rxrpc_wire_header whdr; + __be32 start_time_msw; + __be32 start_time_lsw; + __be32 ticket_len; + } h; + int ret; + + rsp->resp.kvno = gk->key_number; + rsp->resp.version = gk->krb5->etype; + + h.whdr.epoch = htonl(conn->proto.epoch); + h.whdr.cid = htonl(conn->proto.cid); + h.whdr.callNumber = 0; + h.whdr.serial = 0; + h.whdr.seq = 0; + h.whdr.type = RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_RESPONSE; + h.whdr.flags = conn->out_clientflag; + h.whdr.userStatus = 0; + h.whdr.securityIndex = conn->security_ix; + h.whdr.cksum = htons(gk->key_number); + h.whdr.serviceId = htons(conn->service_id); + h.start_time_msw = htonl(upper_32_bits(conn->rxgk.start_time)); + h.start_time_lsw = htonl(lower_32_bits(conn->rxgk.start_time)); + h.ticket_len = htonl(gk->key->ticket.len); + + ret = skb_store_bits(response, offset, &h, sizeof(h)); + return ret < 0 ? ret : sizeof(h); +} + +/* + * Construct the authenticator to go in the response packet + * + * struct RXGK_Authenticator { + * opaque nonce[20]; + * opaque appdata<>; + * RXGK_Level level; + * unsigned int epoch; + * unsigned int cid; + * unsigned int call_numbers<>; + * }; + */ +static ssize_t rxgk_construct_authenticator(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + struct sk_buff *challenge, + const struct krb5_buffer *appdata, + struct sk_buff *response, + size_t offset) +{ + struct { + u8 nonce[20]; + __be32 appdata_len; + } a; + struct { + __be32 level; + __be32 epoch; + __be32 cid; + __be32 call_numbers_count; + __be32 call_numbers[4]; + } b; + int ret; + + ret = skb_copy_bits(challenge, sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header), + a.nonce, sizeof(a.nonce)); + if (ret < 0) + return -EPROTO; + + a.appdata_len = htonl(appdata->len); + + ret = skb_store_bits(response, offset, &a, sizeof(a)); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + offset += sizeof(a); + + if (appdata->len) { + ret = skb_store_bits(response, offset, appdata->data, appdata->len); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + offset += appdata->len; + + ret = rxgk_pad_out(response, appdata->len, offset); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + offset += ret; + } + + b.level = htonl(conn->security_level); + b.epoch = htonl(conn->proto.epoch); + b.cid = htonl(conn->proto.cid); + b.call_numbers_count = htonl(4); + b.call_numbers[0] = htonl(conn->channels[0].call_counter); + b.call_numbers[1] = htonl(conn->channels[1].call_counter); + b.call_numbers[2] = htonl(conn->channels[2].call_counter); + b.call_numbers[3] = htonl(conn->channels[3].call_counter); + + ret = skb_store_bits(response, offset, &b, sizeof(b)); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + return sizeof(a) + xdr_round_up(appdata->len) + sizeof(b); +} + +static ssize_t rxgk_encrypt_authenticator(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + struct rxgk_context *gk, + struct sk_buff *response, + size_t offset, + size_t alloc_len, + size_t auth_offset, + size_t auth_len) +{ + struct scatterlist sg[16]; + int nr_sg; + + sg_init_table(sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg)); + nr_sg = skb_to_sgvec(response, sg, offset, alloc_len); + if (unlikely(nr_sg < 0)) + return nr_sg; + return crypto_krb5_encrypt(gk->krb5, gk->resp_enc, sg, nr_sg, alloc_len, + auth_offset, auth_len, false); +} + +/* + * Construct the response. + * + * struct RXGK_Response { + * rxgkTime start_time; + * RXGK_Data token; + * opaque authenticator<RXGK_MAXAUTHENTICATOR> + * }; + */ +static int rxgk_construct_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + struct sk_buff *challenge, + struct krb5_buffer *appdata) +{ + struct rxrpc_skb_priv *csp, *rsp; + struct rxgk_context *gk; + struct sk_buff *response; + size_t len, auth_len, authx_len, offset, auth_offset, authx_offset; + __be32 tmp; + int ret; + + gk = rxgk_get_key(conn, NULL); + if (IS_ERR(gk)) + return PTR_ERR(gk); + + auth_len = 20 + (4 + appdata->len) + 12 + (1 + 4) * 4; + authx_len = crypto_krb5_how_much_buffer(gk->krb5, KRB5_ENCRYPT_MODE, + auth_len, &auth_offset); + len = sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header) + + 8 + (4 + xdr_round_up(gk->key->ticket.len)) + (4 + authx_len); + + response = alloc_skb_with_frags(0, len, 0, &ret, GFP_NOFS); + if (!response) + goto error; + rxrpc_new_skb(response, rxrpc_skb_new_response_rxgk); + response->len = len; + response->data_len = len; + + ret = rxgk_insert_response_header(conn, gk, response, 0); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + offset = ret; + + ret = skb_store_bits(response, offset, gk->key->ticket.data, gk->key->ticket.len); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + offset += gk->key->ticket.len; + ret = rxgk_pad_out(response, gk->key->ticket.len, offset); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + + authx_offset = offset + ret + 4; /* Leave a gap for the length. */ + + ret = rxgk_construct_authenticator(conn, challenge, appdata, response, + authx_offset + auth_offset); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + auth_len = ret; + + ret = rxgk_encrypt_authenticator(conn, gk, response, + authx_offset, authx_len, + auth_offset, auth_len); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + authx_len = ret; + + tmp = htonl(authx_len); + ret = skb_store_bits(response, authx_offset - 4, &tmp, 4); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + + ret = rxgk_pad_out(response, authx_len, authx_offset + authx_len); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + len = authx_offset + authx_len + ret; + + if (len != response->len) { + response->len = len; + response->data_len = len; + } + + csp = rxrpc_skb(challenge); + rsp = rxrpc_skb(response); + rsp->resp.len = len; + rsp->resp.challenge_serial = csp->hdr.serial; + rxrpc_post_response(conn, response); + response = NULL; + ret = 0; + +error: + rxrpc_free_skb(response, rxrpc_skb_put_response); + rxgk_put(gk); + _leave(" = %d", ret); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Respond to a challenge packet. + */ +static int rxgk_respond_to_challenge(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + struct sk_buff *challenge, + struct krb5_buffer *appdata) +{ + _enter("{%d,%x}", conn->debug_id, key_serial(conn->key)); + + if (key_validate(conn->key) < 0) + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, NULL, RXGK_EXPIRED, -EPROTO, + rxgk_abort_chall_key_expired); + + return rxgk_construct_response(conn, challenge, appdata); +} + +static int rxgk_respond_to_challenge_no_appdata(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + struct sk_buff *challenge) +{ + struct krb5_buffer appdata = {}; + + return rxgk_respond_to_challenge(conn, challenge, &appdata); +} + +/** + * rxgk_kernel_respond_to_challenge - Respond to a challenge with appdata + * @challenge: The challenge to respond to + * @appdata: The application data to include in the RESPONSE authenticator + * + * Allow a kernel application to respond to a CHALLENGE with application data + * to be included in the RxGK RESPONSE Authenticator. + * + * Return: %0 if successful and a negative error code otherwise. + */ +int rxgk_kernel_respond_to_challenge(struct sk_buff *challenge, + struct krb5_buffer *appdata) +{ + struct rxrpc_skb_priv *csp = rxrpc_skb(challenge); + + return rxgk_respond_to_challenge(csp->chall.conn, challenge, appdata); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxgk_kernel_respond_to_challenge); + +/* + * Parse