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Diffstat (limited to 'tools/respond.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/respond.c | 166 |
1 files changed, 166 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/respond.c b/tools/respond.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9a2169c --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/respond.c @@ -0,0 +1,166 @@ +/* + * tools/rsa_respond/respond.c + * A simple RSA authentification challenge response generator for the + * ircd-hybrid CHALLENGE command. + * This code is Copyright(C)2001 by the past and present ircd-hybrid + * developers. + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. + * $Id: respond.c 33 2005-10-02 20:50:00Z knight $ + */ +#include <stdio.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/rsa.h> +#include <openssl/pem.h> +#include <openssl/md5.h> +#include <unistd.h> + +static int insecure_mode = 0; +static char *pass_param = NULL; + +static int pass_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u) +{ + int len; + char *tmp; + + if (insecure_mode != 0) + { + if (pass_param == NULL) + return 0; + len = strlen(pass_param); + if (len <= 0) /* This SHOULDN'T happen */ + return 0; + if (len > size) + len = size; + memcpy(buf, pass_param, len); + return len; + } + + tmp = getpass("Enter passphrase for challenge: "); + if (!tmp) + { + puts("Couldn't read passphrase from stdin!"); + exit(-1); + } + len = strlen(tmp); + if (len <= 0) + return 0; + if (len > size) + len = size; + memcpy(buf, tmp, len); + return len; +} + +static void +binary_to_hex( unsigned char * bin, char * hex, int length ) +{ + static const char trans[] = "0123456789ABCDEF"; + int i; + + for( i = 0; i < length; i++ ) + { + hex[i<<1] = trans[bin[i] >> 4]; + hex[(i<<1)+1] = trans[bin[i] & 0xf]; + } + hex[i<<1] = '\0'; +} + +static int +hex_to_binary(const char *from, char *to, int len) +{ + char a, b=1; + int p=0; + const char *ptr = from; + while (-1) + { + a = *ptr++; + if (!a) + break; + b = *ptr++; + + /* If this happens, we got bad input. */ + if (!b) + break; + if (p >= len) + break; + if (!((a >= '0' && a <= '9') || (a >= 'A' && a <= 'F'))) + break; + if (!((b >= '0' && b <= '9') || (b >= 'A' && b <= 'F'))) + break; + to[p++] = ((a <= '9') ? (a - '0') : (a - 'A' + 0xA))<<4 | + ((b <= '9') ? (b - '0') : (b - 'A' + 0xA)); + } + return p; +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + FILE *kfile; + RSA *rsa = NULL; + char ndata[257], ddata[257]; + /* respond privatefile challenge */ + if (argc < 3) + { + puts("Usage: respond privatefile challenge [passphrase]"); + return 0; + } + + if (argc == 4) + { + /* This is TOTALLY insecure and not recommended, but for + ** interfacing with irc client scripts, it's either this + ** or don't use a passphrase. + ** + ** The likelihood of a passphrase leaking isn't TOO great, + ** only ps auxww will show it, and even then, only at the + ** precise moment this is called. + */ + insecure_mode = 1; + pass_param = argv[3]; + } + + if (!(kfile = fopen(argv[1], "r"))) + { + puts("Could not open the private keyfile."); + return 0; + } + + SSLeay_add_all_ciphers(); + rsa = PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(kfile, NULL,pass_cb, NULL); + + if(!rsa) + { + puts("Unable to read your private key, is the passphrase wrong?"); + return 0; + } + + fclose(kfile); + if (hex_to_binary(argv[2], ndata, 128) != 128) + { + puts("Bad challenge."); + return -1; + } + + if (RSA_private_decrypt(128, (unsigned char*)ndata, + (unsigned char*)ddata, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) == -1) + { + puts("Decryption error."); + return -1; + } + binary_to_hex((unsigned char*)ddata, ndata, 32); + puts(ndata); + return 0; +} |