sendmsg() control message and respond to challenge. We need to see if + * there's an appdata to fish out. + */ +static int rxgk_sendmsg_respond_to_challenge(struct sk_buff *challenge, + struct msghdr *msg) +{ + struct krb5_buffer appdata = {}; + struct cmsghdr *cmsg; + + for_each_cmsghdr(cmsg, msg) { + if (cmsg->cmsg_level != SOL_RXRPC || + cmsg->cmsg_type != RXRPC_RESP_RXGK_APPDATA) + continue; + if (appdata.data) + return -EINVAL; + appdata.data = CMSG_DATA(cmsg); + appdata.len = cmsg->cmsg_len - sizeof(struct cmsghdr); + } + + return rxgk_kernel_respond_to_challenge(challenge, &appdata); +} + +/* + * Verify the authenticator. + * + * struct RXGK_Authenticator { + * opaque nonce[20]; + * opaque appdata<>; + * RXGK_Level level; + * unsigned int epoch; + * unsigned int cid; + * unsigned int call_numbers<>; + * }; + */ +static int rxgk_do_verify_authenticator(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + const struct krb5_enctype *krb5, + struct sk_buff *skb, + __be32 *p, __be32 *end) +{ + u32 app_len, call_count, level, epoch, cid, i; + + _enter(""); + + if (memcmp(p, conn->rxgk.nonce, 20) != 0) + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_NOTAUTH, -EPROTO, + rxgk_abort_resp_bad_nonce); + p += 20 / sizeof(__be32); + + app_len = ntohl(*p++); + if (app_len > (end - p) * sizeof(__be32)) + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_NOTAUTH, -EPROTO, + rxgk_abort_resp_short_applen); + + p += xdr_round_up(app_len) / sizeof(__be32); + if (end - p < 4) + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_NOTAUTH, -EPROTO, + rxgk_abort_resp_short_applen); + + level = ntohl(*p++); + epoch = ntohl(*p++); + cid = ntohl(*p++); + call_count = ntohl(*p++); + + if (level != conn->security_level || + epoch != conn->proto.epoch || + cid != conn->proto.cid || + call_count > 4) + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_NOTAUTH, -EPROTO, + rxgk_abort_resp_bad_param); + + if (end - p < call_count) + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_NOTAUTH, -EPROTO, + rxgk_abort_resp_short_call_list); + + for (i = 0; i < call_count; i++) { + u32 call_id = ntohl(*p++); + + if (call_id > INT_MAX) + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_NOTAUTH, -EPROTO, + rxgk_abort_resp_bad_callid); + + if (call_id < conn->channels[i].call_counter) + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_NOTAUTH, -EPROTO, + rxgk_abort_resp_call_ctr); + + if (call_id > conn->channels[i].call_counter) { + if (conn->channels[i].call) + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_NOTAUTH, -EPROTO, + rxgk_abort_resp_call_state); + + conn->channels[i].call_counter = call_id; + } + } + + _leave(" = 0"); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Extract the authenticator and verify it. + */ +static int rxgk_verify_authenticator(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + const struct krb5_enctype *krb5, + struct sk_buff *skb, + unsigned int auth_offset, unsigned int auth_len) +{ + void *auth; + __be32 *p; + int ret; + + auth = kmalloc(auth_len, GFP_NOFS); + if (!auth) + return -ENOMEM; + + ret = skb_copy_bits(skb, auth_offset, auth, auth_len); + if (ret < 0) { + ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_NOTAUTH, -EPROTO, + rxgk_abort_resp_short_auth); + goto error; + } + + p = auth; + ret = rxgk_do_verify_authenticator(conn, krb5, skb, p, p + auth_len); +error: + kfree(auth); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Verify a response. + * + * struct RXGK_Response { + * rxgkTime start_time; + * RXGK_Data token; + * opaque authenticator<RXGK_MAXAUTHENTICATOR> + * }; + */ +static int rxgk_verify_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + const struct krb5_enctype *krb5; + struct rxrpc_key_token *token; + struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb); + struct rxgk_response rhdr; + struct rxgk_context *gk; + struct key *key = NULL; + unsigned int offset = sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header); + unsigned int len = skb->len - sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header); + unsigned int token_offset, token_len; + unsigned int auth_offset, auth_len; + __be32 xauth_len; + int ret, ec; + + _enter("{%d}", conn->debug_id); + + /* Parse the RXGK_Response object */ + if (sizeof(rhdr) + sizeof(__be32) > len) + goto short_packet; + + if (skb_copy_bits(skb, offset, &rhdr, sizeof(rhdr)) < 0) + goto short_packet; + offset += sizeof(rhdr); + len -= sizeof(rhdr); + + token_offset = offset; + token_len = ntohl(rhdr.token_len); + if (xdr_round_up(token_len) + sizeof(__be32) > len) + goto short_packet; + + trace_rxrpc_rx_response(conn, sp->hdr.serial, 0, sp->hdr.cksum, token_len); + + offset += xdr_round_up(token_len); + len -= xdr_round_up(token_len); + + if (skb_copy_bits(skb, offset, &xauth_len, sizeof(xauth_len)) < 0) + goto short_packet; + offset += sizeof(xauth_len); + len -= sizeof(xauth_len); + + auth_offset = offset; + auth_len = ntohl(xauth_len); + if (auth_len < len) + goto short_packet; + if (auth_len & 3) + goto inconsistent; + if (auth_len < 20 + 9 * 4) + goto auth_too_short; + + /* We need to extract and decrypt the token and instantiate a session + * key for it. This bit, however, is application-specific. If + * possible, we use a default parser, but we might end up bumping this + * to the app to deal with - which might mean a round trip to + * userspace. + */ + ret = rxgk_extract_token(conn, skb, token_offset, token_len, &key); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + /* We now have a key instantiated from the decrypted ticket. We can + * pass this to the application so that they can parse the ticket + * content and we can use the session key it contains to derive the + * keys we need. + * + * Note that we have to switch enctype at this point as the enctype of + * the ticket doesn't necessarily match that of the transport. + */ + token = key->payload.data[0]; + conn->security_level = token->rxgk->level; + conn->rxgk.start_time = __be64_to_cpu(rhdr.start_time); + + gk = rxgk_generate_transport_key(conn, token->rxgk, sp->hdr.cksum, GFP_NOFS); + if (IS_ERR(gk)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(gk); + goto cant_get_token; + } + + krb5 = gk->krb5; + + trace_rxrpc_rx_response(conn, sp->hdr.serial, krb5->etype, sp->hdr.cksum, token_len); + + /* Decrypt, parse and verify the authenticator. */ + ret = rxgk_decrypt_skb(krb5, gk->resp_enc, skb, + &auth_offset, &auth_len, &ec); + if (ret < 0) { + rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_SEALEDINCON, ret, + rxgk_abort_resp_auth_dec); + goto out; + } + + ret = rxgk_verify_authenticator(conn, krb5, skb, auth_offset, auth_len); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + conn->key = key; + key = NULL; + ret = 0; +out: + key_put(key); + _leave(" = %d", ret); + return ret; + +inconsistent: + ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_INCONSISTENCY, -EPROTO, + rxgk_abort_resp_xdr_align); + goto out; +auth_too_short: + ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_PACKETSHORT, -EPROTO, + rxgk_abort_resp_short_auth); + goto out; +short_packet: + ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_PACKETSHORT, -EPROTO, + rxgk_abort_resp_short_packet); + goto out; + +cant_get_token: + switch (ret) { + case -ENOMEM: + goto temporary_error; + case -EINVAL: + ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_NOTAUTH, -EKEYREJECTED, + rxgk_abort_resp_internal_error); + goto out; + case -ENOPKG: + ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, KRB5_PROG_KEYTYPE_NOSUPP, + -EKEYREJECTED, rxgk_abort_resp_nopkg); + goto out; + } + +temporary_error: + /* Ignore the response packet if we got a temporary error such as + * ENOMEM. We just want to send the challenge again. Note that we + * also come out this way if the ticket decryption fails. + */ + goto out; +} + +/* + * clear the connection security + */ +static void rxgk_clear(struct rxrpc_connection *conn) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(conn->rxgk.keys); i++) + rxgk_put(conn->rxgk.keys[i]); +} + +/* + * Initialise the RxGK security service. + */ +static int rxgk_init(void) +{ + return 0; +} + +/* + * Clean up the RxGK security service. + */ +static void rxgk_exit(void) +{ +} + +/* + * RxRPC YFS GSSAPI-based security + */ +const struct rxrpc_security rxgk_yfs = { + .name = "yfs-rxgk", + .security_index = RXRPC_SECURITY_YFS_RXGK, + .no_key_abort = RXGK_NOTAUTH, + .init = rxgk_init, + .exit = rxgk_exit, + .preparse_server_key = rxgk_preparse_server_key, + .free_preparse_server_key = rxgk_free_preparse_server_key, + .destroy_server_key = rxgk_destroy_server_key, + .describe_server_key = rxgk_describe_server_key, + .init_connection_security = rxgk_init_connection_security, + .alloc_txbuf = rxgk_alloc_txbuf, + .secure_packet = rxgk_secure_packet, + .verify_packet = rxgk_verify_packet, + .free_call_crypto = rxgk_free_call_crypto, + .issue_challenge = rxgk_issue_challenge, + .validate_challenge = rxgk_validate_challenge, + .challenge_to_recvmsg = rxgk_challenge_to_recvmsg, + .sendmsg_respond_to_challenge = rxgk_sendmsg_respond_to_challenge, + .respond_to_challenge = rxgk_respond_to_challenge_no_appdata, + .verify_response = rxgk_verify_response, + .clear = rxgk_clear, + .default_decode_ticket = rxgk_yfs_decode_ticket, +}; diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxgk_app.c b/net/rxrpc/rxgk_app.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b94b77a1c317 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/rxrpc/rxgk_app.c @@ -0,0 +1,286 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* Application-specific bits for GSSAPI-based RxRPC security + * + * Copyright (C) 2025 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + +#include <linux/net.h> +#include <linux/skbuff.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/key-type.h> +#include "ar-internal.h" +#include "rxgk_common.h" + +/* + * Decode a default-style YFS ticket in a response and turn it into an + * rxrpc-type key. + * + * struct rxgk_key { + * afs_uint32 enctype; + * opaque key<>; + * }; + * + * struct RXGK_AuthName { + * afs_int32 kind; + * opaque data<AUTHDATAMAX>; + * opaque display<AUTHPRINTABLEMAX>; + * }; + * + * struct RXGK_Token { + * rxgk_key K0; + * RXGK_Level level; + * rxgkTime starttime; + * afs_int32 lifetime; + * afs_int32 bytelife; + * rxgkTime expirationtime; + * struct RXGK_AuthName identities<>; + * }; + */ +int rxgk_yfs_decode_ticket(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb, + unsigned int ticket_offset, unsigned int ticket_len, + struct key **_key) +{ + struct rxrpc_key_token *token; + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); // TODO - use socket creds + struct key *key; + size_t pre_ticket_len, payload_len; + unsigned int klen, enctype; + void *payload, *ticket; + __be32 *t, *p, *q, tmp[2]; + int ret; + + _enter(""); + + /* Get the session key length */ + ret = skb_copy_bits(skb, ticket_offset, tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + if (ret < 0) + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_INCONSISTENCY, -EPROTO, + rxgk_abort_resp_short_yfs_klen); + enctype = ntohl(tmp[0]); + klen = ntohl(tmp[1]); + + if (klen > ticket_len - 10 * sizeof(__be32)) + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_INCONSISTENCY, -EPROTO, + rxgk_abort_resp_short_yfs_key); + + pre_ticket_len = ((5 + 14) * sizeof(__be32) + + xdr_round_up(klen) + + sizeof(__be32)); + payload_len = pre_ticket_len + xdr_round_up(ticket_len); + + payload = kzalloc(payload_len, GFP_NOFS); + if (!payload) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* We need to fill out the XDR form for a key payload that we can pass + * to add_key(). Start by copying in the ticket so that we can parse + * it. + */ + ticket = payload + pre_ticket_len; + ret = skb_copy_bits(skb, ticket_offset, ticket, ticket_len); + if (ret < 0) { + ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_INCONSISTENCY, -EPROTO, + rxgk_abort_resp_short_yfs_tkt); + goto error; + } + + /* Fill out the form header. */ + p = payload; + p[0] = htonl(0); /* Flags */ + p[1] = htonl(1); /* len(cellname) */ + p[2] = htonl(0x20000000); /* Cellname " " */ + p[3] = htonl(1); /* #tokens */ + p[4] = htonl(15 * sizeof(__be32) + xdr_round_up(klen) + + xdr_round_up(ticket_len)); /* Token len */ + + /* Now fill in the body. Most of this we can just scrape directly from + * the ticket. + */ + t = ticket + sizeof(__be32) * 2 + xdr_round_up(klen); + q = payload + 5 * sizeof(__be32); + q[0] = htonl(RXRPC_SECURITY_YFS_RXGK); + q[1] = t[1]; /* begintime - msw */ + q[2] = t[2]; /* - lsw */ + q[3] = t[5]; /* endtime - msw */ + q[4] = t[6]; /* - lsw */ + q[5] = 0; /* level - msw */ + q[6] = t[0]; /* - lsw */ + q[7] = 0; /* lifetime - msw */ + q[8] = t[3]; /* - lsw */ + q[9] = 0; /* bytelife - msw */ + q[10] = t[4]; /* - lsw */ + q[11] = 0; /* enctype - msw */ + q[12] = htonl(enctype); /* - lsw */ + q[13] = htonl(klen); /* Key length */ + + q += 14; + + memcpy(q, ticket + sizeof(__be32) * 2, klen); + q += xdr_round_up(klen) / 4; + q[0] = htonl(ticket_len); + q++; + if (WARN_ON((unsigned long)q != (unsigned long)ticket)) { + ret = -EIO; + goto error; + } + + /* Ticket read in with skb_copy_bits above */ + q += xdr_round_up(ticket_len) / 4; + if (WARN_ON((unsigned long)q - (unsigned long)payload != payload_len)) { + ret = -EIO; + goto error; + } + + /* Now turn that into a key. */ + key = key_alloc(&key_type_rxrpc, "x", + GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred, // TODO: Use socket owner + KEY_USR_VIEW, + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL); + if (IS_ERR(key)) { + _leave(" = -ENOMEM [alloc %ld]", PTR_ERR(key)); + ret = PTR_ERR(key); + goto error; + } + + _debug("key %d", key_serial(key)); + + ret = key_instantiate_and_link(key, payload, payload_len, NULL, NULL); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_key; + + token = key->payload.data[0]; + token->no_leak_key = true; + *_key = key; + key = NULL; + ret = 0; + goto error; + +error_key: + key_put(key); +error: + kfree_sensitive(payload); + _leave(" = %d", ret); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Extract the token and set up a session key from the details. + * + * struct RXGK_TokenContainer { + * afs_int32 kvno; + * afs_int32 enctype; + * opaque encrypted_token<>; + * }; + * + * [tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wilkinson-afs3-rxgk-afs-08 sec 6.1] + */ +int rxgk_extract_token(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb, + unsigned int token_offset, unsigned int token_len, + struct key **_key) +{ + const struct krb5_enctype *krb5; + const struct krb5_buffer *server_secret; + struct crypto_aead *token_enc = NULL; + struct key *server_key; + unsigned int ticket_offset, ticket_len; + u32 kvno, enctype; + int ret, ec; + + struct { + __be32 kvno; + __be32 enctype; + __be32 token_len; + } container; + + /* Decode the RXGK_TokenContainer object. This tells us which server + * key we should be using. We can then fetch the key, get the secret + * and set up the crypto to extract the token. + */ + if (skb_copy_bits(skb, token_offset, &container, sizeof(container)) < 0) + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_PACKETSHORT, -EPROTO, + rxgk_abort_resp_tok_short); + + kvno = ntohl(container.kvno); + enctype = ntohl(container.enctype); + ticket_len = ntohl(container.token_len); + ticket_offset = token_offset + sizeof(container); + + if (xdr_round_up(ticket_len) > token_len - 3 * 4) + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_PACKETSHORT, -EPROTO, + rxgk_abort_resp_tok_short); + + _debug("KVNO %u", kvno); + _debug("ENC %u", enctype); + _debug("TLEN %u", ticket_len); + + server_key = rxrpc_look_up_server_security(conn, skb, kvno, enctype); + if (IS_ERR(server_key)) + goto cant_get_server_key; + + down_read(&server_key->sem); + server_secret = (const void *)&server_key->payload.data[2]; + ret = rxgk_set_up_token_cipher(server_secret, &token_enc, enctype, &krb5, GFP_NOFS); + up_read(&server_key->sem); + key_put(server_key); + if (ret < 0) + goto cant_get_token; + + /* We can now decrypt and parse the token/ticket. This allows us to + * gain access to K0, from which we can derive the transport key and + * thence decode the authenticator. + */ + ret = rxgk_decrypt_skb(krb5, token_enc, skb, + &ticket_offset, &ticket_len, &ec); + crypto_free_aead(token_enc); + token_enc = NULL; + if (ret < 0) + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, ec, ret, + rxgk_abort_resp_tok_dec); + + ret = conn->security->default_decode_ticket(conn, skb, ticket_offset, + ticket_len, _key); + if (ret < 0) + goto cant_get_token; + + _leave(" = 0"); + return ret; + +cant_get_server_key: + ret = PTR_ERR(server_key); + switch (ret) { + case -ENOMEM: + goto temporary_error; + case -ENOKEY: + case -EKEYREJECTED: + case -EKEYEXPIRED: + case -EKEYREVOKED: + case -EPERM: + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_BADKEYNO, -EKEYREJECTED, + rxgk_abort_resp_tok_nokey); + default: + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_NOTAUTH, -EKEYREJECTED, + rxgk_abort_resp_tok_keyerr); + } + +cant_get_token: + switch (ret) { + case -ENOMEM: + goto temporary_error; + case -EINVAL: + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_NOTAUTH, -EKEYREJECTED, + rxgk_abort_resp_tok_internal_error); + case -ENOPKG: + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, KRB5_PROG_KEYTYPE_NOSUPP, + -EKEYREJECTED, rxgk_abort_resp_tok_nopkg); + } + +temporary_error: + /* Ignore the response packet if we got a temporary error such as + * ENOMEM. We just want to send the challenge again. Note that we + * also come out this way if the ticket decryption fails. + */ + return ret; +} diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h b/net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7370a5655985 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ +/* Common bits for GSSAPI-based RxRPC security. + * + * Copyright (C) 2025 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + */ + +#include <crypto/krb5.h> +#include <crypto/skcipher.h> +#include <crypto/hash.h> + +/* + * Per-key number context. This is replaced when the connection is rekeyed. + */ +struct rxgk_context { + refcount_t usage; + unsigned int key_number; /* Rekeying number (goes in the rx header) */ + unsigned long flags; +#define RXGK_TK_NEEDS_REKEY 0 /* Set if this needs rekeying */ + unsigned long expiry; /* Expiration time of this key */ + long long bytes_remaining; /* Remaining Tx lifetime of this key */ + const struct krb5_enctype *krb5; /* RxGK encryption type */ + const struct rxgk_key *key; + + /* We need up to 7 keys derived from the transport key, but we don't + * actually need the transport key. Each key is derived by + * DK(TK,constant). + */ + struct crypto_aead *tx_enc; /* Transmission key */ + struct crypto_aead *rx_enc; /* Reception key */ + struct crypto_shash *tx_Kc; /* Transmission checksum key */ + struct crypto_shash *rx_Kc; /* Reception checksum key */ + struct crypto_aead *resp_enc; /* Response packet enc key */ +}; + +#define xdr_round_up(x) (round_up((x), sizeof(__be32))) +#define xdr_object_len(x) (4 + xdr_round_up(x)) + +/* + * rxgk_app.c + */ +int rxgk_yfs_decode_ticket(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb, + unsigned int ticket_offset, unsigned int ticket_len, + struct key **_key); +int rxgk_extract_token(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb, + unsigned int token_offset, unsigned int token_len, + struct key **_key); + +/* + * rxgk_kdf.c + */ +void rxgk_put(struct rxgk_context *gk); +struct rxgk_context *rxgk_generate_transport_key(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + const struct rxgk_key *key, + unsigned int key_number, + gfp_t gfp); +int rxgk_set_up_token_cipher(const struct krb5_buffer *server_key, + struct crypto_aead **token_key, + unsigned int enctype, + const struct krb5_enctype **_krb5, + gfp_t gfp); + +/* + * Apply decryption and checksumming functions to part of an skbuff. The + * offset and length are updated to reflect the actual content of the encrypted + * region. + */ +static inline +int rxgk_decrypt_skb(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5, + struct crypto_aead *aead, + struct sk_buff *skb, + unsigned int *_offset, unsigned int *_len, + int *_error_code) +{ + struct scatterlist sg[16]; + size_t offset = 0, len = *_len; + int nr_sg, ret; + + sg_init_table(sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg)); + nr_sg = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, *_offset, len); + if (unlikely(nr_sg < 0)) + return nr_sg; + + ret = crypto_krb5_decrypt(krb5, aead, sg, nr_sg, + &offset, &len); + switch (ret) { + case 0: + *_offset += offset; + *_len = len; + break; + case -EPROTO: + case -EBADMSG: + *_error_code = RXGK_SEALEDINCON; + break; + default: + break; + } + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Check the MIC on a region of an skbuff. The offset and length are updated + * to reflect the actual content of the secure region. + */ +static inline +int rxgk_verify_mic_skb(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5, + struct crypto_shash *shash, + const struct krb5_buffer *metadata, + struct sk_buff *skb, + unsigned int *_offset, unsigned int *_len, + u32 *_error_code) +{ + struct scatterlist sg[16]; + size_t offset = 0, len = *_len; + int nr_sg, ret; + + sg_init_table(sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg)); + nr_sg = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, *_offset, len); + if (unlikely(nr_sg < 0)) + return nr_sg; + + ret = crypto_krb5_verify_mic(krb5, shash, metadata, sg, nr_sg, + &offset, &len); + switch (ret) { + case 0: + *_offset += offset; + *_len = len; + break; + case -EPROTO: + case -EBADMSG: + *_error_code = RXGK_SEALEDINCON; + break; + default: + break; + } + + return ret; +} diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxgk_kdf.c b/net/rxrpc/rxgk_kdf.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b4db5aa30e5b --- /dev/null +++ b/net/rxrpc/rxgk_kdf.c @@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* RxGK transport key derivation. + * + * Copyright (C) 2025 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + +#include <linux/key-type.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <keys/rxrpc-type.h> +#include "ar-internal.h" +#include "rxgk_common.h" + +#define round16(x) (((x) + 15) & ~15) + +/* + * Constants used to derive the keys and hmacs actually used for doing stuff. + */ +#define RXGK_CLIENT_ENC_PACKET 1026U // 0x402 +#define RXGK_CLIENT_MIC_PACKET 1027U // 0x403 +#define RXGK_SERVER_ENC_PACKET 1028U // 0x404 +#define RXGK_SERVER_MIC_PACKET 1029U // 0x405 +#define RXGK_CLIENT_ENC_RESPONSE 1030U // 0x406 +#define RXGK_SERVER_ENC_TOKEN 1036U // 0x40c + +static void rxgk_free(struct rxgk_context *gk) +{ + if (gk->tx_Kc) + crypto_free_shash(gk->tx_Kc); + if (gk->rx_Kc) + crypto_free_shash(gk->rx_Kc); + if (gk->tx_enc) + crypto_free_aead(gk->tx_enc); + if (gk->rx_enc) + crypto_free_aead(gk->rx_enc); + if (gk->resp_enc) + crypto_free_aead(gk->resp_enc); + kfree(gk); +} + +void rxgk_put(struct rxgk_context *gk) +{ + if (gk && refcount_dec_and_test(&gk->usage)) + rxgk_free(gk); +} + +/* + * Transport key derivation function. + * + * TK = random-to-key(PRF+(K0, L, + * epoch || cid || start_time || key_number)) + * [tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wilkinson-afs3-rxgk-11 sec 8.3] + */ +static int rxgk_derive_transport_key(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + struct rxgk_context *gk, + const struct rxgk_key *rxgk, + struct krb5_buffer *TK, + gfp_t gfp) +{ + const struct krb5_enctype *krb5 = gk->krb5; + struct krb5_buffer conn_info; + unsigned int L = krb5->key_bytes; + __be32 *info; + u8 *buffer; + int ret; + + _enter(""); + + conn_info.len = sizeof(__be32) * 5; + + buffer = kzalloc(round16(conn_info.len), gfp); + if (!buffer) + return -ENOMEM; + + conn_info.data = buffer; + + info = (__be32 *)conn_info.data; + info[0] = htonl(conn->proto.epoch); + info[1] = htonl(conn->proto.cid); + info[2] = htonl(conn->rxgk.start_time >> 32); + info[3] = htonl(conn->rxgk.start_time >> 0); + info[4] = htonl(gk->key_number); + + ret = crypto_krb5_calc_PRFplus(krb5, &rxgk->key, L, &conn_info, TK, gfp); + kfree_sensitive(buffer); + _leave(" = %d", ret); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Set up the ciphers for the usage keys. + */ +static int rxgk_set_up_ciphers(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + struct rxgk_context *gk, + const struct rxgk_key *rxgk, + gfp_t gfp) +{ + const struct krb5_enctype *krb5 = gk->krb5; + struct crypto_shash *shash; + struct crypto_aead *aead; + struct krb5_buffer TK; + bool service = rxrpc_conn_is_service(conn); + int ret; + u8 *buffer; + + buffer = kzalloc(krb5->key_bytes, gfp); + if (!buffer) + return -ENOMEM; + + TK.len = krb5->key_bytes; + TK.data = buffer; + + ret = rxgk_derive_transport_key(conn, gk, rxgk, &TK, gfp); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + aead = crypto_krb5_prepare_encryption(krb5, &TK, RXGK_CLIENT_ENC_RESPONSE, gfp); + if (IS_ERR(aead)) + goto aead_error; + gk->resp_enc = aead; + + if (crypto_aead_blocksize(gk->resp_enc) != krb5->block_len || + crypto_aead_authsize(gk->resp_enc) != krb5->cksum_len) { + pr_notice("algo inconsistent with krb5 table %u!=%u or %u!=%u\n", + crypto_aead_blocksize(gk->resp_enc), krb5->block_len, + crypto_aead_authsize(gk->resp_enc), krb5->cksum_len); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + if (service) { + switch (conn->security_level) { + case RXRPC_SECURITY_AUTH: + shash = crypto_krb5_prepare_checksum( + krb5, &TK, RXGK_SERVER_MIC_PACKET, gfp); + if (IS_ERR(shash)) + goto hash_error; + gk->tx_Kc = shash; + shash = crypto_krb5_prepare_checksum( + krb5, &TK, RXGK_CLIENT_MIC_PACKET, gfp); + if (IS_ERR(shash)) + goto hash_error; + gk->rx_Kc = shash; + break; + case RXRPC_SECURITY_ENCRYPT: + aead = crypto_krb5_prepare_encryption( + krb5, &TK, RXGK_SERVER_ENC_PACKET, gfp); + if (IS_ERR(aead)) + goto aead_error; + gk->tx_enc = aead; + aead = crypto_krb5_prepare_encryption( + krb5, &TK, RXGK_CLIENT_ENC_PACKET, gfp); + if (IS_ERR(aead)) + goto aead_error; + gk->rx_enc = aead; + break; + } + } else { + switch (conn->security_level) { + case RXRPC_SECURITY_AUTH: + shash = crypto_krb5_prepare_checksum( + krb5, &TK, RXGK_CLIENT_MIC_PACKET, gfp); + if (IS_ERR(shash)) + goto hash_error; + gk->tx_Kc = shash; + shash = crypto_krb5_prepare_checksum( + krb5, &TK, RXGK_SERVER_MIC_PACKET, gfp); + if (IS_ERR(shash)) + goto hash_error; + gk->rx_Kc = shash; + break; + case RXRPC_SECURITY_ENCRYPT: + aead = crypto_krb5_prepare_encryption( + krb5, &TK, RXGK_CLIENT_ENC_PACKET, gfp); + if (IS_ERR(aead)) + goto aead_error; + gk->tx_enc = aead; + aead = crypto_krb5_prepare_encryption( + krb5, &TK, RXGK_SERVER_ENC_PACKET, gfp); + if (IS_ERR(aead)) + goto aead_error; + gk->rx_enc = aead; + break; + } + } + + ret = 0; +out: + kfree_sensitive(buffer); + return ret; +aead_error: + ret = PTR_ERR(aead); + goto out; +hash_error: + ret = PTR_ERR(shash); + goto out; +} + +/* + * Derive a transport key for a connection and then derive a bunch of usage + * keys from it and set up ciphers using them. + */ +struct rxgk_context *rxgk_generate_transport_key(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + const struct rxgk_key *key, + unsigned int key_number, + gfp_t gfp) +{ + struct rxgk_context *gk; + unsigned long lifetime; + int ret = -ENOPKG; + + _enter(""); + + gk = kzalloc(sizeof(*gk), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!gk) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + refcount_set(&gk->usage, 1); + gk->key = key; + gk->key_number = key_number; + + gk->krb5 = crypto_krb5_find_enctype(key->enctype); + if (!gk->krb5) + goto err_tk; + + ret = rxgk_set_up_ciphers(conn, gk, key, gfp); + if (ret) + goto err_tk; + + /* Set the remaining number of bytes encrypted with this key that may + * be transmitted before rekeying. Note that the spec has been + * interpreted differently on this point... + */ + switch (key->bytelife) { + case 0: + case 63: + gk->bytes_remaining = LLONG_MAX; + break; + case 1 ... 62: + gk->bytes_remaining = 1LL << key->bytelife; + break; + default: + gk->bytes_remaining = key->bytelife; + break; + } + + /* Set the time after which rekeying must occur */ + if (key->lifetime) { + lifetime = min_t(u64, key->lifetime, INT_MAX / HZ); + lifetime *= HZ; + } else { + lifetime = MAX_JIFFY_OFFSET; + } + gk->expiry = jiffies + lifetime; + return gk; + +err_tk: + rxgk_put(gk); + _leave(" = %d", ret); + return ERR_PTR(ret); +} + +/* + * Use the server secret key to set up the ciphers that will be used to extract + * the token from a response packet. + */ +int rxgk_set_up_token_cipher(const struct krb5_buffer *server_key, + struct crypto_aead **token_aead, + unsigned int enctype, + const struct krb5_enctype **_krb5, + gfp_t gfp) +{ + const struct krb5_enctype *krb5; + struct crypto_aead *aead; + + krb5 = crypto_krb5_find_enctype(enctype); + if (!krb5) + return -ENOPKG; + + aead = crypto_krb5_prepare_encryption(krb5, server_key, RXGK_SERVER_ENC_TOKEN, gfp); + if (IS_ERR(aead)) + return PTR_ERR(aead); + + *_krb5 = krb5; + *token_aead = aead; + return 0; +} diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c index 6cb37b0eb77f..3657c0661cdc 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c @@ -177,8 +177,10 @@ static struct rxrpc_txbuf *rxkad_alloc_txbuf(struct rxrpc_call *call, size_t rem if (!txb) return NULL; - txb->offset += shdr; - txb->space = part; + txb->crypto_header = 0; + txb->sec_header = shdr; + txb->offset += shdr; + txb->space = part; return txb; } @@ -683,6 +685,8 @@ static int rxkad_issue_challenge(struct rxrpc_connection *conn) serial = rxrpc_get_next_serial(conn); whdr.serial = htonl(serial); + trace_rxrpc_tx_challenge(conn, serial, 0, conn->rxkad.nonce); + ret = kernel_sendmsg(conn->local->socket, &msg, iov, 2, len); if (ret < 0) { trace_rxrpc_tx_fail(conn->debug_id, serial, ret, @@ -698,62 +702,6 @@ static int rxkad_issue_challenge(struct rxrpc_connection *conn) } /* - * send a Kerberos security response - */ -static int rxkad_send_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, - struct rxrpc_host_header *hdr, - struct rxkad_response *resp, - const struct rxkad_key *s2) -{ - struct rxrpc_wire_header whdr; - struct msghdr msg; - struct kvec iov[3]; - size_t len; - u32 serial; - int ret; - - _enter(""); - - msg.msg_name = &conn->peer->srx.transport; - msg.msg_namelen = conn->peer->srx.transport_len; - msg.msg_control = NULL; - msg.msg_controllen = 0; - msg.msg_flags = 0; - - memset(&whdr, 0, sizeof(whdr)); - whdr.epoch = htonl(hdr->epoch); - whdr.cid = htonl(hdr->cid); - whdr.type = RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_RESPONSE; - whdr.flags = conn->out_clientflag; - whdr.securityIndex = hdr->securityIndex; - whdr.serviceId = htons(hdr->serviceId); - - iov[0].iov_base = &whdr; - iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(whdr); - iov[1].iov_base = resp; - iov[1].iov_len = sizeof(*resp); - iov[2].iov_base = (void *)s2->ticket; - iov[2].iov_len = s2->ticket_len; - - len = iov[0].iov_len + iov[1].iov_len + iov[2].iov_len; - - serial = rxrpc_get_next_serial(conn); - whdr.serial = htonl(serial); - - rxrpc_local_dont_fragment(conn->local, false); - ret = kernel_sendmsg(conn->local->socket, &msg, iov, 3, len); - if (ret < 0) { - trace_rxrpc_tx_fail(conn->debug_id, serial, ret, - rxrpc_tx_point_rxkad_response); - return -EAGAIN; - } - - conn->peer->last_tx_at = ktime_get_seconds(); - _leave(" = 0"); - return 0; -} - -/* * calculate the response checksum */ static void rxkad_calc_response_checksum(struct rxkad_response *response) @@ -772,12 +720,21 @@ static void rxkad_calc_response_checksum(struct rxkad_response *response) * encrypt the response packet */ static int rxkad_encrypt_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, - struct rxkad_response *resp, + struct sk_buff *response, const struct rxkad_key *s2) { struct skcipher_request *req; struct rxrpc_crypt iv; struct scatterlist sg[1]; + size_t encsize = sizeof(((struct rxkad_response *)0)->encrypted); + int ret; + + sg_init_table(sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg)); + ret = skb_to_sgvec(response, sg, + sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header) + + offsetof(struct rxkad_response, encrypted), encsize); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; req = skcipher_request_alloc(&conn->rxkad.cipher->base, GFP_NOFS); if (!req) @@ -786,89 +743,206 @@ static int rxkad_encrypt_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, /* continue encrypting from where we left off */ memcpy(&iv, s2->session_key, sizeof(iv)); - sg_init_table(sg, 1); - sg_set_buf(sg, &resp->encrypted, sizeof(resp->encrypted)); skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, conn->rxkad.cipher); skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL); - skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, sizeof(resp->encrypted), iv.x); - crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req); + skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, encsize, iv.x); + ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req); skcipher_request_free(req); - return 0; + return ret; } /* - * respond to a challenge packet + * Validate a challenge packet. */ -static int rxkad_respond_to_challenge(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, - struct sk_buff *skb) +static bool rxkad_validate_challenge(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + struct sk_buff *skb) { - const struct rxrpc_key_token *token; struct rxkad_challenge challenge; - struct rxkad_response *resp; struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb); - u32 version, nonce, min_level; - int ret = -EPROTO; + u32 version, min_level; + int ret; _enter("{%d,%x}", conn->debug_id, key_serial(conn->key)); - if (!conn->key) - return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RX_PROTOCOL_ERROR, -EPROTO, - rxkad_abort_chall_no_key); + if (!conn->key) { + rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RX_PROTOCOL_ERROR, -EPROTO, + rxkad_abort_chall_no_key); + return false; + } ret = key_validate(conn->key); - if (ret < 0) - return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADEXPIRED, ret, - rxkad_abort_chall_key_expired); + if (ret < 0) { + rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADEXPIRED, ret, + rxkad_abort_chall_key_expired); + return false; + } if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header), - &challenge, sizeof(challenge)) < 0) - return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADPACKETSHORT, -EPROTO, - rxkad_abort_chall_short); + &challenge, sizeof(challenge)) < 0) { + rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADPACKETSHORT, -EPROTO, + rxkad_abort_chall_short); + return false; + } version = ntohl(challenge.version); - nonce = ntohl(challenge.nonce); + sp->chall.rxkad_nonce = ntohl(challenge.nonce); min_level = ntohl(challenge.min_level); - trace_rxrpc_rx_challenge(conn, sp->hdr.serial, version, nonce, min_level); + trace_rxrpc_rx_challenge(conn, sp->hdr.serial, version, + sp->chall.rxkad_nonce, min_level); + + if (version != RXKAD_VERSION) { + rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADINCONSISTENCY, -EPROTO, + rxkad_abort_chall_version); + return false; + } - if (version != RXKAD_VERSION) - return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADINCONSISTENCY, -EPROTO, - rxkad_abort_chall_version); + if (conn->security_level < min_level) { + rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADLEVELFAIL, -EACCES, + rxkad_abort_chall_level); + return false; + } + return true; +} + +/* + * Insert the header into the response. + */ +static noinline +int rxkad_insert_response_header(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + const struct rxrpc_key_token *token, + struct sk_buff *challenge, + struct sk_buff *response, + size_t *offset) +{ + struct rxrpc_skb_priv *csp = rxrpc_skb(challenge); + struct { + struct rxrpc_wire_header whdr; + struct rxkad_response resp; + } h; + int ret; - if (conn->security_level < min_level) - return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADLEVELFAIL, -EACCES, - rxkad_abort_chall_level); + h.whdr.epoch = htonl(conn->proto.epoch); + h.whdr.cid = htonl(conn->proto.cid); + h.whdr.callNumber = 0; + h.whdr.serial = 0; + h.whdr.seq = 0; + h.whdr.type = RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_RESPONSE; + h.whdr.flags = conn->out_clientflag; + h.whdr.userStatus = 0; + h.whdr.securityIndex = conn->security_ix; + h.whdr.cksum = 0; + h.whdr.serviceId = htons(conn->service_id); + h.resp.version = htonl(RXKAD_VERSION); + h.resp.__pad = 0; + h.resp.encrypted.epoch = htonl(conn->proto.epoch); + h.resp.encrypted.cid = htonl(conn->proto.cid); + h.resp.encrypted.checksum = 0; + h.resp.encrypted.securityIndex = htonl(conn->security_ix); + h.resp.encrypted.call_id[0] = htonl(conn->channels[0].call_counter); + h.resp.encrypted.call_id[1] = htonl(conn->channels[1].call_counter); + h.resp.encrypted.call_id[2] = htonl(conn->channels[2].call_counter); + h.resp.encrypted.call_id[3] = htonl(conn->channels[3].call_counter); + h.resp.encrypted.inc_nonce = htonl(csp->chall.rxkad_nonce + 1); + h.resp.encrypted.level = htonl(conn->security_level); + h.resp.kvno = htonl(token->kad->kvno); + h.resp.ticket_len = htonl(token->kad->ticket_len); + + rxkad_calc_response_checksum(&h.resp); + + ret = skb_store_bits(response, *offset, &h, sizeof(h)); + *offset += sizeof(h); + return ret; +} + +/* + * respond to a challenge packet + */ +static int rxkad_respond_to_challenge(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + struct sk_buff *challenge) +{ + const struct rxrpc_key_token *token; + struct rxrpc_skb_priv *csp, *rsp; + struct sk_buff *response; + size_t len, offset = 0; + int ret = -EPROTO; + + _enter("{%d,%x}", conn->debug_id, key_serial(conn->key)); + + ret = key_validate(conn->key); + if (ret < 0) + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, challenge, RXKADEXPIRED, ret, + rxkad_abort_chall_key_expired); token = conn->key->payload.data[0]; /* build the response packet */ - resp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rxkad_response), GFP_NOFS); - if (!resp) - return -ENOMEM; + len = sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header) + + sizeof(struct rxkad_response) + + token->kad->ticket_len; + + response = alloc_skb_with_frags(0, len, 0, &ret, GFP_NOFS); + if (!response) + goto error; + rxrpc_new_skb(response, rxrpc_skb_new_response_rxkad); + response->len = len; + response->data_len = len; + + offset = 0; + ret = rxkad_insert_response_header(conn, token, challenge, response, + &offset); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + + ret = rxkad_encrypt_response(conn, response, token->kad); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + + ret = skb_store_bits(response, offset, token->kad->ticket, + token->kad->ticket_len); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; - resp->version = htonl(RXKAD_VERSION); - resp->encrypted.epoch = htonl(conn->proto.epoch); - resp->encrypted.cid = htonl(conn->proto.cid); - resp->encrypted.securityIndex = htonl(conn->security_ix); - resp->encrypted.inc_nonce = htonl(nonce + 1); - resp->encrypted.level = htonl(conn->security_level); - resp->kvno = htonl(token->kad->kvno); - resp->ticket_len = htonl(token->kad->ticket_len); - resp->encrypted.call_id[0] = htonl(conn->channels[0].call_counter); - resp->encrypted.call_id[1] = htonl(conn->channels[1].call_counter); - resp->encrypted.call_id[2] = htonl(conn->channels[2].call_counter); - resp->encrypted.call_id[3] = htonl(conn->channels[3].call_counter); - - /* calculate the response checksum and then do the encryption */ - rxkad_calc_response_checksum(resp); - ret = rxkad_encrypt_response(conn, resp, token->kad); - if (ret == 0) - ret = rxkad_send_response(conn, &sp->hdr, resp, token->kad); - kfree(resp); + csp = rxrpc_skb(challenge); + rsp = rxrpc_skb(response); + rsp->resp.len = len; + rsp->resp.challenge_serial = csp->hdr.serial; + rxrpc_post_response(conn, response); + response = NULL; + ret = 0; + +error: + rxrpc_free_skb(response, rxrpc_skb_put_response); return ret; } /* + * RxKAD does automatic response only as there's nothing to manage that isn't + * already in the key. + */ +static int rxkad_sendmsg_respond_to_challenge(struct sk_buff *challenge, + struct msghdr *msg) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} + +/** + * rxkad_kernel_respond_to_challenge - Respond to a challenge with appdata + * @challenge: The challenge to respond to + * + * Allow a kernel application to respond to a CHALLENGE. + * + * Return: %0 if successful and a negative error code otherwise. + */ +int rxkad_kernel_respond_to_challenge(struct sk_buff *challenge) +{ + struct rxrpc_skb_priv *csp = rxrpc_skb(challenge); + + return rxkad_respond_to_challenge(csp->chall.conn, challenge); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxkad_kernel_respond_to_challenge); + +/* * decrypt the kerberos IV ticket in the response */ static int rxkad_decrypt_ticket(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, @@ -1276,6 +1350,8 @@ const struct rxrpc_security rxkad = { .verify_packet = rxkad_verify_packet, .free_call_crypto = rxkad_free_call_crypto, .issue_challenge = rxkad_issue_challenge, + .validate_challenge = rxkad_validate_challenge, + .sendmsg_respond_to_challenge = rxkad_sendmsg_respond_to_challenge, .respond_to_challenge = rxkad_respond_to_challenge, .verify_response = rxkad_verify_response, .clear = rxkad_clear, diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxperf.c b/net/rxrpc/rxperf.c index e848a4777b8c..0377301156b0 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/rxperf.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/rxperf.c @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #define pr_fmt(fmt) "rxperf: " fmt #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <crypto/krb5.h> #include <net/sock.h> #include <net/af_rxrpc.h> #define RXRPC_TRACE_ONLY_DEFINE_ENUMS @@ -136,6 +137,12 @@ static void rxperf_notify_end_reply_tx(struct sock *sock, RXPERF_CALL_SV_AWAIT_ACK); } +static const struct rxrpc_kernel_ops rxperf_rxrpc_callback_ops = { + .notify_new_call = rxperf_rx_new_call, + .discard_new_call = rxperf_rx_discard_new_call, + .user_attach_call = rxperf_rx_attach, +}; + /* * Charge the incoming call preallocation. */ @@ -161,7 +168,6 @@ static void rxperf_charge_preallocation(struct work_struct *work) if (rxrpc_kernel_charge_accept(rxperf_socket, rxperf_notify_rx, - rxperf_rx_attach, (unsigned long)call, GFP_KERNEL, call->debug_id) < 0) @@ -209,8 +215,7 @@ static int rxperf_open_socket(void) if (ret < 0) goto error_2; - rxrpc_kernel_new_call_notification(socket, rxperf_rx_new_call, - rxperf_rx_discard_new_call); + rxrpc_kernel_set_notifications(socket, &rxperf_rxrpc_callback_ops); ret = kernel_listen(socket, INT_MAX); if (ret < 0) @@ -546,9 +551,9 @@ static int rxperf_process_call(struct rxperf_call *call) } /* - * Add a key to the security keyring. + * Add an rxkad key to the security keyring. */ -static int rxperf_add_key(struct key *keyring) +static int rxperf_add_rxkad_key(struct key *keyring) { key_ref_t kref; int ret; @@ -574,6 +579,47 @@ static int rxperf_add_key(struct key *keyring) return ret; } +#ifdef CONFIG_RXGK +/* + * Add a yfs-rxgk key to the security keyring. + */ +static int rxperf_add_yfs_rxgk_key(struct key *keyring, u32 enctype) +{ + const struct krb5_enctype *krb5 = crypto_krb5_find_enctype(enctype); + key_ref_t kref; + char name[64]; + int ret; + u8 key[32]; + + if (!krb5 || krb5->key_len > sizeof(key)) + return 0; + + /* The key is just { 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, ... } */ + for (int i = 0; i < krb5->key_len; i++) + key[i] = i; + + sprintf(name, "%u:6:1:%u", RX_PERF_SERVICE, enctype); + + kref = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(keyring, true), + "rxrpc_s", name, + key, krb5->key_len, + KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ | KEY_POS_SEARCH | + KEY_USR_VIEW, + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); + + if (IS_ERR(kref)) { + pr_err("Can't allocate rxperf server key: %ld\n", PTR_ERR(kref)); + return PTR_ERR(kref); + } + + ret = key_link(keyring, key_ref_to_ptr(kref)); + if (ret < 0) + pr_err("Can't link rxperf server key: %d\n", ret); + key_ref_put(kref); + return ret; +} +#endif + /* * Initialise the rxperf server. */ @@ -603,9 +649,29 @@ static int __init rxperf_init(void) goto error_keyring; } rxperf_sec_keyring = keyring; - ret = rxperf_add_key(keyring); + ret = rxperf_add_rxkad_key(keyring); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_key; +#ifdef CONFIG_RXGK + ret = rxperf_add_yfs_rxgk_key(keyring, KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_key; + ret = rxperf_add_yfs_rxgk_key(keyring, KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_key; + ret = rxperf_add_yfs_rxgk_key(keyring, KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA256_128); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_key; + ret = rxperf_add_yfs_rxgk_key(keyring, KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA384_192); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_key; + ret = rxperf_add_yfs_rxgk_key(keyring, KRB5_ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA128_CTS_CMAC); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_key; + ret = rxperf_add_yfs_rxgk_key(keyring, KRB5_ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA256_CTS_CMAC); if (ret < 0) goto error_key; +#endif ret = rxperf_open_socket(); if (ret < 0) diff --git a/net/rxrpc/security.c b/net/rxrpc/security.c index 9784adc8f275..078d91a6b77f 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/security.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/security.c @@ -20,6 +20,9 @@ static const struct rxrpc_security *rxrpc_security_types[] = { #ifdef CONFIG_RXKAD [RXRPC_SECURITY_RXKAD] = &rxkad, #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_RXGK + [RXRPC_SECURITY_YFS_RXGK] = &rxgk_yfs, +#endif }; int __init rxrpc_init_security(void) diff --git a/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c b/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c index 84dc6c94f23b..ebbb78b842de 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c @@ -607,7 +607,7 @@ static int rxrpc_sendmsg_cmsg(struct msghdr *msg, struct rxrpc_send_params *p) static struct rxrpc_call * rxrpc_new_client_call_for_sendmsg(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, struct msghdr *msg, struct rxrpc_send_params *p) - __releases(&rx->sk.sk_lock.slock) + __releases(&rx->sk.sk_lock) __acquires(&call->user_mutex) { struct rxrpc_conn_parameters cp; @@ -657,7 +657,6 @@ rxrpc_new_client_call_for_sendmsg(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, struct msghdr *msg, * - the socket may be either a client socket or a server socket */ int rxrpc_do_sendmsg(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) - __releases(&rx->sk.sk_lock.slock) { struct rxrpc_call *call; bool dropped_lock = false; @@ -759,14 +758,21 @@ int rxrpc_do_sendmsg(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) if (rxrpc_call_is_complete(call)) { /* it's too late for this call */ ret = -ESHUTDOWN; - } else if (p.command == RXRPC_CMD_SEND_ABORT) { + goto out_put_unlock; + } + + switch (p.command) { + case RXRPC_CMD_SEND_ABORT: rxrpc_propose_abort(call, p.abort_code, -ECONNABORTED, rxrpc_abort_call_sendmsg); ret = 0; - } else if (p.command != RXRPC_CMD_SEND_DATA) { - ret = -EINVAL; - } else { + break; + case RXRPC_CMD_SEND_DATA: ret = rxrpc_send_data(rx, call, msg, len, NULL, &dropped_lock); + break; + default: + ret = -EINVAL; + break; } out_put_unlock: @@ -794,6 +800,8 @@ error_release_sock: * appropriate to sending data. No control data should be supplied in @msg, * nor should an address be supplied. MSG_MORE should be flagged if there's * more data to come, otherwise this data will end the transmission phase. + * + * Return: %0 if successful and a negative error code otherwise. */ int rxrpc_kernel_send_data(struct socket *sock, struct rxrpc_call *call, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, @@ -829,8 +837,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_kernel_send_data); * @error: Local error value * @why: Indication as to why. * - * Allow a kernel service to abort a call, if it's still in an abortable state - * and return true if the call was aborted, false if it was already complete. + * Allow a kernel service to abort a call if it's still in an abortable state. + * + * Return: %true if the call was aborted, %false if it was already complete. */ bool rxrpc_kernel_abort_call(struct socket *sock, struct rxrpc_call *call, u32 abort_code, int error, enum rxrpc_abort_reason why) diff --git a/net/rxrpc/server_key.c b/net/rxrpc/server_key.c index e51940589ee5..36b05fd842a7 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/server_key.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/server_key.c @@ -152,6 +152,8 @@ int rxrpc_server_keyring(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, sockptr_t optval, int optlen) * * Set the server security keyring on an rxrpc socket. This is used to provide * the encryption keys for a kernel service. + * + * Return: %0 if successful and a negative error code otherwise. */ int rxrpc_sock_set_security_keyring(struct sock *sk, struct key *keyring) { @@ -169,3 +171,43 @@ int rxrpc_sock_set_security_keyring(struct sock *sk, struct key *keyring) return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_sock_set_security_keyring); + +/** + * rxrpc_sock_set_manage_response - Set the manage-response flag for a kernel service + * @sk: The socket to set the keyring on + * @set: True to set, false to clear the flag + * + * Set the flag on an rxrpc socket to say that the caller wants to manage the + * RESPONSE packet and the user-defined data it may contain. Setting this + * means that recvmsg() will return messages with RXRPC_CHALLENGED in the + * control message buffer containing information about the challenge. + * + * The user should respond to the challenge by passing RXRPC_RESPOND or + * RXRPC_RESPOND_ABORT control messages with sendmsg() to the same call. + * Supplementary control messages, such as RXRPC_RESP_RXGK_APPDATA, may be + * included to indicate the parts the user wants to supply. + * + * The server will be passed the response data with a RXRPC_RESPONDED control + * message when it gets the first data from each call. + * + * Note that this is only honoured by security classes that need auxiliary data + * (e.g. RxGK). Those that don't offer the facility (e.g. RxKAD) respond + * without consulting userspace. + * + * Return: The previous setting. + */ +int rxrpc_sock_set_manage_response(struct sock *sk, bool set) +{ + struct rxrpc_sock *rx = rxrpc_sk(sk); + int ret; + + lock_sock(sk); + ret = !!test_bit(RXRPC_SOCK_MANAGE_RESPONSE, &rx->flags); + if (set) + set_bit(RXRPC_SOCK_MANAGE_RESPONSE, &rx->flags); + else + clear_bit(RXRPC_SOCK_MANAGE_RESPONSE, &rx->flags); + release_sock(sk); + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_sock_set_manage_response); diff --git a/net/rxrpc/txbuf.c b/net/rxrpc/txbuf.c index c550991d48fa..29767038691a 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/txbuf.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/txbuf.c @@ -60,14 +60,6 @@ struct rxrpc_txbuf *rxrpc_alloc_data_txbuf(struct rxrpc_call *call, size_t data_ return txb; } -void rxrpc_get_txbuf(struct rxrpc_txbuf *txb, enum rxrpc_txbuf_trace what) -{ - int r; - - __refcount_inc(&txb->ref, &r); - trace_rxrpc_txbuf(txb->debug_id, txb->call_debug_id, txb->seq, r + 1, what); -} - void rxrpc_see_txbuf(struct rxrpc_txbuf *txb, enum rxrpc_txbuf_trace what) { int r = refcount_read(&txb->ref); |